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 1. United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. 
Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492–93 (1st Cir. 1997)); accord United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 
903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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 “To the extent that the [lower] court’s judgment rests on the 
ground that . . . citizens were ‘intimidated’ by ‘threats’ of ‘social 
ostracism, vilification, and traduction,’ it is flatly inconsistent with 
the First Amendment.”2 
 If political discourse is to rally public opinion and challenge 
conventional thinking, it cannot be subdued. Nor may we saddle 
political speakers with implications their words do not literally 
convey but are later “discovered” by judges and juries with the 
benefit of hindsight and by reference to facts over which the 
speaker has no control.3 
 Violence is not a protected value. Nor is a true threat of violence 
with intent to intimidate. [Defendant] may have been staking out a 
position for debate when it merely advocated violence . . . or 
applauded it. . . . Likewise, when it created . . . [an Internet 
Website] in the abstract, because the First Amendment does not 
preclude calling people demeaning or inflammatory names, or 
threatening social ostracism or vilification to advocate a political 
position. [But the defendant’s conduct in publishing “wanted 
posters” like those that proceeded the murders of doctors in the 
recent past and a “score card” of the murders of doctors on its 
Website] was not staking out a position of debate but of a 
threatened demise.4 
 “The concept of individual responsibility for wrongdoing is 
sacrosanct in American society, and [it] applies equally to all . . . .”5 
 
 2. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 921 (1982); see also id. at 916 
(“No federal rule of law restricts a State from imposing tort liability for business losses that are 
caused by violence and by threats of violence. When such conduct occurs in the context of 
constitutionally protected activity, however, ‘precision of regulation’ is demanded.”). 
 3. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded by 
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). The panel’s opinion in American Coalition hardly represented 
an innovation. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 28 N.W. 839, 840 (Mich. 1886) (“It is not the policy 
of the law to punish those unsuccessful threats which it is not presumed would terrify ordinary 
persons excessively; and there is so much opportunity for magnifying or misunderstanding 
undefined menaces that probably as much mischief would be caused by letting them be 
prosecuted as by refraining from it.”). It is now an unfulfilled promise. 
 4. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 5. USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 102(a)(3), 115 Stat. 272, 276 
(2001). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The sun has not set yet, but it is surely twilight for meaningful First 
Amendment freedoms in the nine western states covered by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. For nearly fourteen months, freedom of 
speech appeared to be secure in the Ninth Circuit. In a ringing 
reaffirmation of the First Amendment, a panel of the circuit in Planned 
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of 
Life Activists6 struck down a ruinous $107 million jury verdict and a 
wide-ranging and highly restrictive injunction imposed on a group of 
social and political protesters and all of those who could be connected 
with them for creating and disseminating various “wanted” posters and 
using an Internet Web site to feature vividly its opposition to abortion.7 
Fully consistent with controlling Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court 
precedent, the panel found that the First Amendment completely 
protected the defendants’ speech and conduct, and it reversed the 
damage award and the issuance of the injunction.8 
 
 6. 244 F.3d 1007. 
 7. Reaction to the panel’s ruling was immediate and predictably split. Supporters 
vigorously heralded the opinion as “a reaffirmance of 1st Amendment liberty.” Henry 
Weinstein, Free-Speech Ruling Boon for Abortion Foes, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2001, at A1 
(quoting Christopher A. Ferrara, who represented the defendants); see also id. at A13 (quoting 
an Oregonian anti-abortion protester: “This is great news. The Constitution still stands.”); 
David Kravets, Anti-Abortion Site Verdict Overturned, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINAL, Mar. 29, 
2001, at 3A (quoting Susan Armacost, Legislative Director for the Wisconsin Right to Life 
Group: “We don’t like people who condone (violence), but it’s a separate issue from whether a 
person should have their First Amendment rights taken away.”). Sadly, though predictably, 
criticism of the opinion largely focused on the subject-matter of the appeal—anti-abortion 
protest—rather than its holding under the First Amendment freedoms. See Herbert Wechsler, 
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (“those more 
numerous among us who, vouching no philosophy to warrant, frankly or covertly, make the 
test of virtue in interpretation whether its result in the immediate decision seems to hinder or 
advance the interests or the values they support”). 
 Planned Parenthood President Gloria Feldt expressed “outrage” with the decision, 
arguing that “[r]easonable people understand the difference between free speech and 
harassment that creates a violent social climate. This Web site represents the latter.” Tim 
McDonald, U.S. Court Clears Anti-Abortion Web Site, NEWSFACTOR NETWORK, at 
http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/8587.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). Dr. Warren 
M. Hern, one of the plaintiffs, remarked, “This decision is clearly a green light to the most 
violent and radical anti-abortion fanatics in the country that they can get away with it and not 
worry.” Weinstein, supra at A13. Not so predictably, the media sided with the plaintiffs, even 
though the issue involved the First Amendment, which the media usually vigorously defends. 
See, e.g., id. at A1 (describing the decision as “a major victory for militant abortion foes”). 
 8. See Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 1019–20. 
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Concluding that the posters and Internet Web site were 
protected speech, not a “true threat,” which is unprotected under 
the law, the panel made three crucial points. First, the posters and 
the Internet Web site were pure speech significantly in a public 
discourse, not direct personal communications or other unprotected 
conduct.9 Second, the language employed in the posters and the 
Internet Web site did not contain any explicit threat of present or 
future harmful conduct.10 Finally, while context may disambiguate 
language and render it unprotected under the law, that context must 
substantially relate to the speaker, not be attributed to a speaker 
based on the speech or conduct of unrelated other persons. In short, 
context for which a speaker is not legally responsible—that is, he 
does not authorize, direct, or ratify—cannot limit the speaker’s own, 
personal, constitutional rights.11 
But the en banc court rendered the panel’s work a nullity, 
leaving its promise of protection to protesters unfulfilled.12 In a 
massive opinion (but one hardly characterized by precision of 
analysis) and over three powerful dissents, the en banc Ninth Circuit 
reversed the panel opinion by a vote of six to five.13 Strangely, the en 
 
 9. See id. at 1018. 
 10. See id. at 1017. Because no threat was expressly made, it necessarily left unspoken 
who, if anyone, would engage in unprotected conduct in the future, the speaker, or one legally 
associated with him, or a third party. See id. at 1017–18. 
 11. See id. at 1018. We summarize the law here and elsewhere in these materials with 
the use of “authorize or direct” as a short hand way of referring to the traditional categories of 
secondary participation in criminal conduct: accomplice and conspiracy liability. Those 
categories are analyzed in detail in G. Robert Blakey & Kevin P. Roddy, Reflections on Reves v. 
Ernst & Young: Its Meaning and Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding, Abetting, and 
Conspiracy Liability under RICO, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1345, 1385–1459 (1996) 
(discussing, among other decisions, Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613 (1949) 
(aiding and abetting) and Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943) 
(conspiracy)). We need not repeat here that discussion, but it is presupposed in these materials. 
See infra note 56 ¶¶ 1–4 for our analysis and discussion of “ratification,” and for our reasons 
for concluding that the doctrine of “ratification” is of little, if any, relevance to the issue of 
“true threats.” The panel did not offer a “definition” of “true threat.” Instead, it relied upon 
the examples of language or conduct found outside of the category in Supreme Court 
opinions. See infra Appendix A (Definition) for an extensive discussion of “definitions,” 
including “ostensive definitions” (that is, definitions by example rather than by criteria) and 
our conclusion, contrary to popular wisdom, that the panel’s approach is a proper way to 
proceed in legal and other endeavors. 
 12. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 13. Reaction was again swift and predictably split. Andrew Burnett, a defendant hit with 
an $8 million judgment as part of the verdict, lamented, “If this ruling stands, it will be easy 
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banc opinion, authored by Judge Pamela Ann Rymer, although 
excessively lengthy, does not articulate a rationale for its result; it is, 
in fact, a “holding” without minor premises between its major 
premises and its conclusions. For example, it sets forth the traditional 
Ninth Circuit test for “true threats,”14 discusses the facts of 
American Coalition, but then never applies the test to the facts, even 
in light of the telling objections contained in the dissents.15 
 
precedent to outlaw any speech that goes contrary to abortionists.” Howard Mintz, Federal 
Appeals Court Says Anti-Abortion Activists Intimidate Doctors, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, 
May 17, 2002, at 1. Another defendant, Paul deParrie added, “I think this is another stop on 
the continuing exodus from the 1st Amendment in this nation.” Weinstein, supra note 7, at 
B1. Planned Parenthood personnel disagreed. Their attorney, Maria Vullo, explained, “I think 
[the ruling] says for the abortion and non-abortion community, if you threaten to kill 
somebody, the law is not going to protect you.” David Kravets, Court: Abortion Foes Made 
Threats, AP ONLINE, May 17, 2002, 2002 WL 21233878. Dian Harrison, president of the San 
Francisco-Golden Gate chapter, who commented that “[t]his kind of craziness is not OK,” and 
said, “[w]hen you start threatening people, you cross the line.” Mintz, supra, at 1. Linda 
Williams, head of the Santa Clara, California chapter, added, “[w]hen free speech is explicitly 
designed to incite violence or the fear of violence, it is really something quite different.” Id. As 
with the panel decision, abortion proponents focused on the underlying subject matter—
abortion—rather than the merits of the case. Vicki Saporta, president of the National Abortion 
Federation, commented, “I think this decision is important for the continued protection of 
abortion providers throughout the country.” Weinstein, supra note 7, at B1. Again, the media 
tended to side with the plaintiffs, even though First Amendment issues were raised. See, e.g., 
Editorial, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 19, 2002, at 10B (noting that the Ninth Circuit 
called the published materials involved in the American Coalition litigation, “which gave 
names, addresses and personal details about doctors and declared them guilty of crimes against 
humanity[,] a ‘true threat.’ A reasonable, and obvious, decision. Still, it’s good to have a court 
say so.”). 
In the wake of the ruling, the Web site’s creator vowed not only to keep the site up, but 
also to “‘add six bloody, baby-butchering judges to the Web site,’ referring to the six judges 
on the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals who sided with four doctors and two clinics who 
sued a dozen abortion foes.” David Kravets, Anti-Abortion Web Site to Add Judges’ Names, 
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May 18, 2002, at 14. 
 14. Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1074–75. 
 15. In an analysis of the jurisprudence of “true threats,” preliminarily setting out 
(without the disruption and burden of the citation to precedent) its basic analytical framework 
and identifying the key questions is helpful. We deal with several unproblematic paradigms: 
(1) Protected “speech” (any language or expressive conduct, subject to a few narrow 
exceptions (e.g., “fighting words,” “obscenity,” etc.)); 
(2) Unprotected “true threat” (A to B: “I am (or we are) going to harm you.”); and 
(3) Protected “speech” or unprotected “incitement,” if substantial danger of 
imminent harm is present (A to B: “C ought to be harmed.”). 
We deal primarily with alternative problematic paradigms: 
(4) Protected “warning” or unprotected “true threat” (A to B: “You are going to be 
harmed.”). 
The meaning of (4) is not plain. If it is read to be merely a statement of fact, probable or 
not (e.g., “Continue smoking and you will die of cancer”), neither the majority nor the 
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minority in American Coalition—or any other opinion of which we are aware—would classify 
it as a “true threat”; it is a protected warning, even if, as intended, it puts the listener in mortal 
fear. 
When the meaning of a statement or expressive conduct is not plain, its interpretation—
or disambiguation—is generally a matter of context; the denotation of the language spoken by, 
or the expressive conduct of, the person may be meaningless in itself, that is, innocent of any 
express threat. For example, if a person nails two boards together and erects them in another’s 
front yard, conceivably it could be a Christian symbol, rightly read as, “Repent in light of 
Christ’s crucification.” But tar and burn it, and its symbolism is radically altered: it manifestly 
carries a racist connotation, stemming from its infamous association with the Ku Klux Klan, 
and it legitimately engenders in the householder fear for life, limb, and property from 
whomever erected and torched the cross. 
Place, too, may make a difference. Erect the same cross—even burn it—in your own 
backyard, and while its connotation remains racist, its status as a threat, to a particular person, 
is removed; it is no different in kind from the burning of an American flag. Each is a form of 
protected “speech.” 
The interpretation or disambiguation of a statement or expressive conduct may also have 
to be made on another crucial point. If it is to be read as an unprotected “true threat,” and not 
a protected “warning,” another necessary question arises: “From whom is the harm to come?” 
If the harm is to come from the speaker, or another for whom he is legally responsible, that is, 
someone whose conduct is authorized, directed, or ratified by the speaker to engage in the 
harm, manifestly paradigm (4) is a “true threat.” But if the harm is to come from another, not 
so connected to the speaker, the statement is a protected warning, not a “true threat.” For 
example, a law enforcement officer who tells a person that another person is planning to harm 
him, “warns” him; he does not “threaten,” though the intended effect of the warning may be 
to put the person in mortal fear. 
Legally, interpretation or disambiguation is a process that necessarily relies heavily on 
evidence of circumstances beyond the speech or expressive conduct of the speaker. Multiple 
issues are posed. What role should the court play in the process, either in making decisions for 
itself on interpretation in the First Amendment area or in admitting evidence? Evidence of 
circumstances is referred to as “evidence of context.” Should evidence of context be limited to 
the immediate circumstances of the delivery of the speech or expressive conduct of the speaker? 
May it properly be extended more broadly? How far? Subject to what standards? What 
standards should limit the role of courts? At the trial court or appellate court level? What role 
should a jury play? What standards should apply to limit its conduct? Does it make a difference, 
determinative or otherwise, that the speaker spoke or acted as part of public discourse? That 
the speaker spoke directly to the person who was the target of the alleged threat? What role, if 
any, should the state of mind of the speaker or actor play? Should the standard of responsibility 
be subjective? Intent, knowledge, recklessness? Objective? From whose perspective, the hearer, 
speaker, or that of a reasonable person? Or should perspective not be taken into consideration? 
What difference, if any, should the standard make beyond its impact on the formulation of jury 
instructions? The admission or exclusion of evidence? What difference, if any, does it make that 
the circumstance from which a danger of harm is to be inferred was of the making of the 
speaker? Of those for whom he is not legally responsible? Under what standard? What 
difference, if any, does it make that the circumstances are the beliefs of the speaker, for which 
no independent claim for relief could be brought because of the First Amendment? Of others 
for whom he is legally responsible? Of others? 
These—and others—are the sorts of questions that arise here. These materials undertake 
to give answers to them that can be justified in light of our history and traditions as a free 
society that rightly prides itself on its emphasizing individual responsibility. See Wechsler, supra 
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The panel opinion in American Coalition is a good template for 
what we believe to be the correct approach to “true threats”; it went 
far (although not as far as it should have) toward proscribing “true 
threats,” while at the same time ensuring protection for the freedom 
of speech guaranteed in the First Amendment and basic principles of 
federal criminal law. The en banc opinion, however, bodes ill for that 
freedom. Its reasoning, a far cry from the impressive and careful 
analytical work of the panel opinion and the en banc dissents, leaves 
social and political protesters of all stripes unjustly open to 
debilitating and uncertain litigation. In fairness, the en banc 
opinion’s teachings on the general standard for “true threats” are 
not materially different from those of the other circuit courts of 
appeal. Nor is its holding that evidence of context is relevant. 
Evidence of context is relevant. The black letter rule, however, is 
only a general rule; it does not speak to issues of kind, degree, or 
origin. In fact, the en banc’s upholding on the record before it of the 
use of evidence of context to interpret one person’s statements in 
light of another person’s conduct where the other person is legally 
unrelated to the speaker is especially disturbing. In addition, its 
upholding of the use of similar evidence of context to show the state 
of mind of the speaker himself is little short of revolutionary.16 
Indeed, it gives a new meaning to “guilt by association”—where not 
even association is required to impose guilt vicariously. If this 
decision is not reversed and is followed in the other circuits, it will 
put all protestors everywhere in a perilous position. If all Americans 
 
note 7, at 5, 10–11, 14–15 (“‘Here as elsewhere a position cannot be divorced from its 
supporting reasons; the reasons are, indeed, a part and most important part of the 
position.’ . . . ‘[W]hat, if any, are the standards to be followed in interpretation [?] [What are 
the] criteria . . . [of] those who undertake to praise or to condemn . . . [that] morally and 
intellectually [they are] obligated to support?’ . . . [Unlike in politics where principles may be] 
instrumental in relation to results . . . , the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely 
that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in 
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is 
achieved.”). The aim of our approach in these materials is to meet Wechsler’s test. See also 
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849) (Taney, C.J.) (“that it be regarded 
hereafter as the law of this court, that its opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is 
always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and that its 
judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it 
is supported”). Nevertheless, we recognized, as Lon Fuller so aptly describes it, reason alone 
cannot be our only guide; fiat (rightly understood, not as arbitrary preference, but as fidelity to 
established positive law) must also be given its just due. See Lon Fuller, Reason and Fiat in 
Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1946). 
 16. See Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1079–81. 
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are to enjoy the benefits of their constitutionally protected right to 
free speech and basic principles of federal criminal law, that is, a 
standard of individual responsibility based on personal conduct and 
subjective state of mind, review by the Supreme Court or, at least, 
rejection by the other circuits is required. 
In these materials, we set out a road map for the task of 
reforming the jurisprudence of threats and an articulation of its 
rationale under the First Amendment. In addition, we examine the 
basic jurisprudence of the federal criminal law, in particular, its 
traditional roots in notions of individual responsibility based on 
personal conduct and state of mind. In Part I, we analyze the district 
court and the Ninth Circuit opinions in the American Coalition 
litigation. In Part II, we trace the traditional theory and practice of 
free speech under the First Amendment, rooted in the history and 
various rationales of the First Amendment. We are interested in 
putting the question “why?” to all black letter rules; for only in light 
of the answer, or answers, can particular rules and practices be 
intelligently evaluated. The law must remain a matter of reason, not 
fiat. In Part III, we examine Supreme Court jurisprudence on “true 
threats.” We examine each of the major efforts of the Court to 
grapple with this elusive category. Only then do we make an effort to 
synthesize the law. In Part IV, we look in detail and in context at the 
various tests the circuit courts of appeal apply to distinguish “true 
threats” from “protected speech,” and we analyze how these tests 
and practices in their case-by-case application fit (comfortably or 
otherwise) into the Supreme Court’s general free speech teachings 
and the general jurisprudence of the federal criminal law. Because we 
argue for a reexamination of the law of each circuit, we examine the 
law of each circuit separately. We believe that a general survey does 
not give sufficient data to make an informed judgment about the 
relevant jurisprudence in particular circuits. In Part V, we examine 
the basic principles of federal criminal law that focus on individual 
responsibility in a free society, the necessary background against 
which the use of the criminal law to control speech or expressive 
conduct must be intelligently reevaluated. Our particular concern, in 
opposition to the present jurisprudence of “true threats” in the 
various circuits, is with the traditional requirements of personal 
conduct and culpable state of mind. In a free society, forms of strict 
or vicarious liability should be the exception. That they should be 
employed in the sensitive area of free speech is an anomaly that 
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requires a persuasive justification, a justification that does not yet 
exist in the relevant decisions or legal literature. We believe that it 
cannot be convincingly written. 
In addition, these materials go substantially beyond conventional 
legal analysis; they include, where relevant, fairly comprehensive 
historical, social, and philosophical perspectives. These perspectives 
are principally found in textual footnotes, which we designed to be 
read independently of the general flow of the textual argument that 
is in the form of conventional legal analysis.17 Because the decisions 
 
 17. We go substantially beyond conventional legal analysis in these materials because we 
believe that it alone cannot offer persuasive answers to the “why” question. In brief, the right 
interpretation of a constitution, a statute, or a decision is often plainly not one way or another 
as a matter of legal analysis. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1239, 1252 (1931): 
[T]he line of inquiry . . . has come close to demonstrating that in any case doubtful 
enough to make litigation respectable the available authoritative premises—i.e., 
premises legitimate and impeccable under the traditional legal techniques—are at 
least two, and that the two are mutually contradictory as applied to the case in 
hand. . . . [T]hen there is a choice in the case; a choice to be justified; a choice 
which can be justified only as a question of policy—for the authoritative tradition 
speaks with a forked tongue. 
Id. As Llewellyn observes, the ultimate justification for a legal result must often rest on 
materials outside of the legal analysis itself. Two of the greatest masters of the common law 
tradition and the interpretation of statutes, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and Judge Learned 
Hand, each squarely, in the tradition of positivism in the law, voice similar thoughts about the 
need to go beyond legal analysis. Justice Holmes put it this way: 
If your subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology, the science of man, to 
political economy, the theory of legislation, ethics, and thus by several paths to your 
final view of life. It would be equally true of any subject. The only difference is in 
the ease of seeing the way. To be master of any branch of knowledge, you must 
master those which lie next to it; and thus to know anything you must know all. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, SPEECHES 23 (1913). Judge Hand observed: 
  I venture to believe that it is as important to a judge called upon to pass on a 
question of constitutional law, to have at least a bowing acquaintance with Acton 
and Maitland, with Thucydides, Gibbon and Carlyle, with Homer, Dante, 
Shakespeare and Milton, with Machiavelli, Montaigne and Rabelais, with Plato, 
Bacon, Hume and Kant, as with the books which have been specifically written on 
the subject. For in such matters everything turns upon the spirit in which he 
approaches the questions before him. The words he must construe are empty vessels 
into which he can pour nearly anything he will. Men do not gather figs of thistles, 
nor supply institutions from judges whose outlook is limited by parish or class. They 
must be aware that there are before them more than verbal problems; more than 
final solutions cast in generalizations of universal applicability. They must be aware 
of the changing social tensions in every society which make it an organism; which 
demand new schemata of adaptation; which will disrupt it, if rigidly confined. 
LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 81 (Irving Dillard ed., 3d ed. 1960). 
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In these materials, we advocate the reform of the jurisprudence of threats in each of the 
circuits. Our focus is on that jurisprudence in the context of the First Amendment and basic 
principles of federal criminal law. But that context, too, must be placed in a context, a context 
that mainly lies outside of the usual legal sources. We attempt that daunting task in these 
materials in nine textual footnote paragraphs that are, in effect, extensive asides to our legal 
analysis. 
First, we are a nation at war, a war without a visible enemy in a definite geographical 
area, with no set battles to be fought, and with no conventional way to determine its end in 
victory for our cause. (Presumably, should we lose, those of us who will be around in the 
aftermath of the war will know that we were defeated.) As in the case of other wars, this war 
will inevitably be fought against a backdrop of dissent. That context must be factored into 
proposals for reform. See infra note 53 (recounting the events of September 11, examining the 
beginning signs of dissent, and comparing a growing ethnic animosity with the sacrosanct 
character of individual responsibility in the law). 
Second, while we believe that individual responsibility must remain sacrosanct, we 
recognize that individual responsibility properly extends to liability for the actions of others. 
The legal rules to determine the scope of vicarious liability are fairly routinely applied in 
criminal and civil law (e.g., aiding and abetting, conspiracy, etc.). Nevertheless, we raise a 
question about the proprietary of the extension of ratification to civil responsibility, where civil 
responsibility itself is based on criminal standards. See infra note 56 (analyzing ratification in 
the context of federal racketeering legislation). 
Third, we believe that the American Coalition litigation discussed in these materials is 
about more than legal remedies, injunctions, or damage; in brief, it is about delegitimation by 
the use of the labels “murderer” or “racketeer” in the cultural wars roiling this generation of 
Americans. See infra note 130 (recounting sociological aspects of the current cultural war over 
the contours of American values; the issue of the foundation, if any, of those values, including 
the Founders’ philosophy; litigation as a means of the delegitimation of your opponent in the 
social and political arena; and the proper role of the courts in the cultural war that rages before 
them under the guise of law). 
Fourth, the dominant metaphor for free speech under the First Amendment today is 
“the market place of ideas.” Yet that metaphor formed no part of the Founders’ generation. 
The dominate intellectual framework of the nation then (and for the generation that followed) 
was composed of religious and intellectual ideals. Two events impacted decisively on those 
ideals: the theory of evolution and the Civil War. That impact may be nicely illustrated in the 
lives of a small handful of prominent personalities in philosophy and law in the period that 
followed the war. The impact on the philosophy that became dominate after the war 
(pragmatism or instrumentalism) of the striking events of World War II was also decisive, at 
least for some. See infra note 178 (tracing the origins of the market place metaphor, and the 
impact of the theory of evolution and the Civil War on pre-war ideals, examining forms of 
pragmatism or instrumentalism, contrasting the impact of the Civil War and World War II on 
the philosophies and lives of Justices Holmes and Jackson, and illustrating the practical impact 
of an instrumental conception of law coupled with a majestic ideal (equality before the law) on 
a significant area of constitutional law (equal protection)). 
Fifth, the central concept of the market place of ideas metaphor and basic principles of 
federal criminal law is personality, that is, the principal unit of analysis for free speech and 
responsibility under the federal criminal law is an autonomous individual, capable of acquiring 
knowledge and freely exercising his or her judgment based on that knowledge. In fact, that 
concept is rooted in Jewish and Christian scripture and the struggle for religious freedom 
during Imperial Rome, but those roots are all but unknown to modern and post-modern 
jurisprudence. They may be profitably recalled and examined. See infra note 181 (tracing the 
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and legal literature of “true threats” repeatedly call for “definition,” 
and note or complain about its supposed absence,18 we also include 
an exhaustive appendix on the philosophical presuppositions of 
various theories of “definition.” We believe that these calls or 
complaints may well be unthinking and unjustified, at least for those 
whose work is the practical articulation of legal principles. 
 
 
origins of the Western idea of the autonomous individual (capable of acquiring knowledge and 
freely acting) and the development of religious freedom in Imperial Rome). 
Sixth, privileging reasoning over the affective or emotive aspects of the human 
personality (a characteristic hubris of the Enlightenment) and of many concepts that are a 
pivotal aspect of law sadly omits much in the human condition. Art, too, including popular art, 
reflects insights into that condition and may often be profitably examined in any reflection on 
it, including  ultimately, any reflection on the law. See infra note 337 (examining the phrase 
“silver bullet” in common parlance and the classic horror movie, The Wolfman (1941)). 
Seventh, affording free speech rights to those with whom we are in agreement costs 
little. Affording those rights to others is a more difficult task, turning significantly on both the 
formulation and application of substantive and procedural protections for those rights. See 
infra note 416 (comparing and contrasting recent protest litigation under federal racketeering 
legislation and the Nuremberg Trials following World War II, instances where the temptation 
to afford less than full protection to the individuals on trial is or was strong for many of those 
who sat in judgment on the defendants). 
Eighth, individual responsibility presupposes crucial bedrock concepts, including self or 
identity and its integral aspects, in the heart of which is state of mind. See infra note 647 
(tracing the origins of the philosophical psychology of the concept of state of mind in the 
traditional criminal law and in the concept of civil liberties, looking at its status under modern 
form of empiricism and nominalism (questioning self, freedom, and responsibility and 
undermining the traditional foundations that justify individual responsibility and civil liberties) 
and examining the horrific consequences (in theory and in practice) of abandoning these 
bedrock conceptions of individual responsibility and civil liberties). 
Ninth, traditional notions of individual responsibility mirror a concept of character (a 
person lived a good or evil life, and his or her personality was characterized by virtue or vice); 
while modern and post-modern notions of individual responsibility remain, they usually lack 
any articulate justification outside of individually asserted, subjective value preferences. See 
infra note 656 (tracing the origins in religious and philosophical thought of objective notions 
of moral responsibility and the substitution in modern life for them of subjective value 
preferences that ultimately lead to a relativism or nihilism that can neither justify individualism, 
responsibility, nor civil liberties). 
We also include two appendices on definition in philosophy and law (reviewing the 
problematic state of the general discussion of the concept of definition) and natural language 
as a tool for legal analysis (reviewing the concepts of generality, ambiguity, and vagueness in 
semantics and law). See Appendix A (Definition) and Appendix B (Natural Language: 
Generality, Ambiguity, and Vagueness). 
In the conclusion of these materials, we will attempt to tie these various strands together 
in the context of our proposals for the reform of the jurisprudence of threats, offering our 
answers to the “why” question. See infra note 773. 
 18. See infra notes 232–33 (discussing “definition”). 
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We offer these materials because we advocate a fundamental 
rethinking of the accepted jurisprudence of the circuit courts of 
appeal in this crucial intersection of freedom of speech and the 
criminal law. In sharp and unfavorable contrast with the persuasive 
dissents, the en banc opinion of the Ninth Circuit in American 
Coalition is particularly notable for its wooden and extensive citation 
of authority from its own circuit and the jurisprudence of others. But 
the opinion did not go significantly beyond black letter rules to ask 
probing questions about the supposed rationales for the rules. Nor 
did it make a sustained effort to essay the practical implication of 
alternative rules for a free society. If we are to do more than merely 
offer an academic concurrence to the masterful work of the dissents, 
we have an obligation to do more than review the same legal and 
related materials from a different or related perspective. 
Finally, in Part VI, we analyze the key components of the Ninth 
Circuit’s panel opinion in American Coalition and the en banc 
dissents to see how they could be refined to conform more closely to 
the teachings of the Supreme Court in the area of free speech and 
the jurisprudence of federal criminal law. Needless to say, we reject 
the en banc majority’s fundamental holdings. The principal 
components of the panel opinion include: (1) whether “true threats” 
is properly a question of fact for the jury or a question of law for the 
court; (2) the elements of the standard used to identify “true 
threats”; and (3) the role of “context” in establishing a “true 
threat.”19 Based on our analysis, we propose an approach to dealing 
with “true threats,” which is consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s 
panel opinion and the en banc dissents that fairly and sensitively 
balances the two essential requirements of a free society: (1) the 
freedom of individuals to protest and to be judged based on personal 
conduct and state of mind; and (2) the freedom of individuals to not 
be under the domination of unlawful fear or disruption. We 
conclude that to protect First Amendment rights in a free society 
that places, as it ought, an appropriate emphasis on individual 
responsibility, a court, in distinguishing “speech” from a “true 
threat,” should: 
 
 
 19. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1015 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded by 
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (proper standard); id. at 1017 (de novo review proper); id. at 
1016–20 (role of context). 
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(1) treat whether speech or expressive conduct constitutes a 
“true threat” as a threshold question of law; 
(2) use a heightened, two-pronged standard, with both an 
objective, listener-based element and a subjective, speaker-based 
element, to distinguish “speech” or “expressive conduct” from 
“true threat”; to wit, speech or expressive conduct constitutes a 
“true threat” if, and only if 
(i) a person speaking or engaging in expressive conduct 
subjectively intends that the speech or expressive conduct be 
taken as a threat of unlawful conduct that would serve to 
place the listener in fear of injury (to his or her person, 
property, or other protected interest) or would require the 
listener to take appropriate action to guard against the 
threat that would substantially disrupt his or her course of 
conduct—regardless of whether the speaker actually intends 
to carry out the threat; and 
(ii) a reasonable listener would, in context, interpret the 
speech or expressive conduct as communicating a serious 
expression of an intent to inflict or to cause serious injury or 
other disruption to the listener by the speaker or another for 
whom the speaker is legally responsible; and 
(3) in deciding to admit evidence of “context” to prove a 
“true threat” (where “context” is used to interpret, 
disambiguate, or substantially color objectively nonthreatening 
speech or expressive conduct), including the required state of 
mind of the speaker, independent of other evidentiary 
requirements, and before admitting such evidence, require clear 
proof that the speaker is responsible for the “context,” 
including the violence of others, that is, he authorized it, 
directed it, or ratified it. 
II. THE AMERICAN COALITION LITIGATION 
A. The District Court Opinion 
By now, those who love the First Amendment are familiar 
enough with the general outline of the facts from the American 
Coalition litigation. Indeed, in three years, it produced three 
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published opinions at the trial level alone.20 Nevertheless, a short 
summary of the facts of the litigation is required to understand its 
significance. Plaintiffs, individual doctors and two abortion clinics, 
brought suit against two anti-abortion protest organizations 
(American Coalition of Life Activists (“ACLA”) and Advocates for 
Life Ministries) and various individuals based on the assorted 
propaganda materials.21 The plaintiffs alleged that the First 
Amendment did not protect these materials because the materials 
constituted “true threats.” The plaintiffs did not argue that the 
materials were unprotected “incitements.” According to the 
plaintiffs, the “threats” were actionable under various statutes—
including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”),22 the Oregon Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“ORICO”),23 and the Freedom of Access to 
Clinic Entrances Act (“FACE”).24 
The materials included two posters, one featuring “THE 
DEADLY DOZEN”25 and the other featuring plaintiff Dr. Crist.26 
 
 20. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or. 1999) (amending order and granting permanent 
injunction); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998) (granting in part and denying in part motion for 
summary judgment); Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition 
of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Or. 1996) (denying motion to dismiss and granting in 
part and denying in part motion for judgment on the pleadings).  
 21. Am. Coalition, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. 
 22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (1994). 
 23. OR. REV. STAT. § 166.720 (1997). The plaintiffs abandoned their state law claims 
before trial; only the RICO and FACE claims reached the jury. Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 
1013 n.3; see also Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of 
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994). 
 25. The court described the poster: 
The poster contains a heading in large, bold print that states: “GUILTY of Crimes 
Against Humanity.” The document then makes a statement about prosecution of 
abortion as a “war crime” during the Nuremberg trials in 1945–46. The poster next 
sets out—under the heading “THE DEADLY DOZEN”—the names, addresses, 
and telephone numbers of 12 people, including both Newhall plaintiffs and plaintiff 
Hern. The poster then offers a “$5,000 REWARD” for “information leading to 
arrest, conviction and revocation of license to practice medicine,” states in large 
letters “ABORTIONIST,” and gives the name and address of the ACLA [the 
American Coalition of Life Activists]. Thus, the statement that stands out because it 
is emphasized either by the size and/or boldness of print, reads: “GUILTY OF 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY . . . THE DEADLY DOZEN . . . $5,000 
REWARD . . . ABORTIONIST.” 
Am. Coalition, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1186. 
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They also included an Internet Web site entitled, “The Nuremberg 
Files,”27 the stated purpose of which was to “collect[] dossiers on 
abortionists in anticipation that one day [our society might] be able 
to hold them on trial for crimes against humanity.”28 The Internet 
Web site contained a list of over two hundred people that it termed 
“ABORTIONISTS,” and a list of over two hundred others that the 
site alleged supported the abortionists, including law enforcement 
officers, judges, politicians, abortion clinic workers, and other 
“MISCELLANEOUS BLOOD FLUNKIES.”29 A line was drawn 
through the name of each person killed by those opposed to 
abortion; in three areas, the site bore drawings of dripping blood.30 
 
 
 26. The court described the poster: 
The poster targeting plaintiff Crist bears the initial heading “GUILTY” in very large 
print, followed by “OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY” in somewhat smaller 
print. The poster then sets out the same statement about the Nuremberg trials that 
appears on the Deadly Dozen poster, followed by the statement “Abortionist 
Robert Crist.” Below that statement is a photograph of Crist, and a listing of his 
home and work addresses. Directly below the photograph is language, in tiny print, 
describing Crist as a “notorious Kansas City abortionist [who] travels to St. Louis 
weekly to kill babies at Reproductive Health Services . . . . He also sometimes kills 
women.” The poster next recites information about women allegedly injured by 
Crist, followed by a request (again, in tiny print) to “Please write, leaflet or picket 
his neighborhood to expose his blood guilt. Ask Crist to turn from killing and 
injuring women and children, to helping and healing those in need.” In large print 
directly below the quoted language are the words “$500 REWARD” followed by 
(in tiny print) “to any ACLA organization that successfully persuades Crist to turn 
from his child killing through activities within ACLA guidelines.” Finally, like the 
Deadly Dozen poster, the word “ABORTIONIST” appears in very large print, 
followed by the ACLA’s name and address. Thus, the emphasized portions of the 
poster read “GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY . . . Abortionist 
Robert Crist . . . $500 REWARD . . . ABORTIONIST.” 
Id.  at 1186–87. 
 27. See generally Rene Sanchez, Abortion Foes’ Internet Site on Trial, WASH. POST, Jan. 
15, 1999, at A3. 
 28. Am. Coalition, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1187. 
 29. Id. at 1188 n.9. 
 30. Id. at 1188. The Internet Web site is described in greater detail in Sanchez, supra 
note 27. As a result of the wide-ranging injunction the district court imposed, the site 
disappeared for several months during the pendency of the appeal. In the wake of the Ninth 
Circuit’s panel decision, however, the site returned. Even following the en banc court’s 
opinion, the site is still up—at least for now. See The Nuremberg Files, at 
http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity (last visited May 21, 2002). Indeed, it now features 
a new introduction directed at the six-member majority in the en banc opinion. See Changes, 
at http://www.christiangallery.com/changes.html (last visited May 21, 2002). 
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Concededly, none of these materials was explicitly threatening.31 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argued that the materials constituted 
“true threats” when viewed in the context of the previous violence 
that had been directed toward abortion clinics and providers dating 
back to the 1993 shooting death of Dr. David Gunn. The plaintiffs 
made these arguments even though none of the defendants engaged 
in violent conduct (personally or otherwise).32 No evidence was 
produced to show that the defendants legally authorized, directed, 
or ratified the violence. The evidence that was admitted at trial, 
under the rubric of “context,” contained more than six hundred 
references by plaintiffs’ counsel and their witnesses “to murders, 
shootings, bombings, arson, and acts of vandalism committed 
against abortion providers or facilities by non-parties to the case who 
were not alleged to be conspirators with defendants.”33 
 
 31. Am. Coalition, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1186. 
 32. Id. at 1185–86. The one exception was Michael Bray. See Planned Parenthood of 
the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1138–
39 (D. Or. 1999) (individual injunction finding on Michael Bray). While the jury found for 
plaintiffs on all claims, Bray was excluded on the RICO claim. See Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 
2002); see also infra note 56 (no proof in RICO litigation connecting demonstrations with 
crimes of violence). 
 33. Brief of Defendants-Appellants at 9, Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d 1058 (No. 99-35320) 
(emphasis added). Some of the “context” evidence admitted included: 
  141 references to the murder of Dr. David L. Gunn in 1993 by non-party, 
non-conspirator Michael Griffin. 
  120 references to non-party, non-conspirator Paul Hill’s murder of Dr. John 
Bayard Britton and James H. Barrett in 1993 with a shotgun, and his wounding of 
Barrett’s wife June.  
  109 references to murder victim Dr. John Bayard Britton. 
  58 additional references to murderer Michael Griffin. 
  55 direct references to non-party, non-conspirator Rachelle “Shelley” Shannon 
in relation to her shooting of Dr. Tiller in the arms in 1993. 
  42 additional references to gunshot victim Tiller and his shooting. 
  38 references to John Salvi, who shot clinic workers in Brookline, Mass. in 
1994. 
  35 additional references to murder victims James H. Barrett and/or Mrs. June 
Barrett, all by plaintiffs. 
  22 references to abortion doctors, in general, being shot or killed by non-
party, non-conspirators. 
  12 references to non-party, non-conspirator Shelley Shannon’s arson and 
bombings of abortion clinics. 
  14 references to arson and bombings of abortion clinics in general. 
  10 references to the murder victim Dr. George Wayne Patterson, who was slain 
in Mobile, Alabama in 1993. 
  12 references to the murder of the Dr. Barnett Slepian by a sniper in Amherst, 
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Given that “evidence of context,” the plaintiffs  testified that 
they felt “threatened,” though they frankly conceded that “no 
statement contained in the text of the Deadly Dozen poster, the 
Crist poster, or the Nuremberg Files [was] explicitly threatening, in 
the sense that they contain[ed] no ‘quotable quotes’ calling for 
violence against the targeted providers.”34 Significantly, the record 
also included the testimony of federal law enforcement officers 
stating that they took the posters as threats and that they warned the 
doctors of possible violence.35 But equally significant, if not more so, 
the record contained the closing argument of plaintiffs’ counsel, 
including an impassioned treatment and condemnation of 
defendants’ opinions—that however misguided was manifestly 
protected constitutionally—on the various justifications of killing 
physicians who engage in abortions.36 Over the objections of the 
defendants and the ACLU Foundation of Oregon (“ACLU 
Foundation”) as amicus curiae, the court found that the defendants’ 
propaganda materials were speech outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.37 
In the course of its opinion, the district court specifically 
declined to adopt a test for “true threats” that would have provided 
 
New York, on October 23, 1998, nearly four years after [American Coalition]’s 
posters were issued. 
  5 references to the sniper shooting of Dr. Garson Romalis on November 8, 
1994, including a hearsay account by plaintiff Hern (over vehement defense 
objections) of how Romalis’s femoral artery was severed by the sniper’s bullet and 
he almost bled to death on his kitchen floor. 
  9 references to Brookline, Massachusetts, site of non-party, non-conspirator 
John Salvi’s fatal shootings of abortion clinic employees Shannon Lowney and 
Leanne Nichols on December 30, 1994. 
  4 references to murder victims Shannon Lowney and Leanne Nichols, who 
were killed by Salvi. 
  2 references, both by plaintiffs, to Shelley Shannon’s “butyric acid attacks” 
(i.e., stink bombs) on abortion facilities. 
Id. at 9–12. 
 34. Am. Coalition, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1186. The court also so instructed the jury. 
 35. The testimony is set out in detail in Judge Berzon’s able dissent. Am. Coalition, 290 
F.3d at 1112–13. 
 36. Id. at 1110–11. The danger of this sort of evidence is that it invites a finding of 
liability based on belief rather than conduct. Id. at 1111 (“One cannot read plaintiffs’ closing 
argument in this case without fearing that the jury was being encouraged to hold the 
defendants liable for their abstract advocacy of violence rather than for the alleged coded 
threats in the posters and Website, the instruction to the jury to the contrary not 
withstanding.”). 
 37. Id. at 1086. 
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far greater protection to speech than the test it eventually used.38 
The ACLU Foundation was ardently opposed to those decisions of 
the Ninth Circuit that articulated an objective, speaker-based test for 
the existence of a “true threat,” that is, “whether a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to 
whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression 
of intent to harm or assault.”39 As the ACLU Foundation observed 
in the amicus curiae brief it filed on appeal: 
Civil liberties are indivisible. Free speech rights cannot be granted 
to some and denied to others. The First Amendment, however, 
does not protect a speaker who intentionally threatens another with 
death or serious bodily injury. Although easy to state, this rule is 
not always easy to apply. Its application is especially difficult where, 
as in this case, the alleged “threat” is not explicit but may be 
inferred, if at all, from the surrounding factual circumstances, or 
“context.”40 
Instead, the ACLU Foundation urged the district court to adopt 
a standard with (1) an objective, listener-based component, and (2) a 
subjective, speaker-based component; it urged that the subjective 
component was necessary “to insure that there is proof that the 
speaker actually intended to threaten rather than merely to 
communicate an idea using protected speech.”41 As submitted in the 
brief to the Court, the standard read: 
[T]he Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment does not 
protect statements that are “true threats.” A statement made by a 
person constitutes a “true threat” when: 
First, a person makes a statement that, in context a reasonable 
listener would interpret as communicating a serious expression 
 
 38. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1370–73 (D. Or. 1996); 1 STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. 
DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 6.01, at 6–7 (2d ed. 1985) (Supp. Jan. 2002) 
(reviewing of doctrine of binding precedent or judicial hierarchy). The district court acted 
properly. See Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. Walsh, 139 F.2d 809, 823 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., 
dissenting) (“Nor is it desirable for a lower court to embrace the exhilarating opportunity of 
anticipating a doctrine which may be in the womb of time, but whose birth is distant . . . .”). 
 39. Am. Coalition, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1189 (citing United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 
903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)). For a discussion of this test, see infra Part V.A.1.d. 
 40. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc. at 2, Am. Coalition, 290 
F.3d 1058 (No. 99-35320). 
 41. Am. Coalition, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. 
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of an intent to inflict or cause serious harm on or to the 
listener; and 
Second, the speaker intended that the communication be taken 
as a threat that would serve to place the listener in fear for his 
or her safety, regardless of whether the speaker actually 
intended to carry out the threat.42 
Nonetheless, the Court analyzed the issues, as might properly be 
expected, solely in terms of the Ninth Circuit’s objective, speaker-
based standard.43 Applying that standard, the district court found 
that only three of the materials could be found, in a trial on the 
merits, to constitute “true threats” unprotected by the First 
Amendment.44 The Court emphasized the importance of viewing the 
 
 42. Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc. at 8, Am. Coalition, 290 
F.3d 1058 (No. 99-35320). While we argue for the adoption of a variation of this standard, 
we are not arguing for the entire “approach” to threats that the ACLU Foundation offered the 
district court. In the section of its brief to the district court entitled “A Suggested 
Methodology for Considering True Threats,” the ACLU Foundation set forth its test, but 
then added that 
[A] court should also consider other related factors, including: (a) how explicit and 
unambiguous is the alleged threat; (b) is the alleged threat directed to a specific 
individual or to specific individuals; (c) was the alleged threat communicated to the 
listener and, if so, in what manner; (d) does the alleged threat threaten to inflict 
serious harm. These are not necessarily all of the factors that should be considered, 
but they appear to this amicus to be among the most important considerations for 
ensuring that liability is imposed only upon “true threats” and that speech protected 
under the First Amendment is neither punished nor chilled. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae, ACLU Foundation of Oregon Amicus Curiae Introduction at 
Argument I(D), Am. Coalition, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (No. 95-1671-JO). By adding these 
factors to its “standard,” the ACLU Foundation confused the point of adopting the standard 
in the first place. Accord Steven G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value 
of Threats, 78 TEX. L. REV. 541, 578–79 (2000) (“Regardless of whether these new factors 
merely amplify the two main tests, or supplement them, they nevertheless illustrate the primary 
flaw in the ACLU’s approach to the Nuremberg Files litigation. The ACLU essentially 
proposes that juries be presented with a melange of slippery factors to apply to speech that will 
often be ambiguous and is . . . so abrasive, offensive, or confrontational that it has made 
someone angry enough to sue.”). 
 43. Am. Coalition, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1194 (“The ACLU’s concern, as well as that of 
the defendants’, is that liability not attach unless the threats are intentionally made, and do not 
constitute jests or political hyperbole, even extreme political hyperbole. The cases discussed 
above amply show that the Ninth Circuit shares this concern, and yet repeatedly has confirmed 
that an objective speaker-based test that considers all the circumstances is sufficient to permit 
the trier of fact to distinguish between ‘true threats’ and speech protected by the First 
Amendment. . . . Accordingly, I decline to depart from established Ninth Circuit law and 
create a test unique to this case.”); see supra note 38 (duty to follow precedent in judicial 
hierarchy). 
 44. See Am. Coalition, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1194. 
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posters and the Internet Web site in the “context of violence” 
asserted by the plaintiffs—even though the defendants did not 
authorize it, direct it, or ratify it—noting that “the Ninth Circuit 
holds that whether a threat is a true threat must be determined in 
light of the context (or circumstances) in which it is made.”45 
Ultimately, the trial on the merits resulted in a verdict awarding 
the plaintiffs $107 million in actual and punitive damages46 and a 
broad injunction prohibiting, among other things, the defendants—
and others47—from: 
publishing, republishing, reproducing and/or distributing 
anywhere, either directly or indirectly, the “Deadly Dozen” 
Poster . . . or its equivalent, with specific intent to threaten [the 
plaintiffs] or any of their family members, officers, agents, servants, 
employees, patients, or attorneys; (c) Publishing, republishing, 
reproducing and/or distributing anywhere, either directly or 
indirectly, the Poster of Dr. Robert Crist . . . or its equivalent, with 
specific intent to threaten [the plaintiffs] or any of their family 
members, officers, agents, servants, employees, patients or 
attorneys; [and], (d) Providing additional material concerning [the 
plaintiffs] or any of their family members, officers, agents, servants, 
employees, patients, or attorneys, with a specific intent to threaten, 
to the Nuremberg Files or any mirror Web site that may be created. 
In addition, defendants are enjoined from publishing, republishing, 
reproducing and/or distributing in print or electronic form the 
personally identifying information about plaintiffs contained in [the 
Nuremberg Files] with a specific intent to threaten.48 
B. The Ninth Circuit Panel Opinion 
Scholarly criticism of the district court’s opinion was widespread 
and varied in content, with several commentators offering a variety 
of new approaches to “fix” the district court’s ruling.49 The panel 
 
 45. Id. at 1191. 
 46. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Creators of Anti-Abortion Web Site Told to Pay Millions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1999, at A9. 
 47. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1155 (D. Or. 1999) (granting injunction against defendants 
and “all persons in active concert or participation with any of them who receive actual notice”). 
 48. Id. at 1155–56 (footnote omitted). 
 49. Gey, supra note 42, at 541 (arguing that the standards for incitement to violence 
announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), should be applied to true threats); 
see also Robert Kurman Kelner, Note, United States v. Jake Baker: Revisiting Threats and the 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 851 
opinion of the Ninth Circuit, however, eschewed novelty and 
reversed the district court, engaging in little more than a standard 
application of existing precedent. The panel opinion, authored by 
Judge Alex Kozinski, with the concurrence of Circuit Judge Andrew 
J. Klenfeld and United States District Judge William W. Schwarzer, 
sitting by designation, began by explaining that as an appellate 
tribunal in a First Amendment context, it had the responsibility to 
“conduct a de novo review of both the law and the relevant facts.”50 
“The question . . . is not,” it observed, “whether the facts found 
below are supported by the record but whether we, looking at the 
record with fresh eyes, make the same findings. If we disagree with 
the district court, our findings prevail.”51 In making its de novo 
examination, the court first observed that “[e]xtreme rhetoric and 
violent action have marked many political movements in American 
history,” including the American Revolution and the Abolition, 
Labor, Antiwar, Animal Rights, and the Environmental 
movements,52 and “[a]s a result, much of what was said even by 
nonviolent participants in these movements acquired a tinge of 
menace.”53 But, the court noted, the Supreme Court addressed this 
 
First Amendment, 84 VA. L. REV. 287, 313 (1998) (arguing that courts should “[b]reath[e] 
new life into the ‘true threats’ doctrine, or alternatively requir[e] a showing of a specific intent 
to threaten . . . .”); Leigh Noffsinger, Note, Wanted Posters, Bulletproof Vests, and the First 
Amendment: Distinguishing True Threats from Coercive Political Activity, 74 WASH. L. REV. 
1209 (1999) (advocating a four-part definition distinguishing threats from advocacy). But see 
Michael Vitiello, The Nuremburg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First Amendment, 61 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1175 (2000) (arguing that the American Coalition defendants were not entitled 
to a First Amendment defense). 
 50. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Lovell v. Powell Unified Sch. Dist., 90 
F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 51. Id. (citing Eastwood v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 123 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 52. Id. at 1014. 
 53. ¶1. Id.  
¶2. American Coalition was decided by the panel before September 11, 2001. The en 
banc decision was rendered after September 11th—in a radically altered landscape. With 
prescience, the panel realized that the issues before it extended beyond the “anti-abortion 
activists [who] intimidated abortion providers . . . .” Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 1007. From 
time immemorial, other “movements [also] acquired a tinge of menace,” including “antiwar.” 
Id. at 1014. 
¶3. On September 11, 2001, at 8:45 a.m., a hijacked American Airlines Boeing 757, 
Flight 11, en route from Boston to Los Angeles, carrying eighty-one passengers and eleven 
crew members, crashed into the top of the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New 
York City. At 9:03 a.m., a hijacked United Airlines Boeing 757, Flight 175, en route from 
Boston to Los Angeles, carrying fifty-six passengers and nine crew members, crashed into the 
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South Tower of the World Trade Center. At 9:50 a.m., the South Tower collapsed, while at 
10:29 a.m., the North Tower imploded, causing even more devastation and blanketing 
downtown Manhattan in ash and debris. Meanwhile, at 9:38 a.m., a hijacked American Airlines 
Boeing 757, Flight 77, carrying fifty-eight passengers and six crew members, en route from 
Dulles to Los Angeles, turned back over Cleveland and flew toward Washington, D.C., and 
crashed into the Pentagon. Finally, at 10:00 a.m., a hijacked United Airlines Boeing 757, 
Flight 93, carrying thirty-eight passengers and seven crew members, en route from Newark to 
San Francisco, crashed near Pittsburgh after passengers fought to regain control of the airplane 
to prevent its use as yet another devastating terrorist missile. NEWSWEEK, Extra Ed., Sept. 
2001, at 30–31. Early on, the official count of the dead or missing in New York City was put 
at 4764, though other counts were as low as 2405. Eric Lipton, Hard to Figure: A Difference 
in the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2001, at 131. The final figure came in at 3056. Rick 
Hampson, WTC Recovery Effort Concludes Without a Word, USA TODAY, May 31, 2002, at A2 
(World Trade Center: 2823; Pentagon: 189; Pennsylvania: 44). The financial impact of the 
attacks, which rippled out from New York City and Washington, D.C. to include the nation, 
will probably never be fully known or calculated with precision; it surely will be in the 
hundreds of billions of dollars. Compare N.Y. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at 2 (reporting that a 
consulting firm for New York state estimates a cost to the national economy at $639.3 billion 
and 2 million jobs), with Letter from William J. McDonough, President Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, with attachments, to Honorable Carolyn B. Malony, United States House of 
Representatives (April 18, 2002) (reporting estimates of costs in New York City of building 
replacement and repair ranging from $25 billion to $29 billion with about $15 billion covered 
by insurance; loss of income at $4.5 billion; and displacement of 100,000 city workers, 
including: hotels, 6000 jobs; air, 11,000 jobs; restaurants, 12,000 jobs; amusement, 3000 
jobs; apparel, 3000 jobs; and printing and publishing, 2000 jobs). 
¶4. The events of September 11 are unlike any tragedy the United States had 
experienced in over 200 years. Certainly, many are drawing parallels to the devastating attack 
on Oahu, Hawaii. On December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor, 2300 soldiers and sailors died. On 
September 11, the dead were ordinary working men and women as well as firefighters and 
policemen. In 1941, the enemy, dressed in uniform, was the Empire of Japan. This time, the 
enemy, not dressed in uniform, was Osama bin Laden, his terrorist network, al-Qaeda, and the 
Taliban Government of Afghanistan that was harboring bin Laden and his network. 
¶5. Addressing the Congress and the nation and calling for a vigorous response to the 
terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush warned that America must prepare for a “lengthy 
campaign unlike any other we have ever seen”; its objective must be no less than this: to find 
and defeat “every terrorist group of global reach.” Michael Elliott, We Will Not Fail, TIME, 
Oct. 1, 2001, at 20. The President warned that it will be “a conflict without battlefields or 
beachheads” and that “the conflict will not be short.” Elaine Sciolino, The President’s Message: 
A Different Battle Awaits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at 5. So far, the President’s prediction 
is holding true; we are constantly reminded of America’s War on Terror, and public opinion 
supporting the war runs strong. 
¶6. Nevertheless, antiwar marches followed close on the heels of the beginning of the 
War on Terrorism. Robert Worth, In Three Languages, Urgently Chanting for Peace, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at B12; Elizabeth Becker, Marchers Oppose Waging War Against 
Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at 57. Left-wing intellectuals were quick to point the 
finger of blame at American policies. See Richard Bernstein, Counterpoint to Unity: Dissent, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2001, at A13. In addition, the nation’s campuses are once again roiled. 
Anemona Hartocollis, Campus Culture Wars Flare Anew as Image of the Ugly American Is 
Raised, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at A24; Francis X. Clines, At a Waiting College Campus 
an Echo of the 60’s, Sept. 28, 2001, at B7. Predictably, with a long and involved war, 
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demonstrations may well acquire a “tinge of menace.” See Richard Lacayo, Anti War 
Movement: Rapid Response, TIME, Oct. 8, 2001, at 75 (“[A] prolonged and nasty land war, 
especially one requiring the reestablishment of the draft, would be sure to make more people 
dovish. If it does, there will be a well-established antiwar movement ready to admit them.”). 
As two of the dissenting judges on the en banc court in American Coalition noted in a 
different decision, rendered after September 11, the protections of the First Amendment are of 
crucial importance in times like these. See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279 F.3d 719, 720 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“[A]t times like those 
this nation now confronts, it is especially important that the courts remain sensitive to the 
demands of the First Amendment, a provision that underlies the very existence of our 
democracy. First Amendment judicial scrutiny should now be at its height, whether the 
individual before us is a troubled schoolboy, a right-to-life activist, an outraged 
environmentalist, a Taliban sympathizer, or any other person who disapproves of one or more 
of our nation’s officials or policies for any reason whatsoever.”) (citation omitted); id. at 728 
(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Constitutional law ought to be 
based on neutral principles, and should not easily sway in the winds of popular concerns, for 
that would make our liberty a weak reed that swayed in the winds.”); see also Dazo v. Globe 
Airport Sec. Servs., 295 F.3d 934, 943 (9th Cir. 2002) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“I 
appreciate the fact that the tragic events of September 11, 2001 have cast this case in a 
different light from when it was first taken under submission. . . . But this nation’s recent 
tragedy simply does not bear on the legal question presented in this case. . . . Our judicial 
charge is to stand above the inflamed passions of the public, however much we may share 
them; we must apply the law faithfully and evenhandedly.”), rehearing granted and opinion 
withdrawn, 295 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002). But see Dahlia Lithwick, Poster Children: After 
9/11, What Can Abortion Protesters Get Away With?, at http://slate.msn.com/?id-2066130 
(last visited May 22, 2002) (conceding that Judge Kozinski probably got the right answer in 
his dissent from the en banc opinion in American Coalition, but adding, “even if the 
[majority] opinion stands on shaky legal ground, it somehow still feels, intuitively, right . . . . 
In the wake of Sept. 11 and in a week marked by new anthrax threats and terrorist alerts, 
deciding whether words are just words or thinly veiled calls to action is almost a luxury. 
Subtleties about whether incendiary messages are incitement or threats or protected political 
activity do not really matter . . . .”); id. (“Imagine a Web site called TheJihadFiles.com, 
operated out of Michigan. Imagine promises of death to infidels and the celebration of 
American murders. Imagine lists of all those killed in the attacks on the Twin Towers and the 
Pentagon with strikes through their names. Imagine your name next to that. Your address. The 
address of your kids’ schools. Your picture and license plate number. It’s not a threat. Just a 
roadmap for the next al-Qaida [sic] goon who passes through town.”). 
¶7. Osama bin Laden and his followers are not representative of the Muslim world. 
Karen Armstrong, an astute observer of Islam, notes: 
It would be as grave a mistake to see Osama bin Laden as an authentic 
representative of Islam as it would be to consider James Kopp, the alleged killer of 
an abortion provider in Buffalo, N.Y., a typical Christian, or Baruch Goldstein, who 
shot 29 worshipers in the Hebron mosque in 1994 and died in the attack, a true 
martyr of Israel. 
Karen Armstrong, The True, Peaceful Force of Islam, TIME, Oct. 1, 2001, at 48 (tracing the 
history of the rise of “Islam”—an Arabic word related to shalom or peace—and the mission of 
the Prophet Mohammad in the seventh century, a major part of which was to end the vicious 
cycle of tribal vendetta and counter-vendetta on the Arabian peninsula; explaining that the 
Quran permits only wars of self defense and exhorts peace and that the primary meaning of 
“jihad” is not “holy war” but “struggle,” which refers to the difficult effort required personally 
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problem in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,54 where the Court 
found that the First Amendment fully protected statements by civil 
rights leader Charles Evers that could be interpreted as “intending to 
create a fear of violence whether or not [violence] was specifically 
intended.”55 The Court found that, unless the speaker “authorized, 
ratified, or directly threatened” violence, his speech was fully 
protected.56 Relying on the example of Claiborne, the Ninth Circuit 
 
to put God’s will into practice). See generally KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 
(2000); YOSSEF BODANSKY, BIN LADEN (2001); AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN (2001). 
¶8. Rightly, Congress, in enacting the USA Patriot Act found: 
(a) FINDINGS—Congress makes the following findings: 
(1) Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, and Americans from South Asia play a 
vital role in our Nation and are entitled to nothing less than the full rights of 
every American. 
(2) The acts of violence that have been taken against Arab and Muslim 
Americans since the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States 
should be and are condemned by all Americans who value freedom. 
(3) The concept of individual responsibility for wrongdoing is sacrosanct in 
American Society, and applies equally to all religious, racial, and ethnic groups. 
(4) When American citizens commit acts of violence against those who are, or 
are perceived to be, of Arab or Muslim descent, they should be punished to the 
full extent of the law. 
(5) Muslim Americans have become so fearful of harassment that many Muslim 
women are changing the way they dress to avoid becoming targets. 
(6) Many Arab Americans and Muslim Americans have acted heroically during 
the attacks on the United States, including Mohammed Salman Hamdani, a 
23-year-old New Yorker of Pakistani descent, who is believed to have gone to 
the World Trade Center to offer rescue assistance and is now missing. 
(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS. – It is the sense of Congress that– 
(1) the civil rights and civil liberties of all Americans, including Arab-
Americans, Muslim-Americans, and Americans from South Asia, must be 
protected, and that every effort must be taken to preserve their safety; 
(2) any acts of violence or discrimination against any Americans be 
condemned; and 
(3) the Nation is called upon to recognize the patriotism of fellow citizens 
from all ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds. 
USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 101–102, 115 Stat. 272, 276 (2001). 
 54. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). For a detailed analysis of this case, see infra Part IV.A. 
 55. Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 1014. The speech is set out infra in Appendix C 
(Speech of Charles Evers). 
 56. ¶1. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 929; see Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 1014. We recognize 
in our analysis of “true threats” vicarious as well as individual responsibility for the violence of 
others on the basis of “direction, authorization, or ratification.” We accept ratification as a 
basis of liability because it is too late to contend otherwise. Substantial qualification, if not 
objection, however, must be made, if not generally, at least under RICO. Criminal 
responsibility under RICO is set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1990) (“Whoever violates any 
provision of Section 1962 . . . ”) (emphasis added). Civil responsibility under RICO is set out 
in 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1995) (“Any person injured . . . by . . . a violation of Section 1962 
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. . . ”) (emphasis added). “To violate” does not have a different meaning in its verb or noun 
form. See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 653 (2d ed. 1989). Nor does it under RICO. 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 489 (1985) (“We should not lightly infer 
that Congress intended [“to violate”] to have wholly different meanings in neighboring 
[sections].”); accord United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 542 (1943) (Black, 
J.) (False Claim Act) (“[W]e cannot say that the same substantive language has one meaning if 
criminal prosecutions are brought by public officials and quite a different meaning where the 
same language is involved by the informer.”); N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 197, 401 
(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (anti-trust) (“The words cannot be read one way in a suit 
which is to end in fine and imprisonment and another way in one which seeks an injunction.”); 
see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 239 (1987) (“a ‘pattern’ for 
civil purpose is a ‘pattern’ for criminal purposes”) (citations omitted); H.J. Inc. v. N.W. Bell 
Tel., Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236 (1989) (“pattern . . . appl[ies] to criminal as well as civil 
application of [RICO]”); cf. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (“[I]t seems 
reasonable to give each use [of ‘to conduct,’ as a verb and a noun,] a similar construction.”). 
But see Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 505 (2000) (“to conspire” in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) read 
differently in civil litigation from criminal litigation). Accordingly, if ratification is not a 
permissible basis for criminal liability, it should not be a permissible basis for civil responsibility, 
at least under RICO. Compare United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1320, 1375–78 (2d Cir. 
1989) (en banc), Beauford v. Helmsley, 865 F.2d 1386, 1391 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc), 
adhered to after remand, 893 F.2d 1433 (2d Cir. 1989) (“[T]he analysis in Indelicato is 
equally applicable to the present case, for since a RICO violation is an element to be proven in 
a civil RICO action, the substantive standards as to what must be proven in a criminal RICO 
prosecution also govern civil RICO actions.”), and United States v. Local 560 of IBT, 780 
F.2d 267, 284 (3d Cir. 1985) (standards of responsibility for aiding and abetting for civil 
RICO are the same as for criminal RICO), aff’g, 581 F. Supp. 279, 330–32 (D.N.J.U. 1984) 
with Cox v. Admin. U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1409 (11th Cir. 1994), rehearing 
granted on other grounds, 30 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1994) (failure to repudiate act by union 
ground to infer ratification of misconduct). But see Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidation 
Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 656–57 (3d Cir. 1998) (no civil aiding and abetting under RICO) 
(relying on Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 171–90 
(1994 ) (securities acts)). 
¶2. Ratification was not a ground on which to impose criminal as opposed to civil 
responsibility at common law. See, e.g., Morse v. State, 6 Conn. 9 (1825) (finding that 
although employee gave liquor to minor Yale college student, the employer was not criminally 
liable despite ratification) (“In the law of contracts, a posterior recognition . . . [may be] 
equivalent to a precedent command; but it is not so in respect of crimes. . . . [As] to crimes the 
maxim omnis ratihabalitio retro trahitur et mandato equiparatur, is inapplicable.”). Nor is it 
considered an independent basis for criminal responsibility in the leading treatises, which are 
either silent on the matter or expressly reject it. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 
(3d ed. 2000); ROLLINS M. PERKINS ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW (3d ed. 1982). But see WILLIAM 
LAWRENCE CLARK & WILLIAM LAWRENCE MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 
484 (rev. by Melvin F. Wingersky 1958) (rejecting it and citing Morse v. State, 6 Conn. 9 
(1825)). 
¶3. Ratification is, of course, an accepted basis for civil responsibility. Carbon Fuel Co. 
v. United Mine Workers of Am., 444 U.S. 212, 217–19 (1979); United Mine Workers of Am. 
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 739 (1966). Nevertheless, where ratification is recognized as a basis 
for RICO civil liability, an independent duty to repudiate is present, as in the instance of 
misconduct by union members. See, e.g., Cox, 17 F.3d at 1409; Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. 
Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 883 F.2d 132, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 
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concluded that “[w]hile Charles Evers and the defendants in our 
case pursued very different political goals, the two cases have one 
thing in common: Political activists used words in an effort to bend 
opponents to their will.”57 Consequently, the panel concluded that, 
as a matter of law, “[t]he First Amendment protects ACLA’s 
statements no less than the statements of the NAACP.”58 
The question of what role evidence of context plays in 
determining whether speech or expressive conduct is protected was 
crucial to the panel’s determination. Like the district court, the 
Ninth Circuit, in its panel opinion, recognized that none of 
defendants’ statements were facially threatening; in fact, none 
explicitly mentioned violence at all.59 The panel conceded, “the 
 
vacated on other grounds, 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc). Generally, in fact, 
“[r]atification is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind him but which 
was done or professedly done on his account, whereby the act, as to some or all persons, is 
given effect as if originally authorized by him.” United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 491 F.2d 
1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 82 (1958)). That 
general rule would not recognize ratification as a basis for liability of the defendants in 
American Coalition for the conduct of those who killed the various doctors; it was not done 
on their account. 
¶4. However problematic under principles of criminal law general ratification is as a 
basis of criminal responsibility, it is even more problematic for criminal or civil responsibility 
where First Amendment interests are implicated. As the Court observed in NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co.: 
A legal duty to “repudiate”—to disassociate oneself from acts of another—cannot 
arise unless, absent the repudiation, an individual could be found liable for those 
acts. As our decision in Scales, Noto, and Healy make clear . . . civil liability may not 
be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of 
which committed acts of violence. The chancellor in this case made no finding that 
the individuals who committed those acts of violence were “agents” or “servants” of 
those who attended the NAACP meeting; certainly such a relationship cannot be 
found simply because both shared certain goals. 
458 U.S. 886, 925 n.69 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 1015 
(“But if their statement merely encourages unrelated terrorists, then their words are protected 
by the First Amendment.”) (emphasis added); Nat’l Ass’n For Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 1997 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14854, at *65–68 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding on motion under FEDERAL 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 56 that insufficient evidence was introduced to establish a 
material question of fact on responsibility of demonstrators, even where evidence of illegal 
purpose was introduced, to connect them with acts by others of murder, kidnapping, and 
arson) (“In contrast to the overwhelming evidence of [illegal demonstrations], the record fails 
to support plaintiffs’ allegation that any of the defendants individually or through [others] 
committed the predicate act of murder [, kidnapping, or arson]. Indeed, plaintiff was 
noticeably strained in the attempt . . . .”). 
 57. Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 1014. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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words actually used are not dispositive, because a threat may be 
inferred from the context in which statements are made.”60 But, it 
emphasized that two kinds of ambiguity may be present that context 
may be used to resolve: 
The first deals with statements that call for violence on their face, 
but are unclear as to who is to commit the violent acts—the speaker 
or a third party. All cases of which we are aware fall into this 
category: They hold that, where the speaker expressly mentions 
future violence, context can make it clear that it is the speaker 
himself who means to carry out the threat. 
 A more difficult problem arises when the statements, like the 
ones here, not only fail to threaten violence by the defendants, but 
fail to mention future violence at all. Can context supply the violent 
message that language alone leaves out?61 
The panel expressed doubt on this point, observing that while no 
case directly answered the question, “important theoretical 
objections to stretching context so far” are raised by that approach 
because context, “after all, is often not of the speaker’s making.”62 If 
evidence of context made by others could cause facially 
nonthreatening statements to lose their constitutional protection, “it 
could have a highly chilling effect on public debate on any cause 
where somebody, somewhere has committed a violent act in 
connection with that cause.”63 
The panel then pointed out that while the district court’s 
instructions on true threats, which embodied a negligence 
standard,64 were consistent with previous threat cases in the circuit,65 
 
 60. Id. at 1017. 
 61. Id. at 1018. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. While the panel did not rule on whether the district court properly admitted the 
various items of “evidence of context,” it cautioned that nothing in its ruling “should be 
construed as approving [those] evidentiary rulings.” Id. at 1018 n.15. 
 64. The court instructed the jury as follows: “[A] statement is a ‘true threat’ when a 
reasonable person making the statement would foresee that the statement would be interpreted 
by those to whom it is communicated as a serious expression of an intent to bodily harm or 
assault.” Id. at 1016. 
On the role of the negligence in setting the civil and criminal liability standard in the 
First Amendment area, see infra note 713. 
 65. Id. 
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circuit precedents were not themselves consistent.66 Nevertheless, 
under the district court’s instructions, if 
taken literally, the jury could have concluded that ACLA’s 
statements contained “a serious expression of intent to harm,” not 
because they authorized or directly threatened violence, but 
because they put the doctors in harm’s way. However, the First 
Amendment does not permit the imposition of liability on that 
basis.67 
Accordingly, the panel decided that it was material whether an 
ambiguous jury instruction merited setting aside the district court’s 
verdict, for even if the jury drew only the permissible inference, its 
verdict could not stand under Claiborne; it, therefore, vacated and 
remanded the decision, with instructions to dissolve the injunction 
and enter judgment for the defendants on all counts.68 
C. The Ninth Circuit En Banc Opinion 
Scholarly commentary predictably followed the panel’s opinion—
most of it supportive.69 Nonetheless, the en banc court reversed 
 
 66. See id. at 1015 n.9. The court explained, “[O]ur case law has not been entirely 
consistent as to whether a speaker may be penalized for negligently uttering a threat or 
whether he must have specifically intended to threaten.” Id. While the court stated that it 
believed “specific intent” was the correct standard, it emphasized that “the result here is the 
same under either standard.” Id. at 1016 n.9. For a discussion of the difficulties that the 
traditional use of “general intent” and “specific intent” present, see infra note 513. 
 67. Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d. at 1017. 
 68. Id. at 1019. 
 69. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 283 (2002); Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion?, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (2002). But 
see Kenneth J. Brown, Assessing the Legitimacy of Governmental Regulation of Modern Speech 
Aimed at Social Reform: The Importance of Hindsight and Causation, 10 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 459, 481 (2002) (arguing that the panel should have analyzed the case as one involving 
incitement rather than “true threats,” but failing to recognize that the panel could not have 
done so because the case was not argued as an incitement case; see Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1371 n.13 
(D. Or. 1996) (“Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Plaintiffs are not pursuing an incitement 
to violence theory . . . .”)). Commentators who viewed the decision negatively were often 
influenced less by the merits of the decision and more by its underlying subject matter—
abortion. See, e.g., Kari Lou Frank, Note, Net Effects: How the Internet Has Changed Abortion 
Law, Policy, and Process, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 311, 333 (2002) (“[T]he impact the 
Internet has on the abortion debate can be as positive as it is negative. If used positively, the 
Internet could improve the safety of not only the woman seeking an abortion, but also of the 
abortion provider. Further, it could empower women in their reproductive choices and expand 
the available means by which women can exercise their rights. On the other hand, if the role of 
the Internet in the modern abortion climate is ignored, then the same Internet characteristics 
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course; it concluded that liability could properly be imposed on the 
defendants because their works constituted “true threats.”70 
The en banc court began with an extended discussion on the 
appropriate standard of review.71 It separated its discussion into two 
parts: (1) whether the evidence supported the conclusion that a 
threat was made that came within the underlying statute, FACE, and 
(2) whether the defendants could be held liable consistent with the 
First Amendment.72 On the first issue, the en banc court explained: 
[T]he proper definition of a “threat” for purposes of FACE is a 
question of law that we review de novo. If it were clear that neither 
the Deadly Dozen nor the Crist poster, or the Nuremberg Files, 
was a threat as properly defined, the case should not have gone to 
the jury and summary judgment should have been granted in 
ACLA’s favor. If there were material facts in dispute or it was not 
clear that the posters were protected expression instead of true 
threats, the question whether the posters and the Files amount to a 
“threat of force” for purposes of the statute was for the trier of fact. 
Assuming that the district court correctly defined “threat” and 
properly instructed the jury on the elements of liability pursuant to 
the statute, our review is for substantial evidence supporting the  
 
 
historical facts (including credibility determinations) and the 
 
that bring information to the masses may also bring destruction. Without recognition of the 
impact of the Internet, websites like The Nuremberg Files will only continue to flourish, and 
remain unfazed by legal or contractual injunctions.”); Prana A. Topper, Note, The Threatening 
Internet: Planned Parenthood v. ACLA and a Context-Based Approach to Internet Threats, 33 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 234 (2001) (arguing that the Nuremberg Files Web site 
“fundamentally affected the doctors, increasing the possibility that they would alter their 
behavior and cease to provide women with their constitutionally protected right to an 
abortion. Only an objective, context-based standard can account for the complexities of this 
reality.”); see Wechsler, supra note 7 (calling for a principled and not a result-based 
jurisprudence). 
 70. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 71. Id. at 1066–71. 
 72. The court also set forth its standard of review with specific respect to the injunctive 
relief granted. It explained that it would  
review the district court’s findings with respect to injunctive relief for clear error and 
its conclusions of law de novo. However, while we normally review the scope of 
injunctive relief for abuse of discretion, we will scrutinize the relief granted in this 
case to determine whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no 
more speech than necessary to achieve its goals.  
Id. at 1070–71. 
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elements of statutory liability (including intent).73 
Then, with respect to the First Amendment, the court explained 
that it had a duty to 
review the record independently in order to satisfy ourselves that 
the posters and the Files constitute a “true threat” such that they 
lack First Amendment protection. We will consider the undisputed 
facts as true, and construe the historical facts, the findings on the 
statutory elements, and all credibility determinations in favor of the 
prevailing party. In this way we give appropriate deference to the 
trier of fact, here both the jury and the district judge, yet assure 
that evidence of the core constitutional fact—a true threat—falls 
within the unprotected category and is narrowly enough bounded 
as a matter of constitutional law.74 
Regrettably, after setting forth these two different analyses, the 
court collapsed them into one. It set out to determine whether the 
defendants could be held liable consistent with the First Amendment 
by defining “threat” for purposes of the statute, making sure that the 
statutory definition “comported” with the First Amendment, that is, 
a “true threat.”75 It began by making a vain and dryly literal effort to 
distinguish Claiborne;76 after summarizing the case, it dismissed it 
out of hand, reasoning that because it was an “incitement” case, 
rather than a “threats” case, its teachings were simply not relevant: 
Claiborne, of course, did not arise under a threats statute. The 
Court had no need to consider whether Evers’s statements were 
true threats of force within the meaning of a threats statute; it held 
only that his speeches did not incite illegal activity, thus could not 
have caused business losses and could not be the basis for liability 
to white merchants. As the opinion points out, there was no 
context to give the speeches (including the expression “break your 
neck”) the implication of authorizing or directly threatening 
unlawful conduct. To the extent there was any intimidating 
overtone, Evers’s rhetoric was extemporaneous, surrounded by 
statements supporting non-violent action, and primarily of the 
social ostracism sort. No specific individuals were targeted. For all 
that appears, “the break your neck” comments were hyperbolic 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1071–72. 
 76. Id. at 1072–74. 
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vernacular. Certainly there was no history that Evers or anyone else 
associated with the NAACP had broken anyone’s neck who did not 
participate in, or opposed, this boycott or any others. Nor is there 
any indication that Evers’s listeners took his statement that boycott 
breakers’ “necks would be broken” as a serious threat that their 
necks would be broken; they kept on shopping at boycotted 
stores.77 
Accordingly, the en banc court concluded that Watts v. United 
States “was the only Supreme Court case that discussed the First 
Amendment in relation to true threats before [they] first confronted 
the issue.”78 It then explained that in Watts, “[a]part from holding 
that Watts’s crack about L.B.J. was not a true threat, the Court set 
out no standard for determining when a statement is a true threat 
that is unprotected speech under the First Amendment.”79 To fill 
that gap, supposedly,80 the Ninth Circuit in Roy v. United States81 
articulated the following test: “Whether a particular statement may 
properly be considered to be a threat is governed by an objective 
standard—whether a reasonable person would foresee that the 
statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker 
communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm 
or assault.”82 It concluded that this test was appropriately applied to 
FACE.83 
 
 
 
 
 77. Id. at 1073–74 (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. (discussing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)). 
 79. Id. But see infra Appendix A for a discussion of the appropriate use of “ostensive 
definitions,” particularly in legal materials. 
 80. See infra note 81. 
 81. 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969); see United States v. Patillo, 438 F.2d 13, 14–15 (4th 
Cir. 1971) (en banc) (discussing Roy and United States v. Compton, 428 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 
1970), as a response to the comment in Watts. v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969), 
that the court had “grave doubts” on the state of mind standard applied by the District of 
Columbia Circuit). As we read the Watts’s comment, it called for a greater “state of mind” 
standard in the First Amendment area than negligence; if we are right, Roy was an 
inappropriate response to the court’s comment. See infra note 713 (discussion of the proper, 
but severely limited use of the negligence standard) and text accompanying notes 740–44 
(discussing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring)). 
 82. Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1074 (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 
F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 83. Id. at 1077. 
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The en banc court next set out various general principles that it 
used in applying this test in the past. A “true threat,” as described by 
the test, is “unprotected by the [F]irst [A]mendment.”84 In turn, “a 
threat is ‘an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or 
damage on another.’”85 Such threats, the court continued, “should 
be considered in light of their entire factual context, including the 
surrounding events and reaction of the listeners.”86 “The fact that a 
threat is subtle does not make it less of a threat.”87 Nor is it necessary 
“that the defendant intend to, or be able to carry out his threat; the 
only intent requirement for a true threat is that the defendant 
intentionally or knowingly communicate the threat.”88 
After indicating that it was going to apply the traditional Ninth 
Circuit test, the en banc court specifically declined to adopt the 
subjective intent requirement advanced by the ACLU—i.e., that 
“the speaker actually intended to induce fear, intimidation, or terror; 
namely, that the speaker intended to threaten.”89 The en banc court 
concluded that this requirement was “subsumed within the statutory 
standard of FACE itself, which requires that the threat of force be 
made with the intent to intimidate.”90 Accordingly, it reasoned, 
 
 84. Id. at 1076. 
 85. Id. at 1075 (quoting United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
 86. Id. (quoting Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265). 
 87. Id. (quoting Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265). 
 88. Id. at 1075–76 (quoting Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1266 n.3). 
 89. Id. 
 90. ¶1. Id.; see also id. (explaining that “[t]he requirement of intent to intimidate serves 
to insulate the statute from unconstitutional application to protected speech” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
¶2. This comment can be accepted only if “intent to intimidate” is limited, as is “true 
threat,” by the qualification that the fear engendered is that of conduct by the speaker or one for 
whom he or she is responsible. “Intimidation,” that is, to inspire fear by “warning” of the conduct 
of others for whom you are not responsible, is hardly conduct that falls within the prohibition 
of the statute. The court did not give any indication of awareness in its opinion of this crucial 
distinction, despite the arguments of the dissents on the point. Nor, obviously, did it cite 
anything in the text of the statute, its legislative history, or in any other decision under the 
statute to buttress its opinion. Nor does it have the benefit for its opinion of “intent to 
intimidate” language qualifying the “threat” provision of RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) 
(1994) (“or threat involving”). Accordingly, the court’s reasoning at this point begs the 
question before it, that is, it engages in the classic fallacy petitio principii. The court did not 
undertake a comprehensive analysis of either FACE’s or RICO’s language, or, significantly, 
related statutes, nor can we within the limited confines of these materials. The available 
sources, however, are not particularly enlightening. 
¶3. We begin with the plain meaning of the words used by Congress. United States v. 
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 583 n.5 (1981); see also HENRY FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 202 
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(1967) (“(1) Read the statute; (2) read the statute; (3) read the statute!” (quoting Justice 
Frankfurter)). “To intimidate” is the verb form; “intimidation” is the noun form. Generally, 
meaning does not change with the form of the word. Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 
177 (1993). The word comes from the Medieval Latin. It is typically used in the sense of to 
inspire with fear, especially in modern usage; to force or to deter from action by threats or 
violence; or to force or induce, especially by means of menaces. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 428 (Compact ed. 1985 & Supp. 1987). “Threaten” is the verb form; “threat” is 
the noun form. The word comes from the Old English; it is typically used in the sense of to 
force or induce, especially by means of menaces. 2 id. at 352–53. Accordingly, the two words 
are alternative ways of expressing the same idea, that is, they are synonymous. Unfortunately, 
standard usage leaves unresolved the ambiguity regarding who is to inflict the harm. 
¶4. Neither FACE nor RICO define “threat,” but FACE, and not RICO, offers a 
statutory definition of “intimidate.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3) (1994) defines “intimidate” to 
mean “place a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him or herself or to 
another.” The statutory definition is narrower than the common usage. “Apprehension” must 
be “reasonable” and limited “to bodily harm.” Id. As with common usage, the ambiguity 
“who is to inflict the harm” is left open. Id. When FACE provides “by threat of force” 
intentionally “intimidates,” it is, in fact, using synonyms to perform different grammatical 
functions in the prohibition. “Threat” and “intimidates” could be transposed in the sentence 
without loss of meaning. As drafted, the conduct element (verb) is “threaten”; the result 
element (predicate) is “intimidate.” Id. Actual “intimidation” is not required. Id. The state of 
mind element (adverb) for conduct and result is “intentionally.” Id. Thus, the plain meaning 
of the words plus the grammar of the sentence produces the plain meaning or default meaning 
of the sentence. F.R. PALMER, SEMANTICS 37–41 (2d ed. 1981); see infra Appendix B 
(Natural Language: Generality, Ambiguity, and Vagueness). 
¶5. We turn next to context to obtain utterance meaning by examining the context in 
which the sentence was spoken. PALMER, supra, at 37–41. That context is found in FACE’s 
legislative history; it is instructive on the sense in which “threat” was used in the statute. The 
most salient features of the legislative history of FACE are H.R. REP. NO. 103-796 (1993); S. 
REP. NO. 103-117 (1993); and H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-488 (1993). See Garcia v. United 
States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (Awe have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for 
finding the Legislature=s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill . . . ”). Both the 
House and Senate reports refer favorably to United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th 
Cir. 1989), which interpreted the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3631) (1994) that bans 
“threats of force” “to intimidate” to require a reasonable speaker based test for “threat.” 
Similarly, the Conference Report “notes that the Senate language [that was adopted in the 
final text was] modeled on federal civil rights laws (including 18 U.S.C. § 245(g), 42 U.S.C. § 
3631, and 18 U.S.C. § 247).” Id. at 457 n.19. 
¶6. Nevertheless, the modeling was not precise. At crucial points in the various statutes 
different words are employed. Whether different meanings were intended cannot not be 
authoritatively determined from the legislative materials. FACE, in relevant part, provides “by 
threat . . . intentionally . . . intimidates.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1)–(2) (1994) (emphasis added). 
18 U.S.C. § 245(g) (1994), in relevant part, provides “willfully intimidates . . . ” (emphasis 
added). 18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(2) (1994), in relevant part, provides “intentionally obstructs 
by . . . threat of force . . . ” (emphasis added). 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1994) provides “by . . . 
threat of force willfully . . . intimidates . . . ” (emphasis added). If “intentionally” and 
“willfully” are read as synonyms, the difference in wording is insignificant. But the words have 
multiple meaning. See, e.g., Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–92 (1998) (discussing 
the multiple meanings of “willfully”); see also discussion of “willfulness” infra Appendix B ¶ 3 
(Natural Language: Generality, Ambiguity, and Vagueness). Thus, at least two alternative 
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readings of FACE (and the related statutes) are plausible. They may be illustrated with the text 
of FACE, which prohibits the use of “threat of force” “intentionally” “to intimidate.” 18 
U.S.C. § 248(a)(1) (1994). If the language ended at that point, it might well be read as 
knowingly (“intent” read merely as “conscious awareness”) engaging in conduct (“threat of 
force”) that a reasonable person would know might engender apprehension of bodily harm 
(“threat”). 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3) (1994). The reading would reflect the basic teaching of 
Gilbert and the text of the statute’s definitions (the conduct itself must be “knowingly,” that is 
subjective, but the character of the “threat” is assessed from a reasonable person’s perspective, 
that is, objective). On the other hand, another reading is, in fact, far more plausible. FACE 
does not prohibit “threats of force” simpliciter. The person must possess a reason or motive 
why he engages in the conduct. Thus, FACE is better paraphrased as knowingly (“conscious 
awareness”) engaging in conduct that would, from a reasonable person’s perspective 
(“objective standard”), engender fear of bodily harm with intent (“purpose,” a subjective 
standard) to achieve a result (interference with “obtaining or providing” “reproductive health 
services”). The first paraphrase envisions a pure negligence standard (“reasonable person”). In 
contrast, the second paraphrase envisions both a subjective and an objective standard: the 
conduct must be knowing (“subjective”); it must be “threatening” (“objective”); and it must 
be done to achieve a result, that is, “intentionally,” (“purposely,” a subjective standard, to 
bring about the “result”). The role of lenity, federal-state relations, and First Amendment 
considerations counsel the adoption of narrow view that requires the subjective state of mind. 
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216–18 (1984) (rule of lenity) (citing United States 
v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76, 95 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.)); Lewis v. United States, 401 
U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (broad interpretation that alters federal-state relations to be avoided); 
DeBartolo v. Fla. Gulf Bldg. Constr. Co., 485 U.S. 568, 574–88 (1988) (broad interpretation 
that impinges on First Amendment to be avoided). 
¶7. Sadly, illustrative decisions under the statutes are not consistent and are no more 
enlightening than the texts or the legislative histories on the key issues: state of mind and from 
whom the feared harm must come. Unfortunately, until better analytical work is done on these 
statutes by the courts, the judicial resolution of these issues is not likely to reflect either the 
values of individual responsibility or First Amendment protections. 
¶8. In United States v. McInnis, 976 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1992), the court examined a 
shooting by a rifle by one person, a Caucasian, into the house of an African-American couple. 
The wife was hit by a bullet. Id. McInnis was prosecuted under 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a). Id.  The 
court held that the government must prove: (1) the use of force, and (2) an intent to interfere 
with housing rights on account of race. Id. The conduct (shooting) and surrounding 
circumstances (house occupied by an African-American) were not in issue, but “intent” or state 
of mind was. Id. at 1230. The court held that the government must prove “the specific intent 
to . . . intimidate . . . the victim because of her race and because of the victim’s occupation of 
her home.” Id. On the elusive distinction between “specific” and “general” intent, see infra 
note 513. Voluntary intoxication was a defense. McInnis, 976 F.2d at 1230. Nevertheless, the 
court held that the evidence (racially derogatory statements by McInnis at the time of the 
shooting and racially derogatory paraphernalia in McInnis’s house) was sufficient to prove 
“McInnis acted with the requisite intent, despite his apparent intoxication at the time of the 
shooting.” Id. (“McInnis was aware of his acts and . . . those acts were motivated by racial 
hatred.”). McInnis sought to exclude some of the paraphernalia under FEDERAL RULES OF 
EVIDENCE 403. Its admission was reviewed under standards of review of abuse of discretion, 
harmless error, and plain error. Id. at 1231 & n.3. Relying on a prior decision admitting 
“skinhead” (a neo-Nazi, white power group) evidence in the context of a cross burning in the 
yard of an African-American (United States v. Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1990), 
cert. dismissed, 502 U.S. 922 (1991)), the court upheld the use of the evidence to establish the 
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“[n]o reason appears to engraft another intent requirement onto the 
statute, because whether or not the maker of the threat has an actual 
 
racial hatred with which McInnis acted; proof of such hatred satisfied an element of the crime 
and negated the defense of intoxication. Id. at 1233; see also United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 
821, 826 (8th Cir. 1999) (cross-burning conviction upheld under 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a) 
(1994)) (“[A]lthough cross-burning can be done with the specific intent to intimidate and to 
interfere with the exercise of protected rights, in other situations, cross-burning may be done 
for the sole purpose of making a political statement.”) (internal citation omitted); United 
States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1211, 1250 (7th Cir. 1993) (under 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a), cross-
burning may be expressive conduct, but if done to intimidate because of exercised protected 
rights, it is not protected by First Amendment). 
¶9. Pretermitting the terminology (see infra note 513 (discussing “general intent” and 
“specific intent”), McInnis is an unproblematic application of § 3631(a). In particular, McInnis 
correctly adopts a construction of § 3631(a) (“willfully . . . intimidates . . . because of . . . 
roll”) to require “specific intent” and to entertain a defense (intoxication) designed to negate 
the required state of mind. See infra note 513. Since FACE is based on § 3631(a), American 
Coalition’s embodiment of a negligence standard for “threat,” is troublesome, particularly 
since the court rightly reads FACE itself to embody the subjective “intent to intimidate.” 
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 
F.3d 1058, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2002) (“a knowingly communicat[ion of] the threat,” and the 
specific rejection of a requirement of “a subjective intent . . . to induce fear,”). The meaning of 
the statute and the constitutional limitations on a statute to “true threat” are distinct issues, 
but the court’s reading of a constitutional limitation as less restrictive than a statutory element 
makes Congress the principal guardian of free speech protections, an anomalous and a counter-
intuitive result at best. 
¶10. FACE is not universally read in sync with 42 U.S.C. § 3631 (1994), that is, to 
require a specific intent. In Greenhut v. Hand, 996 F. Supp. 372 (D.N.J. 1998), the court 
examined FACE in the context of threatening calls (“you will be killed”) made to pro-life 
organizations. Id. at 374. Greenhut admitted making the calls, but she defended on the 
ground that she was so intoxicated that she “could not have ‘intended to intimidate.’” Id. at 
375. The court rejected the defense, holding that FACE was a “general intent” statute. Id. at 
377–78. The court reached its conclusion not by analyzing the text of FACE, as above, but by 
making an analogy to 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1994) (threatening President) (citing United States 
v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 85–86 (8th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is the making of the threat that is 
prohibited without regard to the maker’s subject intention to carry out the threat.”), cert. 
denied, 501 U.S. 1234 (1991)), and relying on a reading of “threat” evaluated by its impact 
on recipient, not by the specific intent of maker found as in United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 
F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043 (1996). Manning, at least on the 
point cited, is irrelevant; “intent to engender fear” is distinguishable from “intent to carry out 
the threat.” Similarly, while Dinwiddie, adopted an objective test for threat, it did not reject an 
additional requirement of “intent to engender fear.” See infra text accompanying note 464. 
The issue was not even raised in Dinwiddie’s appeal. In brief, Greenhut was wrongly decided; it 
is, however, favorably cited on other points. See, e.g., United States v. Greg, 226 F.3d 253, 
258 (3d Cir. 2000) (liability under FACE joint and several and sanction based on each 
violation); Roe v. Aware Woman’s Ctr. For Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(language of FACE read in the same fashion in criminal and civil litigation). Nevertheless, 
Greenhut’s general intent holding is not the law in other circuits. Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 
547, at 554 (6th Cir. 2002) (“specific intent”); United States v. Mahoney, 247 F.3d 279, 283 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (“specific intent”). 
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intention to carry it out, an apparently serious threat may cause the 
mischief or evil toward which the statute was in part directed.”91 
Threats, the en banc court noted: 
are outside the First Amendment to “protect[] individuals from the 
fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from 
the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.” R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). This purpose is 
not served by hinging constitutionality on the speaker’s subjective 
intent or capacity to do (or not to do) harm. Rather, these factors 
go to how reasonably foreseeable it is to a speaker that the listener 
will seriously take his communication as an intent to inflict bodily 
harm. This suffices to distinguish a “true threat” from speech that 
is merely frightening.92 
Nor, the en banc court emphasized, does it matter whether a threat 
is communicated publicly or privately.93 
The en banc court next used the traditional definition of threat 
to analyze whether the facts supported a finding of true threats 
under the statute—for, as the court explained, “[s]o defined, a 
threatening statement that violates FACE is unprotected under the 
First Amendment.”94 In so doing, it brushed aside various challenges 
leveled by the defendants. First, the en banc court dismissed the 
assertion that this case did not involve true threats because “a real 
threat [made] directly to others,” was not involved but instead 
involved “political speech”; it also noted that the Ninth Circuit’s test 
does “not require that the maker of the threat personally cause 
physical harm to the listener,” but only “the making of the threat 
with intent to intimidate.”95 
Next, the en banc court declined to limit the relevant “context” for 
determining whether statements constitute threats to “the direct 
circumstances surrounding delivery of the threat, or evidence sufficient 
to resolve ambiguity in the words of the statement—not two weeks of 
testimony as occurred . . . in the district court.”96 Context, the en banc 
 
 91. Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1076 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1077. 
 95. Id. Under the court’s analysis on this point, if Charles Evers’s speech were made 
today, and it were about abortion, not civil rights, it would arguably fall within the prohibition 
of the statute, an indefensible result by anyone’s standards. 
 96. Id. at 1078. 
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court explained, properly includes “the whole factual context and all of 
the circumstances”; indeed, the court rejoined, “context is critical in a 
true threats case and history can give meaning to the medium.”97 
“[W]ithout context,” the en banc court noted, “a burning cross or dead 
rat mean nothing.”98 Indeed, the en banc court later held that context 
properly includes evidence bearing on “motive, history of violence 
including the violent actions of others, and the defendants’ subjective 
motives . . . .”99 Accordingly, applying an abuse of discretion 
standard, it upheld the district court’s opinion permitting: 
an FBI agent and two federal marshals to testify that the FBI and 
the Justice Department considered ACLA’s two posters to be 
“serious threats”; references to non-party violence; introduction of 
defendants’ arrests; physicians’ counsel to tell the jury about Bray’s 
invocations of the Fifth Amendment through a summary of his 
deposition; references to actions of certain defendants and non-
parties on the abortion debate and to such things as the signing of 
“Defensive Action petitions” by five or six of the individual 
defendants; an exhibit with Rev. Sullivan’s hearsay opinion that 
ACLA is a “cancer” which pro-lifers must “cut out immediately” 
before it “destroys the pro-life movement” to remain in the exhibit 
books; and by permitting deposition summaries to be 
introduced.100 
Turning to the merits, the en banc court reasoned: 
 Because of context, we conclude that the Crist and Deadly 
Dozen posters are not just a political statement. Even if the Gunn 
poster, which was the first “WANTED” poster, was a purely 
political message when originally issued, and even if the Britton 
poster were too, by the time of the Crist poster, the poster format 
itself had acquired currency as a death threat for abortion providers. 
Gunn was killed after his poster was released; Britton was killed 
after his poster was released; and Patterson was killed after his 
poster was released. Knowing this, and knowing the fear generated 
among those in the reproductive health services community who 
were singled out for identification on a “wanted”-type poster, 
ACLA deliberately identified Crist on a “GUILTY” poster and 
intentionally put the names of Hern and the Newhalls on the 
 
 97. Id. at 1078–79 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 98. Id. at 1079. 
 99. Id. at 1080. 
 100. Id. at 1082. 
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Deadly Dozen “GUILTY” poster to intimidate them. This goes 
well beyond the political message (regardless of what one thinks of 
it) that abortionists are killers who deserve death too.101 
The Nuremberg Files site, the en banc court noted, was 
“somewhat different” because it named “hundreds of [individuals],” 
with the avowed intent of “collecting dossiers on abortionists in 
anticipation that one day we may be able to hold them on trial for 
crimes against humanity” in “PERFECTLY LEGAL COURTS.”102 
The en banc court hinted that, if the site stopped at this point, it 
might be protected: “[h]owever offensive or disturbing this might be 
to those listed in the Files, being offensive and provocative is 
protected under the First Amendment.”103 But, the court continued: 
in two critical respects, the Files go further. In addition to listing 
judges, politicians and law enforcement personnel, the Files 
separately categorize “Abortionists” and list the names of 
individuals who provide abortion services, including, specifically, 
Crist, Hern, and both Newhalls. Also, names of abortion providers 
who have been murdered because of their activities are lined 
through in black, while names of those who have been wounded 
are highlighted in gray. As a result, we cannot say that it is clear as a 
matter of law that listing Crist, Hern, and the Newhalls on both 
the Nuremberg Files and the GUILTY posters is purely protected, 
political expression. 
 Accordingly, whether the Crist Poster, the Deadly Dozen 
poster, and the identification of Crist, Hern, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall 
and Dr. James Newhall in the Nuremburg Files as well as on 
“wanted”-type posters, constituted true threats was properly for the 
jury to decide.104 
Finally, after concluding that the posters and the Internet Web 
site constituted “true threats” for purposes of FACE (under a 
definition the en banc opinion attempted to tailor to satisfy First 
Amendment concerns) the court nonetheless conducted a separate 
 
 101. Id. at 1079–80. On other occasions, the Ninth Circuit is not so forgiving. See, e.g., 
United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1085–87 (9th Cir. 2002) (district court abused its 
discretion when it permitted law enforcement agents to testify regarding the meaning of the 
defendant’s communication). 
 102. Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1080. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
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analysis of whether “the core constitutional fact—a true threat—
exists such that the Crist and Deadly Dozen Posters, and the 
Nuremberg Files as to Crist, Hen, and the Newhalls, are without 
First Amendment protection.”105 Not surprisingly, this analysis 
essentially amounted to a recapitulation of the earlier analysis of 
whether the materials constituted threats under FACE. Regarding 
the posters, the en banc court explained that 
 The true threats analysis turns on the poster pattern. Neither the 
Crist poster nor the Deadly Dozen poster contains any language 
that is overtly threatening. . . . [But] [b]ecause of the pattern, a 
“wanted”-type poster naming a specific doctor who provides 
abortions was perceived by physicians, who are providers of 
reproductive health services, as a serious threat of death or bodily 
harm. After a “WANTED” poster on Dr. David Gunn appeared, he 
was shot and killed. After a “WANTED” poster on Dr. George 
Patterson appeared, he was shot and killed. After a “WANTED” 
poster on Dr. John Briton appeared, he was shot and killed. None 
of these “WANTED” posters contained threatening language, 
either. Neither did they identify who would pull the trigger. But 
knowing this pattern, knowing that unlawful action had followed 
“WANTED” posters on Gunn, Patterson and Britton, and 
knowing that “wanted”-type posters were intimidating and caused 
fear of serious harm to those named on them, ACLA published a 
“GUILTY” poster in essentially the same format on Dr. Crist and a 
Deadly Dozen “GUILTY” poster in similar format naming Dr. 
Hern, Dr. Elizabeth Newhall and Dr. James Newhall because they 
perform abortions. Physicians could well believe that ACLA would 
make good on the threat. One of the other doctors on the Deadly 
Dozen poster had in fact been shot before the poster was 
published. This is not political hyperbole. Nor is it merely 
vituperative, abusive, and inexact. In the context of the poster 
pattern, the posters were precise in their meaning to those in the 
relevant community of reproductive health service providers. They 
were a true threat.106 
The Internet Web site, the en banc opinion stated, reinforced 
this threatening message. “The communication was not conditional 
or casual. It was specifically targeted. Crist, Hern, and the Newhalls, 
 
 105. Id. 1084–85. 
 106. Id. at 1085–86 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added). 
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who performed abortions, were not amused.”107 “Violence,” the 
court explained: 
is not a protected value. Nor is a true threat of violence with intent 
to intimidate. ACLA may have been staking out a position for 
debate when it merely advocated violence as in Bray’s A Time to 
Kill, or applauded it, as in the Defense Action petitions. Likewise 
when it created the Nuremberg Files in the abstract, because the 
First Amendment does not preclude calling people demeaning or 
inflammatory names, or threatening social ostracism or vilification 
to advocate a political position. But, after being on “wanted”-type 
posters, Dr. Gunn, Dr. Patterson, and Dr. Britton can no longer 
participate in the debate. By replicating the poster pattern that 
preceded the elimination of Gunn, Patterson, and Britton, and by 
putting Crist, Hern, and the Newhalls in an abortionists’ File that 
scores fatalities, ACLA was not staking out a position of debate but 
of threatened demise. This turns the First Amendment on its 
head.108 
Accordingly, the en banc court concluded, in opposition to the 
panel opinion, that the posters and the Internet Web site were “true 
threats” and thus, not protected speech.109 It, therefore, upheld the 
expansive injunction and affirmed the imposition of liability for 
monetary damages—although it remanded for reconsideration of 
punitive damages in light of recent Ninth Circuit and Supreme 
Court precedent.110 
Three judges filed dissents from the en banc opinion. Taken 
together, they form a persuasive and devastating critique of the 
opinion. Judge Reinhardt, in a short but targeted statement, opined 
that the majority’s rejection of the “concept that speech made in a 
political forum on issues of public concern warrants heightened 
scrutiny, . . . if allowed to stand, would significantly weaken the First 
Amendment protections we now enjoy.”111 Judge Kozinski, the 
author of the panel opinion, justly criticized the en banc opinion as 
an unpersuasive effort “to justify a crushing monetary judgment and 
a strict injunction against speech protected by the First 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 1086. 
 109. Id. at 1088. 
 110. Id. at 1086 (citing, among other decisions, BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 
559 (1996) and In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 111. Id. at 1088 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 871 
Amendment.”112 In addition to reiterating the main points of his 
panel opinion (public discourse vs. private communication; absence 
of express threat; limits of the use of evidence of context that a 
speaker did not authorize, direct, or ratify) and attacking the en banc 
opinion’s summary rejection of Claiborne as controlling,113 he made 
the pointed observation that the principal problem with the en banc 
court’s opinion was that it “recognizes . . . the standard it must 
apply, yet when it undertakes the critical task of canvassing the 
record for evidence that defendants made a true threat . . . its 
opinion fails to come up with any proof that defendants 
communicated an intent to inflict bodily harm upon plaintiffs” 
themselves as opposed to a warning of possible actions by others in 
the future that would be lawful.114 He also echoed Judge Reinhardt’s 
 
 112. Id. at 1089 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 1090–92 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 1090 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). Judge Kozinski observed: 
  Buried deep within the long opinion is a single paragraph that cites evidence 
supporting the finding that the two wanted posters prepared by defendants 
constituted a true threat . . . . The majority does not point to any statement by 
defendants that they intended to inflict bodily harm on plaintiffs, nor is there any 
evidence that defendants took any steps whatsoever to plan or carry out physical 
violence against anyone. Rather, the majority relies on the fact that “the poster 
format itself had acquired currency as a death threat for abortion providers. Gunn 
was killed after his poster was released; Britton was killed after his poster was 
released; and Patterson was killed after his poster was released.” But neither Dr. 
Gunn nor Dr. Patterson was killed by anyone connected with the posters bearing 
their names. 
  The record reveals one instance where an individual—Paul Hill, who is not a 
defendant in this case—participated in the preparation of the poster depicting a 
physician, Dr. Britton, and then murdered him. . . . All others who helped to make 
that poster, as well as those who prepared the other posters, did not resort to 
violence. . . . There is therefore no pattern showing that people who prepare 
“wanted”-type posters then engage in physical violence. To the extent the posters 
indicate a pattern, it is that almost all people engaged in poster-making were non-
violent. 
Id. at 1090–91 (citations omitted). He added: 
  The majority so much as admits that the Nuremberg Files website does not 
constitute a threat because of the large number of people listed there. . . . The 
majority does point out that doctors were listed separately, and . . . that the names 
of doctors who were killed or wounded were stricken or greyed out, . . . but does 
not explain how this supports the inference that the posting of the website in any 
way indicated that defendants intended to inflict bodily harm on plaintiffs. At most, 
the greying and strikeouts could be seen as public approval of those actions, and 
approval of past violence by others cannot be made illegal consistent with the First 
Amendment. 
Id. at 1091 n.3 (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
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point that “statements communicated directly to the target are much 
more likely to be true threats than those, as here, communicated as 
part of a public protest.”115 Finally, he tellingly pointed out that 
while 
[a]n injunction against political speech is bad enough, . . . the 
liability verdict will have a far more chilling effect. Defendants will 
be destroyed by a huge debt that is almost certainly not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy; it will haunt them for the rest of their 
lives and prevent them from ever again becoming financially self-
sufficient. . . . The lesson of what a local jury has done to 
defendants here will not be lost on others who would engage in 
heated political rhetoric in a wide variety of causes.116 
In fact, he insightfully observed: 
[A] retrospective liability verdict is far more damaging than an 
injunction; the latter at least gives notice of what is prohibited and 
what is not. The fear of liability for damages, and especially punitive 
 
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1963)). Judge 
Kozinski continues: 
  The majority tries to fill this gaping hole in the record by noting that 
defendants “knew the fear generated among those in the reproductive health 
services community who were singled out for identification on a ‘wanted’-type 
poster.” But a statement does not become a true threat because it instills fear in the 
listener . . . many statements generate fear in the listener, yet are not true threats and 
therefore may not be punished or enjoined consistent with the First 
Amendment. . . . In order for the statement to be a threat, it must send the message 
that the speakers themselves—or individuals acting in concert with them—will 
engage in physical violence. The majority’s own definition of true threat makes this 
clear. Yet the opinion points to no evidence that defendants who prepared the 
posters would have been understood by a reasonable listener as saying that they will 
cause the harm.  
  Plaintiffs themselves explained that the fear they felt came, not from 
defendants, but from being singled out for attention by abortion protesters across 
the country. For example, plaintiff Dr. Elizabeth Newhall testified, “I feel like my 
risk comes from being identified as a target. And . . . all the John Salvis in the world 
know who I am, and that’s my concern.” . . . (“Up until January of ‘95, I felt 
relatively diluted by the—you know, in the pool of providers of abortion services. I 
didn’t feel particularly visible to the people who were—you know, to the John Salvis 
of the world, you know. I sort of felt one of a big, big group.”).  
Id. at 1091–92 (footnote and citations omitted). 
 115. Id. at 1099 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also id. (“[I]n deciding whether . . . 
coercive speech is protected, it makes a big difference whether it is contained in a private 
communication—a face-to-face confrontation, a telephone call, a dead fish wrapped in a 
newspaper—or is made during the course of public discourse.” (footnote omitted)). 
 116. Id. at 1100 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
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damages, puts the speaker at risk as to what a jury might later 
decide is a true threat, and how vindictive it might feel towards the 
speaker and his cause. In this case, defendants said nothing 
remotely threatening, yet they find themselves crucified financially. 
Who knows what other neutral statements a jury might imbue with 
a menacing meaning based on the activities of unrelated parties. In 
such circumstances, it is especially important for an appellate court 
to perform its constitutional function of reviewing the record to 
ensure that the speech in question clearly falls into one of the 
narrow categories that is unprotected by the First Amendment. The 
majority fails to do this.117 
Judge Kozinski concluded with an ominous warning: “While 
today it is abortion protesters who are singled out for punitive 
treatment, the precedent set by this court—the broad and uncritical 
deference to the judgment of a jury—will haunt dissidents of all 
political stripes for many years to come.”118 
In a third masterful and powerful dissent, Judge Berzon aptly 
summed up the American Coalition litigation: “This case is proof 
positive that hard cases make bad law, and that when the case is very 
hard—meaning that competing legal and moral imperatives pull with 
impressive strength in opposite directions—there is the distinct 
danger of making very bad law.”119 She then went on to propose 
discarding the Ninth Circuit’s objective, speaker-based test for “true 
threats” in favor of a new test more faithful to Supreme Court 
teachings. She echoed many of the points made in the panel opinion; 
specifically, she called for recognition of the difference between 
private and public communication of threats120 and for adoption of 
the Second Circuit’s test as set forth in United States v. Kelner121—
albeit with “one exception, an addition, and some explication.”122 
 
 117. Id. at 1100–01 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 1101 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. at 1102 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 121. 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976). See infra text accompanying note 611 and 
following notes for a discussion of the Second Circuit’s approach. 
 122. Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1106 (Berzon, J., dissenting). Specifically, Judge Berzon 
would not include immediacy of the threatened action as a prerequisite to finding a true threat 
delivered as part of a public speech; she would add a requirement of the defendant’s subjective 
intent that the victims understand the communication as an unequivocal threat that the 
speaker or his agents or co-conspirators would physically harm them. Id. at 1106–09.  She 
would also require that the threat be unambiguous, given the proper context—that is, 
objectively threatening, as defined by the Ninth Circuit’s prior case law. Id. at 1109–10. 
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She also advocated more diligent use of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 
in determining what evidence should properly come in under the 
rubric of “context.”123 She concluded with a fateful warning, much 
like Judge Kozinski’s: 
If we are not willing to provide stringent First Amendment 
protection and a fair trial to those with whom we as a society 
disagree as well as those with whom we agree—as the Supreme 
Court did when it struck down the conviction of members of the 
Ku Klux Klan for their racist, violence—condoning speech in 
Brandenburg—the First Amendment will become a dead letter. 
Moreover, the next protest group—which may be a new civil rights 
movement or another group eventually vindicated by acceptance of 
their goals by society at large—will (unless we cease fulfilling our 
obligation as judges to be evenhanded) be censored according to 
the rules applied to the last.124 
D. Analysis 
What is crucial about the reinstated judgment in American 
Coalition is not the size of the damage award—though that is far 
more than the protestors can be reasonably expected to pay, even if 
the amount is reduced on remand. Nor is it the restrictive nature of 
the reinstated injunction—though any injunction against speech or 
expressive conduct goes to the heart of the protections of the First 
Amendment.125 Nor is it, as the media suppose, that the people 
found liable were anti-abortion protesters126—for the protesters 
 
 123. Id. at 1112–18 (Berzon, J., dissenting) (focusing, among other things, on the law 
enforcement testimony and the evidence and argument dealing with defendants’ beliefs). 
 124. Id. at 1120 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 125. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (Pentagon Papers 
Decision); Neer v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (“The chief purpose of the guaranty 
[of free speech is] to prevent previous restraints upon publication.”). 
 126. As one amicus in the litigation explained, while the views expressed by the protesters 
may have been “deeply abhorrent to most Americans,” they nevertheless expressed “a view of 
the type that is protected by the First Amendment.” Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomas Jefferson 
Center for the Protection of Free Expression at 1, Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d 1058 (No. 99-
35320); see also Gey, supra note 42, at 589. 
  It is not outlandish to argue that although judgments such as the one in the 
Nuremberg Files case will undoubtedly chill speech, most of the country will be 
better off when this particular corner of the marketplace of ideas is silenced. 
However, this argument is a very dangerous one, and one that cuts against the grain 
of the First Amendment decisions issued by the Supreme Court since 1960. 
Id.; see supra note 53 (discussing antiwar demonstrations). 
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could just as easily be the advocates of civil rights, labor rights, or 
any other cause that is, at times, controversial.127 Rather, it is what it 
means for freedom of speech in America. If the way the en banc 
court weighed the issues stands, its doctrine of “true threats”—
particularly its purely negligence standard128 and its unrestrained use 
of evidence of context beyond that for which the speaker is legally 
responsible129—is a potentially devastating legal sword to draw and 
 
 127. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded by 
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In more modern times, the labor, anti-war, animal rights 
and environmental movements all have had their violent fringes.”) As one amicus explained: 
  For First Amendment purposes, it is irrelevant that the words charged involve 
abortion, or that they might encourage readers or listeners to thwart a woman’s 
constitutionally protected right of choice. For if an abhorrent subject matter proved 
to be disqualifying under the First Amendment, militant advocates of civil rights, or 
consumer interests, or labor protests might be silenced by similar judgments if a jury 
found certain extreme and inflammatory statements to be actionable threats. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression at 1–2, 
Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d 1058 (No. 99-35320); see also id. at 11 (arguing that “the basic 
principles of free expression clearly transcend both message and medium”); id. at 6 (“Given 
the intensity of the views that [defendants] harbor about abortion, passionate and 
inflammatory language (which some persons might well view as ‘threatening’) is hardly 
surprising. Nor is the situation different in other volatile arenas—civil rights, environmental 
protection, union organizing, consumer boycotts, etc.—where passionate views often give rise 
to intemperate, even menacing words.”); Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of 
Oregon, Inc. at 12, Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d 1058 (No. 99-35320) (“[C]are must be taken to 
ensure that defendants in ‘true threats’ cases are not punished for unpopular but protected 
activities or expression . . . .”); cf. Murray, supra note **, at 738–39 (“Even if some people 
might be tempted to applaud the judicial morphing of the Hobbs Act’s ‘obtaining’ 
requirement to sanction anti-abortion protesters, they should pause to consider the 
implications of this new form of extortion for all social and political protesters. Nothing in the 
language of the statute limits its applicability to anti-abortion protesters. Rather, anyone who 
wants to silence any social or political protest can draw and wield the RICO/Hobbs Act 
weapon created by the expansion of Hobbs Act extortion. Two businesses have, in fact, used 
this weapon to silence protesters who demonstrated against something wholly unrelated to 
abortion—cruelty to animals.”). Indeed, the high money judgment in the Nuremberg 
litigation is spawning similar suits involving protests and issues wholly unrelated to abortion. 
See, e.g., Siobhan Morrissey, Unsavory Speech: A Pedophile Murder Case Drags the First 
Amendment Back into Court, A.B.A. J. 20 (Jan. 2001) (reporting the filing of a wrongful death 
suit, modeled on the Nuremberg suit, for murder of ten-year-old boy against the North 
American Man/Boy Love Association based on Web site postings). Other Internet Web site 
suits are also pending. See, e.g., Federal Suit Targets Neo-Nazi Web Site-Mom, Daughter Stalked 
For Year, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 13, 2000 (reporting the filing of a suit alleging a 
violation of the fair-housing law by the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
against the owner of a neo-Nazi Web site who posted pictures of fair-housing specialists from 
Pennsylvania, called her a “race traitor,” and showed images of her home exploding). 
 128. Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1088. 
 129. Id. at 1086. 
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wield for those who seek to silence and delegitimize speech with 
which they disagree in America’s roiling cultural wars.130 
 
 130. ¶1. Viewing the Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion in isolation from its social and 
political context would be as myopic as trying to determine the meaning of language without 
looking at the context within which the speaker spoke. As context must inform language and 
expressive conduct, so too, it must inform law. 
¶2. Today, America is rocked by a “culture war,” or as Justice Scalia describes it, taking 
his term from German history, a “Kulturkamf.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). In Romer, the Court held that a constitutional amendment in Colorado 
that prohibited granting “special rights” to gays and lesbians, adopted by a statewide 
referendum, was a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority, 
in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, saw the issue in terms that rejected any legitimate state 
interest in the classifications. Id. at 635–36. The minority, composed of Justices Scalia and 
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist, saw the issue differently: 
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional 
amendment . . . [was] a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to 
preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority 
to revise those mores through use of the laws. . . . In holding that homosexuality 
cannot be singled out for disfavorable treatment, the Court . . . places the prestige 
of this institution behind the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as 
reprehensible as racial or religious bias. Whether it is or not is precisely the cultural 
debate that gave rise to the Colorado constitutional amendment. 
Id. at 636 (citation omitted). 
¶3. That America is rocked by a “cultural war” is a thesis that was most recently 
popularized by JAMES DAVIDSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE 
AMERICA–MAKING SENSE OF THE BATTLES OVER THE FAMILY, ART, EDUCATION, LAW, AND 
POLITICS (1991). See also TOM SINE, CEASE FIRE: SEARCHING FOR SANITY IN AMERICA’S 
CULTURE WARS (1995); THE AMERICAN CULTURE WAR: CURRENT CONTESTS AND FUTURE 
PROSPECTS (Jame L. Notan, Jr. ed., 1996). The thesis is not without its detractors. See, e.g., 
CULTURAL WARS IN AMERICAN POLITICS: CRITICAL REVIEWS OF A POPULAR MYTH (Rhys H. 
Williams ed., 1997). Nevertheless, the phrase is commonly used to describe various social or 
political disputes. See, e.g., Judith Lyne Hanna, Wrapping Nudity in a Cloak of Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2001, at 14 (describing efforts by local governments to circumscribe “nude 
erotic dancing” as a “lightning rod for cultural wars”). 
¶4. Broadly, Hunter argues in Culture Wars that most public controversies today, with 
qualifications, may be lined up with the “orthodox” on one side and the “progressives” on the 
other. Traditionally, through the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, America’s 
pluralism struggled with a different effort to define social reality. On the one hand, Protestants, 
and a largely Protestant-based populism, sought to ward off challenges to their view of 
America by various minority cultures—principally Catholics, Jews, and members of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints—to carve out a space in American life where each could live 
according to conscience and the obligation of community life without harassment or reprisal. 
That struggle is largely over. According to Hunter, today’s divisions of political consequence 
are not theological or ecclesiastical, but are the result of differing world views or ideologies. 
For Hunter, public arguments now—whether over “gay rights” or “family values” or “the 
right to chose” or “the right to life”—are rooted in “moral authority,” that is, “the basis by 
which people determine whether something is good or bad, right or wrong, acceptable or 
unacceptable . . . .” HUNTER, supra, at 42. Old kinds of conflicts—Protestants against 
Catholics—are “virtually irrelevant.” Id. Hunter gives “orthodox” and “progressive” special 
definitions. The key distinction lies in that “orthodoxy” reflects the “commitment on the part of 
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adherents to an external, definable, and transcendent authority.” Id. at 44. That authority 
reflects “a consistent, unchangeable measure of value . . . and identity, both personal and 
collective.” Id. By contrast, “progressivism” tends to be “defined by the spirit of the modern 
age, a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism.” Id. “[T]ruth tends to be viewed as a process, a 
reality that is ever unfolding.” Id. Indeed, a radical minority of progressives claim that “there is 
no meaning to life except that which the individual chooses to bestow upon it, that there is no 
justice except the justice that exists in the realization of particular individual interests, that 
virtue is entirely personal and perspectival . . . .” Id. at 321. Sadly, their radical view is 
sometimes reflected in modern court opinions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, JJ., plurality) (“At the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”) If that view was literally obtained, constitutional 
rights themselves would be without the rational support that the Founders’ philosophy 
accorded them. See generally Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher” Law Background of American 
Constitution Law, Parts I & II, 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928–29); DONALD S. LUTZ, 
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 92–95, 156–66 (1988) (arguing for the 
influence of John Locke). WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *42–44, *121–22, 
similarly credits Locke’s influence. Indeed, that the Founders’ philosophy was based on an idea 
of “natural rights” is today a commonplace that no longer requires the citation to authority. 
See, e.g., LEARNED HAND, BILL OF RIGHTS 1–2 (1958) (“[T]hey were generally regarded as 
embodying the same political postulates that had been foreshadowed though not fully 
articulated in the exordium of the Declaration of Independence: ‘self-evident’ and ‘unalienable 
rights’ with which all men are ‘endowed by their creator’ and among which are ‘life, liberty 
and pursuit of happiness.’ . . . The easiest support for this attitude was that the source of 
‘Natural Law’ was the Will of God; so St. Thomas Aquinas conceived it; so does the Church 
still assert it; and so did the Deists of the eighteenth century.”). See infra note 181 for a 
discussion of the historical origin of the idea of liberty in the context of efforts to establish 
freedom of religion in Imperial Rome. That this background of the law and traditional values is 
“foundationless” may, of course, be argued, but its consequences ought to be faced with eyes 
wide open. Rights without rational support are rights on the way to obsolescence. See infra 
note 181 (discussing the lack of support in modern philosophy for a concept of personal 
identity, the prerequisite for “self” to which to attach “rights,” and its tragic consequences for 
human beings, touching closely on the issues raised in the American Coalition litigation). 
According to Hunter, the growth of science and technology; the industrial revolution; the 
spread of the Enlightenment faith in reason and the power of independent human rationality, 
and—ironically—the post-modern despair over that rationality itself; the advent of Darwin and 
the theory of evolution; break throughs in astronomy, psychology, and sociology; the rise of 
historicism and higher criticism all were phenomena that originated in Europe, but spread to 
America and put pressure on traditional forms of culture. In particular, they put pressure on 
religious belief, giving rise to secular humanism and now its collapse into post-modern 
criticism, if not nihilism. For a discussion of those turning points in American history and their 
relation to those who shaped modern law, see infra note 178. 
¶5. What is most problematic about this new divide is its implication for American 
democracy: “[O]n political matters one can compromise; on matters of ultimate moral truths, 
one cannot.” HUNTER, supra, at 46. “At the heart of the new cultural realignment are the 
pragmatic alliances being formed across faith traditions.” Id. at 47. What is at stake in the 
struggle is the “power to define reality,” that is, what “America” means. Id. at 52. 
Unfortunately, in our information society, this struggle is in the hands of the “elites,” who 
alone can operate in various forms of public discourse, including law. Id. at 59. “In brief, the 
media technology that makes public speech possible gives public discourse a life and logic of its 
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own, or life and logic separated from the intentions of the speaker or the subtleties of 
arguments they employ.” Id. at 34. Tragically, “this dispute is between groups who hold 
fundamentally different views of the world [and between contenders who] are generally 
sincere, thoughtful, and well meaning . . . .” Id. at 63. But when a battle in the contemporary 
cultural war becomes a real-life drama of ordinary people opposing each other on an issue, 
litigation seems inevitable; and indeed, “litigation is pursued as the first step rather than the 
last resort . . . .” Id. at 320. “[P]olarization is virtually guaranteed.” Id. at 321. Division and 
deadlock result. Indeed, the litigation, at bottom, reflects a purpose “to delegitimate [the 
other side] and its agenda through discrediting labels and commentary[, in particular,] when[, 
for example,] RICO or federal anti-racketeering laws are applied to certain kinds of political 
activism . . . .” Id. at 250. “As with all other expressions of cultural antagonism, the culture 
war is ‘about’ the uses of symbols, the uses of language, and the right to impose discrediting 
labels upon those who would dissent.” Id. at 158. 
¶6. Hunter’s thesis is aptly illustrated by the litigation discussed in these materials, 
though the issues raised by these materials go well beyond the abortion debate discussed in 
them. On one side, the demonstrators seek to label those involved in the provision of abortion 
services as “murderers,” akin to those who engaged in the Nazi genocide. On the other side, 
those involved in the clinics and their supporters seek to label the demonstrators as 
“racketeers.” The litigation is not, therefore, so much about legal remedies—injunctions, 
damages, or attorney’s fees—as about “labels” or “social stigma.” The war is not fought over 
“villages,” but over the “hearts and minds” of the “country side.” The reason why is clear. In 
1859, John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty, in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 282 
(Robert Maynard Hutchins et al. eds., 1952) [hereinafter GREAT BOOKS] aptly noted: “[T]he 
chief mischief of . . . legal penalties is that they strengthen . . . social stigma.” It is “the 
stigma,” he commented, “which is really effective” in limiting the “open avowal” opinions so 
labeled. Id. The American people are, in fact, sharply divided over abortion. See Gallop Poll 
Topics: A-Z, Abortion Issues, available at, http://www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/ 
indabortion.asp (last visited Nov. 29, 2000) (reporting the relative “pro-choice” proportion of 
the population (48%) and the relative “pro-life” proportion of the population (43%) to be 
relatively constant between 1988 and 2000; that 48% of the population thinks that abortion is 
an act of murder, while 45% do not; that in the first three months of pregnancy 65% of the 
population thinks abortion should be legal, while 31% do not, but in the last three months of 
pregnancy 86% of the population thinks it should be illegal, while 8% think it should be legal). 
How these seemingly contradictory positions can be reconciled is seldom articulated by those 
who voice them. Neither side, therefore, is currently “winning” in the “label” war, that is, a 
majority is neither “pro-life” nor “pro-choice,” and because each side’s position is in apparent 
irreconcilable conflict with the other’s position, its supporters must be constantly galvanized to 
maintain even a minority position. But see Gina Kolata, As Abortion Rate Decreases, Clinics 
Compete for Patients, N.Y. TIMES., Dec. 3, 2000, at A1 (reporting that the number of 
abortions declined from 1990 to 1997 by 17.4% and that, as a consequence, the same number 
of clinics must compete for the business of an increasingly smaller number of persons seeking 
abortion services). 
¶7. However, as these wars develop in society, one proposition should not be up for 
debate: the courts ought to be neutral. Otherwise, the Constitution would become, as Holmes 
notes, “the partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions . . . .” Otis v. Parker, 
187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (Holmes, J.). Legal processes should not be enlisted to advantage 
or disadvantage any side. Groups within society should be left to work out their differences 
among themselves. Judicial thumbs should not be placed on the scales of justice. The First 
Amendment does not belong to one side or the other, but to both sides together. Justice 
Holmes put it well in United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654–55 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
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dissenting): “[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for 
attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought—not free thought for those who 
agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.” 
¶8. More recently, one Ninth Circuit judge made the point with even greater force in 
American Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 
2002). In 1998, the AFA, a Christian group, sponsored an advertising campaign in San 
Francisco. The campaign featured a newspaper ad proclaiming that while “Christians love 
homosexuals, ‘God abhors any form of sexual sin,’ whether it is homosexuality, premarital sex, 
or adultery.” Id. at 1119. Certainly, the message was controversial, especially in San Francisco. 
But rather than allow the various sides to air their views, the City and County of San Francisco 
quickly passed two resolutions formally condemning the campaign. One of the Resolutions, 
No. 873-98, denounced the campaign. Another sponsoring organization, with particularly 
harsh language, declared: 
[T]he vast majority of medical, psychological and sociological evidence supports the 
conclusion that sexual orientation can not be changed” and that ads insinuating as 
much are “erroneous and full of lies.” The [R]esolution also stated that ads 
suggesting gays or lesbians are “immoral and undesirable creates an atmosphere 
which validates oppression of gays and lesbians” and encourages maltreatment of 
them. The Resolution claimed a “marked increase in anti-gay violence” that 
coincided with “defamatory and erroneous campaigns” against gays and lesbians. It 
then urged “local television stations not to broadcast advertising campaigns aimed at 
‘converting’ homosexuals. 
Id. at 1120. The majority upheld the resolutions against both Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clause challenges. But in a pointed dissent, Judge John Noonan justly excoriated the majority 
for legitimizing the government’s foray into the culture wars: 
  This case is a skirmish in the culture wars of the last century. Our culture has 
been the product, at least in part, of Jewish and Christian religious teaching; and the 
culture wars have, almost inevitably, brought about challenges to that teaching. The 
plaintiffs here emphasize the religious roots and religious nature of their message. 
The defendants focus on secular consequences of a message that they nonetheless 
maintain comes from a religious group using such a fundamentally religious 
category as sin. 
  We are not meant to be soldiers in the skirmish. We are asked, as much as it 
lies within our capabilities, to put aside our own freight of values and to put on the 
neutrality that our Constitution guarantees government will have in religious 
controversy. We are not asked to determine the religious or secular truth of the 
plaintiffs’ message or the city’s rebuttal. We have no competence to do so. 
Id. at 1126 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
¶9. For a perceptive and persuasive essay about the cultural wars in the academy, see 
Eugene Goodheart, Reflections on the Culture Wars, 126 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF ARTS & SCI. 
153, 173–74 (1997) (“The argument in the essay represents an ongoing effort on my part 
to . . . franchise certain ideas that have become disreputable in the humanities: objectivity, 
disinterestedness, tradition, and aesthetic appreciation. . . . They are or should be the common 
possession of scholars of whatever political or cultural persuasion—left, right, or center. . . . To 
agree on their necessity in intellectual exchange is not to agree about everything, but it may 
create the possibility of overcoming the current academic Balkanization in which one seeks the 
comfort zone of the like-minded or prepares to do battle with the enemy.”). See generally 
CAMPUS WARS: MULTI-CULTURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (John Arthur & 
Amy Shapiro eds., 1995). For an appropriate application of “true threat” teaching to a campus 
war, see Bauer v. Sampson, No. 99-56964, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22362 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 
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Under the en banc court’s approach, all that is required for 
speech to constitute a “true threat” is that a reasonable person in a 
“context of violence” would foresee that the recipients of the 
speaker’s statement could view the statement as a serious expression 
of the speaker’s intent to harm or assault.131 This mere negligence 
standard is simply not compatible with a constitutional guarantee as 
fundamental as free speech. Certainly, few argue that threats of violence 
should be constitutionally protected; we do not. On the other hand, 
speech that attempts to persuade by label—or even coerce by social 
ostracism—is an inviolate part of give and take in a free and pluralistic 
society.132 Certainly, a person’s right to protected speech cannot be 
consistent with individual freedom, curtailed by another person’s violent 
conduct, when that conduct is not authorized, directed, or ratified by 
the speaker. Constitutional rights to free speech are personal; they 
cannot be vicariously lost.133 In short, warnings are not threats. 
 
2001) (granting summary judgment to college professor on professor’s First Amendment claim 
that his speech was protected as against application of campus speech code). 
For a short review of the Kulturkampf in Bismarckian Germany between the Iron 
Chancellor and Germany’s dissenting Catholic minority, see MICHAEL STURMER, THE 
GERMAN EMPIRE: 1870–1918, 28–41 (2000). Hitler’s Germany also had its “church 
struggle.” See IAN KERSHAW, HITLER 1936–45: NEMESIS 39–41 (2000). Concern about 
changes in culture patterns is a part of most historical periods in Western society. See, e.g., 
OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST (1932); MAX NORDAU, DEGERERATION 
(1895). 
 131. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 132. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982) (“The claim 
that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive impact . . . does not remove them 
from the reach of the First Amendment.”); cf. Appellants’ Reply Brief at 24, Am. Coalition, 
290 F.3d 1058 (No. 99-35320) (commenting on the power of social disapprobation to effect 
change, the defendants pointed out that “Plaintiffs find these ‘posters’ threatening because 
they became known as the country’s foremost providers of abortion services. They became 
known as, as the Defendants state, ‘the deadly dozen.’ Anyone—those who disapprove of 
abortion, the plaintiffs’ neighbors, friends, pastors and others with whom they might come 
into contact—would now be more likely to know them as abortion providers. Plaintiffs have 
become to the abortion arena what the President is to the political arena. It is this thrust into 
prominence that the Plaintiffs find threatening.”). 
 133. In our polity, rights—particularly constitutional rights—are personal rights. They 
belong to each individual to exercise or not to exercise, and they are each person’s to use or 
lose. This is current teaching of history and constitutional doctrine. During the conflict over 
the ratification of the Constitution, the Anti-Federalists argued against ratification on the 
grounds that it ceded too much power to the federal government. See generally THE ANTI-
FEDERALISTS PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham 
ed., 1986). The Constitution needed, they argued, a bill of rights to protect individuals against 
the misuse of federal power. See infra note 171 (debates in House of Representatives on 
adoption of bill of rights). Indeed, six of the constitutions adopted by the colonies at the 
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suggestion of the Continental Congress before 1787 contained full bills of right. ROSCOE 
POUND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF LIBERTY 82 (1957). The 
proposed national constitution did not. The absence was telling. Not that the body of the 
Constitution did not contain protections for civil liberties. It did. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 
(state denied power to impair obligation of contracts); id. art. I, §§ 9–10 (neither federal nor 
state power extends to ex post facto laws); id. art. I, §§ 9–10 (neither federal nor state power 
extends to bills of attainders). It was a question of degree. Accordingly, a Bill of Rights was 
adopted in the form of ten amendments to the Constitution of 1789; they were ratified by the 
states in 1791. 
Excluding the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the first eight amendments protect, in 
one form or another, individual liberties. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486–
99 (1965) (Goldberg, J. concurring with Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J.) (arguing that the 
Ninth Amendment protects privacy). The amendments were drafted as limitations on national 
government. Bannon v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). 
After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court began the process of the 
“selective incorporation” of the Amendments into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as a limitation on state power. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147–48 
(1968) (tracing the incorporation of various amendments and the test for incorporation). Only 
the right to bear arms, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 542, 553 (1876), grand 
jury indictment, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884), and civil jury trials, 
Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 216–23 (1916), are expressly 
not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. No Supreme Court decision touches on 
the Third Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. III (quartering soldiers). 
Each of these amendments is rooted in particular historical grievances. See generally 
POUND, supra, at 82–108 (tracing the origins of each of the provisions in the Bill of Rights). 
Each represents an instance of perceived overreaching by government that invaded individual 
rights. See supra note 130 ¶ 4 (Founders’ Natural Rights Philosophy); HAND, supra note 130, 
at 1–2 (“[T]hey were generally regarded as embodying the same political postulates that had 
been foreshadowed though not fully articulated in the exordium of the Declaration of 
Independence: ‘self-evident’ and ‘unalienable rights’ with which all men ‘are endowed by their 
Creator’ . . . .”). 
The individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution are personal rights. The Bill of 
Rights are, in effect, “bills of liberties.” POUND, supra, at 92. “They define circumstances . . . 
in which politically organized society will keep its hands off and permit free, spontaneous, 
individual activity . . . .” Id. The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491–92 (1963), 
not to be witness against oneself under the Fifth Amendment, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 
69–70 (1906), and effective assistance of counsel, under the Sixth Amendment, Massiah v. 
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206–07 (1964), are, for example, personal; they cannot be 
exercised by another or for another. Even where another may consent to a search, for example, 
the individual is thought to have clothed the person with the authority, United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169–72 (1974), and he retains the right to object to its exercise, 
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 546–50 (1968). 
Behind bills of rights are political ideas rooted in religious ideas. Pound observes: 
  The political ideas [in the Constitution] are largely those of the Puritan 
Revolution. . . . [They] are those of an era of revolt from authority: of individual 
interpretation of the Bible and nonconformity in religious organization, and of 
consociation rather than subordination in government. They are ideas of the privacy 
of the individual man as the moral and so the political unit. . . . [They give rise to 
the] rights of the individuals subject to the authority of government and 
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define[] . . . and protect liberties, that is, areas of nonrestraint of men’s natural 
faculties of action. 
POUND, supra, at 102–04 (emphasis added); see infra note 181 ¶¶ 7–8 (religious origin of 
idea of individual). 
Generally, only the individual personally aggrieved by an unconstitutional exercise of 
governmental power may complain of the infringment. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 
U.S. 17, 21 (1960) (“one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard 
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other 
persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional”). Exceptions are 
made in the areas of civil rights and free speech. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 495–
507 (1972) (Whites may complain of exclusion of Blacks from petit jury); Broadrick v. 
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–18 (1973) (principles reviewed of permitted facial attacks on 
statutes on a First Amendment ground by person not aggrieved by statute’s application to 
him); see also Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1013–17 (1973) (Burger, C.J., and Powell, J., 
concurring) (considering and denying the standing of a “next of friend” to raise Eighth 
Amendment issues in face of knowing and intelligent waiver of rights by condemned convict); 
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154–56 (1990) (personal injury of condemned convict 
prerequisite to assertion of another’s rights, even in general administration of death penalty). 
Nevertheless, the “Justices agree on no specific litmus test that determines when an individual 
may assert the rights of others not before the Court.” JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99 (6th ed. 2000) [hereinafter NOWAK & ROTUNDA]. For 
one description of those considerations, see Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Wonson Co., 467 U.S. 
947, 956 (1984) (“Within the context of the First Amendment, the Court has enunciated 
other concerns that justify a lessening of prudential limitations on standing . . . . Thus, when 
there is a danger of chilling free speech . . . society’s interest [in the exercise of free speech by 
individuals trumps prudential limitations].”). But our point is that these exceptions are seen as 
exceptions, and even in their application, the right to object exercised by third parties is not 
seen as an exercise of the person’s or society’s right, but the right of the aggrieved individual. 
Individual rights are, in short, personal rights. 
The issue of the power, if at all, of third parties by their own conduct to circumscribe 
the exercise of the rights of another is worked out by the Supreme Court in the context of the 
Fighting Words, Incitement, and Hostile Audiences Doctrines. See generally 4 RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTION 240–48 (3d ed. 1999) 
(analyzing the Fighting Words and Hostile Audience Doctrines) [hereinafter ROTUNDA, 
TREATISE]. In brief, the Fighting Words Doctrine, stemming from Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942) (face-to-face confrontation; “G**-damned racketeer” 
and “a damned fascist”; properly prohibited as “fighting words”), permits the government to 
ban “face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee.” Id. at 
573. Such “epithets [are] likely to provoke the average person to retaliation [and] . . . cause a 
breach of the peace.” Id. at 574. Their “slight social value as a step to the truth” is “clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Id. at 572; accord ZECHARIAH 
CHAFEE JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 170–71 (1990) (Fighting words “do not form an essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, have a very slight social value as a step toward truth, . . . offer 
little opportunity for the usual process of counter-argument[, and] almost immediately [will be 
followed by] retaliatory violence.”). 
Where a person is speaking to a crowd, rather than face to face, the issue is controlled by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[The government may not] forbid . . . 
advocacy of . . . force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting . . . 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite . . . such action.”). There, a Ku Klux Klan 
leader’s conviction was reversed; he was charged for violating Ohio’s criminal syndication 
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statute by advocating political reform through violence and assembling with a group to teach 
his doctrines. The Court held that no conviction could be obtained consistent with free speech 
rights unless the government proved (1) subjective intent to incite by the speaker, and (2) the 
words spoken by the speaker were in context likely to produce imminent lawless action. The 
requirement that the words objectively encouraged the lawful action was added by Hess v. 
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 106–08 (1973) (“We’ll take the f**king street later” or “We’ll take 
the f**king street again.”) (spoken during antiwar demonstration, but spoken to no one in 
particular; conviction of disorderly conduct not consistent with free speech rights). 
The Hostile Audience Doctrine may be illustrated by Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 
(1949) and Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). Terminiello was convicted for a breach 
of the peace. A howling crowd gathered outside the auditorium where he was speaking. 
Terminiello’s speech was a denunciation of Jews and Blacks. The police feared violence. When 
Terminiello did not end his speech, he was arrested in order to keep the peace. Justice 
Douglas, who wrote for the majority, analyzed the function of free speech; it was, he said, “to 
invite dispute. . . . Speech is often provacative and challenging. It may . . . have profound 
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea . . . .” Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4. 
Nevertheless, the conviction was reversed, not because the speech was protected, but because 
the statute was overbroad. Terminiello was followed by Feiner, which directly raised the hostile 
audience issue, since Feiner did not challenge the over breadth of the ordinance. Feiner spoke 
for over thirty minutes, in which he made derogatory remarks about the President of the 
United States and Mayor of Syracuse; he then called on Blacks to “rise up in arms and fight for 
equal rights.” Feiner, 340 U.S. at 333 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The racial remarks stirred 
“excitement.” Id. at 317. “[On]lookers made remarks to the police about their inability to 
handle the crowd . . . .” Id. The police asked Feiner to stop; when he refused, he was arrested 
for disorderly conduct. Chief Justice Vinson justified the arrest, finding that Feiner “pass[ed] 
the bounds of argument or persuasion and under[took] incitement to riot . . . .” Id. at 321 
(emphasis added). In dissent, Justices Douglas and Black thought that the threat of violence 
was minimal; they believed that the first duty of the police was to protect the speaker and to 
control the crowd. Rightly, Rotunda and Nowak distinguish Terminiello and Feiner, hostile 
audience decisions, from Chaplinsky, a fighting words decision, based on context. NOWAK & 
ROTUNDA, supra, at 1195. Terminiello and Feiner, he points out, involved speakers delivering 
speeches heard by an undifferentiated crowds; Chaplinsky, on the other hand, involved a face-
to-face confrontation between the speaker and a particular person. In brief, speeches are 
properly afforded free speech protection, but words spit out in face-to-face confrontations are 
treated, not as speeches, but as actions likely to provoke unthinking reactions. Thus, context is 
crucial. 
While Feiner (even though it can be seen as an incitement decision rather than as an 
incorrectly decided hostile crowd decision) is not yet overruled, but it is repeatedly 
distinguished. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 13 (collecting cases). If cases can be said to 
possess only leases on life, not a fee simple ownership, Feiner’s lease long ago ran out, and it is 
now surely a tenant at sufferance. In brief, convictions of speakers because of hostile audience 
reactions are no longer affirmed by the modern Court. The government, in short, is “not 
allowed . . . to prosecute speakers for breach of the peace simply because the speech was before 
a hostile audience.” Id. at 1199. Instead, the Court follows the wise counsel of Zechariah 
Chafee: no one ought to be made “a criminal simply because his neighbors have no self control 
and cannot refrain from violence.” CHAFEE, supra, at 172 
The Hostile Audience Doctrine may also be illustrated by City of Forsyth v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), in which the Court struck down on its face an ordinance that 
permitted a county administrator to charge no fee or to vary the fee for a demonstration or 
parade permit based on his estimate of the county’s costs associated with maintaining public 
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Worse, under the district court’s approach, as affirmed by the en 
banc court, whether speech is protected or unprotected becomes a 
jury question, subject to a relatively limited constitutional review. 
Close questions will go to the jury,134 and they will be affirmed on 
appeal on the basis of substantial evidence135 (deferentially 
reviewed)136 where the admissibility of evidence is a matter of abuse 
of discretion.137 That not only means that the interpretation of the 
 
order, in effect, letting him gauge public response and shift the cost of a hostile audience 
reaction to the demonstrator or parade sponsor. In short, the whole Court is in agreement that 
“heckler’s veto” is not constitutionally permissible. See 505 U.S. at 139–40 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting in which White, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ., concurred). 
 134. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1070–71. 
 137. ¶1. Id. at 1070. 
¶2. For the sophisticated legal practitioner at the trial and appellate level, standards of 
review are passports to understanding and using the law. In fact, the rules of law that define its 
substance are only one of its aspects; the understanding and use of standards of review by 
advocates, fact finders, individual judges at trial, or by panels of judges on appeal goes to the 
heart of the law, not as rule, but as process, and the law as process is often the difference 
between the law as aspiration and the law as performance. Thus, understanding and using 
standards of review are crucial to understanding and using the law. Justice Benjamin Cardozo 
aptly made the point in his classic THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921): “We 
may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with any 
eyes except our own.” (He might well have added that after we get a little older, we must wear 
glasses to see things at all.) Since few aspects of the law may legally be viewed with our own 
eyes, standards of review are a key aspect of the legal process. In brief, standards of review are 
the variously tinted “legal lenses” through which the law requires its participants to view 
different kinds of legal issues. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 163 (1999) (analyzing 
proper standard of review for patent matters). For an insightful discussion of the factors (legal, 
factual, and administrative) that go into the formulation of standards of review on appeal, see 
the able opinion of Chief Judge Posner in Thomas v. GMAC Corp., 388 F.3d 305, 307–08 
(7th Cir. 2002). 
¶3. Standards of review are crucial in several general ways, but, most significantly, in 
framing issues and assigning roles. CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 38, at 1–2. “[P]ractice 
counts more than words.” Id. Practice gives legal formulation life. But, words, in fact, “frame 
the practice.” Id. Justice Felix Frankfurter put it well: “In law . . . the right answer usually 
depends on putting the right question.” Estate of Roberts v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue Service, 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943); accord R.G. COLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF 
HISTORY 273–75 (rev. ed. 1951) (“Every step . . . depends on asking a question. . . . 
Descartes, one of the three great masters of the Logic of Questioning (the other two being 
Socrates and Bacon) insisted upon this as a cardinal point . . . .”); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE 
BRAMBLE BUSH 72–73 (1975) (“[E]ven when the evidence has been interpreted as to what it 
means—in fact—there remains the job of seeing what it means in law: of putting [it] into those 
abstract categories . . . of legal rules . . . .”). “[I]ssue framing is the turning point of the 
decision.” CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 38, at 1–3. So, too, is the assignment of roles and 
powers to those who exercise them. Id. Power is both granted and withheld by standards of 
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review. Roles are defined for the participants in the legal process: litigant, advocate, fact finder, 
trial judge, and appellate judge. Each participant is assigned a role, and each is told how to play 
it. The participant’s role determines the kind and degree of intensity with which matters are 
viewed. Most significant, the terms for finding error by other participants are set. Judges sit in 
review of both juries and other judges under specified standards of review. In short, role and 
power are opposite sides of the legal tender of standards of review. 
¶4. We discuss at various points in these materials the relevant standards of review, their 
impact on litigation raising issues of free speech or expressive conduct, and make appropriate 
recommendations for reform. See, e.g., infra notes 719–20 (pleading standards in civil and 
criminal litigation). Here, we make only two broad points about standards of review that cut 
across particular issues: viewed as a whole, standards of review tend to move matters forward—
without regard to the underlying issue—to the point where legal and factual disputes are 
resolved, and once a resolution is made, they tend to protect it from change at later points in 
the system. 
¶5. Moving the process forward and a reluctance to change decisions once made are two 
tendencies in the law that reflect an unavoidable and uneasy balance between justice on the 
merits and efficiency of process. On the civil side, for example, the liberal pleading standards of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rely, not on pleading, but on discovery and summary 
judgment to get to “the gravamen of the dispute . . . frankly into the open for the inspection 
of the court.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 122 S. Ct. 992, 998 (2002) (citation omitted). Yet the 
imposition of various and severe discovery costs on the adversary may, in fact, be a principal 
objective of the litigation for one side of the controversy. That tactic must be recognized for its 
transparent character and circumscribed; it can be if courts are attuned to the tactic and willing 
to intervene. See, e.g., Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 597–601 (1998) (procedures to 
control civil litigation reviewed). Moreover, under FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
56(c) (“no genuine issue as to any material fact”), summary judgment is only proper where a 
party fails to raise a material issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986). The party must be given notice of any 
challenged issue and an opportunity to respond. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 326. A full 
opportunity for discovery is required. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257. A dispute is “genuine” when 
“a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id., 477 U.S. at 248. The 
facts and inference are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587. Thus, while summary judgment may curtail litigation 
without substance, substance may too often be easily put in issue or manufactured, particularly 
on questions of states of mind. Mental states give meaning to otherwise innocent conduct, but 
questions dealing with states of mind are for the jury; thus legally requiring proceeding to trial. 
See, e.g., Bruner Corp. v. R.A. Bruner Co., 133 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 1998) (knowledge of 
stolen character of property); Veten v. Regis B. Lippert Intercat, Inc., 985 F.2d 1515, 1522–
24 (11th Cir. 1993) (intent to defraud at time of formation of contract). Litigation that 
implicates free speech or expressive conduct or questions of personal responsibility under basic 
principles of federal criminal law necessarily implicates mental states, thus requiring trial and 
imposing potentially crippling discovery costs on the speaker. Moving litigation along without 
an independent assessment of underlying merits threatens essential values in a free society 
because the threat of litigation itself, regardless of the likely outcome, chills protected speech. 
¶6. Similarly, on the criminal side, alleging an offense is little more than a matter of 
using the language of the statute. See infra note 720 (reviewing standards of civil and criminal 
pleading). Once the government puts in a reasonable amount of evidence of a “threat,” the 
question of whether the conduct is a “threat” is usually a question of fact for a duly instructed 
jury. See, e.g., United States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1995) (upholding 
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conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 886 for the use of the mail to transmit threat to judge over 
defense of political speech). Under FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 29, the general 
standard for a judgment of acquittal is whether reasonable minds on the part of the jury might 
fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 
240, 243 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.) (higher standard of burden of proof (beyond a 
reasonable doubt) in criminal cases reflected in review by trial court before submission to jury) 
(overruling United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J., collecting 
and analyzing the decisions) (same standard to be used in civil and criminal cases)). The 
question for the trial court is not whether it would find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but 
whether a reasonable jury might find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In brief, close questions 
usually go to the jury. Close questions are typically found where testimony conflicts, credibility 
is at issue, or different assessments may be made regarding the weight of the evidence. Such 
questions are not matters of principle to be resolved similarly across cases; for that reason, they 
are expressly the province of the jury, to be resolved case by case. Such questions, too, are 
found in most criminal prosecutions, a fact that highlights the central role of the jury in a 
criminal prosecution. 
¶7. Once a jury returns a guilty verdict in a criminal case, and after all post trial motions 
are denied, as they usually are, attention turns to the appeal, where the court of appeals, facing 
a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, is, like the trial court, not to resolve conflicts in 
testimony, to pass on the credibility of witnesses, or to assess the weight to be given to 
testimony. Because the jury verdict removes the presumption of innocence of the defendant, 
the court of appeals views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, gives to 
the government the benefit of all favorable inferences, and, if the verdict is merely sustained by 
substantial evidence, affirms the verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) 
(rational trier of fact could have found elements of offense beyond a reasonable doubt). Courts 
of appeal are unusually candid in assessing the practical implication of this standard of review. 
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 477 (3d Cir. 2002) (standard of review for 
reversal not met unless “prosecution’s failure is clear”); United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 
173, 175 (3d Cir. 2002) (the standard of review is “particularly deferential”; it imposes a “very 
heavy burden” on the appellant); United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 913 (7th Cir. 
1999) (standard of review faces appellant with “an uphill battle”); United States v. Hickok, 77 
F.3d 992, 1002, 1006 (7th Cir. 1996) (standard of review imposes on appellant a “heavy 
burden”; role of appellate court “exceedingly narrow”). Evidentiary issues, too, are reviewed 
on appeal, not de novo, as matter of law, but on an abuse of discretion standard; that also 
makes reversal unlikely. See, e.g., United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d 620, 637 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(standard of review is abuse of discretion; appellant carries a “heavy burden” because trial court 
is given “special deference” on evidence issues); Saunders, 166 F.3d at 917 (standard of review 
on admission of evidence is abuse of discretion; reversal only proper if failed to exercise 
discretion or exercised it in unprincipled fashion); United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777, 
781, 786 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding limit on the admission of early childhood experience of 
defendant and the admission of interracial couple’s reaction to defendant’s conduct, and 
affirming cross burning conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 3631). Moreover, errors at trial are 
viewed against the background of FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 52 (harmless 
errors not affecting substantial rights are to be disregarded; only plain error affecting 
substantial rights may be noticed when not brought to attention of the court). Katteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764–65 (1946) (conviction will be upheld unless influence of 
error gives rise to grave doubt of innocence); United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 
(1936) (only exceptional case may be noticed; plain error must substantially affect fair trial); 
accord Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993); see also Johnson v. United States, 
520 U.S. 461 (1997) (plain error is assessed at time of appeal, not trial); Cueto, 151 F.3d at 
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metes and bounds of constitutional protection is largely left in the 
hands of lay persons,138 but also that, in the majority of cases, 
defendants will have to undergo—and in civil proceedings pay for 
the costs of extensive discovery—a full trial on the merits before they 
can learn whether their speech is, in fact, protected.139 Given the 
 
637–38 (“substantial and injurious”; “exclusion of evidence had a prejudicial effect upon the 
jury’s verdict”). Finally, since Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 4-17 (1999), the failure to 
instruct the jury on an element of offense may itself be harmless error, a result all the more 
remarkable in light of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. In brief, the 
judicial role of error correction in criminal litigation is generally subordinated to considerations 
of process. The possibility of criminal prosecution for vicarious speech crimes, where judicial 
review of a defendant’s First Amendment rights is made only after the defendant is stripped of 
his presumption of innocence, by a review standard that severely disadvantages him, is 
inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty. 
¶8. We have no quarrel with the point at which the balance between merits (justice) and 
process (efficiency) intersects in most civil and criminal litigation. In fact, merits may be 
difficult to determine in the majority of cases simply because we possess no infallible method to 
determine with certainty historical facts. Fair, not perfect, process is all that is required. United 
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508–09 (1983) (“no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, 
and . . . Constitution does not guarantee such a trial”). Indeed, fair process may be an 
appropriate surrogate for right merits. Judicial resources are finite. If lavished or squandered on 
one piece of litigation, they are not available for use on another piece of litigation. Thus, 
justice rendered in one case is justice denied in the other. Nevertheless, we vigorously argue in 
these materials that litigation itself is not fungible. Some cases are more important than others, 
not to the litigants, but to the society. Litigation rightly raising free speech or expressive 
conduct issues is more important than other kinds of litigation. See supra note 133 (while 
individual rights are personal, free speech issues warrant special standing rules). Accordingly, 
we identify in these materials in each particular context where and when the present standards 
of review for speech or expressed conduct and personal responsibility in the federal criminal 
law must be more faithfully applied or rethought and reformulated, that is, particularized in 
light of the importance of these values, which are insistently implicated in this kind of litigation 
in a free society. 
 138. See Appellants’ Reply Brief at 9, Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, 
Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 99-35320) (“The 
jury’s decision below, which imposed a total of $107 million in damages . . . is a poster-child 
for just how fact-finders may inhibit free expression.”). 
 139. See id. at 15 (“The mammoth length of First Amendment cases will impose costs on 
defendants bludgeoning them into submission.”). Moreover, the conduct of such protesters 
may well be outside of insurance coverage, not only for liability, but also for defense. See, e.g., 
State Auto Ins. Cos. v. McClamroch, 497 S.E.2d 439, 442 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (residential 
picketing against abortion provider that gave rise to tort litigation, including under North 
Carolina RICO, within policy exclusions as “intentional acts”). Indeed, as Judge Kozinski 
noted in his en banc dissent, civil judgments imposed on protesters may not even be 
dischargeable in bankruptcy. See In re Treshman, 258 B.R. 613 (Bankr. D. Md. 2001) (finding 
judgment incurred by a protester in the American Coalition trial court decision 
nondischargeable under the discharge exception for “willful and malicious injury” found in 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1993 & Supp. 2000)); see also In re Michael Bray, 256 B.R. 708 (Bankr. 
D. Md. 2000); WILLIAM MILLER COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 523.12[3] (1996) 
(analyzing 11 U.S.C. § 532 (1994) (making exceptions to the discharge in bankruptcy)). The 
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arsenal of statutes proscribing “threats,” this constitutional test will 
inevitably chill free speech140—as the defendants and various 
amicae141 in the American Coalition litigation so eloquently pointed 
out. Under this approach, the prospects for freely exercising First 
 
concern of congressmen over the issue of the discharge of “abortion protesters” is difficult to 
understand except as symbolic action in the continuing culture wars. Compare note 130 
(analyzing the current culture wars), with Philip Sheon, Negotiators Agree on Bill to Rewrite 
Bankruptcy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2002 (reporting that “[t]he compromise will restrict 
the ability of anti-abortion protesters to use the bankruptcy laws to shield themselves”). That 
means, of course, that such protest activity puts at risk all of the assets the protester has, and all 
he may ever acquire. Only the very poor or the very rich can afford to protest. See Murray, 
supra note **, at 694. 
 140. As Antonio Califa, Legislative Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”), explained: 
[T]he harm caused by the chilling of free speech is comparatively greater than the 
harm resulting from the chilling of other activities. [Therefore,] [t]he logical 
mandate of the chilling effect doctrine is that legal rules should be formulated to 
allocate the risk of error away from the preferred value, thereby minimizing the 
occurrence of the most harmful errors. 
Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 833 (1990); see also 
Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 
B.U. L. Rev. 685, 688 (1978) (arguing that the doctrine of “chilling effect may be seen not as 
[a] non-conceptual generalization . . . but rather as a specific substantive doctrine lying at the 
very heart of the first amendment” (footnote omitted)). 
 141. For example, the ACLU Foundation observed: 
  When protected speech is chilled because of uncertainty about the dividing line 
between protected and unprotected speech, the benefits and protections of the First 
Amendment are diminished for everyone. On the other hand, “true threats” 
undeniably have a chilling effect on the exercise of constitutionally-protected 
activities and have no place in civil society. Reconciling these two principles is one of 
the most important challenges in this case. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc. at 3, Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d 
1058 (No. 99-35320). Likewise, the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free 
Expression commented: 
  The need for . . . care is especially acute where, as is the case here, the targeted 
speech [on the basis of which liability is to be imposed] concerns volatile topics of 
public and political debate. 
  While certain types of verbal threats may incur legal sanctions, . . . not all 
words which may seem to convey a threat are unprotected. . . . [T]he task of 
determining what constitutes a “true threat”—for which the speaker may be liable—
is a delicate and painstaking one. That task becomes even more difficult when the 
alleged threats contain language which, literally construed, do not immediately 
threaten harm, and which include a view on a volatile political question. In such a 
case, the potential for chilling protected expression is especially grave. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression at 2, 
Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d 1058 (No. 99-35320) (citations omitted); see also id. at 5 (“[T]he 
facts of the present case illustrate the risk that [an objective] standard—if not applied in the 
most sensitive way—could gravely chill political expression on issues of public concern.”). 
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Amendment rights in an increasingly pluralistic society—which can 
be expected to see more, not less, social and political dissension—are 
tragically bleak. Is the sun beginning to set on free speech in 
America? Is it twilight for the First Amendment? These questions are 
not yet conclusively answered. 
In fact, the Founders precisely designed the First Amendment to 
protect speech so that it could serve as an alternative to violence and 
as a way to express and to resolve social, political, and even personal 
disagreements in a free society. To so ill-define the contours of First 
Amendment protections through substantive standards or trial and 
appellate practices that the rights guaranteed are difficult to exercise 
when they are most needed is perverse. The “negligence standard,” 
which substitutes for a subjective state of mind, and that the district 
court followed and the en banc court affirmed, is fundamentally at 
odds with the general theory of the First Amendment and 
fundamental principles of federal criminal jurisprudence.142 In 
addition, its revolutionary view of evidence of context for which a 
defendant may be held responsible is similarly objectionable. 
Together, they are inconsistent not only with the fundamental 
principles of the First Amendment and federal criminal jurisprudence 
but also with specifically controlling Supreme Court precedent, in 
particular Claiborne. The en banc court’s cursory effort to 
distinguish Claiborne cannot be squared with the duty of lower 
courts under the doctrine of stare decisis.143 
The Ninth Circuit’s panel opinion went far toward curing the 
defects of the district court’s effort. Its approach was far more 
 
 142. See infra Part III; Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. 
Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1015 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part, remanded by 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (questioning whether the Ninth Circuit’s 
standard was an intent or a negligence standard); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU 
Foundation of Oregon, Inc. at 5, Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d 1058 (No. 99-35320) (“Our 
worry . . . is that a ‘negligence’ standard will lead to self-censorship by speakers who must 
necessarily guess about where the constitutional lines will ultimately be drawn. For that reason, 
the Supreme Court has often imposed a scienter requirement in free speech cases . . . .”). 
 143. Justice Baldwin put it well: “We must respect the solemn decisions of our 
predecessors and associates, as we may wish that those who succeed us should respect ours; or 
the supreme law of the land, so far as depends on judicial interpretation, will change with the 
change of judges.” Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190, 202–03 (1831) (Baldwin, J., 
dissenting); see also Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam) (“[U]nless we 
wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be 
followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may 
think it to be.”); supra note 38 (duty to follow precedent). 
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consistent with the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
than is the en banc court’s opinion. First, the panel insisted on 
making a de novo determination of whether the speech involved was 
protected and ultimately decided that, as a matter of law, it was.144 
The en banc court correctly determined that de novo review was 
required, but then failed to perform that review in any meaningful 
way.145 Second, the panel rightly realized that it was not free to write 
on a blank slate: no matter what Ninth Circuit precedent said about 
the test for a true threat—specific intent or negligence—the Supreme 
Court provided controlling guidance on the issue in Claiborne.146 
The en banc court’s flat rejection of Claiborne as precedent is 
unpersuasive and an affront to the doctrine of precedent; even if the 
case did not involve a statute specifically targeting threats, the 
rationale of the Court’s decision, including its specific reference to 
Watts, spoke volumes about the proper scope of political and social 
protest under the protections of the First Amendment.147 Indeed, 
that the decision would have gone the same way had it involved civil 
rights, not abortion, is questionable. The en banc majority could not 
offer this point as a controlling distinction between the two 
decisions, but it was sadly implicit in all that it said. The media can 
be forgiven for seeing the case in those stark terms.148 That a court 
would share the media’s shallow view is indefensible in a free society 
under the rule of law. Finally, the panel resoundingly affirmed that 
constitutional rights are personal and cannot be vicariously lost: 
context neither authorized, directed, nor ratified by the speaker 
cannot be used to divest his or her speech of constitutional 
protection.149 Its opinion stands in sharp and unfavorable contrast 
with the en banc court’s permissive approach to evidence of 
context.150 
Still, even under the panel’s approach, that the defendants 
endured discovery, trial, and appeal before finding out that their 
speech was protected does not bode well for the open and robust 
 
 144. Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 1019. 
 145. Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1085. 
 146. Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 1014. 
 147. Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1071–72. 
 148. See supra notes 7, 13. 
 149. Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 1014; see supra note 133 (discussing personal character 
of constitutional rights). 
 150. Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1086–88. 
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exercise of free speech rights. Moreover, the panel, while recognizing 
the facts of Claiborne as controlling, nevertheless left open the 
question of whether specific intent or mere negligence is the proper 
standard to use for state of mind.151 Thus, while the Ninth Circuit 
panel opinion is far more protective of free speech than the rulings of 
the district court or the en banc court, and far more consistent with 
First Amendment theory and Supreme Court precedent, it does not 
do all that must be done if free speech is to be protected in 
America.152 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
To understand the proper application of the First Amendment to 
cases involving “true threats,” we must do more than simply cite 
precedents. We must begin at the beginning. Adopted as part of the 
Bill of Rights in 1791, the First Amendment states, in relevant part, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.”153 By its terms, the Amendment applies only to the federal 
government.154 Nevertheless, it applies to the states through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.155 While the language 
of the Amendment as applied to both the federal and state 
governments requires that neither Congress nor state legislatures 
“abridge . . . freedom of speech,” the Amendment neither defines 
“speech” nor explains what kinds of laws constitute “abridging” 
freedom of speech.156 The history of the Amendment is also 
 
 151. Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d at 1015 n.9. 
 152. See infra Part VI. 
 153. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 154. See id.; see also Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) 
(holding that the Bill of Rights applies only to the Federal Government and not to the States). 
 155. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 n.1 (1996) 
(“Although the text of the First Amendment states that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press,’ the Amendment applies to the States under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 
(1925), was the first Supreme Court decision to apply the freedom of speech provision of the 
First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 666 (“For 
present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are 
protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the 
fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”). 
 156. Cf. KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS 13–14 (1995) (“The basic American 
constitutional standard of ‘abridging the freedom of speech’ seems to call for conceptual 
categorization to do much of the work of constitutional decision, although courts may need 
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uninformative.157 Consequently, courts must resort to “creative 
interpretation”—looking simultaneously to tradition and to theory—
to breathe appropriate life into the Amendment.158 
A. Creative Interpretation: Rationales for the Freedom of Speech 
From time to time, writers advance theories of the proper role of 
the First Amendment in American society. As they deforest the land 
in an effort to provide a theoretical framework for the First 
Amendment, writers advocate one or more of various, but not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, theories. These theories include: (1) 
free speech is essential to the search for truth159; (2) free speech is 
essential to intelligent self-government in a democratic system160; (3) 
free speech promotes tolerance and diversity161; (4) free speech 
furthers individual autonomy and self-fulfillment162; (5) free speech is 
a check on tyranny163; (6) regulations directed at “harmful” speech 
 
some explicit balancing to avoid unacceptable results.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, Liberal Visions of 
the Freedom of the Press, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1025, 1040 (1992) (“[T]aking the text at face value 
when it seemingly speaks in categorical terms might lead to absurd results.”). 
 157. Even the renowned originalist Robert Bork admits that the First Amendment’s text 
and legislative history are unhelpful; something more is required, Bork argues, in enforcing the 
dictates of the First Amendment. See Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(en banc) (Bork, J., concurring) (recognizing the need for courts to “continue to develop 
doctrine to fit [F]irst [A]mendment concerns” and “discern how the [F]ramers’ values, 
defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the world we know”); see also Robert 
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 22 (1971) 
(“The [F]ramers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not to have 
been overly concerned with the subject.”). 
 158. See Tona Trollinger, Reconceptualizing the Free Speech Clause: From a Refuse of 
Dualism to the Reason of Holism, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 137, 147 (1994). Trollinger 
writes: 
Because the text of the First Amendment is not self-defining and its history is 
uninformative, courts can only deduce the meaning of the Free Speech Clause by 
creative interpretation. In other words, because the major premise of the 
jurisprudential free-speech syllogism, the text, is so unenlightening[,] . . . the minor 
premise, the interpretive schematization, necessarily defines the scope of speech 
protection. 
Id. (citing Frederick Schauer, Philosophy of Language and Legal Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 399 (1985) and NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.02[G], at 1–3 (1992)). 
 159. See infra notes 192–96 and accompanying text (development of marketplace 
rationale for free speech). 
 160. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 25 (1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 109 (1965). 
 161. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986). 
 162. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984). 
 163. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 893 
will inevitably be abused to constrain worthwhile speech164; (7) free 
speech is important in accommodating the interests of competing 
groups and achieving social stability165; and more recently, (8) free 
speech protects the essential function of expression of “dissent.”166 
While each of these rationales offers an important insight into the 
values underlying the First Amendment, none of them by itself 
proves capable of setting out sufficiently clear principles to explain 
what “speech” is or when it can be “abridged.”167 As Professor 
Greenawalt observes, “What all of these perspectives do provide . . . 
is a set of considerations, a set of standards for the relation of 
government to citizens, which help to identify which interferences 
with expression are most worrisome and which operate as counters, 
sometimes powerful ones, in favor of freedom.”168 
In fact, theory alone cannot explain the practical reality of First 
Amendment protections in modern day America. However 
compelling, theory must always be tempered with the experience of 
the everyday—for while in theory, reality may not matter, in reality, 
theory often does not matter. As Justice Jackson once observed in 
the context of First Amendment freedoms, “The choice is not 
between order and liberty. It is between liberty with order and 
anarchy without either.”169 Thus, a historical examination of how 
courts treat the First Amendment is necessary to understand how it 
reached its present scope.170 
 
FOUND. RES. J. 521. 
 164. See GREENAWALT, supra note 156, at 22. 
 165. See id. at 24. 
 166. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 
(1999). See generally the brilliant—and dissenting from the modern liberal position (the right 
is prior to the good)—treatment of freedom, including, in various contexts, freedom of speech, 
found in the powerful essay, JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1999). The 
Garvey approach informs these materials, even when we disagree with him, and even though 
his text does not directly deal with “true threats.” 
 167. See GREENAWALT, supra note 156, at 34. 
 168. Id.; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789 (2d ed. 
1988). Professor Tribe maintains: 
No satisfactory jurisprudence of free speech can be built upon such partial or 
compromised notions of the bases for expressional protection or the boundaries of 
the conduct to be protected . . . . Any adequate conception of freedom of speech 
must instead draw upon several strands of theory in order to protect a rich variety of 
expressional modes. 
Id. 
 169. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 170. Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897) 
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This history of the First Amendment from its ratification in 1791 
until the early part of the twentieth century is muddled and often 
inconsistent.171 From the miasma of doctrine, theory, and result that 
 
(arguing that understanding history is vital to understanding law). Holmes writes: 
  At present, in very many cases, if we want to know why a rule of law has taken 
its particular shape, and more or less if we want to know why it exists at all, we go to 
tradition. We follow it into the Year Books, and perhaps beyond them to the 
customs of the Salian Franks, and somewhere in the past, in the German forests, in 
the needs of Norman kings, in the assumptions of a dominant class, in the absence 
of generalized ideas, we find out the practical motive for what now best is justified 
by the mere fact of its acceptance and that men are accustomed to it. The rational 
study of law is still to a large extent the study of history. History must be a part of 
the study, because without it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is 
our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, because it is the first step 
toward an enlightened skepticism, that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the 
worth of those rules. When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in 
the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his strength. But 
to get him out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or to tame him 
and make him a useful animal. 
Id. at 469. 
 171. See Michael T. Gibson, The Supreme Court and Freedom of Expression from 1791 to 
1917, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 331 (1986). After an extended analysis of the cases, Gibson 
concludes: 
  Although the freedom of expression doctrines which [sic] the Supreme Court 
developed between 1791 and 1917 were not as broad or as libertarian as modern 
doctrines, it would be an exaggeration to say that the Court was thoroughly hostile 
to freedom of speech . . . . It would be an even greater error to suggest that the 
Court’s decisions during this time should be considered when confronting First 
Amendment issues today. 
  The Court’s record on speech . . . was, for the most part, mixed. 
Id. at 331. 
The story of the controversies surrounding the adoption of the Constitution is an oft-
told tale; it need not be fully canvassed once again here. For a recent treatment of that history, 
see United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(8)(ii) the charge of unlawful possession of firearm by person subject to judicial 
restraint in domestic relations litigation; holding that Second Amendment affords a private 
right to bear arms, but that right is subject to reasonable limitations; tracing, in great detail, 
the history of the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and focusing, in particular, on the right to 
bear arms). For a general summary of the adoption of the Constitution, see ROBERT ALLEN 
RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS—1776, at 791 (1955). The classic treatments 
of that history, including contemporaneous arguments and understandings, may be found in 
JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Ch. 
XLIV, §§ 1857–1902 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991). Story treats the First Amendment in 
sections 1864–88. Story’s nineteenth century, limited, Blackstonian understanding of the 
meaning of the Free Speech Clause of the Amendment is, manifestly, considerably more 
restrictive than that which animates the jurisprudence of the current Supreme Court. In brief, 
he thought: 
[T]he language of [the] amendment imports no more, than that every man shall 
have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject whatsoever, 
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without any prior restraint, so always, that he does not injure any other person in his 
rights, person, property, or reputation; and so always, that he does not disturb 
thereby the public peace, or attempt to subvert the government. 
Id. § 1874, at 732–33 (footnotes omitted). 
A classic treatment, including the adoption of state constitutions, may also be found in 
THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST 
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (DaCapo Press 
1972) (1868). James Madison himself alluded to the controversy over the adoption of a Bill of 
Rights to the Constitution when he rose in the House of Representatives, on June 8, 1789, to 
offer “amendments” to the Constitution, in what, he said, “may be called a bill of rights.” 1 
THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDING IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 424, 436 
(compiled by Gales and Seaton in 1834). Madison observed: 
  There have been objections of various kinds made against the Constitution. 
Some were levelled against its structure because the President was without a council; 
because the Senate, which is a legislative body, had judicial powers in trials on 
impeachments; and because the powers of that body were compounded in other 
respects, in a manner that did not correspond with a particular theory; because it 
grants more power than is supposed to be necessary for every good purpose, and 
controls the ordinary powers of the State Governments. I know some respectable 
characters who opposed this Government on these grounds; but I believe that the 
great mass of the people who opposed it, disliked it because it did not contain 
effectual provisions against the encroachments on particular rights, and those 
safeguards which they have been long accustomed to have interposed between them 
and the magistrate who exercises the sovereign power; nor ought we to consider 
them safe, while a great number of our fellow-citizens think these securities 
necessary. 
  It is a fortunate thing that the objection to the Government has been made on 
the ground I stated; because it will be practicable, on that ground, to obviate the 
objection, so far as to satisfy the public mind that their liberties will be perpetual, 
and this without endangering any part of the Constitution, which is considered as 
essential to the existence of the Government by those who promoted its adoption. 
Id. at 433; see also id. at 447 (“The ratification of the Constitution in the several States would 
never have taken place, had they not been assured that the objections [to the lack of a bill of 
rights] would have been duly attended to by Congress.”). Among the amendments that 
Madison offered was: “The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to 
write, or to publish their sentiments.” Id. at 434. 
Madison, too, was concerned with more than the abuse of governmental power. He 
observed: 
  The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be leveled against that quarter 
where the greatest danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest prerogative 
of power. But this is not found in either the Executive or Legislative departments of 
Government, but in the body of the people, operating by the majority against the 
minority. 
  It may be thought that all paper barriers against the power of the community 
are too weak to be worthy of attention. I am sensible they are not so strong as to 
satisfy gentlemen of every description who have seen and examined thoroughly the 
texture of such a defense; yet, as they have a tendency to impress some degree of 
respect for them, to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the 
attention of the whole community, it may be one means to control the majority 
from those acts to which they might be otherwise inclined. 
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decisions in this time period created, the position that Blackstone 
advocated in his Commentaries largely prevailed until the turn of the 
twentieth century. Blackstone argued that freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press were limited concepts, protecting an individual 
only from prior restraint and not from post-publication 
prosecution.172 He wrote, “The liberty of the press . . . consists in 
laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom 
from censure for criminal matter when published.”173 Robertson v. 
Baldwin,174 decided in 1897, confirms that at that time the Supreme 
Court held this limited view. Robertson held that the First 
Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, did not 
 
Id. at 437. He added: 
  It has been said that it is unnecessary to load the Constitution with this 
provision, because it was not found effectual in the constitution of the particular 
States. It is true, there are a few particular States in which some of the most valuable 
articles have not, at one time or other, been violated; but it does not follow but they 
may have, to a certain degree, a salutary effect against the abuse of power. If they are 
incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider 
themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an 
impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or 
Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly 
stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights. 
Id. at 439 (emphasis added). The italicized portion of this speech does much to undermine the 
thought of those who question the legitimacy of the Supreme Court when it enforces the 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights. In a justly famous exchange at Harvard in the Holmes 
lectures of 1958 and 1959, Judge Learned Hand and Professor Herbert Wechsler reflected on 
the justification for judicial review. Hand supported it only on pragmatic grounds; Wechsler 
thought it supportable based on text and contemporary understanding. Wechsler cited, among 
other things, THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Hand even questioned that 
Madison supported judicial review. Compare HAND, supra note 130 ¶ 4, at 6 (Madison 
“doubtful”), 15 (“practical conclusion”) with Wechsler, supra note 7, at 3 (citing Hamilton, 
supra). Strangely, neither referred to the congressional debates on the passage of the Bill of 
Rights nor those at the time of the Civil War Amendments. The congressional debates on the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment are comprehensively summarized in Bernard H. 
Siegan, Separation of Powers & Economic Liberties, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 415, 443–49 
(1995) (“The Framers of and the state conventions that ratified the original constitution may 
not have comprehended the potential power of the Supreme Court, but the Framers and 
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly did.”). 
 172. BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at *151; accord STORY, supra note 171, § 1878. 
 173. BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at *151. 
 174. 165 U.S. 275 (1897). Subsequently, no less a figure than Justice Holmes echoed 
the point, for the Court, in Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. the Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 
462 (1907) (stating that the “main purpose of [freedom of speech] is ‘to prevent all such 
previous restraints . . . as had been practiced by other governments,’ and . . . [it does] not 
prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public 
welfare. . . . The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false as to the true; the subsequent 
punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false.” (citations omitted)). 
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create “any novel principles of government,” but instead, simply 
codified “certain guarantees and immunities which we had inherited 
from our English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial 
been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions.”175 
Beginning in the early part of the 1900s, however, Supreme Court 
First Amendment doctrine underwent a radical transformation, which 
eventually led to the present form of its jurisprudence. In fact, most 
courts and commentators begin their analysis of modern First 
Amendment doctrine with Justice Holmes’s opinions, beginning in 
1919 with the articulation of his “clear and present danger” test in 
Schenck v. United States,176 and his classic dissent in Abrams v. United 
States,177 which together form the backdrop for the bulk of the Court’s 
current work in the area of freedom of speech. In his Abrams dissent, 
Holmes famously advocated his “marketplace of ideas” theory, a 
tempered version of which still dominates the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence.178 That theory, in its moderate form, holds that freedom 
 
 175. Robertson, 165 U.S. at 281. 
 176. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 177. 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Chief Judge Posner 
suggests that the “common view” is that Holmes’s opinions in Schenck and Abrams are 
inconsistent. See RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 66 n.13 (2001) (citing 
DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 280–82, 324–25, 346–55 
(1997)). He disagrees and offers a convincing reconciliation of the two opinions: Schenck, in 
the context of an actual effort to obstruct the draft by mailing leaflets, discussed the costs of 
free speech, while Abrams, in the context of the general circulation of leaflets, discussed the 
costs of abridging free speech. Id. at 66. 
 178. ¶1. Holmes owes his “marketplace of ideas” theory to Charles Sanders Peirce. David 
S. Bogen, The Free Speech Metamorphosis of Mr. Justice Holmes, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 120 
(1982). Indeed, Peirce’s general contribution of American law is tangible, for those who take 
the trouble to look, though sadly few do. As such, the story of Holmes’s substantial debt to 
Peirce ought to be more widely known, for it embodies in the life experiences of identifiable 
individuals important aspects of the American experience, which are relevant to the 
foundations of American jurisprudence, one focus of these materials. 
¶2. In early 1872, several young Cambridge, Massachusetts, intellectuals formed a 
discussion group which they called “half-ironically, half-defiantly, ‘The Metaphysical Club’—
for agnosticism was then riding . . . high . . . and was frowning superbly upon all metaphysics,” 
LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 201 (2001), as remembered by one of its 
members, Charles Sander Peirce (1839–1914), a prodigy in mathematics, science, and 
philosophy. Other members of the club, each of whom would become influential, included: 
William James (1842–1910), then a young doctor, but eventually the world-renowned 
psychologist and quintessential American philosopher, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1841–
1935), a future Justice and Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court (1882–1902), a 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court (1902–32), and widely thought to be one of the 
giants to sit on the Supreme Court in the twentieth century, though dissent is sharp. See 
generally G. Edward White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 51 (1971); 
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see also infra note 193 (favorable opinion of Holmes by Chief Judge Richard A. Posner). The 
club lasted for only a few months, but the issues its members discussed—which were to occupy 
them for the rest of their lives—define, in many ways, modern American life; they are 
particularly relevant to the issues posed by the American Coalition litigation and our proposals 
for the reform of the jurisprudence of “true threats.” Our intellectual life in law—and outside 
of law—is the product in many ways of two wars: the Civil War, and the horrors it manifested 
on the battlefield, and World War II, and the horrors it brought to the attention of the nation 
in the impact of National Socialism. We turn here to the Civil War and its necessary 
background for the analysis undertaken in these materials. We also concretely illustrate the 
commonplace that turns in jurisprudence to produce changes in the law through the actions of 
particular individuals. For additional treatment of the impact of World War II and National 
Socialism, see infra notes 178, 416. 
¶3. According to Menand, for those who came of age in the early 1860s, two events—
one intellectual and one traumatic—changed the assumptions with which they viewed their 
world: The publication in 1859 of Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species and the Civil War. 
Accord WILLIAM JAMES, A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE 29–30 (1977) (We “have witnessed in our 
own persons one of those gradual mutations of intellectual climate [due in part to the] vaster 
vistas which scientific evolutionism has opened . . . .”). A materialistic theory of evolution, 
rooted in chance, not design, radically undermined belief in the thick legacy of religious and 
philosophical idealism that preceded the War—a war that swept away not only the civilization 
of the South, based on slavery and agriculture, and justified theoretically within the Union by 
state’s rights, but also the entire intellectual culture of the industrial North. “It took nearly half 
a century for the United States to develop a culture to replace it, to find a set of ideas . . . that 
would help people cope with the conditions of modern life.” MENAND, supra ¶ 2, at x. 
¶4. The basic facts of that fratricidal struggle make its sweeping impact wholly 
understandable. The population of the North was twenty-two million, the South nine million, 
plus three and one-half million slaves. ALAN BARKER, THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICA 144 
(1961). The North fielded the equivalent of 1,500,000 men, in rolling three year enlistments, 
totaling approximately 2,900,000, while the South, at any one time, fielded 1,000,000, for an 
overall total of 1,300,000, though “because of inadequate records nobody will ever get an 
exact count.” BRUCE CATTON, THE CIVIL WAR 162 (1960). “The struggle of [General 
Ulysses S.] Grant and [General Robert E.] Lee was an epic drama: modern total war faced the 
traditional conception of war as a contest of skill, finesse and chivalry.” BARKER, supra at 126. 
The North suffered 111,000 deaths in battle, the South 94,000, and “more than double this 
number on each side from disease and wounds.” Id. at 112. A people that suffers carnage of 
that magnitude will inevitably be revolutionized in a wide variety of ways. In fact, the Civil War 
“mark[s] the great divide in American history.” Id. at 164. Little remained as it was—down to 
the details of grammar. Symbolically, people now wrote, “The United States is, not the United 
States are.” A union of states was preserved in form, but changed in substance. “Succession 
allowed the North, for four years, to set the terms for national expansion without interference 
from the South.” MENAND, supra ¶ 2, at ix. The military defeat of the South made the 
Republican Party the controlling force in national politics after 1865. Considerations of states’ 
rights were put aside. “For more than thirty years, a strong central government practiced and 
promoted the ascendance of industrial capitalism and the way of life associated with it—the 
way of life we call ‘modern.’” Id. at x. 
¶5. The broad name for the set of ideas that emerged to replace the pre-War, traditional 
intellectual order is “pragmatism.” Borrowing it from Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, in 42 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 241 (contingent belief “forming the ground 
of actual use of means for the attainment of certain ends . . . [is] pragmatical belief”), Peirce 
introduced “pragmatism” to the Metaphysical Club in 1872. MENAND, supra ¶ 2, at 227. 
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When James publicly “invented” it years later, he expressly credited the name to Peirce. 
WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 25 (Guiles B. Gunn ed., 2000) 
[hereinafter JAMES, PRAGMATISM]. Peirce, James, and Holmes were hardly of a single mind. 
Nevertheless, certain doctrines are associated with American pragmatism (of which they are 
thought to be exemplars) and give an indication of the diversity of thought masked behind the 
label: that beliefs are hypotheses and ideas are plans of actions (a theory of mind); that ideas 
can be clarified by showing their relation to action (an account of meaning); and that beliefs 
are true when they are successful guides for prediction and action (a theory of truth). See 
Robert G. Meyers, The Beginnings of Pragmatism: Peirce, Wright, James, Royce, in COLUMBIA 
HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 592 (Richard H. Popkin ed., 1999). Each of these 
doctrines was formulated, elaborated, and modified, at least by Peirce during his career. See id. 
See generally CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, PRAGMATISM AS A PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF 
RIGHT THINKING (Patricia Ann Turrisi ed., 1999). Peirce, however, was a different kind of 
pragmatist from James or Holmes; he resolutely resisted nominalism and individualism. For 
Peirce, while thinking is done in generalizations, the universe contained things “to which our 
generalizations correspond[ed].” MENAND, supra ¶ 2, at 228. Each sees with his own eyes, 
but the aggregate of what we all see individually is real. “The opinion which is fated to be 
ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what [I] mean by the truth.” Id. at 229 (quoting 
Peirce). As in evolution, bad ideas are weeded out, leaving the good; we are, as Menand 
summarizes Peirce believing and “evolving, as a species, toward a complete epistemological 
rapport with reality.” Id. at 367. Accordingly, all opinion “must converge.” Id. at 369; see also 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, I.I. 992a, in 8 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 911 (“no one is able 
to attain the truth adequately, while collectively we do not fail . . . and . . . by the union of all a 
considerable amount is amassed”). 
¶6. James, on the other hand, possessed no such grand scheme, and he was not only an 
empiricist, but a nominalist and an individualist. For him, the “true” was nothing more than 
“what works well, even though the qualification ‘on the whole’ may always have to be added.” 
WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 357 (1997). Put in other words, 
“‘the true’ . . . is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as ‘the right’ is only the 
expedient in our way of behaving.” JAMES, PRAGMATISM, supra, at 97–98. In short, the “real” 
was only “anything . . . of which we find ourselves obligated to take account . . . .” WILLIAM 
JAMES, SOME PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 101 (1996). See infra note 647 ¶ 28 for the views 
of a more modern pragmatist (Richard Rorty) and for an analysis of the possible consequences 
of such views if the history of the rise of National Socialism can be used to draw lessons from 
history, though some of those points are made here. See also infra note 793 for the notion 
that lessons may be or are drawn from history. 
¶7. Peirce and James were philosophers, spokesmen for the new view of things. Holmes, 
on the other hand, was a jurist and in no sense a systematic thinker. Jurisprudential theories are 
often classified by which elements of the law they find essential. See MENAND, supra ¶ 2, at 
339. For example, “[a] legal theory that stresses . . . logical consistency of judicial opinions is 
called formalist; a theory that emphasizes their social consequences is called utilitarian; a theory 
that regards them as reflections of the circumstances in which they were written is called 
historicist.” Id. In contrast, Holmes acted on the belief that the law had “no essential aspect.” 
Id. In fact, “[o]nce at war,” Holmes “found that life resisted a neat intellectual ordering and 
that the rightness or wrongness of belief was largely irrelevant.” G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION PROFILES OF AMERICAN JUDGES 157 (1978). “[N]o 
generalization was worth a damn; fighting for ideals was heroic, but ideals were meaningless in 
themselves.” Id. “The easy solution was to acknowledge ‘ultimate facts’—power, force and 
change—and let the ‘goodness or badness of laws’ turn on ‘what the crowd wants,’ even 
though the crowd, ‘if it knew,’ would not want what it did.” Id. at 160 (citations omitted); see 
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Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 31 (1920) 
(“Men . . . believe what they want . . . . I see . . . no basis . . . that tells us what we should 
want . . . .”). Admittedly, aspects of Holmes’s thought are in tension and require, for some, a 
reconciliation. These aspects include his good reputation in modern times and his bad 
philosophy, that is, bad from the traditional religious or natural rights perspective of the 
Founders. See Harold R. McKinnon, The Secret of Mr. Justice Holmes: An Analysis, 36 A.B.A. J. 
261 (1950); see also supra note 133 (material on natural rights background of the 
Constitution). Holmes’s philosophy was “agnostic, materialistic, hopeless of the attainment of 
any ultimate truth, meaning or standard of value.” McKinnon, supra, at 261. Accordingly, his 
philosophy is “indistinguishable from the amoral realism of those regimes of force and power 
that are the scandal of the century.” Id. Compare Robert H. Jackson, The Rule of Law Among 
Nations, A.B.A. J. 290, 293 (1945) (“It is a popular current philosophy, with adherents and 
practitioners in this country, that law is anything that can muster the votes to be put in 
legislation, or directive, or decision and backed with a policeman’s club. Law to those of this 
school has no foundation in nature, no necessary harmony with higher principles of right and 
wrong. They hold that authority is all that makes law, and power is all that is necessary to 
authority. It is charitable to assume that such advocates of power as the sole source of law do 
not recognize the identity of their incipient authoritarianism with that which has reached its 
awful climax in Europe.”), with McKinnon, supra, at 262 (quoting Holmes: “When the 
Germans [in World War I] disregarded what we called the rules of the game, I don’t see there 
was anything to be said except: we don’t like it and shall kill you if we can.”). In brief, 
Holmes’s thinking is characterized by “nihilism” and “Darwinian evolutionism in place of a 
personal destiny.” McKinnon, supra, at 344. While his reputation is good and his philosophy 
was bad, the tension is only apparent, for Holmes was “an agnostic prophet to an agnostic age. 
His bottomless relativism fails to create a reaction [today] because in an age that denies the 
validity of any form of knowledge but the tentative findings of the positive sciences that 
relativism possesses the glamour of a war cry.” Id. at 345. 
¶8. The contrast between Jackson’s ideals and Holmes’s nihilism is also reflected in their 
public lives. Holmes fought heroically as a soldier, but lost his ideals. At the conclusion of 
another war, Jackson fought heroically as a United States Prosecutor in the Nuremberg Trial 
to see American ideals translated into international law. The trial and the ideal of personal 
responsibility is discussed infra note 416. President Harry S. Truman appointed Jackson the 
United States Prosecutor for the Nuremberg Trial of the major Nazi leaders. Jackson is 
generally credited with being the moving force behind the successful effort of the trials to 
establish principles of international law holding that individuals in governments are personally 
responsible for their conduct in conspiring to and engaging in aggressive war, committing war 
crimes, and committing crimes against humanity. Following the trial, the newly established 
United Nations ratified the Nuremberg principles. A popular account of the trial is JOSEPH E. 
PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL (1995). A more scholarly treatment is ANN TUSA & 
JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1986). For the single best, thoughtful essay on the 
“meaning” of the trial, see David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, in LEGAL MODERNISM 
335–78 (1994) (“The ambiguous legacies of Nuremberg linger at the margins of our 
unreliable moral memories; they inspire but also burden the conscience of our politics.”). The 
principles established by Jackson’s efforts at Nuremberg are vital today. See, e.g., Suzanne 
Daley, A Full Charge of Genocide for Milosevic: Indictment Portrays an Architect of War, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at A8 (reporting that the United Nations war crimes tribunal in the 
Hague issued a sweeping new indictment of the former Yugoslav president, Slobodan 
Milosevic, charging him with genocide, crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the 
Geneva Convention and with participating “in a joint criminal enterprise, the purpose of 
which” was genocide). Holmes’s legacy is more ambivalent. 
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¶9. American ideals, joined with pragmatism, also produced profound change in 
American law. Ideas, whenever they are adopted, inevitably produce consequences, as Holmes 
himself was fully aware. See Holmes, supra note 170, at 478 (“[R]ead the works of the great 
German jurists, and see how much more the world is governed today by Kant than by 
Bonaparte.”). The Civil War ended slavery; pragmatism contributed to the end of legal 
segregation. For James, theories were “instruments not answers to enigmas.” JAMES, 
PRAGMATISM, supra, at 28; see MENAND, supra, at xi (arguing that while different, Peirce, 
James, and Holmes “had in common . . . , not a group of ideas, but a simple idea—an idea 
about ideas. They all believed that ideas are not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but are 
tools . . . to cope with the world . . . .”). James’s thought had a major influence on Roscoe 
Pound (1870–1964). See DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND 183–204 (1974). Pound himself 
acknowledged the influence. See 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 16, 31 (1959). From 
1910 to 1936, Pound was the Dean of the Harvard Law School. In turn, Pound greatly 
influenced one of his students, Charles Hamilton Houston (1895–1950), one of the few blacks 
at the law school in the early 1900s, and the first to edit the Harvard Law Review. See JUAN 
WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL 55 (1998). Pound and Houston were close. Id. Houston 
took Pound’s instrumentalism with him to the Howard Law School, where he taught and 
became vice-dean, and where one of his protégées was Thurgood Marshall. Id. Together, 
harnessing Pound’s instrumentalism to the ideal of equality, they formulated and executed, 
through the NAACP, its project of using the law to end the legal separation of the races, which 
is memorialized in such decisions as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and, 
significantly for these materials, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
See generally WILLIAMS, supra, at 57–63, 93–100, 174–227 (tracing the relation between 
Houston and Marshall and the litigation that culminated in Brown). 
¶10. In 1872, “pragmatism” was only an idea. Today, pragmaticism is dominant in the 
American law. In fact, Robert Summers argues persuasively that “pragmatic instrumentalism” 
is the American jurisprudential philosophy. See ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, 
INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). But see GEORGE SANTAYANA, 
THE LIFE OF REASON 214, 218–19 (2d ed. 1924) (“[B]ut thought is in no way instrumental 
or servile; it is an experience realized, not a force to be used. . . . In so far as thought is 
instrumental it is not worth having . . . it must terminate in something truly profitable and 
ultimate which, being saved in itself, may lend value to all that led up to it. . . . a word, the 
value of thought is ideal.”). For a classic treatment of the impact of ideas—over a longer period 
of time—that essays more generally the thesis that ideas influence history, see RICHARD M. 
WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES (Midway reprint 1976) (arguing that much of the 
“disintegration” of modern culture may be attributed to a “first cause,” that is, the decline in 
social standards that we see today may be, in fact, intellectually traced to the fourteenth 
century when the belief in the reality of transcendentals was first seriously challenged). Weaver 
observes the following: 
[M]odernism encourages . . . rebelliousness; and rebellion, as the legend of the Fall 
tells us, comes from pride. Pride and impatience, these are the ingredients of that 
contumely which denies substance because substance stands in the way. Hence the 
war against nature, against other men, against the past. For modern man there is no 
providence, because it would imply a wisdom superior to his and a relationship of 
means to ends which he cannot find out. . . . The physical world is a complex of 
imposed conditions; when these thwart immediate expression of his will, he 
becomes angry and asserts that there should be no obstruction of his wishes. In 
effect this becomes a deification of his own will; man is not making himself like a 
god but is taking himself as he is and putting himself in the place of God. . . . Now 
that we have unchained forces of unpredictable magnitude, all that keeps the world 
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of speech is a necessary element of the process of searching for truth,179 
emphasizing “that a process of robust debate, if uninhibited by 
governmental interference, will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least 
the best perspectives or solutions for societal problems.”180 
While most trace the roots of the “marketplace of ideas” theory 
to English philosophers John Milton or John Stuart Mill, its roots 
actually extend further back—all the way to the time of the Roman 
Emperor Constantine, to Lucius Caecilius Firmiaus Lactantius. In his 
day Lactantius, a tutor to the Emperor’s eldest son, Crispus, was 
“[t]he leading contemporary exponent of Latin letters.”181 Charles 
 
from chaos are certain patterns, ill understood and surviving through force of 
inertia. Once these disappear, and we lack even an adventitious basis for unity, 
nothing separates us from the fifth century A.D. 
Id. at 182–85. Menand’s The Metaphysical Club is favorably reviewed in Jean Strouse, Book 
Review, Where They Got Their Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2001, at 10; it is, in fact, one 
excellent place to start in any review of the intellectual history of the early twentieth century— 
in law and in related fields. 
 179. See TRIBE, supra note 168, at 785. 
 180. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 3. 
 181. ¶1. CHARLES NORRIS COCHRANE, CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE 191 
(1944). 
¶2. Its modern relevance is seldom alluded to by anyone—except in histories of the 
period—but religious liberty first appeared in Western jurisprudence during the period of the 
Roman Empire through the Edict of Milan, jointly issued in 313 A.D., by Constantine (274–
337 A.D.), the ruler of the Empire in the West, and Licinius (308–324 A.D.), the ruler of the 
Empire in the East. The Edict of Milan was, however, not wholly an innovation. The old 
pagan Empire was slowly moving for some time toward an accommodation with a spreading 
Christianity. For a history of that process based on contemporary records, see RAMSAY 
MACMULLEN, CHRISTIANIZING THE ROMAN EMPIRE (A.D. 100–400), at 102 (1984) (arguing 
from a secular, practical perspective that nothing counts for more than the year 312, which 
brought Constantine’s conversion, or 313, with the Edict of Milan; also arguing that prior to 
those dates, conversion was accomplished mainly by apparent supernatural cures and the 
expulsion of supernatural beings from people and places, rather than particular teachings, but 
then after those dates, material and other advantages stemming from Imperial sponsorship may 
well be said to have played the major role in conversion). For a review of that period based on 
the insight of modern sociology, see RODNEY STARK, THE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY (1996) 
(arguing, among other things, that the growth of Christianity was slow, not massive; its 
growth was consistent with the growth of modern religions; it spread through religiously 
dispirited Greeks and Jews and among the pagan upper classes, not the poor; it spread due to 
the depopulation of the Empire through plagues that Christians disproportionably survived, 
since they cared for the sick, as pagans did not; and it offered superior ideas, including the 
higher status accorded women, and form of organization). In April of 311, Galerius, Emperor 
in the West, recanted the traditional, though not always enforced, policy of the persecutions of 
those who would not recognize the cult of the emperor. The text of his Edict is set out in 
EUSEBIUS, THE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH FROM CHRIST TO CONSTANTINE 353–54 (1965) 
(extending clemency to Christians so long as “they do nothing contrary to public order”). So, 
too, during this period, Maximin, the Emperor in the East, who first persecuted Christians, 
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wrote to governors under him, “the first missive on behalf of the Christians . . . .” Id. at 371–
73. It provided, in relevant part, that “if some [Christians] choose to follow their own worship, 
you will please leave them free to do so . . . [for] it is by persuasion and coaxing . . . [through 
which people] can more appropriately be recalled to the worship of the gods.” Id. at 372–73; 
see also id. at 376 (“[E]veryone who chooses to follow . . . [Christianity] may, in accordance 
with this our indulgence and in fulfillment of his own choice and desire, participate in such acts 
of worship as he was accustomed . . . .”) 
¶3. Constantine only came to the precedent-establishing Milan meeting after having 
first defeated in the West Maxentius at the Milvian Bridge in 312 A.D., where “as later legend 
has it . . . Constantine experienced his famous vision.” JOHN JULIUS NORWICH, A SHORT 
HISTORY OF BYZANTIUM 5 (1997). According to the legend, Constantine saw in the heavens a 
cross of light bearing the inscription Hoc Vince, or “Conquer by this Sign.” Comparable to 
that experienced by St. Paul on the road to Damascus, Constantine’s vision marked a 
watershed of world history. The story of the vision itself may be largely written off as a pious 
legend, though surely “before the battle the Emperor underwent some profound spiritual 
experience.” See id. at 41. When the triumphant Constantine met Licinius at Milan in 313 
A.D., one of the issues that was before them was “the question of religious toleration and, in 
particular, the future status of Christians.” Id. at 44. After other matters were taken care of, the 
two Emperors “agreed on the final text of [an] . . . edict, confirming that of Galerius and 
granting Christianity full legal recognition throughout the Empire.” Id. at 45. The text of the 
Edict is set out in Latin and English in LACTANTIUS, DE MORTIBUS PERSECUTORUM 71–73 
(J.L. Creed ed. and trans., 1984). In relevant part, the Edict provided: 
  When I, Constantine Augustus, and I, Licinius Augustus happily met at 
Milan . . . we thought that . . . the arrangements which above all needed to be made 
were those which ensured reverence for the Divinity, so that we might grant both to 
Christian and to all men freedom to follow whatever religion each one wished . . . so 
that the supreme Divinity, whose religion we obey with free minds, may be able to 
show in all matters. His accustomed favour and benevolence toward us . . . . This we 
have done to ensure that no cult or religion may seem to have been impaired by us. 
Id. at 71. 
¶4. The relations between the two Emperors did not remain amicable. Eventually, 
Constantine vanquished Licinius. At first, on the plea of Licinius’s wife, Constantia, 
Constantine’s sister, Constantine merely exiled Licinius. But a few months later, Constantine 
summarily put him to death. See NORWICH, supra ¶ 3, at 45–50. Constantine was then in sole 
control of the Empire, East and West. Constantine continued the policy of toleration begun in 
the Edict of Milan. In fact, reflecting his policy of toleration, he prepared and circulated 
throughout the Empire a prayer. In relevant part, it provided: 
Let those, therefore, who are still blinded by error be made welcome to the some 
degree of peace and tranquility which they have who believe [in Christianity] . . . . 
Let no man molest another in this matter, but let everyone be free to follow the bias 
of his own mind. . . . For it is one thing voluntarily to undertake the struggle for 
immortality, another to compel other to do likewise from fear of punishment. 
Id. at 52. 
¶5. ELIZABETH D. DIGISER, THE MAKING OF A CHRISTIAN EMPIRE: LACTANTIUS AT 
ROME (2000), contains a masterful retelling of the story, in which she develops fully, from an 
intellectual perspective, the contrasting ideas that stood on each side of the enormous historical 
divide represented by the Edict of Milan. In particular, Digiser carefully traces the influence of 
Lactantius on Constantine, whose court Lactantius joined in 310. Digiser credibly argues that 
Lactantius made a major contribution to Constantine’s policy of religious tolerance. See id. at 
13 (Constantine used Lactantius’s “Divine Institutes as a sort of touchstone in order to  
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establish a government under which all his subjects could fully exercise their obligation as 
citizens” consistent with the religious pluralism of the Empire.). 
[Lactantius] declares that it is inappropriate to use threats of force or penalties to 
defend any sort of religious worship . . . . To support his claim he draws upon 
Cicero’s ideal constitution in On the Laws. For Cicero, the gods should be 
approached chastely, “by people offering piety [pietas] and laying aside wealth”; 
God would “punish the one who does differently” . . . . Lactantius interprets this 
passage to mean that a true deity would reject human coercion to obtain 
worship . . . . On the contrary, he argues, force opposes the spirit of religion; it 
pollutes and violates religion with bloodshed . . . . Moreover, those who strive to 
defend religion with force make a deity appear weak . . . . Lactantius precludes the 
practice on the part of either side. The use of force against Christians merely exhibits 
the bankruptcy of the traditional religions and the philosophers’ arguments; the use 
of force by Christians opposes their deepest religious convictions, a fact that he 
makes explicit: “We put up with practices that should be prohibited. We do not 
resist even verbally, but concede revenge to God” . . . . 
  Lactantius also develops Cicero’s assertion that “purity of mind” is more 
important than ritual . . . . Here he takes Cicero to mean that a deity wants 
devotion, faith, and love, sentiments that do not arise in response to force . . . : 
“Why should a god love a person who does not feel love in return?” Consequently, 
“nothing requires free will as much as religion [nihil est enim tam voluntarium 
quam religio],” because religion is absent where an observance is forced . . . . This 
argument too applies to both sides: lack of feeling for a god violates both the quid 
pro quo of the traditional religions and the interior quality of philosophical piety. 
Nor can Christians retain people “against their will [invitus],” because the person 
who lacks the requisite inner conviction is “useless to God [inutilis est . . . 
deo]” . . . . 
Id. at 109 (citations omitted). 
¶6. Lactantius, a Christian, drew on Cicero, a Roman orator, to make his arguments 
more persuasive to the educated Roman. Nevertheless, “religious freedom” (libertas religionis) 
was first proposed by another Christian writer, Tertullian (160–220), who first coined the 
phrase. Compare id. at 112, with TERTULLIAN, APOLOGY XXIV 6 at 133 (1931) (“Look to it, 
whether this also may form part of the accusation of irreligion–to do away with freedom of 
religion, to forbid a man choice of deity, so that I may not worship whom I would, but am 
forced to worship whom I would not. No one, not even a man, will wish to receive reluctant 
worship.” (emphasis added)). In turn, Tertullian only developed the thought of other early 
Christians. Building on the Genesis 1:26 account of creation, where God made man in his own 
image and likeness, they developed, against the Roman ideal, that a man’s worth related to his 
family and society, the idea of “the intrinsic worth of every human being . . .” ELAINE PAGELS, 
ADAM, EVE, AND THE SERPENT XIX–XX (1988) (exploring how early Christians used in the 
first four centuries the Genesis account of creation in Jewish scriptures to develop ideas of 
human worth, equality, and freedom); see, in particular, id. at 32-56 (Chapter 2: Christians 
Against the Roman Order); accord ROBERT L. WILKEN, THE CHRISTIANS AS THE ROMANS 
SAW THEM 205 (1984) (“Christianity became the kind of religion it did because it had 
[pagan] critics . . . . They helped Christians to find their authentic voice . . . . Christians 
encountered the traditions of the ancient world, not simply as an intellectual legacy from the 
past . . . , but as part of a vital interaction through the vigorous criticism of pagan 
intellectuals.”). Pagels observes: 
Most Roman citizens would probably have agreed with Aristotle that . . . the 
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measure of one’s worth was what are contributed to the . . . business of the 
state . . . . Anyone who chose . . . to go a solitary way risked extreme ostracism: in 
Greek, the term “idiot” literally referred to a person concerned solely with personal 
or private matters . . . instead of the public life and social life of the larger 
community. 
PAGELS, supra, at 80. 
¶7. In fact, in the Roman polity, the unit of analysis of the law was not “person,” as we 
know it, a human being, but the family, which was identified with the father. BARRY 
NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 65 (1975) (“In the early law, and to a 
considerable extent throughout Roman history, the family is the legal unit. Its head, the pater 
familias, is the only full person known to the law.”). 
¶8. Significantly, Pagels elaborates: 
[Christians] originated . . . the idea that developed much later in the West as the 
“absolute value of the individual.” The idea that each individual has intrinsic, God-
given value and is of infinite worth quite apart from any social contribution—an idea 
most pagans would have rejected as absurd—persists today as the ethical basis of 
western law and politics. Our secularized western idea of democratic society owes 
much to that early Christian vision of a new society—a society no longer formed by 
the natural bonds of family, tribe, or nation but by the voluntary choice of its 
members. 
PAGELS, supra ¶ 6, at 81. 
¶9. Unfortunately, the policy of religious toleration lasted only sixty-seven years. 
Theodosius the Great (379–395 A.D.) faced a number of problems during his sixteen-year 
reign. The effects of some of his policies can still be seen. Theodosius was the last Emperor to 
rule over a united Roman Empire before the final collapse of the West from barbarian 
incursions. See NORWICH, supra ¶ 3, at 109–19. To stave off the tribes, he created 
“federalism” to permit them to settle within the Empire. But his policy on religion is what 
interests us. At Thessalonica in 380 A.D., Theodosius issued a fateful decree: 
  We desire that all peoples who fall beneath the sway of our imperial clemency 
should profess the faith which we believe to have been communicated by the 
Apostle Peter to the Romans . . . . And we require that those who follow this rule of 
faith should embrace the name of Catholic Christians, adjudging all others madmen 
and ordering them to be designated as heretics . . . . 
COCHRANE, supra ¶ 1, at 327. 
¶10. The old classical idea of a commonwealth held together by the cult of the emperor 
thus gave way in the Edict of Milan to the notion of two more or less distinct orders, one 
political, the other ecclesiastical, a beginning of the idea of the separation of church and state. 
As the Edict of Milan inaugurated the New Republic, the Edict of Thessalonia broke with that 
new notion, and it returned to the older idea of unity; it inaugurated the Orthodox Empire, a 
Catholic State. Id. at 328. In fact, the administration of Theodosius embarked upon a 
systematic effort to abolish the surviving forms of paganism. See id. at 328–32. Freedom of 
religion was at an end. The old Greco-Roman religion fell victim to the weapons that it had 
earlier employed against Christianity. The famous statue of Victory in the Senate House was, 
for example, removed. Ironically, as foretold by ancient legend that the removal of the symbol 
of Rome might be presaged, Alaric and his Gothic host marched triumphantly through the 
streets of the sacred capital in 410 A.D.; the event shook the Roman world to its foundations. 
See id. at 332–51. “The sack of the capital revealed as nothing else could have done, the grim 
truth that Romanitas had reached the end of the road.” Id. at 351–52. 
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Lactantius deserves, in much more than a purely verbal sense, to be 
called “the Christian Cicero.” And, in his Divine Institutes, his 
object was precisely analogous to that of Cicero in his generation 
[for the Old Republic of Rome]; the work was intended to serve as 
a De Officiis for the New Republic [of Constantine]. From this 
standpoint, it merits the close attention of those who desire a clue 
to the spirit of the Constantinian age.182 
The concept of a marketplace of ideas, while not so 
denominated, served as one of the core postulates for Lactantius’s 
vision of society. Lactantius was a devout Christian. Nevertheless, he 
realized that “by its very nature religion is something which cannot 
be imposed upon the mind by force.”183 Consequently, although he 
insisted that “[i]n the New Republic the primary object will be to 
secure, to all alike, liberty to profess Christianity and to live the 
Christian life” and recognized that this “postulates freedom for the 
Church,” he emphasized that under his vision of society, this 
“freedom . . . w[ould also] be extended to non-believers.”184 
Convinced that Christians had the truth, he reasoned that if pagans 
and Christians were permitted to write and discuss freely, the truth 
would prevail without coercion. Apparently, but unknowingly, later 
thinkers such as Milton and Mill185 would echo Lactantius.186 
 
 182. COCHRANE, supra note 181, at 191. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. John Stuart Mill (1806–73) is usually given unalloyed credit for On Liberty. In fact, 
he himself tells us that it was a collaborative work between him and Harriet Taylor, whom Mill 
met in 1831, but only subsequently married after the death of her husband. Mill called Taylor 
“the most admirable person I had ever known.” JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 111 
(Jack Stillinger ed., 1957). Mill commented that Taylor was “shut out by the social disabilities 
of women from any adequate exercise of her highest faculties in action on the world without.” 
Id. at 112. “Alike in the highest regions of speculation and in the smallest practical concerns of 
daily life,” he said, “her mind was the same perfect instrument, piercing to the very heart and 
marrow of the matter; always seizing the essential idea or principle.” Id. In fact, Mill and 
Taylor wrote On Liberty together, “reading, weighing and criticizing every sentence.” Id. at 
144. If it is truly a joint work, however, we wonder why it was not published under their joint 
names. No evidence appears in Mill’s autobiography that he read or was aware of the idea of 
Lactantius, though he was given a classical education. See id. at 5–6. But he was also aware of 
the issue of religious liberty under Roman rule. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in 43 GREAT 
BOOKS, supra note 130, at 267–79 [hereinafter Mill, Liberty]. That Lactantius and Mill (and 
Taylor) came to similar conclusions, though for different reasons, was apparently a product of 
independent invention. 
 186. Lactantius was among those that the Second Vatican Council credited, in its 
declaration on Religious Liberty, with helping to formulate the position of the Catholic 
Church, which “became more fully known to human reason through centuries of experience,” 
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Lactantius’s reasoning resurfaced during the Protestant 
Reformation when John Milton, whose views were a powerful blend 
of Christian humanism and Puritanism, argued for it in defense of 
free speech in England. In a speech before Parliament in 1644, 
Milton argued that allowing all perspectives on a given issue to be 
heard would not prevent the truth from coming out. Indeed, in his 
words, “Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon 
the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and 
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood 
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to worse in a free and open 
encounter.” 187 For Milton, reason was “choosing.” Man must, 
therefore, be left free to choose between good and evil; prescriptive 
morality prevented the understanding of truth known and the 
discovery of truth unknown. 
John Stuart Mill, for his part, refined the concept of freedom, 
pointing out the potentially catastrophic results of allowing anything 
short of free and vigorous expression of all sides of an issue. For Mill, 
the argument for the right of free speech—and its vigorous 
exercise—could be summed up in four points: 
 First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, 
for naught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to 
assume our own infallibility. 
 Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an error, it may, and 
very commonly does, contain a portion of the truth; and since the 
general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the 
whole truth, it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the 
remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied. 
 
that is, “man’s response to God by faith ought to be free, and that therefore nobody is to be 
forced to embrace the faith against his will . . . [, as t]he act of faith is of its very nature a free 
act . . . that [must be] reasonable and free.” VATICAN COUNCIL II, THE CONCILIAR AND 
POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 806–07 & n.7 (Austin Flannery ed., 1987) (comparing with 
Lactantius, Divinarum Institutionum). Pope John Paul II continues to affirm that “even in the 
context of a soundly secular State . . . each citizen, without distinction of sex, race and 
nationality, [must be guaranteed] the fundamental right to freedom of conscience . . . .” John 
Paul II, Address to Astana, Kazakhstan, Sept. 24, 2001, at http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/john_p. . .010924_Kazakhstan-astana-culture_en.html. 
 187. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644), reprinted in JOHN MILTON: COMPLETE 
POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 717, 746 (1957). See generally A.S.P. Woodhouse, Milton, 
Puritanism, and Liberty, 4 U. TORONTO Q. 483 (1934–35) (comparing Milton and Roger 
Williams in light of Pauline theology as formulated by Martin Luther and John Calvin). 
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 Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not only true, but the 
whole truth; unless it is suffered to be, and actually is, vigorously 
and earnestly contested, it will, by most of those who receive it, be 
held in the manner of a prejudice, with little comprehension or 
feeling of its rational grounds. And not only this, but, fourthly, the 
meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost, or 
enfeebled . . . .188 
Moreover, Mill observed, suppressing an idea harms all of 
humanity by robbing the truth-finding process of that idea: 
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that 
it is, robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing 
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than 
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the 
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what 
is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.189 
Thus, three philosophers—classic and modern, Catholic and 
Protestant—concluded that freedom of speech is essential because, in 
the end, truth is more likely to emerge from a debate in which many 
differing views are voiced than from government suppression of what 
the government deems false. The history of freedom of religion 
teaches us, too, that “freedom” itself began as “freedom of religion,” 
that is, a right against the state to chart a course of our own 
choosing. Over time, that “freedom” of “persons,” made in the 
image and likeness of God,190 grew to the full panoply of 
“freedoms,” which are now legally secured in the Bill of Rights. As 
history teaches that “virtue” for the person is indivisible,191 she also 
teaches that freedom for all of us is indivisible: when an attack is 
made on one freedom, an attack is made on all freedoms. 
In time, the marketplace rationale crossed the Atlantic and found 
its way into the American First Amendment jurisprudence of Holmes’s 
now famous Abrams dissent. There, Holmes observed that while 
 
 188. Mill, Liberty, supra note 185, at 292. 
 189. Id. at 275. 
 190. See supra note 181 (discussing history of “religious liberty”); see infra note 647 
(discussing the history of “personal responsibility”). 
 191. See infra note 656 (discussing “character,” “vice,” and “virtue”). 
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“[p]ersecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly 
logical . . . [i]f you have no doubt of your premises or your power and 
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your 
wishes in law and sweep away all opposition,” such persecution is not 
ultimately the wisest course.192 Instead, he opined as follows: 
 
 192. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
¶1. We cite to Justice Holmes in support of many of the propositions we advance on 
free speech in these materials. This is not the place, of course, for an in-depth analysis of 
Holmes’s free speech jurisprudence; it is ably done elsewhere. See, e.g., G. Edward White, 
Justice Holmes and the Modernization of Free Speech Jurisprudence: The Human Dimension, 80 
CAL. L. REV. 391 (1992); see also id. at 393 nn.10–12 (collecting articles). Nor do we express 
any opinion on the internal coherency of Holmes’s free speech jurisprudence—though various 
commentators observe that Holmes was not always a free speech defender, as most remember 
him. See, e.g., id. at 462 (“Holmes’s consciousness about the free speech dimensions of cases in 
1929 was light-years away from that in the 1890s, when he decided the McAuliffe [v. Mayor 
and Bd. of Aldermen, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892)] and [Commonwealth v.] Davis [, 39 N.E. 
113 (Mass. 1895)] cases, or that in 1915, when he decided Fox v. Washington, [236 U.S. 273 
(1915),] or even that in the spring of 1919, when Schenck and the other Espionage Act cases 
were decided. By the time he was deciding the Gitlow and Schwimmer cases, Holmes’s 
consciousness had shifted from that of a judge for whom speech issues seemed incidental, or 
trivial, or merely subsumed in other common-law issues, to one for whom speech issues were 
of central constitutional importance.”). Rather, we point to Holmes because most recognize 
him—and justly so—as among the founders of current, free speech-protective First 
Amendment doctrine. See id. at 392 (discussing Holmes’s “identification as the modern 
founder of an approach toward freedom of expression that treats the First Amendment as a 
source of significant limitations on legislative sovereignty”). But cf. Yosal Rogat & James M. 
O’Fallon, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion—The Speech Cases, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1349, 
1406 (1984) (describing how, for Holmes, deciding a case was merely a matter of “doing 
sums” to arrive at the answer required by “duty and reason”: “Justice Holmes did his ‘sums’ 
elegantly. That elegance was put to good use by [Zechariah] Chafee and others whose 
dedication to a liberal conception of free speech is clear.”). 
¶2. We do not mean to suggest that Holmes might adopt our approach to “true 
threats” in its entirety—or in part. Indeed, he probably would not adopt our approach. 
Holmes is best remembered for his “clear and present danger” test; simply put, Holmes 
believed that speech could be suppressed where “the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of 
proximity and degree.” Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.). The 
idea of “clear and present danger” justifying suppression of speech was ultimately given its 
enduring content by then Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, Learned Hand: “In each case 
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the ‘evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies 
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.” United States v. Dennis, 183 
F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). Under this test, speech is 
suppressible not because of any evil that the speech as speech might cause, but because of some 
criminal activity that it might bring about, such as violence. That is, speech is proscribable 
when it approaches an “attempt” to commit some substantive crime. See, e.g., Schenck, 249 
U.S. at 52 (Holmes, J.) (“It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting 
service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced . . . . If the 
act, (speaking, or circulating a paper,) its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the 
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same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.”); 
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (arguing that if the “natural 
and intended effect” of a speech was to obstruct recruiting, “and if, in all the circumstances, 
that would be its probable effect, it would not be protected by reason of its being part of a 
general program and expressions of a general and conscientious belief”); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I do not doubt for a moment that 
by the same reasoning that would justify punishing persuasion to murder, the United States 
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and 
imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United 
States constitutionally may seek to prevent.”); id. at 628 (“Publishing . . . opinions for the very 
purpose of obstructing [government aims,] however, might indicate a greater danger and at 
any rate would have the quality of an attempt . . . . An actual intent . . . is necessary to 
constitute an attempt, where a further act of the same individual is required to complete the 
substantive crime . . . . It is necessary where the success of the attempt depends upon others 
because if that intent is not present the actor’s aim may be accomplished without bringing 
about the evils sought to be checked.”); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If the publication of this document has been laid as an attempt to 
induce an uprising against government at once and not at some indefinite time in the future it 
would have presented a different question. The object would have been one with which the 
law might deal, subject to the doubt whether there was any danger that the publication could 
produce any result, or in other words, whether it was not futile and too remote from possible 
consequences. But the indictment alleges the publication and nothing more.”); see also Dennis, 
341 U.S. at 506–07 (synthesizing Holmes and Brandeis on freedom of speech: “[In their 
dissent in Gitlow,] Justices Holmes and Brandeis . . . made no distinction between a federal 
statute which made certain acts unlawful, the evidence to support the conviction being speech, 
and a statute which made speech itself a crime. This approach was emphasized in Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), where the Court was confronted with a conviction under 
the California Criminal Syndicalist statute . . . . In their concurrence[, Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis] repeated that even though the legislature had designated certain speech as criminal, 
this could not prevent the defendant from showing that there was no danger that the 
substantive evil would be brought about.”). 
¶3. Indeed, various commentators recognize that Holmes’s free speech jurisprudence 
was largely shaped by his experience with the law of criminal attempts. See Rogat & O’Fallon, 
supra, at 1361; White, supra, at 395. We, on the other hand, argue strenuously that threats 
should not be viewed as inchoate offenses—indeed, viewing threats as “attempts” 
fundamentally distorts federal criminal jurisprudence. Thus, while Holmes’s understanding of 
the free speech is inconsistent with our proposal, his approach—like that of Professor Gey, see 
supra note 42—is misguided as applied to “true threats” because it justifies proscribing speech 
because of substantive criminal offenses it might bring about, offenses which other statutes 
already proscribe, rather than because of the evils that the threats themselves, in fact, cause, 
i.e., fear and disruption. See infra note 729–33 and accompanying text (discussing interests 
implicated by threat jurisprudence). 
¶4. Two logical corollaries of Holmes’s “clear and present danger” approach also put 
him at odds with our approach. First, for Holmes, the state of mind required for a speaker to 
lose First Amendment protection is the intent to bring about some substantive harm—e.g., 
violence. See, e.g., Debs, 249 U.S. at 215 (Holmes, J.) (arguing that if the “natural and 
intended effect” of a speech was to obstruct recruiting, “and if, in all the circumstances, that 
would be its probable effect, it would not be protected [by the First Amendment against a law 
proscribing obstructing recruiting] . . . ”); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (Holmes, J.) (“If the act, 
[speaking, or circulating a paper,] its tendency and the intent with which it is done are the 
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 When men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the 
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good 
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon  
 
 
 
same, we perceive no ground for saying that success alone warrants making the act a crime.”); 
Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he United States constitutionally may 
punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will 
bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek 
to prevent.” (emphasis added)); id. (explaining that in this context, “intent” reflects a special 
meaning: “[A] deed is not done with intent to produce a consequence unless that consequence 
is the aim of the deed. It may be obvious, and obvious to the actor, that the consequence will 
follow, and he may be liable for it even if he regrets it, but he does not do the act with intent 
to produce it unless the aim to produce it is the proximate motive of the specific act, although 
there may be some deeper motive behind.”). This makes sense: if the purpose of proscribing 
speech is to prevent a substantive crime that it might bring about, then the proposition has its 
greatest effect in those situations in which the speaker, in fact, intends to bring about the 
crime. For us, though, threats are proscribable because of the precise evils that the threats 
themselves, as speech, bring about—fear and disruption. For us, therefore, the required state of 
mind is that the speaker intends to threaten. See infra text accompanying note 747 (discussing 
proposed “intent” state of mind). 
¶5. Second, for Holmes, context can limit one’s right to speak—whether or not the 
speaker authorizes, directs, or ratifies the context. See, e.g., Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (Holmes, 
J.) (“We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was 
said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of 
every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.”); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627–28 
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The power [of the United States to punish speech] is greater in time 
of war than in time of peace because war opens dangers that do not exist at other times.”). 
Again, this makes sense if the purpose of proscribing speech or expressive conduct is to prevent 
substantive crimes that it might bring about, and they might well be brought about by others 
or at least made more likely by circumstances outside of a speaker’s control; as such, limiting a 
speaker’s freedom to speak or engage in expressive conduct under those circumstances is 
arguably reasonable at least where some form of excitement is present. See infra text 
accompanying note 727 (discussing interest protected by threat jurisprudence). But again, we 
sharply disagree with Holmes. For, as we see it, threats are proscribable because of the fear and 
disruption they, the threats themselves, engender. Other bodies of law, including that of 
excitement, are sufficient to protect against those offenses in themselves. See, e.g., supra note 
730 and accompanying text (discussion of murder and wrongful death). Thus, as we see it, 
context is relevant only in determining whether a reasonable listener might deem given speech 
or expressive conduct “threatening” (and thus, whether the speech or expressive conduct 
might reasonably engender fear and disruption). But we perceive substantial constitutional 
problems with making one’s right to speak or act expressively dependent on the actions of 
others, or on circumstances outside of a speaker’s control. See supra note 133 (analyzing the 
personal character of constitutional rights). Accordingly, although we agree with much of 
Holmes’s work in the area of free speech, we disagree with his overall approach—at least as 
applied to “true threats.” 
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which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the 
theory of our Constitution.193 
 
 193. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630. Holmes’s concepts of “fighting faiths” and “marketplace 
of ideas” are, in many ways, close to the concepts of Mill. See Mill, Liberty, supra note 185, at 
275–76 (“[E]very age [has] held many opinions which subsequent ages have deemed not only 
false but absurd . . . .”; “[c]omplete Liberty of contracting and disproving our opinion is the 
very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action . . . .”). 
Nevertheless, while Mill believed in truth, he did not believe that “truth always triumphs over 
persecution.” Id. at 280. He termed that thought “one of those pleasant falsehoods which 
men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience 
refutes.” Id. Instead, he believed: “Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and 
argument; [but] facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought 
before it.” Id. at 276. At the same time, he thought: 
The real advantage which truth has consists in this, that when an opinion is true, it 
may be extinguished once, twice, or many times, but in the course of ages there will 
generally be found persons to rediscover it, until some one of its reappearances falls 
on a time when from favorable circumstances it escapes persecution until it has made 
such head as to withstand all subsequent attempts to suppress it. 
Id. at 280.  
Like Mill, Holmes did not credit his view to any source. But he was, as it is now 
generally conceded, “notorious for not giving credit to his intellectual forebears and for being 
petty in his insistence on the primacy of his own contributions.” Saul Touster, Holmes a 
Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law and Legal Theory, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 673, 687 
(1982). Touster is a disapproving Holmes critic; his view, however is shared by others more 
sympathetic to Holmes’s project. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 113 (1993) (“Holmes was loath to acknowledge 
influences on and antecedents of his work.”). Chief Judge Richard Posner calls Holmes “the 
greatest figure in American law—perhaps our greatest judge, probably our most seminal legal 
thinker . . . [but] ungenerous to his intellectual predecessors and . . . contemporaries . . . .” 
Richard A. Posner, Bookshelf: Star of the Legal Stage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 1989, at A9 
(reviewing SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES (1989)). 
Holmes’s “bad man theory” of the law, for example, famously advanced in The Path of 
the Law, supra note 170, was, in all likelihood, taken from Rudolf von Jhering, a German 
jurisprudential writer. See RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 33 (Isaac 
Husik trans., 1913). That he did not acknowledge von Jhering is hardly to Holmes’s credit. 
Indeed, Holmes acknowledged reading German jurists and recommended them to those who 
would “command ideas.” Holmes, supra note 170, at 478. Holmes, in fact, read The Spirit of 
the Roman Law before he wrote The Path of the Law. See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE II, JUSTICE 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 1870–1882, at 152 (1963) (noting that 
Holmes read The Spirit of the Roman Law in 1879 in a French translation). See generally 
Mathias W. Reiman, Holmes’ Common Law and German Legal Science, in THE LEGACY OF 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR. 72, 101–05 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992). His debt to von 
Jhering is more extensive. Compare OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COMMON LAW 1 (Mark 
DeWolfe Howe ed. 1963) [hereinafter HOLMES, COMMON LAW] (“The life of the law has 
been not logic: it has been experience.”), with Konrad Zweigert & Kurt Siehr, Jhering’s 
Influence on the Development of Comparative Legal Method, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 215, 225–26 
(1971) (drawing a “precise parallel” to Jhering in The Spirit of the Roman Law: “Life is not 
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Holmes thus argued, as did Lactantius, Milton, and Mill, though 
with a skeptical twist,194 that insistence on free trade in ideas is 
ultimately more important than pressing any individual cause. In a 
regime where any idea can be suppressed, today’s victors may well be 
tomorrow’s silenced voices, when some view or philosophy other 
than their own becomes ascendant. 
While Holmes wrote in dissent when he first introduced the 
concept into Supreme Court jurisprudence, the marketplace 
rationale gradually took root and flourished. Justice Brandeis picked 
up the idea eight years later and cast it in its more moderate and 
enduring form. He did not skeptically argue that whatever the 
marketplace produces must be the truth, as Holmes had. Rather, he 
argued that a free marketplace of ideas is necessary to the search for 
truth. He wrote: 
 Those who won our independence believed that the final end of 
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that 
in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the 
arbitrary. . . . They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness 
and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom 
to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that 
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that 
with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against 
the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; 
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American 
government. They recognized . . . . that the fitting remedy for evil 
counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied 
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—
the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional 
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution 
so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.195 
 
here to be a servant of concepts, but concepts are here to serve life.” (citation omitted)). 
Holmes, too, did cite von Jhering on other points. HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra, at 208 
(theory of possession). 
 194. A profound difference, of course, distinguishes the confident but untested view that 
truth will always win out over any untruth, and the skeptical view that whatever is wins out is 
the truth. See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold Laski (June 1, 1927), in 2 
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 948 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (“I do accept ‘a rough 
equation between isness and oughtness. . . .’”). 
 195. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). The 
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Thus, Brandeis emphasized that the best cure for bad ideas is 
more ideas, rather than immediate government suppression. Only by 
being able to consider all sides of an issue can people eventually 
come to see the truth, or a least have a fair chance to come to it. 
From Lactantius to the present day, the marketplace theory is 
impressive in its ability to withstand aggressive attack196 and remain a 
viable theory in scholarly debate.197 Moreover, and more important, 
it finds favor with an enduring majority on the Supreme Court. The 
marketplace concept appears consistently throughout the Court’s 
controlling opinions over the last forty years.198 In an effort to 
 
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964), termed Brandeis’s 
formulation of the principle behind the First Amendment “classic.” 
 196. For a harsh critique of this theory, see Ingber, supra note 180, at 5 (arguing that in 
the marketplace of ideas—as in the economic marketplace—“real world conditions . . . 
interfere with the effective operation of the marketplace of ideas,” and that government 
regulation may be required to correct “communicative market failures”). Various other lines of 
criticism are also leveled at the theory. See also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment 
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 978 (1978) (arguing that the hope that the 
marketplace of ideas leads to truth is implausible, and that such a marketplace “appears 
improperly biased in favor of presently dominant groups”). 
 197. For a compelling reply to criticisms of the truth finding function of free speech, see 
KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 16–24 (1989) 
(responding to the major criticisms of the truth finding function of free speech, and finding 
that this rationale is “at a minimum . . . neither incoherent nor evidently fallacious,” and thus 
“warrant[s] continued reliance on it in our culture”). But see id. at 34 (emphasizing that the 
value of the truth finding function should neither be conflated with the idea that whatever the 
marketplace produces must be truth because “what emerges from the marketplace of ideas 
simply counts as the truth under a liberal government,” which does not yield distinctive 
support for a free speech principle, nor with the idea that “there are things that count 
independently as the truth and that the chances of those being accepted by people are 
enhanced by a marketplace of ideas”—which makes “whether free speech contributes to 
truth . . . a factual question, however hard to answer”). 
 198. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 831 (1995); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995); 
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 464–65 (1995); Milkovich v. 
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989); 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 696 (1984); Fed. 
Communications Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377–78 
(1984); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984); 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866–
67 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981); Citizens Against Rent Control 
v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 537, 538 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 
745–46 (1978); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
760 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. 
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promote a free marketplace of ideas, the Court is extremely hesitant 
to allow the government to proscribe speech or expressive conduct 
based on its content. 
B. The First Amendment, the Marketplace, and Content 
Discrimination 
In the early 1970s, the Court began to prohibit simplicitor the 
suppression of speech or expressive conduct on the basis of its 
content.199 In its seminal decision in Police Department of Chicago v. 
Mosley,200 the Court announced that the prohibition on content-
based proscription was a “central principle” of the First Amendment. 
Tapping into the marketplace rationale, the Court explained that 
because “[t]here is an ‘equality of status in the field of ideas,’ 
government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to 
be heard.”201 Because the First Amendment embodies a “profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”202 the Court 
declared in sweeping terms that, “above all else, the First 
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict 
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”203 Thus, the First Amendment generally prohibits 
 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 
(1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1967). 
 199. See Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 
80 IOWA L. REV. 51, 66 (1994) (arguing that “[a]lthough its doctrinal roots can be traced to 
the 1930s and 1940s,” the principle that speech cannot be regulated because of its content 
“did not emerge as an organizing methodology in First Amendment jurisprudence until the 
early 1970s”). 
 200. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 201. Id. at 96 (citations omitted); see also Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448 
(1991) (noting that the risk posed by content-based regulation is that “[i]t will distort the 
market for ideas”); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). As the Court said in Cohen: 
The constitutional right of free expression is . . . intended to remove governmental 
restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views 
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us . . . in the belief that no other 
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon 
which our political system rests. 
Id. 
 202. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (barring suits by public 
figures for defamation absent a showing of actual malice). 
 203. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (1972) (citing Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24 (upholding a 
defendant’s right to wear inside a courthouse a jacket that had printed on its back, “F**k the 
draft”)). 
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government from proscribing speech204 or even expressive 
conduct205—including such activities as demonstrating,206 
picketing,207 and even burning the American flag208—because it does 
not approve of the idea expressed. The government cannot prohibit 
public discussion of a given topic nor can it restrict speech or 
expressive conduct that reflects a particular viewpoint.209 “Content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid,”210 as are “viewpoint-
based” restrictions.211 Such regulations can be sustained only if they 
survive strict scrutiny; “[t]he [government] must show that the 
‘regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it 
is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.’”212 As the Court has noted, 
 
 204. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citing Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309–11 (1940)). 
 205. See id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)). 
 206. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969) 
(striking down an ordinance governing the issuance of parade permits because it gave public 
officials too much discretion in determining who could demonstrate). 
 207. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459–60 (1980) (striking down a statute 
that prohibited the picketing of residences or dwellings except when the dwelling was a place 
of business, a place of employment involved in a labor dispute, or the place of holding a 
meeting on premises commonly used to discuss subjects of general interest); Mosley, 408 U.S. 
at 94 (striking down an ordinance that banned all picketing within 150 feet of a school 
building while classes were in session and one half-hour before and afterwards, excepting the 
peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute). 
 208. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420. 
 209. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 210. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citing, among other things, 
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991); id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); 
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). 
 211. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383–90. 
 212. Burson, 504 U.S. at 198 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted); see also R.A.V., 505 
U.S. at 394 n.7 (stating that while a prohibition of hate speech was “narrowly tailored,” and 
the interest to be protected “compelling,” the availability of alternative means of enforcement 
of the interest rendered it “unnecessary” and inconsistent with the First Amendment). But see 
Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that “strict 
scrutiny” balancing has no place in content-based regulation of First Amendment-protected 
speech, tracing the history of “strict scrutiny” in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
to its origin as an Equal Protection doctrine, and arguing that “[b]orrowing the compelling 
interest and narrow tailoring analysis is ill advised when all that is at issue is a content-based 
restriction, for resort to the test might be read as a concession that States may censor speech 
whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for doing so”). None of the other 
members of the Court was inclined to Justice Kennedy’s approach. See id. at 118 (majority 
opinion) (noting that a content-based proscription can be sustained if it passes “strict 
scrutiny”). 
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“[I]t is the rare case in which we have held that a law survives strict 
scrutiny.”213 
Evidently, as those who reflect on jurisprudence observe, general 
rules always undergo subtle (sometimes not so subtle) 
transformations, and develop, with experience, exceptions.214 Despite 
its general prohibition of content-based speech regulation, the Court 
recognizes that certain categories of speech may be regulated 
precisely on the basis of their content.215 In Chaplinsky v. New 
 
The requirements for content-based speech regulation are far more exacting than those 
for content-neutral regulations of speech, which draw only “intermediate scrutiny.” Under this 
standard, the Court upholds time, place, and manner restrictions of content-neutral speech 
using one or the other of two tests. In some cases, the Court holds that “content-neutral” 
regulations are constitutional when they are “narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” United 
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). In others, the Court acknowledges that such a 
restriction is acceptable “if it furthers an important or substantial government interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental 
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The Court 
treats these two tests as essentially equivalent. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 
215, 244 (1990) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 213. See Burson, 504 U.S. at 211; accord TRIBE, supra note 168, at 836 (arguing that the 
“autonomy of the individual . . . from government’s content-based restrictions” is “nearly 
absolute”). 
 214. See, e.g., HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 193, at 32: 
  Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at 
bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy; most 
generally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious result of 
instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less traceable to 
views of public policy in the last analysis. And as the law is administered by able and 
experienced men, who know too much to sacrifice good sense to a syllogism, it will 
be found that, when ancient rules maintain themselves in the way that has been and 
will be shown in this book, new reasons more fitted to the time have been found for 
them, and that they gradually receive a new content, and at last a new form, from 
the grounds to which they have been transplanted. 
  . . . . 
  What has been said will explain the failure of all theories which consider the 
law only from its formal side, whether they attempt to deduce the corpus from a 
priori postulates, or fall into the humbler error of supposing the science of the law 
to reside in the elegantia juris, or logical cohesion of part with part. The truth is, 
that the law is always approaching, and never reaching consistency.  It is forever 
adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from 
history at the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will 
become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow. 
Id. 
 215. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (observing that a “categorical [exception] approach has 
remained an important part of our First Amendment jurisprudence”). 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
918 
Hampshire,216 the Court acknowledged the existence of “certain 
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention 
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”217 The Court listed the categories that can 
be regulated qua categories as including “the lewd and obscene, the 
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words . . . .”218 
These categories of speech may be regulated, the Court explained, 
because they “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are 
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.”219 Under this approach, if a particular speech 
regulation targets one of these specific categories, the government 
may constitutionally regulate or prohibit speech entirely. 
Despite Chaplinsky’s broad language, its scope was considerably 
curtailed in the ensuing years. To be sure, obscenity, defamation, 
and fighting words may still be regulated on the basis of content,220 
and the category has been expanded: child pornography221 is now 
among the list of exceptions.222 Nevertheless, each of these categories 
 
 216. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
 217. Id. at 571–72. Various authors agree that Chaplinsky marked the beginning of the 
Court’s “categorization” approach. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 168, at 837; Werhan, supra 
note 199, at 54. But see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382–83 (“From 1791 to the present, however, 
our society, like other free but civilized societies, has permitted restrictions upon the content of 
speech in a few limited areas . . . .”). 
 218. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 219. Id.; see also TRIBE, supra note 168, at 837 (arguing that “[t]he premise that speech 
has special value only in the context of dialogue underlies the dictum” in Chaplinsky). 
 220. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383. 
 221. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that the “category of 
child pornography . . . , like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment”). 
 222. Commercial speech was once thought to be a categorical exception; it is no longer. 
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 
(1976). Nevertheless, it does not receive full protection. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (adopting a four-
part test when the government can abridge commercial speech; “The Constitution . . . accords 
a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed 
expression.”); accord Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 553 (2001) (applying 
Hudson to strike down, under the First Amendment, Massachusetts regulations governing the 
advertising and sale of cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, and cigars: “For over 25 years, the Court 
has recognized that commercial speech does not fall outside the purview of the First 
Amendment . . . . Instead, the Court has afforded commercial speech a measure of First 
Amendment protection ‘commensurate’ with its position in relation to other constitutionally 
guaranteed expression.”); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (applying 
Hudson to strike down, under the First Amendment, mandatory advertising assessments 
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is considerably more narrow than when it was first introduced.223 
Moreover, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court held that even 
the excepted categories are protected against viewpoint 
discrimination, that is, content-based discrimination “unrelated to 
their distinctively proscribable content.”224 Invalidating a St. Paul 
ordinance proscribing hate speech that “arouses anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender,”225 the Court explained: 
We have sometimes said that [the excepted] categories of 
expression are “not within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech,” . . . or that the “protection of the First Amendment does 
not extend” to them . . . . Such statements must be taken in 
context, however, and are no more literally true than is the 
occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity “as not 
being speech at all.” What they mean is that these areas of speech 
can . . . be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable 
content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories 
of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution.226 
It is not that the categories “have at most a ‘de minimis’ 
expressive content . . . or that their content is in all respects 
‘worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection . . . .’”227 
“We have not said that [the excepted categories] constitute ‘no part 
of the expression of ideas,’ but only that they constitute ‘no essential 
 
imposed on mushroom procedures and handlers, since they were not part of a broad regulatory 
scheme); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (applying 
Hudson to strike down 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (prohibiting the interstate transmission of gambling 
information) and implementing FCC regulation as applied to the commercial advertising of 
lawful casinos between states in which casinos are lawful). 
 223. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (“Our decisions since the 1960’s have narrowed the 
scope of the traditional categorical exceptions . . . .”). On the narrowing of “obscenity,” see 
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). On the narrowing of “defamation,” see New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1974). See generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13–17 (1990). On the 
narrowing of the “fighting words” doctrine, see Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), 
Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and 
TRIBE, supra note 168, at 929 (“The fighting words doctrine itself has been narrowly 
construed.”). 
 224. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 384. 
 225. ST. PAUL, MINN., BIAS-MOTIVATED CRIME ORDINANCE, LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 
(1990). 
 226. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (citations omitted). 
 227. Id. at 385. 
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part of any exposition of ideas.’”228 Consequently, the Court held 
that, even when regulating speech falling within a categorical 
exception, “[t]he government may not regulate use based on 
hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message 
expressed.”229 
To summarize: the Supreme Court, in giving substance to the 
First Amendment’s undefined language, holds that government—
whether state or federal—generally may not regulate speech based on 
its content. The exceptions to this blanket rule are few in number 
and limited in scope. Moreover, the government may not regulate 
even such “excepted” speech based on approval or disapproval of its 
message. While the Supreme Court’s decisions following Chaplinsky 
leave a role for categorical exceptions, they “demonstrate the 
Court’s . . . determination not to allow the methodology to defeat 
First Amendment claims.”230 Balancing the interests involved with 
strict scrutiny on a case-by-case basis, rather than finding speech 
unprotected by squeezing it into a pre-ordained box, is the preferred 
basis for adjudicating content-based free speech regulations.231 
 
 228. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
 229. Id. at 386. In one of the more memorable lines from the case, Justice Scalia 
observed, “St. Paul has no . . . authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while 
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.” Id. at 392. 
 230. Werhan, supra note 199, at 66; cf. TRIBE, supra note 168, at 929 (arguing that 
Court decisions since Chaplinsky narrowing the excluded categories have “called into question 
the whole structure of [F]irst [A]mendment rights erected on the Chaplinsky foundation”). 
For a recent argument that a First Amendment jurisprudence that relies solely on the content-
neutral/content-based distinction to determine whether speech is protected—with no 
balancing of interests in individual cases—is incoherent, see SHIFFRIN, supra note 166, at 8–10 
(arguing that categorical exceptions must be chosen by reference to some set of standards, and 
thus can never be truly content-neutral). 
 231. The Court’s movement away from large categories towards adjudication based on 
individual cases may be characterized as a move from “rules” to “standards.” On the merits of 
each, see generally Alan K. Chen, The Ultimate Standard: Qualified Immunity in the Age of 
Constitutional Balancing Tests, 81 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1995); TRIBE, supra note 168, at 793–
94; and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICTS 106–08, 110–15, 
130–35 (1993). The classic examination of the issues remains Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of 
Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TUL. L. REV. 475, 482–83, 485–86 (1933). 
One of the most well-documented debates concerning whether rules or standards 
should be preferred in the area of the First Amendment was that between Justices Black 
(advocating rules) and Frankfurter (advocating standards). Compare Dennis v. United States, 
341 U.S. 494, 524–25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring): 
  Absolute rules would inevitably lead to absolute exceptions, and such 
exceptions would eventually corrode the rules. The demands of free speech in a 
democratic society as well as the interest in national security are better served by 
candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the 
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IV. “TRUE THREATS” AND THE SUPREME COURT 
Given the Court’s reluctance to shoehorn speech or expressive 
conduct proscriptions into ever-narrowing categorical exceptions to 
find them constitutional or unconstitutional and its preference to 
weigh the constitutionality of the proscriptions case by case, the 
Court’s retention of the “true threats” categorical exception without 
more than an ostensive definition, that is, a definition by illustration, 
need not be seen as objectionable.232 Ostensive definitions are, in 
fact, definitions,233 and they can give crucial guidance, as American 
 
judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the nonEuclidian 
problems to be solved.  
(footnote omitted), with Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., 
dissenting): 
  As I have indicated many times before, I do not subscribe to that doctrine for I 
believe that the First Amendment’s unequivocal command that there shall be no 
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who 
drafted our Bill of Rights did all the “balancing” that was to be done in this field. 
The history of the First Amendment is too well known to require repeating here 
except to say that it certainly cannot be denied that the very object of adopting the 
First Amendment, as well as the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was to put the 
freedoms protected there completely out of the area of any congressional control 
that may be attempted through the exercise of precisely those powers that are now 
being used to “balance” the Bill of Rights out of existence.  
(footnote omitted). 
Which opinion should be the preferred approach for First Amendment issues is a 
question not easily resolved. We do not attempt it. We highlight the change, however, to 
underscore the analogous constitutional ground on which the doctrine of “true threats” now 
finds itself, that is, lagging behind in this progression. 
 232. Compare Gey, supra note 42, at 543 & n.11 (“‘True threats’ is merely the term 
courts apply to threatening language that is not constitutionally protected. The Supreme Court 
has not provided a definitive interpretation of the term, and the lower courts have been unable 
to agree on the components of a true threat.”), with Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“The Supreme Court has provided benchmarks, but no definition”), and id. at 1074 
(the Supreme Court in Watts “set out no standard for determining when a statement is a ‘true 
threat’”). But see John L. Gordon, First Amendment Protection of Free Speech May Not Be 
Enlarged to Protect Threats Made by Minors, in a Public School Environment, Where the State 
Constitution’s Protection of Free Speech Reaches Beyond That Guaranteed by the Federal 
Constitution: Lovell v. Poway Unified School District, 18 J. JUV. L. 246, 249 (1997) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court has defined “true threat” and that “California is in agreement with the 
Supreme Court on First Amendment protection for threats and has relied upon the Supreme 
Court’s definition of a true threat”). 
 233. See Gey, supra note 42, at 545 (“Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly 
defined the standard for assessing whether speech containing threatening language is protected 
by the First Amendment, the Court’s incitement decisions and the references to threats that 
occasionally appear in those decisions actually leave far less room to maneuver than lower 
courts have typically assumed.”). 
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Legal literature generally is replete with calls for a “definition,” or at least a better 
“definition,” of various concepts. Compare Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side 
of Private Ordering: An Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 41, 46 (2000) (“little agreement even on a definition of organized crime”), with G. 
Robert Blakey, Definition of Organized Crime in Statutes and Law Enforcement 
Administration, in PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME: REPORT TO PRESIDENT, 
THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME TODAY 511 (1986) (“Different definitions . . . usually 
depend[] on the purpose of the . . . use of the concept.”). Often implicit in efforts to provide 
such a “definition” is the assumption that the concept of “definition” itself is wholly 
unproblematic. In fact, “paradoxically, no problem . . . [in philosophy or logic is] less settled 
than . . . [that] of definition . . . .” Raziel Abelson, Definition, in 1 & 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY 314 (1966). As Abelson aptly states: 
Definitions play a crucial role in every field of inquiry, yet there are few if any 
philosophical questions about definition (what sort of thing it is, what standards it 
should satisfy, what kind of knowledge, if any, it conveys) on which logicians and 
philosophers agree. 
 Id. 
Indeed, anyone trying to clarify the concept of “definition” quickly runs into other, 
equally vexing problems: epistemology (the theory of knowledge, SIMON BLACKBURN, THE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 123 (1996) and metaphysics (the theory of what 
things, if any, exist beyond the empirical. Id. at 240)). Finally, the concept of theory itself 
implicates a theory of language, the means by which we think and share our thoughts about 
things. Abelson, supra, at 211. The concept of “definition,” particularly seeking its “essence,” 
is problematic.  Nevertheless the various problems are largely ignored in the existing literature. 
See infra Appendix A (Definition) for a survey of the literature. 
Because we believe that the quest for an “essentialist” definition of “threat” or “true 
threat” is Quixotic, we do not undertake it. What is needed, we believe, is an identification of 
the interests involved and a careful balancing of them. We know, more or less, the interests 
behind “free speech.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) articulates for us the 
three major policy considerations underlying why “true threats” are proscribable qua threats: 
to “protect[] individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and 
from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.” Id. at 388. The First Amendment 
must also play its crucial role that much of the en banc majority in American Coalition 
recognizes. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377). We go 
further. We believe that the jurisprudence of the federal criminal law must also play its 
appointed role: individual responsibility, based on personal conduct and a state of mind, must 
remain sacrosanct. See, particularly, infra text accompanying note 647 (analyzing basic 
principles of federal criminal law). But once all of these policy considerations are recognized, 
the rest is a question of “means.” POSNER, supra note 177, at 63 (“It is so much easier to 
reason about means to given ends than about the ends themselves.”). 
For us, as for any lawyer, the rest is purely practical. Adopt any definition that is “no 
more complicated or elaborate than necessary.” REED DICKERSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF 
LEGAL DRAFTING 100 (1965). For lawyers—if not philosophers or logicians—definition 
follows, or ought to follow, purpose (or purposes). But achieving purpose (or purposes) is 
necessarily circumscribed by the various linguistic techniques of definition and the inherent 
limitations of language itself (generality, vagueness, ambiguity, etc.). In brief, the project is 
purposeful (human purpose) and pragmatic (how does it work) given the substantial limits 
placed on the achievement of human purpose by fallible human understanding, real world 
constraints of language, and the character of things themselves; it is not “essentialist,” in the 
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Coalition shows. That guidance is principally contained in four 
decisions. 
A. The Decisions 
Watts v. United States,234 a short per curium opinion, marked the 
Court’s first foray into “true threats,” and it is the Court’s only 
decision on the merits applying the “true threats” doctrine. Decided 
against the backdrop of national upheaval over the Vietnam War and 
the draft, the case involved a person who allegedly “threatened” 
President Lyndon Baines Johnson at a rally on the Washington 
Monument grounds in Washington, D.C.235 Robert Watts was 
speaking about police brutality with a group of young men and 
women, most of whom were in their teens or early twenties.236 When 
one member of the group suggested that those present should “get 
more education before expressing their views,” Watts responded 
angrily: 
They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have 
already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to 
report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If they 
ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
L.B.J. They are not going to make me kill my black brothers.237 
Based on this statement, Watts was convicted of knowingly and 
willfully threatening the President under 18 U.S.C. § 871, a federal 
felony.238 Watts moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the 
prosecution introduced insufficient evidence on which a jury could 
find he had, in fact, threatened the President; he emphasized that he 
made his statement “during a political debate,” that he made it 
“conditional upon an event—induction into the Armed Forces—
which [he] vowed would never occur,” that “both [he] and the 
 
classic sense, nor is it purely “prescriptive” or “linguistic.” See infra Appendix A (Definition) 
(discussing essentialist, prescriptive, linguistic, and pragmatic). 
Hand put it well: “[There is] no escape in each situation from balancing the conflicting 
interests at stake with as detached a temper as we can achieve.” HAND, supra note 17, at 179. 
Hand echoes Pound. See ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN CITY 18 
(1922) (“[T]he problem is one of compromise; of balancing conflicting interests . . . .”). 
 234. 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
 235. Id. at 706. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
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crowd laughed after the statement was made,” and that at worst, 
“what happened . . . was a kind of very crude offensive method of 
stating a political opposition to the President.”239 The district court 
denied his motion, and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed.240 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the conviction in an 
unsigned opinion. The Court recognized that the presidential threat 
statute was constitutional on its face.241 Nevertheless, it stressed that 
because the provision criminalized “pure speech,” it was to be 
“interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in 
mind.”242 Statutory language, it explained, must be interpreted 
“against the background of a profound national commitment to the 
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide open.”243 Consequently, the Court concluded that “[w]hat 
is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally 
protected speech,”244 and that the statute in issue “initially requires 
the Government to prove a true ‘threat.’”245 In determining whether 
Watts’s speech constituted a “true threat,” the Court focused on the 
conditional nature of the statement, the reaction of the listeners, and 
on the context in which the statement was made.246 Based on these 
factors, the Court concluded that the speech was not a “true threat,” 
but was “political hyperbole.”247 The Court recognized that “[t]he 
language of the political arena, like the language used in labor 
disputes, . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and inexact”; it agreed, 
therefore, “with [Watts] that his only offense here was ‘a kind of very 
crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the 
President.’”248 
The Court later clarified—at least in our judgment, if not that of 
the en banc majority in American Coalition—its Watts opinion in 
 
 239. Id. at 706–07. 
 240. Id. at 706. 
 241. Id. at 707. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 708 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 244. Id. at 707. 
 245. Id. at 708. 
 246. Id. at 708. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
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NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,249 a suit by seventeen white 
merchants, which stemmed from a boycott of their stores, located in 
Port Gibson, in Claiborne County, Mississippi. The purpose of the 
boycott was to secure equality and racial justice.250 The boycott was 
well-organized and well-executed; it began at the First Baptist 
Church, after repeated calls for action by members of the black 
community—including a petition presented to the public officials of 
Port Gibson and Claiborne County—went unheeded.251 A meeting 
was held at the First Baptist Church, which “[s]everal hundred 
[B]lack people” attended252 and at which several people spoke. 
Charles Evers, the Field Secretary of the NAACP in Mississippi, was 
among the speakers. Evers told the assembled people that “any 
‘uncle toms’ who broke the boycott would ‘have their necks broken’ 
by their own people.”253 After Evers’s speech, the group voted, and 
it agreed unanimously to place a boycott on the white merchants of 
Port Gibson and Claiborne County.254 
During the boycott, Evers delivered a number of other speeches 
to various crowds of African-Americans.255 In one, he stated that 
boycott violators would be “disciplined” by their own people, and he 
warned that the “Sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at 
night.”256 In another, he warned, “If we catch any of you going in 
any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”257 
Evers’s powerful language was enhanced by the posting of observers 
(“enforcers,” “deacons,” or “black hats”) in the vicinity of white-
owned businesses,258 who noted who went into the stores. The 
names of persons who violated the boycott were then read at 
meetings of the Claiborne County NAACP, and they “were branded 
 
 249. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
 250. Id. at 889–90, 899–900. 
 251. Id. at 889, 898–900. 
 252. Id. at 900. 
 253. Id. at 900 n.28. According to Sheriff Dan McKay, who was present during the 
speech, “Evers’s remarks were directed to all 8,000-plus black residents of Claiborne County, 
and not merely the relatively few members of the Claiborne NAACP.” Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. The content of one of Evers’s speeches—which the Court found fully protected—
warrants, for that reason, close attention; it is set out, here, as it was to the Court’s opinion, in 
full in an appendix to these materials. See infra Appendix C (The Speech of Charles Evers). 
 256. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 902. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 894. 
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as traitors to the [B]lack cause, called demeaning names, and socially 
ostracized for merely trading with whites.”259 Nevertheless, the 
boycott was, for the most part, peaceful;260 it was, however, marred, 
according to the record, by at least some instances of violence: shots 
were fired into at least two boycott violators’ homes, a brick was 
thrown through a third violator’s windshield, and a fourth violator 
sustained damage to his flower garden.261 
Angered by the boycott, several merchants sued two 
corporations, the NAACP and Mississippi Action for Progress 
(MAP),262 and 146 individuals—including Evers.263 At trial, the 
Chancellor found 130 of the defendants jointly and severally liable 
on three different conspiracy theories.264 He then held them liable 
 
 259. Id. at 904. 
 260. Id. at 903. 
 261. Id. at 904. Since violence was not an element of any of the claims for relief brought 
by the merchants, they were, of course, not required to show it. Accordingly, the trial 
proceedings are not necessarily a reliable record of the extent of the violence, if any, that 
occurred or its sources. See infra note 264. Nevertheless, the merchants possessed an adequate 
incentive to show violence for the practical purpose of making their presentation more 
persuasive, and to the degree that the record contained only isolated instances of violence, and 
none of it was connected to the defendants, we may infer that the merchants lacked evidence 
of it and that the boycott was essentially nonviolent. 
 262. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 889–90. MAP was a Mississippi corporation; it implemented 
the federal “Head Start” program. Id. at 889. 
 263. Id. at 890. 
 264. According to the Supreme Court, the lower court considered three theories of 
liability: 
First, the court held that the defendants were liable for the tort of malicious 
interference with the plaintiffs’ businesses, which did not necessarily require the 
presence of a conspiracy. Second, the chancellor found a violation of a state 
statutory prohibition against secondary boycotts, on the theory that the defendants’ 
primary dispute was with the governing authorities of Port Gibson and Claiborne 
County and not with the white merchants at whom the boycott was directed. Third, 
the court found a violation of Mississippi’s antitrust statute, on the ground that the 
boycott had diverted black patronage from the white merchants to black merchants 
and to other merchants located out of Claiborne County and thus had unreasonably 
limited competition between black and white merchants that had traditionally 
existed. 
Id. at 890–92. 
An examination of the lower court opinion shows that, while the plaintiffs did not need 
to prove violence to win on the antitrust claim, proof of violence played a key (if not strictly 
necessary) role in their victory on the secondary boycott claim. The malicious interference 
claim was upheld primarily based on the defendants’ coercive (but not actually violent) acts. In 
fact, the Mississippi court only considered violence broadly rather than specifically, and it 
recounted just two instances of actual violence, while it made no effort (beyond mere 
association) to link the violence to the particular defendants in the litigation. NAACP v. 
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for all of the plaintiffs’ lost earnings during the seven-year period of 
the boycott,265 specifically rejecting the defendants’ claims that the 
First Amendment protected their conduct.266 On appeal, the 
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the defendants’ liability on two 
of the theories but upheld their liability under a third—although it 
held that the plaintiffs failed to establish their case with respect to 
 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 393 So. 2d 1290, 1297–99 (Miss. 1980). 
In upholding liability for instituting an illegal secondary boycott, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court held that “[i]f any . . . force, violence, or threats is [sic] present, then the 
boycott is illegal regardless of whether it is primary, secondary, economical, political, social or 
other.” Id. at 1301. Thus, while violence is not an element of an illegal secondary boycott, the 
court’s finding that boycotters committed actual violence in the boycott was sufficient to 
render it illegal. To support this holding, the court cited Smith v. Grady, 411 F.2d 181, 187 
(5th Cir. 1969): “Any kind of boycott is unlawful if executed with force or violence or 
threats . . .” The court did not find, however, that the defendants, as opposed to other 
boycotters, committed violent acts, nor did it hold that such a finding was necessary to impose 
liability. 
To uphold the judgment under the malicious interference statute, the plaintiffs were 
required to prove coercive behavior by defendants. The statute read: “If any person shall . . . 
threaten with bodily harm, intimidate or coerce another person to prevent said person from 
lawfully trading or carrying on business, including buying or selling, he shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.” MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-23-83 (1966). Here, again, the court found that 
boycotters (but not the defendants) went beyond merely coercive conduct and engaged in 
actual violence. See Claiborne, 393 So. 2d at 1300 (“In carrying out the agreement and design, 
certain of the defendants, acting for all others, engaged in acts of physical force and violence 
against the persons and property of certain customers and prospective customers.”). 
Nevertheless, the finding was not essential to the holding, which was mainly based on forms of 
coercion by the defendants. See id. The court found: “Intimidation, threats, social ostracism, 
vilification, and traduction were some of the devices used by the defendants to achieve the 
desired results. Most effective, also, was the stationing of guards . . . in the vicinity of white-
owned businesses. Unquestionably, the evidence shows that the volition of many black persons 
was overcome out of sheer fear . . . .” Id. 
The Court’s holding that the malicious interference was part of a conspiracy did not rely 
on a finding of actual violence. The statute, in relevant part, defines “conspiracy” as the 
conduct of “two (2) or more persons [who] conspire . . . [t]o prevent another from exercising 
a lawful trade or calling, or doing any other lawful act, by force, threats, intimidation . . . .” 
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 97-1-1 (1942). The court, in short, held: “The agreed use of illegal force, 
violence, and threats against the peace to achieve a goal makes the present state of facts a 
conspiracy.” Claiborne, 393 So. 2d at 1301 (emphasis added). Thus, the defendants’ 
agreement to use violence or threats of violence, not actual violence, was the element that the 
court relied upon to impose liability. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court’s reference to actual violence by the boycotters, on the 
other hand, indicated its belief that such violence was, if not required, at least relevant to the 
defendants’ liability. See id. at 1298 (“The thread of fear and violence is woven throughout this 
case.”). 
 265. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 898. 
 266. Id. at 892. 
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MAP and thirty-seven of the individual defendants.267 The 
defendants’ general First Amendment defense was flatly rejected; the 
court quoted a trial court finding that: 
[i]n carrying out the agreement and design, certain of the 
defendants, acting for all others, engaged in acts of physical force 
and violence against the persons and property of certain customers 
and prospective customers. Intimidation, threats, social ostracism, 
vilification, and traduction were some of the devices used by the 
defendants to achieve the desired results.268 
It then observed: 
We know of no instance, and our attention has been drawn to no 
decision, wherein it has been adjudicated that free speech 
guaranteed by the First Amendment includes in its protection the 
right to commit crime.269 
The Supreme Court reversed, making two crucial points. First, 
the Court recognized that the defendants sought to “persuade 
others to join the boycott through social pressure and the ‘threat’ of 
social ostracism.”270 Nevertheless, it held: “Speech does not lose its 
protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass others or 
coerce them into action.”271 Quoting Justice Rutledge, the Court 
continued: “[The First Amendment] extends to more than abstract 
discussion, unrelated to action. The First Amendment is a charter for 
government, not for an institution of learning. ‘Free trade in ideas’ 
means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to action, not 
merely to describe facts.”272 Moreover, the Court explained, “[t]he 
claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a coercive 
impact . . . does not remove them from the First Amendment.” The 
Court added: 
Petitioners were engaged openly and vigorously in making the 
public aware of respondent’s . . . practices. Those practices were 
offensive to them, as the views and practices of petitioners are no  
 
 
 267. Id. at 894, 896. 
 268. Id. at 894 (quoting Claiborne, 393 So. 2d at 1300). 
 269. Id. at 895 (quoting Claiborne, 393 So. 2d at 1301). 
 270. Id. at 909–10. 
 271. Id. at 910. 
 272. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1965) (Ruthledge, J.)). 
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doubt offensive to others. But so long as the means are peaceful, 
the communication need not meet the standards of acceptability.273 
The Court did recognize, however, that “[t]he First Amendment 
does not protect violence,”274 and—in a passage squarely overlooked 
by the en banc majority in American Coalition—that “[n]o federal 
rule of law restricts a State from imposing . . . liability for . . . losses 
that are caused by . . . violence and by threats of violence.”275 
Nevertheless, it concluded that “[t]he record in this case 
demonstrates that all of [the plaintiffs’] losses were not proximately 
caused by violence or threats of violence,”276 and that “[t]o the 
extent that the court’s judgment rests on the ground that ‘many’ 
black citizens were ‘intimidated’ by ‘threats’ of ‘social ostracism, 
vilification, and traduction,’ it is flatly inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.”277 How the en banc majority could ignore the import 
of this language in a controlling Supreme Court opinion boggles 
even the legal imagination. 
Second, the Court emphasized the importance of assessing 
individual responsibility only for individual conduct in the sensitive 
area of First Amendment speech—precisely the point we argue so 
vigorously for here and which the en banc majority distorted, if it did 
not simply ignore. Liability simply cannot be imposed vicariously in 
the First Amendment area without substantial qualification. When 
violence or threats of violence “occur . . . in the context of 
constitutionally protected activity, . . . ‘precision of regulation’ is 
demanded.”278 Specifically, liability may be imposed only for the 
“direct consequences of . . . [violent] conduct, and does not include 
consequences resulting from associated peaceful . . . activity,”279 that 
is, “[o]nly those losses proximately caused by unlawful conduct may 
be recovered.”280 Individual liability must, in short, be based on 
individual conduct, not on mere association with an unpopular 
group—absent a showing that the “group itself possessed unlawful 
goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those 
 
 273. Id. at 911 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). 
 274. Id. at 916. 
 275. Id. (emphasis added). 
 276. Id. at 922. 
 277. Id. at 921. 
 278. Id. at 916 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
 279. Id. at 918 (quoting Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 730 (1966)). 
 280. Id. at 918. 
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illegal aims.”281 The en banc majority, in contrast, imposed such 
liability without even an association. For it, “context” is a magic 
formula that removes all constitutional restraints. As in Ali Baba and 
the Forty Thieves, all that a court need say is, “Context” or “Open 
Sesame.”282 Then, it will be admitted to a cave where the First 
Amendment and requirements of individual responsibility are 
inapplicable. 
Under this framework, the Court addressed Evers’s liability 
based on his speeches: 
While many of the comments in Evers’ speeches might have 
contemplated “discipline” in the permissible form of social 
ostracism, it cannot be denied that references to the possibility that 
necks would be broken and to the fact that the Sheriff could not 
sleep with boycott violators at night implicitly conveyed a sterner 
message. In the passionate atmosphere in which the speeches were 
delivered, they might have been understood as . . . intending to 
create a fear of violence whether or not improper discipline was 
specifically intended.283 
Nevertheless, the Court found that “Evers’ addresses did not 
exceed the bounds of protected speech.”284 Although the Court 
principally analyzed the speeches under the “fighting words” 
exception, it did, significantly, recount the facts and the holding of 
Watts concerning “true threats.”285 Refusing to uphold Evers’s 
liability, the Court, in a crucial passage, added, “there is no 
evidence—apart from the speeches themselves—that Evers . . . 
directly threatened acts of violence.”286 This point, too, was ignored 
or missed by the en banc majority in American Coalition. The 
Supreme Court then reversed and remanded Claiborne.287 
 
 
 281. Id. at 920. 
 282. “Open Sesame” is how most people remember the phrase from Arthur Lubin’s ALI 
BABA AND THE FORTY THIEVES (1943), which starred Maria Montez and Jon Hall. That is 
how the phrase is also recounted in children’s books. See, e.g., MARION N. FRENCH, MYTHS 
AND LEGENDS OF THE AGES 228 (1956). More authoritative translations of the original Arabic 
read: “Open, O Simsim.” 1 THE ARABIAN NIGHTS ENTERTAINMENTS 150 (Burton trans., 
1955). 
 283. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 927. 
 284. Id. at 929. 
 285. Id. at 928 n.71. 
 286. Id. at 929. 
 287. Id. at 934. 
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The approach to “true threats” established in Watts—and 
elaborated in Claiborne—stands unaltered to this day. Considering 
the doctrine’s long standing dominance, that it was ignored or 
misread by the en banc majority in American Coalition is that much 
more remarkable. In fact, the two most recent cases from the court 
concerning threats, Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.288 and 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 289 simply confirm that while “true threats” 
may be proscribed under the First Amendment, “true threats” is a 
narrow category. When such threats are subject to proscription, they 
may be proscribed only to the extent that other categorical 
exceptions—such as obscenity, defamation, and fighting words—may 
be proscribed. 
In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,290 a case dealing with an 
injunction issued against a group of anti-abortion protesters, the 
Court indicated in two places that “true threats” were outside of 
First Amendment protection. First, in dealing with the portion of the 
injunction that banned the anti-abortion protesters from displaying 
images that people inside a particular clinic could observe, the Court 
observed that “threats to patients or their families, however 
communicated, are proscribable under the First Amendment.”291 
The Court avoided deciding the issue of whether the posters were 
“true threats,” though, noting instead that patients and their families 
could avoid the images if the clinic were simply “to pull its 
curtains.”292 It struck down that provision of the injunction because 
it extended to all “images observable” rather than to those “signs 
that could be interpreted as threats or veiled threats.”293 Accordingly, 
the injunction failed to survive the level of First Amendment scrutiny 
applicable to a “content-neutral injunction”294—dubbed by some 
“intermediate-intermediate scrutiny.”295 
 
 288. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 289. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 290. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 291. Id. at 773. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. See id. at 765 (“[W]hen evaluating a content-neutral injunction, we . . . must 
ask . . . whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than 
necessary to serve a significant government interest.”). 
 295. See generally id. at 791 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a 
critique by one of our number of the majority opinion in Madsen, see Murray, supra note **, 
at 754–57. 
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Second, the Court struck down a provision of the injunction that 
barred protesters from speaking to any person seeking the services of 
a clinic within 300 feet of the clinic as violative of the First 
Amendment, holding that “[a]bsent evidence that the protesters’ 
speech is independently proscribable (i.e., ‘fighting words’ or 
threats), . . . this provision cannot stand.”296 
Similarly, in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,297 which dealt not with 
threats or expressive conduct but with “hate speech,” the Court 
confirmed that “threats of violence are outside the First 
Amendment.”298 Nevertheless, the Court added that even categorical 
exceptions like “true threats” must be proscribed in a way that is 
viewpoint-neutral. Citing Watts, the Court explained that 
the Federal Government can [for example] criminalize only those 
threats of violence that are directed against the President . . . since 
the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First 
Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from 
the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to 
the person of the President.299 
But, the Court cautioned, “the Federal Government may not 
criminalize . . . threats against the President that [merely] mention 
his policy on aid to inner cities.”300 
B. Analysis 
The Court’s teachings on “true threats” may be quickly 
summarized. Watts lays the foundation on which the Court builds its 
understanding of how to distinguish protected speech or expressive 
conduct from unprotected threats. The decision identifies the “true 
threat” categorical exception to First Amendment protections. “True 
threats” must be, however, distinguished from “political 
hyperbole.”301 Debate about ideas is a crucial aspect of the freedoms  
 
 
 296. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 774. 
 297. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 298. Id. at 388. 
 299. Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)). 
 300. Id. 
 301. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
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protected by the First Amendment,302 and the language of the public 
arena is often “vituperative, abusive, and inexact.”303 
Watts provides two important guideposts on how the Court 
reached its conclusion. First, regarding the standard for determining 
whether the speech is protected speech or expressive conduct or is an 
unprotected threat, the Court emphasized the factors that it 
considered to determine whether Watts’s speech was protected: (1) 
whether the threat was conditional, (2) the reaction of the listeners, 
and (3) the context in which the statement was made.304 What the 
Court did not say is equally important: it did not say that the list was 
exhaustive, that any one of the factors was determinative, that each 
must be examined, or that any one of the factors was more 
important than another. Nor did it say that any of the factors (e.g. 
“context”) was legitimately open to manipulation that might 
constrict the breathing room of the First Amendment to the point of 
suffocation.305 
Second, the Court adopted a methodology of enforcing its 
approach for separating “true threats” from protected speech: 
instead of remanding for a new trial with different instructions, it 
remanded with an instruction to dismiss the case. The Court thus 
followed a long line of decisions, holding: 
[T]he question is one of alleged trespass across “the line between 
speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may 
legitimately be regulated.” . . . [T]he rule is that we “examine for 
ourselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under 
which they were made . . . .” We must “make an independent 
examination of the whole record,” . . . so as to assure ourselves that 
the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field 
of free expression.306 
 
 302. See supra note 192 (discussing Holmes’s free speech jurisprudence). 
 303. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Compare Watts with the en banc opinion in Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1086 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
 306. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (citations omitted); see also 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 567–68 (1995) 
(explaining that the “constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record 
as a whole, without deference to the trial court” rests upon the Supreme Court “simply 
because the reaches of the First Amendment are ultimately defined by the facts it is held to 
embrace, and we must thus decide for ourselves whether a given course of conduct falls on the 
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The question whether speech constitutes a “true threat” is, 
therefore, a question of law to be decided by a court independent of 
the jury’s finding of fact.307 
Claiborne confirms that not all threats or expressive conduct are 
proscribable simply because they are threats. While consistently 
referring to “threats of violence” as outside the First Amendment, 
the Court in Claiborne emphasized that “‘threats’ of ‘social 
ostracism, vilification, and traduction’”308 are fully within the 
Amendment’s protection. In addition, in Claiborne, the Court 
intimated that “true threats” is a narrow category. Evers repeatedly 
addressed crowds of black citizens, telling them that boycott 
violators would have their “necks broken” and that the “Sheriff 
could not sleep with boycott violators at night.” In a highly charged 
climate or context, in which violence actually was visited upon 
several boycott violators—shots were fired through houses, bricks 
were thrown through windshields—the Court still refused to uphold 
liability.309 Because Evers himself had not authorized or ratified 
violence, the First Amendment protected his speeches.310 Without 
evidence of personal involvement in the violence, Evers’s speeches 
were protected: “[s]peech does not lose its protected character . . . 
simply because it may embarrass others or coerce them into 
action.”311 
Two other points stand out. Where protected speech is 
intermixed with unprotected speech, individual liability must be 
based on individual conduct.312 Only those losses proximately caused 
by the unprotected conduct can be the basis for liability. Individual 
 
near or far side of the line of constitutional protection”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 
458 U.S. 886, 933–34 (1982); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 
(1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732–33 (1968). 
 307. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984), in which 
the Court unanimously observed: “[T]he rule of independent review assigns to judges a 
constitutional responsibility that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact, whether the fact-
finding function be performed in the particular case by a jury or by a trial judge.” But see 
CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 38, § 3.12 (“[I]t remains to be seen whether the court’s de 
novo review in defamation cases [on malice] will apply broadly to First Amendment actions.”) 
 308. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 921. 
 309. Id. at 904. 
 310. Id. at 921. 
 311. Id. at 910; see also id. at 911 (“The claim that the expressions were intended to 
exercise a coercive impact . . . does not remove them from the reach of the First 
Amendment.”). 
 312. See id. at 918. 
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liability may not be imposed without individual conduct, so losses 
resulting from protected conduct are not cognizable.313 Thus, the 
Court required “precision of regulation,” that is, independent 
judicial review of fact finding, focused pleadings, limited arguments 
of counsel, narrowly tailored jury instructions, clarifying special 
verdicts, and a heightened burden of proof (“clear”).314 Each of 
 
 313. See id. 
 314. Strangely, most comment on the Court’s opinion in Claiborne is fixed on its 
substantive teaching about the First Amendment. Far less attention is paid to the techniques 
through which those First Amendment teachings are to be exercised, including procedural and 
evidentiary limitations. Six elements of the Court’s opinion stand out: 
First, the Court’s opinion mandates an independent standard of review by any reviewing 
court of the application of its First Amendment standards. Id. at 916 n.50 (“We must make an 
independent examination of the whole record.” (citations omitted)). We argue that an 
independent review by the trial court before a matter is submitted to a jury is necessarily 
included within that mandate. See infra Part VII.A. 
Second, the Court focused on pleadings as a means to define issues. Claiborne, 458 U.S. 
at 917–18 (citing labor law limitations as “no less applicable . . . to the important First 
Amendment interests at issue in this case”). We argue that First Amendment litigation is a 
constitutional exception to general notice pleading. See infra Part VII.D. 
Third, the Court focused on arguments of counsel as a means to define issues. Claiborne, 
458 U.S. at 917–18. Arguments of counsel will be appropriately limited if the substantive 
standard for “true threats” is rightly set out and the admissibility of evidence is rigorously 
policed. See infra Part VII.D. 
Fourth, the Court focused on jury instructions as a means to define issues. Claiborne, 
458 U.S. at 917–18. Jury instructions, too, will be appropriately limited if the substantive 
standard for “true threats” is rightly set out and the admissibility of evidence is rigorously 
policed. See infra Part VII.D. 
Fifth, considering that the Court requires that a distinction be made between damages 
that flow from protected conduct and damages that flow from unprotected conduct, we do not 
see how this distinction can be drawn—and reviewed—except by detailed and carefully drafted 
special verdicts that disclose evidentiary bases. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 918 (“Only those losses 
proximately covered by unlawful conduct may be recovered.”). “[A]mbiguous findings . . . are 
inadequate to assure the ‘precision of regulation’ demanded by [the First Amendment].” Id. at 
921. “[N]o constitutional freedom . . . [may] be defeated by insubstantial findings of 
fact . . . .” Id. at 924 (citation omitted). Conclusions of fact “must be supported by findings 
that adequately disclose the evidentiary basis for concluding that specific parties agreed to use 
unlawful means, that carefully identify the impact of such unlawful conduct . . . .” Id. at 933–
34 (emphasis added). We argue, therefore, that special verdicts are required in First 
Amendment litigation. See infra note 416. 
Sixth, “clear proof” is required of what must be shown, that is, association and specific 
intent when an individual joins an organization or group that reflects dual goals: lawful and 
unlawful. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 919 (“[T]here must be ‘clear proof that a defendant 
“specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to violence.”’” 
(citations omitted)). We read this passage to prohibit the use of the usual civil standard of 
preponderance of the evidence. See infra note 768 (discussing various burdens of proof). 
Collective responsibility is, in short, beyond the pale. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 920 n.55. “Civil 
liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members 
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these devices must be used to ensure the maximum possible 
safeguards for speech by segregating protected speech or expressive 
conduct, otherwise not actionable, from unprotected speech when it 
is uttered in the context of unprotected speech or violent conduct. 
Madsen and R.A.V. fill out some of the interstices of the 
Watts/Claiborne framework. While the Court does not squarely 
hold that “true threats” is a categorical exception,315 Madsen, in fact, 
treats them as “independently proscribable” as well as, and, in the 
same breath as “fighting words,” indicating that the Court conceives 
of “true threats” like obscenity, defamation, and fighting words.316 
R.A.V. confirms this view, and it underlines that, like other 
categorical exceptions, “true threats” may not be proscribed based 
on a viewpoint criterion. Significantly, too, R.A.V. articulates the 
three major policy considerations underlying why “true threats” are 
proscribable qua threats: to “protect[] individuals from the fear of 
violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the 
possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”317 Finally, 
R.A.V.’s reference to “threats of violence” rather than just to “true 
threats” as proscribable confirms Claiborne’s holding that other 
kinds of threats (e.g., at least those of ostracism, vilification, and 
traduction) are not within the categorical exception of “true 
threats.” 
Despite the Court’s guidance, the circuit courts of appeal 
continue to formulate their own discrete approaches to the issue of 
“true threats.” The approaches of most circuits—including the en 
 
of which committed acts of violence.” Id. at 920. “[I]t is necessary to establish that the group 
itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those 
illegal aims.” Id. 
Each of the techniques must be employed with care to assure that judgments of 
individual responsibility in these sensitive areas are consistent with the promise of the First 
Amendment and, at the same time, with basic principles of criminal jurisprudence. That the 
courts presently do so is hardly the case. See infra note 416 (discussing the Scheidler decision). 
 315. Accord James R. Bussian, Comment, Anatomy of the Campus Speech Code: An 
Examination of Prevailing Regulations, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 153, 175 (1995) (observing that 
the Supreme Court has “never expressly h[eld] that a threat of violence is a categorical 
exception to the First Amendment”); Kristine L. Sendek, Comment, “FACE”-ing the 
Constitution: The Battle over the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Shifts from Reproductive 
Health Facilities to the Federal Courts, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 165, 213 (1996) (“Although not 
specifically referred to as a categorical exception to the First Amendment’s protection of 
speech, threats of force are not considered protected speech by the Supreme Court.”). 
 316. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994). 
 317. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 937 
banc opinion in American Coalition—reflect little of what the Court 
teaches. Indeed, too often the teaching is flatly misread or simply 
ignored altogether. The result is a myriad of approaches, tests, and 
holdings that significantly (and impermissibly) broaden the scope of 
“threats,” correspondingly (and impermissibly) decrease First 
Amendment freedoms, and distort fundamental principles of federal 
criminal jurisprudence. A careful examination of each of the circuit’s 
major decisions is required to demonstrate the scope and depth of 
the required reform. Much must be done. 
V. THE CIRCUITS ON “TRUE THREATS” 
Despite the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court on “true 
threats,” the circuit courts of appeal are using a lot of time—and 
pages of the Federal Reporters—as if they were largely free to think 
about the problem for themselves. Nevertheless, as Judge Avern 
Cohn aptly observes, the results are far from “uniform.”318 The 
circuit courts generally agree that, as appellate tribunals, they must 
scrutinize independently whether speech is protected. But after that, 
unanimity splinters. The lack of uniformity may be traced in large 
part to the conflation of the question of whether a statement is a 
“true threat” for the purposes of (1) the requisite state of mind 
under the particular statute at issue and (2) for the scope of the First 
Amendment. The confusion results from “too loose a use of the 
phrase true threat.”319 The confusion may be demonstrated in the 
two major approaches to “true threats.” 
Under the majority approach, courts treat the First Amendment 
as intermingled with the statutory construction. In doing so, the 
courts find that the statute itself requires a showing of a 
constitutional “true threat,”320 they define “true threat” for both 
constitutional and statutory purposes, and they conclude that any 
speech that falls within the statute, as so construed, is unprotected.321 
 
 318. See United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1381 (E.D. Mich. 1995), aff’d sub 
nom., United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 319. Id. at 1381. 
 320. See, e.g., United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851, 857 n.7 (E.D. Wis. 1994) 
(“Congress need not explicitly limit FACE to ‘true threats’ to comply with the First 
Amendment; as with other statutes criminalizing threats, the courts will infer such a 
limitation.”) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)), aff’d sub nom., United 
States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 321. See infra Part VII.A. 
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Significantly, the question of whether particular speech falls within 
the statute is, as a rule, left to a duly instructed jury, and courts note 
that as with any other statute, a jury finding can be set aside on a 
showing that no reasonable jury could find that, the speech 
constituted a “true threat.”322 The legal standard used to instruct the 
jury is an “objective” test,323 but it comes, nevertheless, in three main 
verbal varieties, although the exact word formulation varies by 
circuit, and significantly, the various verbal formulations hardly 
produce differing results: (1) an objective, speaker-based approach,324 
(2) an objective, hearer-based approach,325 and (3) an objective, 
viewpoint-neutral approach.326 At a minimum, the different 
formulations should affect the character of jury instructions; they 
could, but do not, affect the admission of evidence, that is, speaker-
based tests might cue the district court to admit less evidence of 
 
 322. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1264 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(reviewing a conviction challenged on First Amendment grounds, and stating that, in so doing, 
it “examines the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction and the denial of a motion 
for acquittal by reviewing the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution,’ 
determining whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt’”) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); 
United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973) (“‘When a motion for a 
directed verdict of acquittal is made in a criminal case, the sole duty of the trial judge is to 
determine whether there is substantial evidence which, taken in the light most favorable to the 
[prosecution], tends to show that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .’ 
Even when the defense is based on a claim of [F]irst [A]mendment rights, [this] rule . . . 
contains the proper standard for determining whether a case should be submitted to the jury.”) 
(quoting Bell v. United States, 185 F.2d 302, 310 (4th Cir. 1950)); see also United States v. 
Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 555 (3d Cir. 1991) (“A few cases may be so clear [in favor of acquittal] 
that they can be resolved as a matter of law, but most cases arising under [18 U.S.C. § 871] 
present widely varying fact patterns that should be left to the trier of fact.” (citations omitted)). 
 323. On this point within the circuits, decisions are not entirely uniform. See, e.g., United 
States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that “the showing of an intent to 
threaten, required by § 875(c) . . . is a showing of specific intent”); United States v. 
Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358, 1363 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying, as the law of the case, a specific 
intent standard requiring proof “that the defendant appreciated the threatening nature of his 
statement and intended at least to convey the impression that the threat was a serious one” 
(citing Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring))); United 
States v. Patillo, 431 F.2d 293, 297–98 (4th Cir. 1970) (“We hold that where, as in Patillo’s 
case, a true threat against the person of the President is uttered without communication to the 
President intended, the threat can form a basis for conviction under the terms of Section 
871(a) only if made with a present intention to do injury to the President.”), panel opinion 
adhered to, 438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1971). 
 324. See infra Part V.A.1. 
 325. See infra Part V.A.2. 
 326. See infra Part V.A.3. 
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hearer reaction while hearer-based tests might cue district courts to 
admit more evidence of hearer reaction. Nevertheless, the 
administration of the various tests reflects little variation.327 Within 
each circuit, additional factors may also be considered and various 
subsidiary rules may be followed. In addition, each circuit tends to 
use the same definition or test for all statutes dealing with “threats.” 
The minority approach—which only the Second Circuit follows, 
although the Sixth Circuit may be moving to do so—is markedly 
different. In the Second Circuit, whether speech is protected by the 
First Amendment is a separate inquiry from whether it is a “threat” 
for purposes of a particular statute. In fact, in the Second Circuit 
(and perhaps the Sixth), the focus significantly shifts from a duly 
instructed jury to the trial court itself. Before examining any 
particular statute, the trial court itself must first apply a threshold test 
to ensure that, consistent with the First Amendment, the speech at 
issue constitutionally constitutes a “true threat.” In all of these 
circuits, appellate courts purport to scrutinize independently whether 
speech is protected. In the Second Circuit, the legal standard is also 
objective; it is, however—at least in theory—a higher standard than 
that followed by other circuits.328 
These approaches—and the variations among them—constitute 
the “true threats” jurisprudence of the federal circuit courts. 
Regrettably, none of the circuits adequately safeguards freedom of 
speech, nor do any of the circuits even afford that degree of 
protection guaranteed by current Supreme Court jurisprudence, 
 
 327. Here, we agree with the judgment of the en banc opinion in Planned Parenthood of 
the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1074–
75, 1075 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The difference does not appear to matter much because all 
consider context, including the effect of an allegedly threatening statement on the listener.”). 
 328. The Second Circuit asserts that this higher objective standard “works ultimately to 
much the same purpose and effect as would a requirement of proof of specific intent to execute 
the threat . . . .” United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976). In fact, the 
Second Circuit observes, the “qualities of unequivocal immediacy and express intention,” 
which its standard requires for proof that a given communication is a threat unprotected by the 
First Amendment, “are the most, perhaps, that even [a] . . . requirement of specific intent 
could demand in any event since such an intent may be proved circumstantially; the jury under 
that test would have the almost impossible task of evaluating (a defendant’s) subjective mental 
processes in relation to executing his apparent intent as that intent was manifested by his words 
and gestures in context.” Id. While these arguments are telling, they do not change the 
objective character of the standard, which looks to what a reasonable person would think, 
rather than to what the speaker intended. Nor does this standard focus the jury’s attention on 
its duty to find, in fact, that the defendant subjectively intends “to threaten” a particular 
person. 
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much less give due recognition to basic principles of federal criminal 
law. An analysis of illustrative decisions from each circuit 
demonstrates the substantial shortcomings of the various approaches. 
It also establishes how thorough the required reform must be. 
A. Construing Around the First Amendment:  
The Predominant Approach 
1. The objective, speaker-based test 
a. The First Circuit. Two cases, both decided in 1997, reflect the 
First Circuit’s teachings on “true threats.” The first, United States v. 
Fulmer,329 involved the prosecution of Kevan Fulmer for threatening 
a federal agent in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). Convinced 
that his brother and father-in-law committed pension fraud and 
income tax fraud by failing to disclose assets in bankruptcy, Fulmer 
complained to the Office of the United States Trustee—which, in 
turn, referred the matter to Richard Egan, an FBI agent.330 Egan met 
with Fulmer in August or September of 1994, and in that meeting, 
Fulmer described his brother and former father-in-law331 as “vicious” 
people who “used the courts to keep him away from his family.”332 
Egan described Fulmer’s demeanor as “polite, articulate,” but 
“tense.”333 Fulmer remained in constant contact with Egan for 
approximately three months following the meeting, stopping by to 
inquire about the case, sending Egan letters and faxes, and calling 
him on the telephone. Egan investigated the case and consulted with 
an Assistant United States Attorney,334 who advised him that he 
would not prosecute the case. In turn, Egan informed Fulmer that 
the case did not merit prosecution. Fulmer “protested the decision, 
but said ‘good-bye’ and hung up after Egan told him there was 
nothing further to discuss.”335 
Subsequently, Fulmer left Egan the following voicemail message: 
 
 
 329. 108 F.3d 1486 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 330. Id. at 1489. 
 331. By the time of the meeting, Fulmer was divorced. See id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. 
 334. See id. 
 335. Id. at 1490. 
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Hi Dick, Kevan Fulmer. Hope things are well, hope you had an 
enjoyable Easter and all the other holidays since I’ve last spoken 
with you last. I want you to look something up. It’s known as a 
misprision. Just think of it in terms of a misprision of a felony. 
Hope all is well. The silver bullets are coming. I’ll talk to you. 
Enjoy the intriguing unraveling of what I said to you. Talk to you, 
Dick. It’s been a pleasure. Take care.336 
At trial, Egan testified that the message “shocked” him; he found 
it, “chilling” and “scary.” He testified that the phrase “silver bullets” 
was unknown to him, and he thought that it indicated a threat.337  
 
 336. Id. (emphasis added). 
 337. ¶1. Id. 
¶2. The members of the court, the Assistant United States Attorney, and Special Agent 
Egan, were apparently raised in a rarefied milieu divorced from the ubiquitous icons of popular 
culture. In fact, the phrase “silver bullet” is a well-known and often-used cliché. A search of 
Lexis for the period from August 18, 2001, to October 18, 2001, for example, finds the phrase 
used by the general media 721 times in reference to a wide-ranging melange of subjects, 
including airbags, John M. Broder, How We Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2001, at 10, col. 1.; 
terrorism, Amity Shlaes, America Must Fight Against Terrorism at Home, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2000, at 25; and gasoline additives, Seema Mehta, MTBE Cleanup Cost Put at 29 Billion, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2001, pt. 2, at 6. The use continues. See, e.g., Louis Vehitelle, Consumer 
Confidence Index Goes from a Aha to a Hmm, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2002, at 1 (New York 
University economist quoted: “No index or statistic is the silver bullet that anticipates 
consumption.”). While the phrase does not appear in the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, its 
meaning is commonplace, at least to aficionados of popular film, in particular the horror 
movie. 
¶3. For many, however, films are little more than an opportunity for entertainment, a 
harmless diversion, and a “good scare.” For others, their meaning as art is deeply psychological 
or profoundly religious or is a socio-economic commentary. See, e.g., STUART M. KAMINSKY, 
AMERICA FILM GENRES 130–54 (1974); Judith Hess Wright, Genre Films and the Status Quo, 
in FILM GENRE READER 41 (Barny Keith Grant ed., 1986); R.H.W. Dillard, The Pageantry of 
Death, in FOCUS ON THE HORROR FILM 36 (Roy Huss & T.J. Ross eds., 1972). They provide 
a sharp counterpoint to the optimistic rationalism of the Enlightenment, which was often, 
though not always, antireligious—that is, rejecting that which could not be touched or 
measured, as matter of faith or belief. Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein (1818)—one novel and 
motion picture character known to all—is a classic in the genre, a powerful romantic reaction 
to the hubris of reason. Law, of course, privileges reason, but it must still keep an eye on what 
the other facilities of the human person know in their own ways. Lawyers must study and learn 
from art as well as philosophy or science. In fact, from the interpretation of art, we can learn 
much about the human condition, which must be taken into account in any formulation of a 
legal rule, including the jurisprudence of “true threats.” Various views provide not confusion 
but perspective. 
¶4. For Kaminsky, for example, horror films—from a Jungian perspective—are modern 
shared dreams, a contemporary form of myth or folktale. Previously, myths possessed religious 
meanings. For example, a universal fear, like death, that could not be handled in any other 
way, was turned into allegory. In modern society, horror films deal with not only fear of death 
but also a loss of individuality and the presence of social isolation. Immortality, a frequent 
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theme, is seen not as a boon but as a bane, a curse from which a tormented creature seeks 
release, a creature who is “acutely aware of this aloneness, . . . pained because he constantly 
finds love but, knows that he is doomed to destroy or outlive the love object.” KAMINSKY, 
supra, at 101. Often, the uncontrolled beast that lurks within each of us, once out, must 
“destroy others to continue living.” Id. at 102. As in the biblical conflict between Cain and 
Abel, life is seen as a struggle between good and evil, not only external, “but something 
monstrous within ourselves.” Id. at 104. “Graves and crypts [are] constantly . . . defiled . . . 
[and] a corpse . . . [found] missing [is a fact viewed not as] resurrection [but] as a horror 
[instead of] a Christ-like miracle.” Id. at 106. Modern science is of no avail in mitigating or 
destroying the evil; the monster can only be exorcized by the supernatural. For a similar, but 
Freudian, interpretation, see RANDY LOREN RASMUSSEN, CHILDREN OF THE NIGHT 222–38 
(1998). 
¶5. For Wright, “genre films,” on the other hand, “produce satisfaction rather than 
action [and] pity and fear rather than revolt” against oppressive “social and political conflicts.” 
Wright, supra at 41. They serve the interest of the ruling classes since “oppressed groups [all 
too often] . . . accept the genre film’s absurd solutions to economic and social conflicts.” Id. In 
particular, the “horror film attempts to resolve the disparities between two contradictory ways 
of problem solving—one based on rationality, the other based on faith, an irrational 
commitment to certain traditional beliefs.” Id. at 42. “Horror films present human beings as 
fallen, prey to uncontrollable evil impulses.” Id. at 43. “The message is clear: science must not 
be allowed to replace traditional values and beliefs. Otherwise, chaos will result, as humans 
cannot control their own evil tendencies or those of the people around them without 
supernatural help.” Id.at 46. “The social order out of which these monsters spring,” however, 
“is . . . good [and] it must remain unchanged.” Id. “[T]he existing class structure [properly] 
prevents chaos.” Id. “Like the German expressionist horror films that preceded them, 
American horror films . . . may be seen as a reaction to . . . economic and social upheaval . . . .” 
Id. It is, in effect, “a plea to go back to older methods of coping.” Id. 
¶6. For Dillard, however, “all significant Western Art, at least since the medieval period, 
has been directly concerned with the original fall of man and the consequent introduction of 
sin and death into the world.” Dillard, supra at 36. The horror film is 
[a]t its best, as thoroughly and richly involved with the dark truths of sin and death 
as any art form has ever been, but its approach is that of parable and metaphor—an 
approach which enables it on occasion to achieve a metaphysical grandeur, but 
which also may explain why its failures are so very awful . . . . 
Id. 
¶7. Like the morality play of the middle ages, “the horror film deals with the central 
issue of Christian life—the struggle between the spirits of good and evil . . . .” Id. at 36. It 
“teaches an acceptance of the natural order of things . . . [and that] death . . . is also the 
natural and peaceful end to the turmoil and terror of life in a fallen world.” Id. at 37. 
¶8. “The werewolf story is perhaps the clearest example of [the] . . . ambiguity of death in the 
horror film.” Id. at 38. The central figure is both hero and villain. Through no action of his own, like 
each of us, possessing a fallen nature, the evil within the protagonist is released by happenstance, the 
bite of a werewolf; he, too, becomes a beast of the full moon, a creature of blind evil but still a man, 
tortured as if damned. An individual in a business suit by day and is a beast at night, cursed by 
immorality, he “can only die . . . by a wound from a silver weapon (a knife, a bullet, the head of a 
cane) . . . .” Id. at 39. “Reason . . . is ineffectual, because it denies the existence of any evil that does 
not fit the immutable laws of a logical and orderly universe.” Id. at 40. “Death . . . [is] the 
instrument of the hero’s salvation. . . . a paradox worthy of the highest art.” Id. at 39. The horror 
film, therefore, “is a morality play for our times.” Id. at 41. It is “religious . . . as all art finally proves 
to be . . . [affirming] humanity in the very face of honor.” Id. 
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¶9. George Waggner’s The Wolf Man (Universal Pictures 1941), a classic, tragic horror 
film, is illustrative of the genre and warrants, for that reason, further treatment. It presents a 
view of the human being as not different in kind from a beast, and it provides an artistic 
counterpoint to simplistic concepts of individual responsibility sometimes found in the criminal 
law and at issue in these materials. As developed by Curt Siodmak’s excellent screenplay based 
on lycanthropic folklore, Larry Talbot, the protagonist, is played by Lon Chaney, Jr., son of 
the silent film star. For more on lycanthropy, see A LYCANTHROPY READER (Charlotte Otten 
ed., 1986) (indicating, generally, that Siodmak’s screenplay is more imaginative than true to 
historical myth). Chaney’s definitive portrayal of the monster, using a rubber snout, long 
claws, and yak hair, catapulted the junior Channey to horror film stardom, rivaling that of his 
father. 
¶10. Cast as a young Welsh heir, Chaney returns from an American education 
(“pragmatism”) to the mansion of his father, Sir John Talbot (“enlightened reason”) played by 
Claude Raines, who does typically fine work in a role well beneath his considerable talent. 
While working on his father’s telescope, Cheney sees the beautiful young Gwen Conliffe, 
played by Evelyn Ankers, in the second floor of her father’s antique shop; he goes there, asking 
to see the pair of earrings that she was wearing when he saw her through the window. Gwen 
tells him they are not for sale; instead, he buys an old walking cane with a silver handle, formed 
in the shape of a wolf’s head with a pentagram engraved on it. Gwen tells Larry about the 
werewolf legend, including that the pentagram was its sign, but Larry laughs it off as a silly 
superstition, asks Gwen for a date (the real purpose of his visit to the shop), and suggests that 
she join him to get their futures told at a local gypsy camp. Gwen agrees, though she is 
engaged (a traditional bond) to Frank Andrew (played by Patric Knowles), the Talbot’s game-
keeper. But to assuage her “guilt” of cheating (unknown to Larry) on Frank (a violation of a 
bond, for which tradition will inevitably impose a sanction), she brings her friend, Jenny 
Williams (played by Fay Helm), as a chaperone. 
¶11. At the camp, the trio meets the gypsy fortune teller, Bela, played by Bela Lugosi, 
whose intense talent is largely wasted in a minor role, and his mother, Queen Maleva (“the 
voice of the supernatural” marvelously played with great restraint by Maria Ouspenskaya). 
Jenny has her fortune read by Bela. As Larry and Gwen walk off into the fog-shrouded moor, 
deepening their illicit relationship and her guilt, Bela sees a pentagram in Jenny’s hand, a sign 
that she will be killed by a werewolf; she quickly ends the session. While Larry and Gwen are 
walking on the moor, they hear a bone-chilling wolf’s howl and a young woman’s screams; 
Larry rushes toward the sounds, and he is attacked by a hairy beast; during the struggle he 
manages to beat the animal to death with the head of his cane but is bitten on his chest by the 
animal and faints from the pain. When he comes to, the dead bodies of Jenny and Bela are 
found—Jenny’s throat ripped out and Bela’s head beaten in. Captain Paul Montford, played by 
Ralph Bellany (“the voice of the law”) without particular distinction, comes upon the scene 
and of course, doubt’s Larry’s story since it is not supported by “evidence” (his alleged wound 
has disappeared). Similarly, Doctor Lloyd (“the voice of science”), played by Warren Williams, 
does not believe Larry after examining only what he can see, Jenny’s and Bela’s bodies. 
¶12. Seeking answers beyond the accepted methods of reason or science, Larry goes to the 
crypt where Bela is resting. There, he sees Maleva but does not then talk to her. Later, Larry goes to 
a gypsy carnival, held to commemorate Bela’s death. This time, he does seek out Maleva and she tells 
him that her son was a werewolf and since he was bitten, he too will become a wild beast when the 
moon is full, the victim of a capricious fate. She tells him that, like her poor son, he will kill despite 
himself, that nothing can help him, and that he can only be killed by a silver object—a bullet, a knife, 
or—ominously—a cane. See DRAKE DOUGLAS, HORRORS! 97 (1989) (“A silver bullet entering the 
werewolf’s body . . . will bring instant death . . . [, but an] ordinary bullet will not harm a werewolf, 
even though he be in human form.”). 
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¶13. As the plot develops, Larry, in fact, turns into a werewolf at the next full moon and 
viciously kills a grave digger—in, of course, a foggy cemetery—fulfilling Maleva’s dire 
prediction. Tormented by what he did, Larry tries to convince Gwen that he is a werewolf; 
though she knows well the myth, she refuses to believe him, and Larry—horrified—sees the 
portentous sign of the pentagram in Gwen’s palm, as Bela saw it in Jenny’s. Larry then seeks 
Sir John’s aid, but Sir John also refuses to believe his son’s fantastic story because it does not fit 
into his “enlightened” view of the world. Like Doctor Lloyd, he “explains” Larry’s fears as 
possibly a form of schizophrenia, an answer of science. But Sir John eventually agrees to tie 
Larry up while he goes out onto the moor—fatefully carrying, at Larry’s suggestion, his wolf’s 
head cane—with Capt. Montford (“the law”), Dr. Lloyd (“science”), and Frank Andres 
(“traditional man”) the game keeper. They futilely use man-made traps, unknowingly seeking a 
supernatural wild beast of the night that is terrorizing the village community; the techniques of 
the modern man will never “catch” the truth of the supernatural. The full moon rises, and 
Larry turns into a werewolf, easily breaking free of the restrains (representing enlightened 
reason), which Sir John placed on him. 
¶14. Gwen—unbelievably—is on the moor, and Larry finds and attacks her. Sir John, 
separated from the hunting party, hears her screams, rushes to the sound, and like Larry with 
Bela, beats the beast to death with Larry’s silver cane—a result that Larry transparently 
envisioned when he importuned his father to take the cane (to go beyond enlightened reason). 
Sir John, who scoffed at his son’s supernatural tale, now sees with his own eyes the beast laying 
on the moor slowly turning from a monster into his own son: an empirical verification of the 
supernatural. The separated hunting party now appears and assumes that Larry died trying to 
save Gwen. Sir John does not disabuse them of their too hasty assumption, a characteristic of 
modern man. Maleva also appears and says a prayer, embodying the “real” truth, over Larry’s 
lifeless body: “[t]he way you walked was thorny, though no fault of your own. But as the rain 
enters the soil, the river enters the sea, so tears run to a predestined end. Your suffering is over. 
Now you will find peace for eternity.” 
¶15. Released only two days after Pearl Harbor, The Wolfman was an unanticipated 
financial smash hit for Universal. Despite bad reviews, see, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1941, at 
24 (“[N]obody is going to go on believing in werewolves or Santa Clauses if the custodians of 
these legends don’t tell them with a more convincing imaginative touch.”), the picture did 
extremely well at the box office, touching something deep in the popular imagination, which 
popular education did not encompass. See, e.g., VARIETY, Dec. 24, 1941 (reporting double 
house averages, big engagements, and hold overs at the theaters). In the following years, 
Chaney reprised the werewolf role six times, giving further currency to the legend and its 
“silver bullet” myth, as the only means to kill a monster. Nevertheless, the “sequels were 
clearly hurry-up jobs played for the thrills and scares . . . .” JAMES B. TWITCHELL, DREADFUL 
PLEASURES 226 (1985). 
¶16. Though the sequels hardly graced the genre, the original rightly made Chaney a 
star; it also made the phrase “silver bullet” part of the daily vocabulary of at least the American 
theater-going public, if not law enforcement or the judiciary. See also William Safire, On 
Language—Drug War Lingo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1989, § 6, at 20 (tracing the origins of 
“magic bullet” (in German Zauberkugel) to bacteriologist Paul Ehrlich who shared the Nobel 
Prize in 1908 and coined the term to describe the ideal therapeutic agent that destroys 
unhealthy cells but spares healthy tissue. The phrase was also related to “silver bullet” thought 
to be effective with werewolves). Apparently, only those involved in the administration of 
justice—a process of enlightened reason, like that of Sir John or Captain Monford—are 
ignorant of the popular meaning of “silver bullet”—that which unfailingly achieves its 
objective. 
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For his part, Fulmer called two witnesses who testified to the 
meaning of the phrase “silver bullets.” The first testified that the 
phrase meant “a clear-cut simple violation of law” and that Fulmer 
used it to “describe specific evidence, including an $8,200 check 
from a bankruptcy estate that never reached its intended 
recipient.”338 The second testified that Fulmer used the term to 
mean “information that he was going to provide to banks proving 
the illegality of some of [his brother’s] transactions.”339 Fulmer was 
convicted, and he appealed. He argued, among other things, that the 
prosecution violated his First Amendment rights as outlined in 
Watts. 
The court began its opinion by examining the “threat” 
requirement of the statute. After noting that the First Circuit was 
not on record “on the appropriate standard regarding the nature of a 
‘true threat,’” it reviewed the work of its sister circuits in developing 
a “true threat” standard under the statute “and other federal threat 
statutes.”340 The court refused to adopt an actual intent standard for 
the making of a true threat, which the defendant actually intended to 
threaten. Rather, it adopted an objective test. It concluded: 
[T]he appropriate standard under which a defendant may be 
convicted for making a threat is whether he should have reasonably 
foreseen that the statement he uttered would be taken as a threat 
by those to whom it is made. This standard not only takes into 
account the factual context in which the statement was made, but 
also better avoids the perils that inhere in the “reasonable-recipient 
standard,” namely that the jury will consider the unique sensitivity 
of the recipient. We find it particularly untenable that, were we to 
apply a standard guided from the perspective of the recipient, a 
defendant may be convicted for making an ambiguous statement 
that the recipient may find threatening because of events not within 
the knowledge of the defendant.341 
It then dismissed Fulmer’s argument that “the statement was at most 
ambiguous and could not have been a ‘true threat,’” stating that 
after “[r]eviewing . . . [the] . . . facts, and drawing all inferences in 
favor of the verdict,” it could not “say that no rational jury could 
 
 338. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 1491. 
 341. Id. 
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have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Fulmer’s statement was a 
threat.”342 The court emphasized that “[w]hether a given 
[statement] constitutes a threat is an issue of fact for the trial 
jury.”343 Moreover, it held, “[t]he use of ambiguous language does 
not preclude a statement from being a threat.”344 It explained: 
[w]hile the statement on its face may be susceptible to more than 
one interpretation, some factors not discernible from the record, 
such as the tone of the defendant’s voice or the credibility of the 
government’s and Fulmer’s witnesses, may legitimately lead a 
rational jury to find that his statement was a threat.345  
Nevertheless, the court later inconsistently noted that, when 
examining context, “evidence of the recipient’s reactions” to an 
alleged “true threat” as well as his “interpretation” of it is “relevant 
to the inquiry.”346 
Only at this point did the court address Fulmer’s First 
Amendment argument, which it then dismissed in a single 
paragraph. The court observed that Watts “involved a statement 
made against the president in the context of a political rally against a 
war”; Fulmer’s statement, in contrast, was not “one criticizing either 
Egan or any other government figure.”347 “Moreover,” the court 
added, “a true threat is unprotected by the First Amendment. . . . 
Thus, a conviction under this statute, based on a finding that the 
statement was a true threat, would not violate Fulmer’s 
constitutionally protected right to speech.”348 In sum, the court 
defined the “threat” element of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) to require 
a “true threat,” applied an objective, speaker-based test to determine 
 
 342. Id. at 1492. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. at 1499. Here, the court gave away the benefit of a reasonable speaker test. 
Nevertheless, while the court inconsistently upheld the admission of most of Egan’s testimony, 
it ultimately found that admission of one of Egan’s statements—that he brought home extra 
ammunition on the night he received the threat—constituted an abuse of discretion since it 
was unduly prejudicial under FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 403. See id. at 1500. That the 
court adopted a general policy of admitting this kind of evidence, subject to Rule 403 
objections, is paradoxical in light of its expressed concern that a defendant might be found 
guilty “for making an ambiguous statement that the recipient may find threatening because of 
events not within the knowledge of the defendant.” Id. at 1491. 
 347. Id. at 1492. 
 348. Id. at 1492–93. 
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whether a “true threat,” existed, and held that the threat was 
unprotected, even though it only met the First Circuit’s test for 
“true threat” rather than the Supreme Court’s test. 
In United States v. Whiffen,349 decided five months after Fulmer, 
the First Circuit reaffirmed its approach to true threats. Kevin 
Whiffen was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for repeatedly 
threatening workers at a collection agency who were pursuing a debt 
he owed. On several occasions, he told the workers that their 
building “will go boom,” that “buildings go boom boom,” and the 
like.350 Upholding the conviction over a First Amendment challenge, 
the court first held that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) required the government 
to prove a “true threat.”351 Then, declining to adopt an actual intent 
standard, it reiterated the Fulmer objective, speaker-based standard. 
It emphasized: 
This test takes into consideration the context in which the remark 
was made and avoids the risk that an otherwise innocuous 
statement might become a threat if directed at an unusually 
sensitive listener. This approach also protects listeners from 
statements that are reasonably interpreted as threats, even if the 
speaker lacks the subjective, specific intent to threaten, or, as would 
be more common, the government is unable to prove such specific 
intent which, by its nature, is difficult to demonstrate.352 
The court then summarily dismissed Whiffen’s First Amendment 
challenge in much the same fashion as the Fulmer court dismissed 
Fulmer’s claim. It simply stated that Whiffen did “not claim that his 
statements were a form of political speech,” and that, “[i]n any 
event, a true threat is not protected by the First Amendment. . . . 
For this reason, a conviction upon a finding that the statements were 
true threats would not violate Whiffen’s constitutionally protected 
right to speech.”353 
These two cases illustrate several problems with the First 
Circuit’s approach. First, by making the issue—as a rule—a question 
for the jury, the First Circuit necessarily subjects defendants, in close 
 
 349. 121 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 350. Id. at 20. 
 351. Id. at 21. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 22. The court did eventually reverse the conviction on evidentiary issues. See 
infra note 774. 
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cases, to a full jury trial and all the expense and delay that go along 
with it.354 Second, close cases are submitted to a jury, which usually 
results in the case being affirmed on appeal after a conviction since 
the appellate standard is not easily overcome.355 These results are not 
consistent with the protection of minority rights under the First 
Amendment. Close cases should go to the defendant, not to the 
jury. 
Moreover, Fulmer is not consistent with either Watts or 
Claiborne. In Fulmer, the court affirmed a conviction for a “true 
threat” based on a facially nonthreatening statement to an FBI 
agent—an employee of the government—albeit directed to him 
personally.356 In Watts, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction 
where a statement that was facially threatening was made against 
another government employee—the President—albeit during a 
public debate.357 In Claiborne, the Court also overturned a judgment 
based on facially threatening statements against regular citizens—
albeit during a public debate.358 If neither the First Amendment nor 
the Supreme Court differentiates between political speech and other 
forms of protest or expressive conduct in the context of “true 
threats,” the First Circuit cannot justify drawing that line. Putting to 
one side the failure of the trial court to make an independent 
assessment of the character of Fulmer’s speech, that the remarks were 
directed to the agent personally—standing alone—ought not tip the 
scale against the defendant. 
Finally, Whiffen’s argument for an objective standard on the 
ground that it “protects listeners from statements that are reasonably 
interpreted as threats, even if . . . the government is unable to prove 
such specific intent which, by its nature, is difficult to 
 
 354. See infra Part VII.A. 
 355. See supra note 137 (discussing standards of review). 
 356. United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1490 (1st Cir. 1997); cf. United States v. 
Poocha, 259 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that a defendant’s speech was 
constitutionally protected, even though the defendant “clench[ed] his fists, st[u]ck out his 
chest, and yell[ed] ‘f**k you’” at a park ranger, who was standing approximately five feet away, 
after the ranger ordered the defendant to move on); id. at 1080 n.1 (Defendant’s “words, even 
when viewed in the light of his conduct, do not suggest that his speech was a threat of violence 
unprotected by the First Amendment. Under the circumstances [the statements could 
reasonably be seen as an] expression of criticism from an onlooker.”). 
 357. See supra Part IV.A. 
 358. See supra Part IV.A. 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 949 
demonstrate”359 is hardly tenable. In a nation that values its 
commitment to robust, wide-open debate, risk of loss must fall on 
the government in prosecutions involving arguably protected speech. 
That convictions are difficult to obtain is not objectionable if free 
speech is to be given breathing room. That objection proves too 
much, so it proves nothing. The promise of freedom always makes 
the government’s job harder. That is its function. 
b. The Third Circuit. The Third Circuit’s definitive 
pronouncement on “true threats” came in United States v. Kosma,360 
where Louis Kosma sent a series of threatening letters to the 
President; he was indicted on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 
871(a). A postcard written on March 2, 1988, addressed to 
President Reagan, “C/O Ye Ol Whitehouse,” read: 
 
Mr. Reagan: You are hereby invited to PHILADELPHIA. We are 
going to give you a 21 Gun-Salute.  
 21 guns are going to put bullets thru your heart & brains. You 
are a Disgrace to the Air-Force. You are a Disgrace to Teddy 
Roosevelt. You are a Disgrace to John F. Kennedy. You are a 
Disgrace to Nancy Reagan. You have insulted her intelligence, and 
dignity, and honor, and integrity, and I resent this very much!! You 
are In Contempt of EVERYTHING that I represent, and standby, 
and believe. Officially: an Act of Contempt of Court. Your name is 
going to be removed from ALL documents, and books. 
OFFICIALLY: you were NEVER the “president” of anything!361 
A document dated April 20, and sent to the U.S. Marshall’s office in 
Baltimore, was headed, “IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA” 
and purported to be an “Official Court Order,” “Official Proclamation,” 
and “Motion to Proceed in Forma.”362 The letter stated: 
 
 
 
 359. United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court 
specifically rejects this rationale for not adopting an appropriate state of mind requirement. See 
infra note 644 ¶ 13 (detailed discussion and analysis of Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246 (1952)). 
 360. 951 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 361. Id. at 550. 
 362. Id. at 551. 
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To: Wilson Goode. 
 Ronald Reagan. 
WHEREBY; You criminals have caused many Crimes against 
Humanity, and it would be Futile for you to seek Justice. YOU 
CAN ONLY SEEK MERCY.!! “Give me Liberty or give me 
Death.” WE can NOT give you Liberty, but we can give you 
Death, to end your Mental Anguish.!! You are hereby ORDERED 
to Philadelphia, Penna. We are going to give you a 21 Gun-Salute. 
Twenty-one guns are going to put bullets thru your heart & brains. 
Place: FEDERAL COURTHOUSE. 601 Market street. Time: 
6:O’clock am. Date: June 14th. 1988. Flag Day.363 
The document claimed to be from the “Senior Commander. 
REGIONAL TASK FORCE” and the “U.S. MARINES” but was 
signed by the defendant.364 Kosma was convicted on both counts; he 
appealed, claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights;365 his 
conviction was affirmed.366 
The Third Circuit began its opinion by recognizing that because 
the appeal “involve[d] the interpretation of a statute and its 
application to the facts of this case, our review is plenary.”367 Then, it 
recognized that “[i]n cases raising First Amendment issues we have 
repeatedly held that an appellate court has an obligation to ‘make an 
independent examination of the whole record’ in order to make sure 
that ‘the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the 
field of free expression.’”368 The court observed that while it was 
“mindful of the potential difficulties in distinguishing between 
constitutionally protected political speech and unprotected threats 
against the President” and despite its “solicitude for the First 
Amendment,” it believed that the case was “not a difficult one.”369 
 
 
 
 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id.  
 365. Id. at 553. 
 366. Id. at 559. 
 367. Id. at 553. 
 368. Id. (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 
(1984)). 
 369. Id. 
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Kosma argued that Watts controlled; the court, however, held 
that his reliance on Watts was misplaced.370 It noted that in Watts, 
the court held that the “appropriateness of . . . statements about the 
President must be viewed ‘in context,’” with consideration given to 
“the expressly conditional nature of the statement and the reaction 
of the listeners.”371 By contrast, in Kosma’s case, none of these 
factors was present. First, “there was no overtly political context for 
Kosma’s letters.”372 Second, “Kosma’s threats, though ostensibly 
phrased as ‘invitations,’ were not as conditional as those in Watts, 
which were dependent on the defendant’s induction into the armed 
forces—a condition which the defendant stated would never 
happen.”373 Third, Kosma did not direct his “remarks at a group 
attending a W.E.B. DuBois Club rally,” with the result of “th[e] 
group laugh[ing],” as Watts did; instead, Kosma “sent his letters 
directly to the President,” making “the only audience for them . . . 
the Secret Service and the staff of the White House mailroom, and it 
is doubtful that they were laughing.”374 Moreover, the court found it 
“significant” that Kosma’s letters implied that Kosma himself would 
kill the President.375 The court then observed that while “[a] few 
cases may be so clear [in favor of acquittal] that they can be resolved 
as a matter of law, . . . most cases arising under [§ 871] present 
widely varying fact patterns that should be left to the trier of fact.”376 
It concluded, “[i]n sum, we find that Kosma’s letters to the 
President clearly constituted ‘true threats’ and were not protected 
expression.”377 
Finally, the court analyzed an additional aspect of a “true 
threat”: “the appropriate intent standard for judging a ‘true threat’ 
against the President.”378 The court declined to adopt a subjective 
intent standard for two reasons: (1) such a test “makes it 
considerably more difficult for the government to prosecute threats 
against the President,” which is inconsistent with “the compelling, 
 
 370. Id. at 554. 
 371. Id. at 553–54. 
 372. Id. at 554. 
 373. Id. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. Id. at 555 (citation omitted). 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. 
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and indeed paramount, interest in safeguarding the President”;379 
and (2) such a test “defies the purposes behind the Congressional 
enactment of section 871,” which was not only “meant to protect 
the President’s life” but also “to prevent the disruptions and 
inconveniences which result from the threat itself, regardless of 
whether there is any intention to execute the threat.”380 Thus, the 
court adopted an “objective, reasonable speaker standard.” Viewed 
from the standpoint of the speaker: 
the defendant [had to] intentionally make a statement, written or 
oral, in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable 
person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by 
those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious 
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take 
the life of the President . . . .381 
Under that test, the court concluded, “the evidence presented at trial 
was more than sufficient to convict Kosma.”382 
The court in Kosma correctly stated its appellate responsibility in 
a case involving the First Amendment, that is, to examine the record 
independently. But that special responsibility at the appellate level 
will often come too far down the road.383 If a defendant is entitled to 
have a judge, who is more neutral and sensitized to First 
Amendment concerns and the protection of minority views than a 
jury, review his conviction, then he is entitled to have a judge decide 
in the first instance whether conviction would be appropriate, 
consistent with the First Amendment. Sending most prosecutions to 
the jury in “widely varying fact patterns,” as the Kosma Court 
expressly envisioned, and giving a deferential review to jury 
findings—albeit within a de novo framework—hardly squares with 
First Amendment concerns. In a country that values free speech, a 
defendant should not have to suffer trial, conviction, and appeal 
before he receives careful judicial review. 
Further, Kosma itself cannot be squared with Watts. Admittedly, 
that Kosma’s letters were private—rather than part of a public 
debate—and were directed personally to the President distinguishes 
 
 379. Id. at 556. 
 380. Id. 
 381. Id. at 557 (citing Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877–78 (9th Cir. 1969). 
 382. Id. 
 383. See infra Part VII.A. 
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this case, at least somewhat, from Watts. But the court’s other 
attempts at distinguishing Watts are unconvincing. Indeed, on the 
whole, it is fair to say that Watts controls; in the end, Kosma’s letters 
are, like Watts’s rant—statements vituperative of a matter of public 
concern. First, saying that no “overly political” context was present 
for the letters ignores the obvious—the letters were written to 
President Reagan to criticize the job he was doing.384 Second, 
Kosma’s “threats” were conditional; they were conditioned on 
President Reagan accepting his “invitation.”385 Nothing indicated 
Reagan ever intended to visit Philadelphia—let alone on June 14, 
1988. Third, that Kosma directed his letters to the President, the 
“threatened person,” does not remove them from First Amendment 
protection. Charles Evers, the defendant in Claiborne, directed his 
speeches at the persons allegedly threatened, the black citizens of 
Claiborne County, Alabama.386 Nevertheless, the court found those 
threats fully protected.387 Fourth, that the crowd in Watts laughed, 
while the Secret Service agents did not, is ambiguous.388 The crowd 
in Watts may have laughed because they thought Watts amusing 
(i.e., not threatening), but equally possibly, they may have snickered 
at the prospect of the President’s death, a more sobering possibility. 
That the Secret Service agents did not laugh at Kosma’s letters (at 
least the court assumes they did not) cannot be enough to 
distinguish Kosma from Watts. To be sure, the agents appropriately 
took the statement seriously, but that alone hardly takes it out of the 
protection of the First Amendment. Agents have to take all 
statements about shooting the President seriously. That fact goes to 
the reasonableness of the agents’ response, not to the character of 
the statement to which they may be reacting.389 The functions of the 
Secret Service ought not define the limits of freedom; they ought not 
be permitted to define the constitutionally protected character of the 
statement. 
Moreover, that Kosma himself would kill the President is hardly 
a reason to affirm. After all, Watts himself said he wanted to get 
 
 384. Kosma, 951 F.2d at 550, 554. 
 385. Id. 
 386. See supra note 255. 
 387. See supra note 255. 
 388. For more about “ambiguity,” see infra note 459 and Appendix B ¶¶ 2–5 (Natural 
Language: Generality, Ambiguity, and Vagueness). 
 389. See infra Part VII.B.2. 
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L.B.J. in his sights.390 Finally, that it will be difficult for the 
government to obtain convictions is surely no reason to adopt a lax 
standard for “true threats.”391 It would be “easy” to forego trials 
altogether, but that is not the test. Thus, the Third Circuit’s 
approach to “true threats” flatly fails to conform to the high level of 
First Amendment protection mandated by the Supreme Court or by 
basic principles of the federal criminal law. 
c. The Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit also follows an 
objective, speaker-based test for true threats.392 In United States v. 
 
 390. See supra text accompanying note 237. 
 391. See infra Part VII.C. The Supreme Court specifically rejects this rationale for 
determining the appropriate state of mind. See infra note 644 ¶ 13 (detailed discussion and 
analysis of Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1951)). 
 392. This objective speaker-based test controls in the Seventh Circuit in spite of one 
opinion, written by Chief Judge Posner, in which the court employed an objective hearer-
based test. See United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The test for 
whether a statement is a threat is an objective one; it is not what the defendant intended but 
whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the defendant’s statement as a threat. 
United States v. Prochaska, 222 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1955). We have found no recent cases on 
the point, but it seems clearly correct to us as a matter of principle.”). This statement ignores 
the existence of United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1192 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing 
United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1986)), which followed the objective 
speaker-based standard. 
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Pacione, 950 F.2d 1348 (7th Cir. 1991), noted 
this contradiction; the defendant was convicted on one count of making threats under 18 
U.S.C. § 155(a)(1)(B) (1994) and appealed. At trial, he requested—and was denied—an 
instruction on what is required to prove a true threat under Khorrami. The Seventh Circuit 
explained that Khorrami, Hoffman, and Watts focused on whether a “reasonable person would 
foresee that the hearer would take the statement seriously.” Pacione, 950 F.2d at 1355. The 
court then “note[d] that a recent case in this circuit where the alleged threat was deemed 
ambiguous, focuses on whether the recipient could reasonably have regarded the statement as a 
threat.” Id. (citing Schneider, 910 F.2d at 1570). The court, however, did not attempt to 
explain, or even harmonize Schneider; it simply noted and then ignored it. Two sentences later, 
it concluded 
that a defendant charged with making a threat is entitled to [a Khorrami] 
instruction where the evidence permits a reasonable doubt whether the alleged 
threat meets the Khorrami test. Because of the difficulty of drawing the reasonable 
doubt line in many circumstances, it would be prudent to give the instruction, if 
requested. 
Id. 
If Schneider is, in fact, an anomaly, the Seventh Circuit follows a speaker-based rather 
than a hearer-based approach to “true threats.” See also United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 
907, 912, 914 n.7 (7th Cir. 1999) (applying the Khorrami test to an allegation under 18 
U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (1994) and noting that Schneider represented a departure from Seventh 
Circuit practice); United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777, 782–83 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(adopting the Khorrami test for an allegation under 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1994)). 
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Hoffman,393 the Seventh Circuit reviewed David Hoffman’s 
conviction for threatening the life of the President. Hoffman sent a 
letter to the White House that read, “Ronnie, Listen Chump! Resign 
or You’ll Get Your Brains Blown Out.”394 “[At the end of the 
unsigned letter] was a crude drawing of a pistol with a bullet 
emerging from the barrel.”395 Addressing Hoffman’s appeal, the 
court began by noting that in Watts the Supreme Court 
cautioned that because the statute “makes criminal a form of pure 
speech, [it] must be interpreted with the commands of the First 
Amendment clearly in mind. What is a threat must be distinguished 
from what is constitutionally protected speech” . . . . 
To protect these First Amendment values, the Court held that “the 
statute initially requires the government to prove a true ‘threat.’”396 
After considering the “purposes of the statute,” namely, “to prohibit 
any statement that would disrupt the activities and movements of the 
president,” the court concluded that an objective, speaker-based test 
for a true threat would satisfy those purposes.397 It held that: 
[I]n order for the government to establish a “true threat” it must 
demonstrate that the defendant made a statement “in a context or 
under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would 
foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom 
the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an 
intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the 
President.”398 
The court then explained that this standard does not require 
“that the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat” as “it 
is the utterance which the statute makes criminal, not the specific 
intent to carry out the threat . . . .”399 The court noted that its task 
on the review of a jury verdict was to determine “not whether [it] 
 
 393. 806 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 394. Id. at 704. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. at 706. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. at 707 (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969)). Roy 
is an unpersuasive precedent. See supra note 81 (discussing Roy as an inappropriate response to 
the Supreme Court’s concern with the state of mind requirement of the District of Columbia 
Circuit in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 798 (1969)). 
 399. Id. (citing United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1025 (2nd Cir. 1976)). 
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would have convicted the defendant,” but rather to determine 
“whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”400 Finding this 
standard met, it affirmed the conviction.401 
The Seventh Circuit confirmed its approach four years later. In 
United States v. Khorrami,402 Mohammed Farhad Khorrami made a 
series of harassing phone calls and sent a harassing letter to the New 
York headquarters of the Jewish National Fund (JNF).403 At trial, 
Khorrami was convicted on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 
876.404 The conviction stemmed from a “wanted poster” he sent the 
JNF.405 The letter, which Khorrami sent to the JNF in one of the 
Fund’s business reply envelopes, consisted of 
a poster-like paper that stated at its top “Wanted for crimes against 
humanity and Palestinians for fifty years.” Under this heading the 
paper contained pictures that had been taken from materials that 
the Jewish National Fund published. The pictures were of Israeli 
officials including Yitzhak Shamir, Israeli Prime Minister, Shimon 
Peres, Israeli Foreign Minister, Chaim Herzog, Israeli President, 
Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Jerusalem and Shlomo Lahat, Mayor of 
Tel Aviv. Also included on the paper were pictures of Thomas 
Pickering, former United States Ambassador to Israel as well as of 
individuals who were the President, Executive Vice-President and 
Director of Communications for the Jewish National Fund. 
Swastikas and epithets were drawn over the pictures together with 
“mustaches” and other disfigurements. Next to the names Yitzhak 
Shamir and Shimon Peres were, respectively, the words “Execute 
now!” and “His blood need.” Next to the pictures of both Teddy 
Kollek and Shlomo Lahat were the statements “Must be killed.” 
On the left side of the picture was a map of Israel on which was 
written “Long live Palestine,” and a small disfigured picture of an 
individual appearing to be Senator Edward Kennedy with an arrow 
pointing to an accompanying statement “Long live Sarhan Sarhan.” 
[sic].406 
 
 400. Id. at 708. 
 401. Id. at 714. 
 402. 895 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 403. Id. at 1188. 
 404. Id. at 1190. 
 405. Id. at 1189. 
 406. Id. 
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On appeal, Khorrami unsuccessfully argued that the evidence at 
trial was insufficient to support his conviction. Analyzing the 
elements of the statute and finding that Khorrami’s authorship of the 
letter was essentially undisputed, the court found that “the only 
question presented is whether the government produced evidence 
sufficient to support the jury’s verdict that Khorrami’s letter 
constituted a ‘true threat.’”407 The “necessity to resolve the question 
of whether Khorrami’s letter constituted a ‘true threat,’” the court 
explained, “stem[med] from the protections our Constitution 
accords free speech.”408 Given the holdings in Watts and Hoffman, 
the court concluded that in order “[t]o protect . . . First 
Amendment values” the government must “prove a true ‘threat,’” 
that is, a threat under the objective, speaker-based test laid out in 
Hoffman.409 It continued, “[t]he question of whether the language 
constitutes a threat is an issue of fact for the jury.”410 The court, 
therefore, affirmed the conviction, dismissing Khorrami’s arguments 
that his poster was merely “political hyperbole”: 
Khorrami sent the “wanted poster” to the Jewish National Fund 
following a six-month campaign of profane, vulgar and vicious 
telephone calls to the Fund’s toll-free number. He sent the poster 
at the same time that he also sent another threatening letter to the 
Fund. Khorrami drafted all of his threatening correspondence from 
Jewish National Fund materials, demonstrating to the Fund 
employees that they were dealing with an individual who had 
previous contact with the Fund, and he included threats against 
Fund officers on the same poster that contained threats to Shimon 
Peres and Yitzhak Shamir. Later, Jaime Negroni, a Fund employee, 
reasoned that it was likely that the letters and the harassing 
telephone calls were coming from the same individual. In the 
context of Khorrami’s personal vendetta campaign of telephonic 
and postal harassment waged against the Jewish National Fund, a 
reasonable jury could conclude that the recipients of Khorrami’s 
“wanted” poster would interpret this poster as a serious threat to 
inflict bodily harm upon another rather than as mere “political 
hyperbole.” Since there was more than sufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s conclusion that Khorrami’s “wanted” poster 
 
 407. Id. at 1192. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. 
 410. Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
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constituted a “true threat,” Khorrami’s conviction must be 
upheld.411 
These two appeals aptly demonstrate the substantial 
shortcomings of the Seventh Circuit’s current approach. First, the 
question of whether speech constitutes a “true threat” should not, at 
least in the first instance, be left to a jury. The trial court should 
review the government’s evidence against the First Amendment and 
make an independent judgment on the constitutional issue of “true 
threat” before it gives the case, if at all, to the jury. Second, in 
Hoffman, as in Watts, the defendant criticized the President.412 The 
Hoffman Court, however, missed the point when it emphasized that 
a “true threat” does not require an intent to carry it out. As the 
Court recognized in R.A.V., of the three main purposes behind why 
threats are proscribable, two have nothing to do with the danger that 
the threats might lead to violence, that is, protecting hearers from 
fear and preventing the disruption that threats may cause.413 The 
court should have spent its time focusing on whether Hoffman 
differed in any relevant way from Watts. It did not. The results 
should, therefore, have been the same: Hoffman’s conviction should 
have been reversed. 
Khorrami is even less tenable. Under Watts and Claiborne, the 
poster would have been protected had it contained just faces and 
language like “Wanted for Crimes Against Humanity.” To be sure, 
the addition of the phrases “must be killed,” “execute now,” and 
“his blood need” added a menacing dimension to the poster. But 
given that the poster itself was a tool of social protest and that the 
statements were made on the poster in the context of social protest, 
they cannot be punished consistent with Claiborne. In Claiborne, 
Evers made remarks that were just as threatening in the context of 
his social protest.414 In fact, his remarks were directed to the people 
“threatened,” where Khorrami, in fact, did not send his poster to 
Yitzhak Shamir, Shimon Peres, Teddy Kollek, or Shlomo Lahat. 
Thus, the poster, while hardly in “good taste,” or within the bounds 
of social acceptability—on that we can all agree—squarely falls well 
within protected political or social protest. We may also agree with 
 
 411. Id. at 1193. 
 412. See supra note 234 (discussion of Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)). 
 413. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (quoting Watts, 394 U.S. at 707). 
 414. See infra Appendix C (Speech of Charles Evers). 
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Evers and disagree with the view point of Khorrami, but that sort of 
content discrimination415 is precisely what the First Amendment 
prohibits. Free speech is for friend and foe alike.416 
 
 415. See supra text accompanying note 303 (quoting Watts, 394 U.S. at 708). 
 416. ¶1. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that 
we hate”). 
¶2. The Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. 
Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 1604 (2002) (petition 
limited to scope of extortion and private equity under RICO), requires extended comment. 
While the court’s opinion on RICO law is unexceptionable, its treatment of the First 
Amendment is seriously flawed and in sharp and unfavorable contrast to the workman-like 
opinion of the Second Circuit in New York v. Operation Rescue National, 273 F.3d 184 (2d 
Cir. 2001), which is analyzed infra note 623. Candor also requires that we disclose that one of 
our number, Blakey, represented Scheidler in a previous Supreme Court appearance. Nat’l 
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994). The Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Scheidler is the appeal from the trial court’s ruling on remand of the Supreme Court’s first 
Scheidler opinion. 
¶3. First, the court holds, inconsistently with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Religious 
Technology Center. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1986), that equity relief is properly 
available to private parties under RICO. We have no quarrel with the court’s holding. See G. 
Robert Blakey & Scott Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious 
Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar 
Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 528 (1987) (“Wollersheim’s reasoning is fatally flawed, 
since it is inconsistent with the text, legislative history, and purpose of RICO, and it cannot be 
easily squared with the teaching of the Supreme Court on how to read statutes in general or 
RICO in particular.”). The conflict in the circuits will now apparently be resolved by the 
Supreme Court. 
¶4. After its statutory analysis on the equity relief issue, the court turned to the 
defendant’s First Amendment arguments. Nat’l Org. for Women, 267 F.3d at 700. “All parties 
acknowledge,” the court observed, “that the defendants engaged in a substantial amount of 
protected speech . . . .” Id. The court then, unsurprisingly, held that “liability cannot 
constitutionally be imposed on them for this portion of their conduct.” Id. Nevertheless, the 
court, mistakenly, concluded that the jury instructions and verdict forms contained the 
necessary constitutional protections. See supra note 314 (discussing the Claiborne requirement 
of special verdicts and carefully tailored jury instructions). First, the court expressed doubt 
about the scope of its power to review the record. Nat’l Org. for Women, 267 F.3d 700. In 
light of Claiborne, however, it should not have. See supra note 314 (discussing the proper role 
of an appellate court in First Amendment litigation). Despite the doubts, the court applied the 
standard most favorable to the defendants and still upheld the verdict. Nat’l Org. for Women, 
267 F.3d at 700. 
¶5. The court applied an incorrect test—that “the plaintiffs presented ample evidence 
that the individual defendants and others associated with PLAN [the umbrella organization 
that loosely coordinated the demonstrations] engaged in illegal conduct . . . .” Id. at 702. On 
the contrary, the focus must be not on the plaintiff’s evidence, but on the instructions and the 
verdicts and they hardly met the strict Claiborne standards. See supra note 314 (discussion of 
Claiborne). No one who sees, as we have, the instructions or verdict forms will reasonably 
conclude otherwise. The Special Interrogatories and Verdict Form are set out in National 
Organization for Women, 267 F.3d at 702 (see docket Nos. 97-3076, 99-3336, 99-3891, 99-
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3897 and 01-2050). Id. Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing en banc of Defendant-
Appellants Scheidler, Scholberg, Murphy & Pro Life Action League, Inc., Nat’l Org. for 
Women, apps. B–C (setting out relevant instructions); see also id. App. D (setting out the 
injunction). As it had to, the court acknowledged the applicability of Claiborne, but it did not 
follow it. Nat’l Org. for Women, 267 F.3d at 702. 
¶6. First, it focused on the record, which is only part of its constitutional task; it then 
turned to the instructions and the jury verdict. Despite the court’s holding to the contrary, the 
interrogatory answers and verdict forms do not adequately disclose the evidentiary basis for 
concluding that specific parties agreed to the unlawful purposes and conduct and “that carefully 
identify the impact of such unlawful conduct . . . .” NAACP v. Claiborne Hardward Co., 458 
U.S. 886, 933–34 (1982). Nor do they carefully require and demonstrate that the necessary 
distinction was made between the consequences of the protected and unprotected conduct of 
the defendants—or persons for whose individual conduct they may be constitutionally held 
responsible. Id. 
¶7. The instructions, which permitted liability to be predicated on “overt acts” as well as 
“predicate acts,” also violated Beck v. Prupis, 594 U.S. 494 (2000) (holding that mere overt 
acts are not cognizable). See Nat’l Org. for Women, 267 F.3d at app. C (especially Instruction 
No. 28 and Question No. 9). Moreover, the court failed to require a unanimous verdict on 
each predicate act that was alleged. Cf. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999) 
(holding that under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848, which was 
modeled after RICO, a unanimous verdict is required). The use of the generic state law 
extortion instruction (No. 26) by the district court was also hardly harmless, particularly in a 
First Amendment litigation, as the Court of Appeals held. Nat’l Org. for Women, 267 F.3d at 
702–03; see, e.g., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284 (1964) (reviewing court must 
overturn verdict that may rest on an unlawful or unconstitutional theory); cf. Isaacs v. Sprint 
Corp., 261 F.3d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 2001) (variations in state law militate against class 
certification). In fact, the verdicts are, in substance, general and not specific as Claiborne 
manifestly requires. See supra note 314 (discussion of Claiborne). In addition, despite 
Claiborne, the Scheidler court found that its duty to review the instruction was “deferential.” 
Nat’l Org. for Women, 267 F.3d at 704; see supra note 314 (discussion of Claiborne). 
¶8. When the Scheidler Court finally turned to the injunctions themselves, it upheld 
them; it concluded that they were drawn as “precise[ly] as possible.” Nat’l Org. for Women, 
267 F.3d at 706. We have little quarrel with the court’s judgment here, especially since it 
substantially narrows the text of the injunction by adding gloss that will well serve those who 
might be otherwise unconstitutionally affected by it. See id. (focusing on (1) the express 
exclusion for peaceful picketing, etc., (2) the provision for limiting the responsibility of the 
defendants for conduct by others not “actively [in] concert” with them, and (3) the pointed 
advice to the lower court to take “care in enforcing the injunction”). But see id. at 706–07 
(Others acting in concert with the defendants or PLAN, which was not a party, without 
inducement or direction from the defendants, may be held in violation of the injunction, 
despite the general rule that the “only occasion when a person not a party may be punished, is 
when he has helped to bring about, not merely what the decree has forbidden . . . , but what it 
has power to forbid, an act of a party.” (quoting Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Stoff, 42 F.2d 832, 
833 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.))). 
¶9. The Seventh Circuit next cursorily turned to what it dismissively termed “a 
hodgepodge of other challenges to the judgment, none of which need detain us long.” Nat’l 
Org. for Women, 267 F.3d at 707. One issue, at least, merited considerably more attention 
than the court gave it: “obtaining” under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2000). 
Rightly, the defendants contended that they did not “obtain” any of the plaintiff’s “property.” 
Id. at 709. Mistakenly, the court asserted that “a long line of precedent in this circuit hold[s] 
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that . . . ‘an extortionist can violate the Hobbs Act without either seeking or receiving money 
or anything else. A loss to . . . the victim is all that is required.’” Id. at 51 (citation omitted). In 
fact, the Seventh Circuit never so held; the language cited for the proposition, found in United 
States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 1995), is plainly dicta. In fact, the defendants 
sought to obtain property for themselves. The matter is considered, in depth, by one of our 
number. Murray, supra note **, at 718–19 & n.124 (tracing “extortion” from its common 
law roots into the Hobbs Act and concluding not only that the Seventh Circuit had not 
previously decided the issue by a square holding but also that “obtaining” under “extortion” 
requires more than the victim “giv[ing] up” the “property”; it also requires, as a property law 
offense like “larceny” and “robbery,” that the perpetrator or a third party must “get” the 
property”); accord United States v. Panaro, 266 F.2d 939, 943 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Murray, 
supra note **). But see United States v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380, 393–94 (2d Cir. 2000) (reaching 
its contrary judgment by use of a 1976 dictionary without consideration of the common law 
background of extortion or the required rules for construction of a federal statute, including 
lenity, federal-state relations, etc.); see Murray, supra note **, at 732–36, for a discussion and 
evaluation of Arena. The Supreme Court will now apparently resolve that issue. 
¶10. Remarkably, another tribunal—in another time and place—treated the issues of 
culpable state of mind and individual responsibility in the context of action by an organization 
with the due attention it deserves in a free society, a central theme of these materials: the 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, Germany, in 1945–46. Because those 
proceedings stand in sharp and unfavorable contrast with the jurisprudence of “true threats” in 
the circuits, they warrant close attention; they also involved people (Justice Robert Jackson and 
others) who would subsequently play a major role in the development of federal, state-of-mind 
jurisprudence. Indeed, those debates—and the judgment of the tribunal—are highly 
enlightening today, particularly in light of the Court’s decision in Morissette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246 (1952), in which the Court’s opinion was authored by Justice Robert H. 
Jackson; it is a ringing affirmation of the central role that state of mind plays in federal criminal 
jurisprudence. See infra note 644 (analysis of opinion in Morissette and its significance for state 
of mind in federal criminal jurisprudence). 
¶11. The debates and the judgment also deserve to be more widely known in the 
context of modern RICO prosecutions, which, like the Nuremberg prosecution in Germany 
and in the United States in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American 
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), feature “enterprise criminality.” See 
United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983) (“finding that enterprise 
criminality” consists of “all types of organized criminal behavior [ranging] from simple political 
corruption to sophisticated white-collar crime schemes to traditional Mafia-type endeavors” 
(quoting G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO): Basic Concepts—Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1013–14 
(1980)). 
¶12. In due course, the twenty-four leaders of the National Socialist German Workers’ 
Party (N.S.D.A.P. or “Nazi”), the armed forces, the government, and banking industry in Nazi 
Germany were indicted. Along with the individuals, seven organizations were brought before 
the tribunal; they were the organizations through which the Nazis acquired and maintained 
power and conducted a world war, which ultimately took lives of anywhere from thirty-five to 
sixty million people and cost $14 trillion. 29 NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 1022–23 
(1992). They were also the instruments through which a policy was implemented for 
eliminating lebensunwerten Leben or unnutze Esser (“life unworthy of life” or “useless eater”). 
DEREK HUMPHRY & ANN WICKETT, THE RIGHT TO DIE: UNDERSTANDING EUTHANASIA 22 
(1986). Those included in the “elimination project” were the handicapped, Gypsies, 
homosexuals, and six million Jews. 
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¶13. The charges at Nuremberg were as follows: (1) conspiracy to wage aggressive war, 
(2) waging aggressive war, (3) war crimes, and (4) crimes against humanity. The organizations, 
however, were not on trial in their corporate capacity; the trial focused on them to establish an 
element in the major offenders’ trials that would be foreclosed in subsequent prosecutions of 
minor offenders. Under its charter, the prosecution had the right to secure, in effect, a 
declaratory judgment of the criminal character of organizations that would be binding in 
subsequent trials of individuals. General notice was given of the proceedings, and individuals 
were given the right to be heard at the discretion of the tribunal, in person or by affidavit. The 
charged organizations were the Reich Cabinet, the Leadership Corp of the Nazi Party, the S.S. 
(Schutzstaffeln der N.S.D.A.P.), the S.D. (Sicherheitsdienst des Reichfuhrers S.S.), the S.A. 
(Sturmabteilung der N.S.D.A.P), the Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei), and the General Staff 
and High Command of the German Armed Forces (“High Command”). 
¶14. One of the defendants was incompetent to stand trial; two committed suicide; six 
were sentenced to terms of imprisonment; twelve were hanged; and three were acquitted. (The 
three acquitted were subsequently tried and found guilty under German law.) Three 
organizations were not found criminal under the charter: the S.A., the Reich Cabinet, and the 
High Command. The trial lasted 166 days and heard 133 witnesses, including nineteen of the 
defendants; the basic defense of the individuals was “I didn’t know.” Understandably, the 
tribunal was unpersuaded by that particular defense plea. 
¶15. Significantly, one week after the American prosecution concluded its case on the 
accused organizations, the tribunal submitted to the prosecution four questions designed, the 
tribunal said, to define—using language remarkably like Claiborne—“with more precision” the 
charges against the organizations found in the indictment: (1) What test of criminality should 
be applied in light of claims of conscription and ignorance of criminal purposes?; (2) When did 
an organization become criminal?; (3) Should any class of persons within an organization be 
excluded?; and (4) How should the elements of criminality be defined for the organizations? 5 
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
228–29 (1946–49). 
¶16. Arguments on these questions took three days. Justice Robert H. Jackson, the 
Chief American Prosecutor, was the first to speak; he began his argument by saying that the 
United States did “not seek to convict the whole German people of crime.” Id. at 356. “But 
[this] trial should not,” he said, “absolve the whole German people except the 21 men in the 
dock.” Id. “The success of their design,” he argued, “was made possible because great 
numbers of Germans organized themselves . . . [so that] the power of their leaders was 
extended and magnified.” Id. Individuals must be held accountable for their conduct. 
Nevertheless, everyone who was responsible could not be tried in one trial. “[T]he number of 
individual defendants that fairly can be tried in a simple proceeding probably does not greatly 
exceed the number now in your dock.” Id. at 357. Individual conduct must be the focus of the 
trial. 
¶17. To be criminal, membership in an organization had to be “intentional and 
voluntary.” Id. at 360. But a member was, Jackson argued, “chargeable not only with what he 
knew but with all of which he was reasonably put on notice.” Id. Yet solely looking at 
individuals was insufficient. “Not even the most tolerant of governments permit an 
accumulation of private power in organizations to a point where it rivals, obstructs, or 
dominates the government itself. To do so would be to grant designing men a liberty to 
destroy liberty.” Id. at 361. “Protection of the citizen’s liberty . . . requir[es] even free 
governments to enact laws making criminal those aggregations of power which threaten to 
impose their will on unwilling citizens.” Id. Justice Jackson then reviewed the basic principles 
of conspiracy law in the United States; he concluded with the observation that “organizational  
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affiliation is a quick and simple, but at the same time a fairly accurate way of speaking about 
“‘what . . . [an] organization actually’” does. Id. 
¶18. Jackson then offered to the tribunal four basic principles of organizational liability: 
“[1] the organization or group . . . must be some aggregation of persons associated 
in [an] identifiable relationship with a . . . general purpose, (2) membership must be 
voluntary, (3) the aims of the organization must be criminal, [and] (4) the aims 
must be of a such a character that membership may properly be charged with 
knowledge, [that is,] its purpose or methods . . . [must have been] open or 
notorious.”  
Id. 367–68. The test, he argued, “would be not what . . . [a person] actually knew, but 
what . . . a person of common understanding . . . should have known.” Id. at 369. “Group or 
organization should be given no artificial or sophisticated meaning. The word ‘group’ . . . [is] 
a broad term, implying a loose and less formal structure or relationship than is implied in the 
term ‘organization.’” Id. 
¶19. Not every person in an organization was necessarily worthy of prosecution. Jackson 
would, he said, exclude in the Gestapo, for example, “persons employed in a purely clerical, 
stenographic, janitorial or similar unofficial routine tasks.” Id. at 371. Sir David Maxwell-Fye, 
the Chief British Prosecutor, concurred in Justice Jackson’s principles. Id. at 378. In particular, 
he supported Jackson’s “constructive knowledge” test. Id. (“Of such a character” that he 
“ought to have known.”). So, too, did the French Prosecutor. Id. at 384. He only clarified one 
element: the distinction between a “legal entity” and a “de facto group.” Id. at 385–86. Both 
should, he argued, come within the prohibition of the charter. When pressed by the tribunal 
on the point of “should have known,” Justice Jackson would only concede that lack of 
knowledge, if argued by the defense, should go solely to mitigation, not to exculpation. Id. at 
444, 448–49 (“We do not want to set up a trap for innocent people . . . but there can be no 
doubt that every person affiliated with this movement [knew of its illicit aims.] . . . [A] 
court . . . [could] take judicial notice (of what) must have been known in Germany . . . .”). 
¶20. Maxwell-Fye supported Jackson’s position. Id. at 458 (“[T]he Prosecution’s test is 
constructive knowledge . . . [it was] only too true that . . . a large number of people [in 
Germany] made a habit of sticking their heads in the sand . . . .”). Strikingly, only General R. 
A. Rudenko, the Chief Soviet Prosecutor, demurred. When pressed by the tribunal, Rudenko 
squarely affirmed the “principle of individual guilt,” and he readily concluded that somewhere 
an individual might “have been unaware of [the organization’s] criminal purpose.” Id. at 471. 
That would be, he recognized, a “question of individual responsibility” on which a “defense” 
could be “submitted.” Id. at 471–72 (“stating that the strength of the defense depends upon 
the extent of his information, the reasons for his entering, and the reasons for his leaving”). No 
one who reads the record at Nuremberg, as we have, could avoid being struck by the striking 
irony that neither the American nor the British prosecutor stood squarely behind individual 
responsibility based on personal conduct and state of mind. In fact, only the Soviet prosecutor 
(who knew from personal experience under a different system what neither the American nor 
the Englishman could know from his personal experience) recognized that respect for the 
freedom of the individual in free society requires individual responsibility based on personal 
conduct and state of mind. 
¶21. On October 1, 1946, the tribunal handed down its judgments. Judicial Decisions, 
International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172 
(1947) [hereinafter International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg)]. Significantly, for the 
purposes of these materials, the tribunal flatly rejected the arguments of the American and 
British advocates and squarely established, consistent with the advocacy of the Soviet 
prosecutor, a standard of individual responsibility based on individual conduct and state of 
mind: 
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A criminal organization is analogous to a criminal conspiracy in that the essence of 
both is cooperation for criminal purposes. There must be a group bound together 
and organized for a common purpose. The group must be formed or used in 
connection with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter. Since the 
declaration with respect to the organizations and groups . . . fix[es] the criminality 
of its members . . . [it] exclude[s] persons who had no knowledge of the criminal 
purposes or acts of the organization and those who were drafted by the State for 
membership, unless they were personally implicated in the commission of acts 
declared criminality by . . . the Charter as members of the organization. Membership 
alone is not enough . . . .  
Id. at 251 (emphasis added); cf. Blakey & Roddy, supra note 11, at 1617–26, 1634–56 
(Appendix D (state of mind) and Appendix G (association in fact)). 
¶22. After finding that certain of the organizations existed as alleged during the period 
of the indictment, and that they had either criminal purposes or engaged in criminal methods, 
the tribunal turned to the S.A., the Reich Cabinet, and the High Command. The tribunal first 
examined the S.A. After the purge of June 30, 1934, the S.A. was, the tribunal found, reduced 
“to the status of a group of unimportant Nazi hangers-on.” International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), supra ¶ 21, at 268. It was not shown, as required by the charter, that the 
atrocities that the S.A. committed before 1934 were part of a “specific plan to wage aggressive 
war.” Id. While in specific instances units of the S.A. subsequently engaged in war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, “it cannot be said that its members generally participated in or even 
knew of the criminal acts.” Id. For these reasons, the tribunal did “not declare the SA to be a 
criminal organization” under the charter. Id. 
¶23. The tribunal then turned to the Reich Cabinet and declined to declare it a criminal 
organization since it never “really acted as an organization.” Id. Indeed, after 1937, it held no 
meetings; its members “were undoubtedly involved in the conspiracy to make aggressive war,” 
but they were “involved as individuals.” Id. At best, it was “merely an aggregation of 
administrative officers subject to the absolute control of Hitler.” Id. It was not, the tribunal 
found, a functioning organization. Similarly, the tribunal declined to declare the High 
Command a criminal organization, since it was neither “an ‘organization’ nor a ‘group’ 
within . . . the Charter.” Id. at 270. Undoubtedly, high ranking officers (the indictment did 
not charge middle or lower level officers) “coordinated and directed the three services” but to 
“derive from this pattern of their activities the existence of an association or group” did not, it 
held, follow. Id. The officers were instead “an aggregation of military men . . . who happen at 
a given period of time to hold the high-ranking military positions.” Id. at 271. Nevertheless, 
while “they actively participated in . . . crimes, or sat silent as acquiescent, witnessing the 
commission of crimes on a scale larger and more shocking than the world had ever had the 
misfortune to know,” they acted as individuals, not as an organization or group. Id. They 
should, the tribunal found, “[w]here the facts warrant it . . . be brought to trial” as individuals. 
Id. The principles applied at Nuremberg are now a settled part of international law; they were 
used, for example, as precedent in the trial of Adolf Eichmann for his part in the “Final 
Solution” (Endlosung). See Cr.A. (Jm.), Attorney Gen. of the Gov’t of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 
I.L.R. 5 (1961), aff’d, Cr.A. (Jm.), 36 I.L.R. 277 (1962). 
¶24. The most succinct, yet comprehensive summary of the trial of the major war 
criminals is DREXEL P. SPRECHER, 2 INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1999); it also contains 
an excellent chronology and an extensive bibliography. Id. at 1537–44, 1549–57. The best 
historical account of the process through which the United States was drawn into the trials, 
based on a thorough analysis of the documentary record, is BRADLEY SMITH, THE ROAD TO 
NUREMBERG (1981); the best account of the process by which the tribunal itself reached its 
verdict is BRADLEY SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (1977). 
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¶25. Judge John J. Parker, an alternate member of the tribunal, returned to the United 
States where he served on the Fourth Circuit. Parker wrote Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 
635, 637 (4th Cir. 1940), which held that “knowledge” is the proper standard for aiding and 
abetting within 18 U.S.C. § 2; he also wrote Scales v. United States, 227 F.2d 581, 587 (4th 
Cir. 1955), aff’d on other grounds, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), which held that knowledge is the 
proper standard for conspiracy with 18 U.S.C. § 371. Professor Herbert Wechsler, a former 
Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division in the U.S. Department of Justice and an 
aid to Judge Francis Biddle, who was a former Attorney General of the United States as well as 
a member of the tribunal, returned to the United States, where he became one of the reporters 
for the Model Penal Code that adopted “purpose” as the standard for complicity and 
conspiracy. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.06, 5.03 (1961). 
¶26. When Justice Jackson returned to the United States he wrote the opinion for a 
unanimous Supreme Court in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–76 (1952), which 
established a general presumption of state of mind (scienter) for federal criminal statutes. For a 
detailed analysis of a watershed decision in the development of federal criminal jurisprudence, 
whose importance for the jurisprudence of the federal criminal law can hardly be over-
emphasized, see infra note 644. The significance of Morissette for the central argument of these 
materials on state of mind need only be pointed out here. See generally Blakey & Roddy, supra 
note 11, at 1345–90 (required state of mind in 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting) is “intent 
or purpose”); id. at 1430–38 (required state of mind in 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy) is 
“intent or purpose”); id. at 1617–26 (history of state of mind in criminal jurisprudence); id. at 
1646–56 (containing analysis of the association-in-fact enterprise under RICO: concept, 
composition, and proof (separateness, structure, common purpose, and continuity)). See also 
Alexander D. Tripp, Comment, Margins of the Mob: A Comparison of Reves v. Ernst & Young 
with Criminal Association Laws in Italy and France, 20 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 263 (1996). 
¶27. RICO was a claim for relief submitted to the jury in Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 
2002), but it played a small role in the decision of the en banc opinion. Nevertheless, since it 
was used in both American Coalition and National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 
267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001), against protests that implicated First Amendment concerns and 
basic principles of the federal criminal law, a more detailed treatment of its central concepts is 
relevant. Consistent with the central holding of the Nuremberg Trial, RICO does not prohibit 
“membership” in an organization; it focuses on a person’s “participation,” through 
“racketeering activity” in the “affairs of an enterprise.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994). The shift 
in the drafting of the key pieces of legislation from “membership” to “participation” is traced 
in detail in Blakey & Roddy, supra note 11, at 1666–71. Broadly, the original draft of the bill 
that developed into RICO, introduced by Senator John L. McClellan, prohibited knowingly 
“becom[ing] a member of (1) the Mafia or (2) another organization having . . . [as] its 
purposes” engaging in specified crimes. S. Res. 2187, 89th Cong. § 2(a) (1965). The bill was 
subjected to trenchant criticism by the Department of Justice on constitutional grounds in 
light of earlier questionable efforts to deal with membership in the Community Party in the 
Smith Act; it was redrafted and merged with another bill, originally drafted by Senator Roman 
Hruska, which outlawed “investing unreported income” in “any business enterprise” and using 
that “income to establish or operate . . . such . . . business enterprise.” S. Res. 2204, 90th 
Cong. (1967). Senate Resolution 2204 became Senate Resolution 1861 in the Ninety-first 
Congress (1969), which, in turn, became Title IX (“RICO”) of the Organized Crime Control 
Act. 
¶28. This crucial beginning of the legislative history of Senate Bill 2187 was entirely 
missed by Professor, now Judge, Gerald E. Lynch in his otherwise thoughtful work on RICO, 
despite specific reference to it in Blakey & Gettings, supra ¶ 11 (citing Cressey, The Functions 
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d. The Ninth Circuit. Prior to the panel opinion in American 
Coalition,417 the Ninth Circuit was an “objective, speaker-based” 
jurisdiction. The leading case was United States v. Orozco-
Santillan,418 which the panel opinion in American Coalition did not 
question. Orozco-Santillan was convicted on three counts of 
threatening a federal law enforcement officer in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). Count III stemmed from his arrest, which 
occurred during a routine INS stop in a park in Los Angeles. Daniel 
Vela, an INS agent, questioned Orozco-Santillan as he was 
handcuffed and kneeling on the ground. When Vela asked him to 
stand, Orozco-Santillan replied, “take these handcuffs off and I’ll 
 
and Structure of Criminal Syndicates, in TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME, 
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 960 
(1967) (analyzing S. 2187)). Compare Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: 
A Response to Gerald E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774 (1988), with Gerald E. Lynch, A Reply 
to Michael Goldsmith, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 802 (1988), and Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The 
Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661 (1987). Professor Lynch’s 
factual mistake distorts his legal analysis and tends to undermine much of his otherwise 
thoughtful pieces on RICO. RICO does not, in short, prohibit “being a criminal,” as Lynch 
suggests by the title to his article, but does prohibit “participating” in the “affairs” of an 
“enterprise” by a “pattern of criminal activities.” 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Accordingly, it adroitly 
sidesteps the constitutional problem of criminalizing “membership” in associations that may 
have multiple goals, not all of which may be criminal. Plainly, RICO does not focus on what 
you think or whom you associate with but on what you do, intend, and know—and its 
criminality under specified state and federal offenses. See, e.g., United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 
880, 906–07 (5th Cir. 1978) (without knowledge of RICO aspects of conspiracy, RICO 
conviction reversed), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). It fully reflects, therefore, the central 
legal lessons of Nuremberg on the requirements of personal conduct and state of mind to 
establish individual responsibility. Compare United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1527 
(11th Cir. 1996) (finding a RICO prosecution consistent with the First Amendment even 
though individuals used religious organization as an “enterprise” through which they engaged 
in a pattern of criminal activity), and United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 772–76 (3d Cir. 
1982) (findings similar to Beasley), with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502 (1951) 
(finding that Smith Act prosecutions for conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the 
government by force or violence are constitutional), and Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 
318 (1957) (finding that the Smith Act is limited to advocacy of concrete violent action, not 
abstract principles of advocacy), overruled in part on other grounds, Burks v. United States, 437 
U.S. 1, 7 (1978). 
¶29. Civil RICO litigation, like American Coalition or National Organization of 
Women, that proceeds without concern for the teaching of Claiborne, threatens to undermine 
these careful drafting efforts by Congress as well as the First Amendment. In particular, if a free 
society can give the leaders of National Socialism due process, that is, a standard of individual 
responsibility including personal conduct and knowledge as the proper state of mind, we ought 
to be able to do as much for demonstrators in the United States, no matter what they 
demonstrate for or against. 
 417. For a detailed description, see supra Part II.B. 
 418. 903 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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kick your f**king a**.”419 The agents took him to jail and booked 
him on immigration charges; there, he repeated his threat that “he 
would ‘kick [Vela’s] a**’ if Vela removed his handcuffs.”420 
Count II was based on statements Orozco-Santillan made during 
a phone call to Vela while out on bail, approximately two months 
after his arrest. “Orozco-Santillan said he was back on the street and 
could obtain information about Vela from another INS agent 
. . . .”421 He also said, “‘you motherf**ker, lo vas a pagar,’ which 
Vela translated as ‘you will pay for this.’”422 Count I was based on a 
second phone call, made two days after the first and the day after 
Vela arrested Orozco-Santillan’s neighbor. Orozco-Santillan said, 
“‘[Vela], this is Orozco. Somebody is going to die.’”423 He also said, 
“you ain’t s***, Vela. You’re just a punk. You better let [the 
neighbor] go. You had no right arresting him. You can’t f**k with 
me Vela, cause I’m out on bail! You’re going to get you’re a** 
kicked, punk.’”424 The court found that the statements, “made in a 
loud and angry manner, frightened Vela, and he understood 
[Orozco] was ‘out to kill him.’”425 When Orozco-Santillan was 
arrested, five days after the second phone call, he said, “You can’t 
f**k with me, Vela, just because I called.”426 
Orozco-Santillan was convicted on all three counts; he 
unsuccessfully appealed. First, the court examined whether his 
statements constituted threats. The court began by borrowing its 
approach from other statutes; it then defined a “threat” as “‘an 
expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on 
another.’”427 Beyond its definition, the court required that “[a]lleged 
threats . . . be considered in light of their entire factual context, 
including the surrounding events and reaction of the listeners. . . .  
 
 
 
 419. Id. at 1264 (alteration added). 
 420. Id. (alteration added). 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. (alteration added). 
 423. Id. 
 424. Id. (alteration added). 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. (alteration added). 
 427. Id. at 1265 (quoting United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2382 (1993))). 
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[T]hat a threat is subtle does not make it less of a threat.’”428 The 
court explained: 
 Whether a particular statement may properly be considered to 
be a threat is governed by an objective standard—whether a 
reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be 
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the 
statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.429 
Regarding the First Amendment, the court continued: 
Although a threat must be “distinguished from what is 
constitutionally protected speech,” this is not a case involving 
statements with a political message. A “true” threat, where a 
reasonable person would foresee that the listener will believe he will 
be subjected to physical violence upon his person, is unprotected 
by the [F]irst [A]mendment.430 
The court found sufficient evidence on all three counts.431 
Regrettably, Orozco-Santillan cannot be squared with the process 
required by Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence, though 
its result, at least in part, is fair enough. First, on count II, Vela was a 
government employee like the President in Watts.432 The defendant 
was upset with the way Vela was doing his job, much like Watts was 
upset with how the President was doing his.433 If this were all that 
the case involved, Watts would end the matter. Nevertheless, 
 
 428. Id. (quoting Gilbert, 884 F.2d at 457). Later, the Ninth Circuit would carefully and 
correctly point out that it did 
not mean to suggest that [the person to whom the threat was made] need only 
assert that he or she felt threatened by another’s conduct in order to justify 
overriding that person’s right to free expression. While courts may consider the 
effect on the listener when determining whether a statement constitutes a true 
threat, the final result turns upon whether a reasonable person in these 
circumstances should have foreseen that his or her words would have this effect. 
Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 429. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265. The court clarified that under its objective 
standard, no subjective proof was required in order to show that a defendant intended to 
threaten. As the court explained, “The only intent requirement is that the defendant 
intentionally or knowingly communicates his threat, not that he intended or was able to carry 
out his threat.” Id. at 1265 n.3. 
 430. Id. at 1265–66 (citation omitted) (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 
707 (1969)). 
 431. Id. at 1266; cf. United States v. Poocha, 259 F.3d 1077, 1079–85, 1081 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (discussed supra note 356). 
 432. See supra text accompanying notes 234–48. 
 433. See supra Part IV.A. 
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Orozco-Santillan’s threats, like Watts’s, were also conditional. Watts 
teaches, too, that protest is not always channeled into dulcet 
phrases.434 That the speech was vituperative, therefore, does not 
remove it from the First Amendment.435 Nevertheless, what 
distinguishes Orozco-Santillan’s threats from Watts’s threats is that 
they were not made in public or on a matter of public concern; they 
were not just criticisms of a governmental official but instead were 
apparently serious statements of an intent to inflict harm on the 
officials and personally directed to that official. Had the district court 
made an independent judgment on the constitutional issue and not 
paid deference to the jury and had the standard adopted required an 
inference of subjective intent, as well as an objective showing of the 
threatening character of the language, Orozco-Santillan’s conviction 
would have been proper. 
Count III, on the other hand, which was based on the 
defendant’s “threats” to inflict violence on Vela if Vela released him 
from his handcuffs, cannot constitute a “true threat.” As in Watts, 
the threat was conditional.436 Threats are proscribable, R.A.V. 
teaches,437 because they may cause fear and disruption, but here the 
“threat” could not reasonably cause Vela fear or bring about 
disruption—Orozco-Santillan could not hurt Vela unless Vela 
released the handcuffs. Finally, Count I is arguably contrary to 
Watts. Criticism of a government employee—even the President—is 
protected, even where the criticism is less than civil.438 While Watts 
did not utter a face-to-face threat, as was the threat to Vela, that Vela 
was a law enforcement officer must be counted in the balance. 
Vituperative language is routine in street confrontations; it ought 
not be routinely construed as independently criminal, even though it 
is hostile. Multiplying crimes will not create civility in 
police/offender encounters. Going down that route merely 
compounds hostility. The category of merely verbal crimes ought to 
be narrowly, not expansively, construed. 
 
 
 434. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. 
 435. Id. 
 436. Id. 
 437. See supra note 234 (discussing Watts, 394 U.S. 705). 
 438. See, e.g., Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (“We agree with petitioner that his only offense 
here was ‘a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the 
President.’”). 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
970 
The panel opinion in American Coalition assumes the validity of 
Orozco-Santillan, but the panel’s First Amendment analysis is 
manifestly more rigorous than that of the en banc opinion.439 
Following the Supreme Court’s teachings in Claiborne and Watts, 
the panel makes several important distinctions, which were largely 
ignored by the en banc majority. Nevertheless, they merit repetition. 
First, public speech ought to be distinguished from speech privately 
addressed to another; private speech is less likely to be protected as a 
general matter—though of course, this is not dispositive.440 Second, 
speech that is not explicitly threatening ought to be distinguished 
from explicitly threatened speech, where harm is threatened either by 
the speaker or someone connected with him.441 
Finally, while context can render ambiguous language a “true 
threat,” that context ought to be derived from the speaker; context 
that a speaker does not authorize, direct, or ratify ought not limit the 
speaker’s First Amendment freedoms.442 The panel opinion in 
American Coalition does not, however, indicate when a trial court 
should address the question of whether speech is protected. 
Although it points to Claiborne for its “threat” standard, it expressly 
avoids the question whether a person must intend to threaten or 
whether mere negligence (of the objective, speaker-based kind used 
in Orozco-Santillan) suffices to render a threat unprotected by the 
First Amendment. Those issues, too, must be rigorously examined.443 
2. The objective, hearer-based test 
a. The Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit first touched on “true 
threats” in United States v. Patillo,444 where it reasoned that the 
Supreme Court in Watts required a “true threat” as an element of 18 
U.S.C. § 871(a). With little discussion, it quickly concluded in 
Patillo that a “true threat” was shown.445 In United States v. 
 
 439. See, e.g., id. 
 440. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2001), reh’g en banc granted, 268 F.3d 908, (9th 
Cir. 2001), rev’d, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 441. Id. at 1018. 
 442. Id. 
 443. See infra Part VII.B.1. 
 444. 431 F.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1970), panel opinion adhered to, 438 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 
1971) (en banc). 
 445. Id. at 295. 
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Maisonet,446 on the other hand, the court offered a slightly more 
elaborate discussion of “true threats.” 
Maisonet was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 876. At first, 
Maisonet was convicted of another crime and sentenced in the 
Superior Court of the District of Columbia. While incarcerated, he 
sent a personal letter to the judge who sentenced him, mailed to the 
judge’s home in Virginia, accusing him of prejudice against Puerto 
Ricans and declaring his sentence illegal. The letter continued: “I 
may have to do all my ten (10) years, but if I ever get out of here 
and nothing happen [sic] to me while I am in here, you will never be 
able to be prejudice [sic] and racist against another Puerto Rican like 
me.”447 Maisonet addressed the letter to the judge at his home “so 
that it would receive the judge’s personal attention.”448 
Maisonet unsuccessfully appealed his threat conviction, asserting 
that he expressed his intent to seek the judge’s removal from office 
and offering a First Amendment defense. The court began its analysis 
by holding that “[e]ven when [a] defense is based on a claim of 
[F]irst [A]mendment rights” the case should be submitted to the 
jury because 
[w]hen a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is made in a 
criminal case, the sole duty of the trial judge is to determine 
whether there is substantial evidence which, taken in the light most 
favorable to the [prosecution], tends to show that the defendant is 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 449 
The court continued, “whether a letter that is susceptible of 
more than one meaning—one of which is a threat of physical 
injury—constitutes a threat must be determined in the light of the 
context in which it was written.”450 The court then proceeded to 
state a test: “If there is substantial evidence that tends to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that an ordinary, reasonable recipient 
who is familiar with the context of the letter would interpret it as a 
threat of injury, the court should submit the case to the jury.”451 
  
 
 446. 484 F.2d 1356 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 447. Id. at 1357. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Id. at 1358 (citation omitted). 
 450. Id. 
 451. Id. 
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The court found ample evidence of a true threat. It observed: 
Maisonet had been sentenced to prison by the judge to whom he 
addressed the letter; he considered the sentence to be illegal; he 
charged that the judge was motivated by prejudice and racism; he 
addressed the letter to the judge’s home; and he said nothing in 
the letter about having the judge investigated or about seeking his 
removal.452 
Consequently, the court affirmed Maisonet’s conviction.453 
The reasoning of Maisonet—if not its result—amply 
demonstrates that the Fourth Circuit does not adequately protect 
First Amendment freedoms in the context of “true threats.” 
Maisonet—like Watts—was upset with a government officer: a judge 
in Maisonet and the President in Watts.454 The crucial difference is 
that Watts’s threat was made in a public place in the context of a 
public debate on a subject of public concern while Maisonet made 
his threat to the judge personally and mailed to his home.455 
Moreover, the court’s analysis in Maisonet gives unwarranted 
deference to the jury. Apart from the issue of the subjective intent, 
the principal vice of the decision—not its result—is its use of the 
jury, where the usual standards of review are deferential to the 
jury.456 The court in the first instance, as a matter of law, ought to 
distinguish between protected and unprotected speech or expressive 
conduct.457 Maisonet was convicted—fair enough on the facts—but 
the process was not consistent with the proper protection of free 
speech. First Amendment freedoms, in short, require a more 
discriminating process. 
b. The Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit’s most comprehensive 
decision on “true threats” is United States v. Dinwiddie,458 in which 
the government civilly sued Regina Dinwiddie, an anti-abortion 
protestor. The government alleged that she violated the Freedom of 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE), 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1), and 
it sought an injunction barring further violations. At trial, the district 
 
 452. Id. 
 453. Id. at 1359. 
 454. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706–07 (1969). 
 455. See supra Part IV.A.2.a. 
 456. See supra note 137 (analysis of standards of review). 
 457. See infra Part VII.A. 
 458. 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996). 
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court found that Dinwiddie violated FACE by unambiguously 
threatening to use physical force against Planned Parenthood’s staff. 
The court found that 
Mrs. Dinwiddie directed particularly pointed threats at Dr. Robert 
Crist, a physician who is the Medical Director of Planned 
Parenthood. Over a six- to eight-month period beginning in mid-
1994, the defendant made approximately 50 comments to Dr. 
Crist, often through a bullhorn, warning “Robert, remember Dr. 
Gunn [a physician who was killed in 1993 by an opponent of 
abortion]. . . . This could happen to you. . . . He is not in the 
world anymore. . . . Whoever sheds man’s blood, by man his blood 
shall be shed.”459 
Similarly, she told Patricia Brous, the Executive Director of 
Planned Parenthood, “Patty, you have not seen violence yet until 
you see what we do to you.”460 
 
 459.  Id. at 917. The court did not consider alternative interpretations of the arguably 
“ambiguous statements.” Here, as in American Coalition, the statements were, in fact, 
ambiguous. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. The text admits of another reading, 
which is hardly implausible. The statement could just as easily be read as a warning, not a 
threat, of what “might happen,” not necessarily what Dinwiddie herself, or another connected 
to her, would do. See supra note 15 (analysis of difference between “warning” and “threat”); 
see infra Appendix B (Natural language: Generality, Ambiguity, and Vagueness) ¶¶ 3–5. In 
other circuits, ambiguity does not generally preclude sending the case to the jury. See, e.g., 
United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Malik, 16 
F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(“The threat in this case was ambiguous, but the task of interpretation was for the jury.”); 
United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The fact that a 
threat is subtle does not make it less of a threat.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); 
United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973). 
The Eighth Circuit, however, in United States v. Barcley, 452 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1971), 
held that “[w]here a communication contains language which is equally susceptible of two 
interpretations, one threatening, and the other nonthreatening, the government carries the 
burden of presenting evidence serving to remove that ambiguity. Absent such proof, the trial 
court must direct a verdict of acquittal.” Id. at 933. That proof was not offered here by the 
government. Under the Eighth Circuit’s own jurisprudence, therefore, the matter could not 
have been submitted to a jury; accordingly, the district court should not have found the facts 
against Dinwiddie. 
 460. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 917. That Dinwiddie supposedly threatened the persons 
directly was important under Eighth Circuit precedent, although the court did not so observe. 
See, e.g., United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1321–22 (8th Cir. 1993) (dealing with 
letters rather than oral communications and noting that “[a]s a general proposition, . . . 
[communication] delivered to a person at home or at work is somewhat more likely to be 
taken by the recipient as a threat than is an oral statement made at a public gathering, which 
was the situation in Watts” and that “[a]lthough the government agreed to save time at trial by 
not presenting evidence of the recipients’ reactions to the letters, we suspect that, unlike the 
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Dinwiddie challenged the injunction on appeal, arguing that her 
“threats” were actually First Amendment protected speech. The 
Eighth Circuit disagreed, noting Brous’s testimony that “the words 
that have been thrown, through the bullhorn or otherwise, at staff 
and patients have become much more violent. There is a higher level 
of stress. We have had to have counselors deal with stress among the 
staff.”461 The court also observed: 
Dr. Crist, Ms. Brous, and other members of Planned Parenthood’s 
staff testified that Mrs. Dinwiddie’s conduct . . . caused them to 
fear for their personal safety. Dr. Crist stated that because of his 
fear of the defendant, he now wears a bullet-proof vest. Planned 
Parenthood has responded to Mrs. Dinwiddie by placing an armed 
guard at its front door.462 
Nevertheless, the court recognized: 
[a]lthough the government may outlaw threats, . . . the First 
Amendment does not permit the government to punish speech merely 
because the speech is forceful or aggressive. What is offensive to some is 
passionate to others. The First Amendment, therefore, requires a court 
(or a jury) that is applying [a statute]’s prohibition on using “threats of 
force” to differentiate between ‘true threat[s]’ and protected speech.463 
The court then explained that an alleged threat must be analyzed 
“‘in the light of [its] entire factual context,’ and [the factfinder must 
decide] whether the recipient of the alleged threat could reasonably 
conclude that it expresses ‘a determination or intent to injure 
presently or in the future.’”464 The court, in short, adopted an 
objective, hearer-based standard. The court further offered a list of 
factors that were considered in past Eighth Circuit cases. They 
included: 
the reaction of the recipient of the threat and of other listeners; . . . 
whether the threat was conditional; . . . whether the threat was 
 
crowd at the anti-war rally in Watts, the recipients did not laugh when they read [the 
defendant’s] messages”). 
 461. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 917. 
 462. Id. at 918. 
 463. Id. at 925; accord United States v. McDermott, 822 F. Supp. 582, 592 (N.D. Iowa 
1993) (stating that, in the Eighth Circuit, “[t]he question of whether language constitutes a 
threat is a question for the jury” (citation omitted)). 
 464. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925 (citing Martin v. United States, 691 F.2d 1235, 1240 
(8th Cir. 1982)). 
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communicated directly to its victim; . . . whether the maker of the 
threat had made similar statements to the victim in the past; . . . 
and whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the 
threat had a propensity to engage in violence.465 
Though Mrs. Dinwiddie did not specifically say to Dr. Crist, “I am 
going to kill you,” the court concluded that “the manner in which 
Mrs. Dinwiddie made her statements, the context in which they were 
made, and Dr. Crist’s reaction to them all supported the conclusion 
that the statements were ‘threats of force’ that ‘intimidated’ Dr. 
Crist.”466 Consequently, it affirmed the lower court’s finding that 
Mrs. Dinwiddie’s comments were “true threats” and not protected 
speech.467 
The Dinwiddie approach was also followed in United States v. 
Hart,468 where Fred J. Hart rented two Ryder trucks and parked 
them in the driveways of two Little Rock, Arkansas abortion 
 
 465. Id. The court gave no guidance on the appropriate weight to give each factor; 
indeed, it hedged, pointing out that the “list is not exhaustive, and the presence or absence of 
any one of its elements need not be dispositive.” Id. 
 466. Id. The court added, in a footnote, that “the fact that Mrs. Dinwiddie did not 
specifically say to Dr. Crist that she would injure him does not mean that Mrs. Dinwiddie’s 
comments were not ‘threats of force.’” Id. at 925 n.9. 
 467. Id. at 926. 
 468. 212 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2000). Similarly, the circuit court purported to apply 
Dinwiddie in Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District, 263 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2001), 
vacated by No. 01-1048, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 23877 (8th Cir. Nov. 5, 2001). There, an 
eighth-grade student accused of threatening a classmate successfully challenged his expulsion. 
The school district argued that the expulsion was proper since a true threat was made. While 
the circuit court analyzed the Dinwiddie factors, it obfuscated the circuit’s approach by 
quoting approvingly from Second, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit opinions, where markedly different 
approaches are followed. Amazingly, the court claimed that it was “integrating” these various 
approaches with its own and then—nakedly—concluded that the proper test was to “ask 
whether a reasonable person would foresee that . . . [another’s communication] could be 
interpreted by [the recipient] as a serious expression of intent to harm . . . .” Id. at 837. That 
the test leaves much to be desired may be seen from the ease in which the majority and 
dissenting opinions reach opposite conclusions based on the same set of facts. Compare id. at 
837–38 (majority), with id. at 838–39 (dissent). A more nuanced approach is required. 
After the editorial process for these materials was substantially completed, the Eighth 
Circuit granted en banc rehearing in Doe and reversed (6-4) the panel opinion. See Doe v. 
Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616 (2002) (reaffirming Dinwiddie, rejecting 
Fulmer’s criticism (undue danger of giving too much attention to the too-sensitive hearer), 
and holding that an intent to communicate must be found (not an intent to carry out the 
threat or a capacity to engage in the threatened conduct), that speaker reaction is relevant, and 
that the full context must be examined, including the speaker’s self-created image as a violent 
person. 
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clinics.469 When the employees arrived at the clinics that morning, 
they “were alarmed” as the trucks reminded them “of the 
catastrophic 1995 bombing of a federal office building in Oklahoma 
City, Oklahoma, involving a Ryder truck . . . . They immediately left 
the buildings and notified the police.”470 When the bomb squad 
investigated, no explosive materials were found.471 
At a trial for violating FACE,472 the government offered 
testimony from employees who said that they feared that the trucks 
contained bombs. Police officers also testified that they believed that 
the trucks posed a threat. In addition, the government introduced 
stipulated testimony from Hart’s father, who said that “Hart acted 
with the intent that ‘if people believed that there was a bomb on one 
or more of those Ryder trucks, that it would have been worth it in 
order to save at least the life of one baby.’”473 For his part, Hart 
offered the testimony of Carrie Land, a Special Agent for the FBI. 
Land testified that shortly after Hart’s indictment, she noticed 
several Ryder trucks parked outside the FBI’s offices in Little Rock, 
but she did not find them threatening “because she knew that the 
other occupants of the building were in the process of moving.”474 
Hart was convicted; he unsuccessfully appealed his conviction. 
The court began its opinion by noting that Hart had to show “that 
the evidence presented by the government was not sufficient to 
permit a reasonable jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”475 Following Dinwiddie, the court observed that “conduct 
constitutes a ‘threat of force’ in violation of the FACE Act only if it 
constitutes a ‘true threat.’”476 That reflects, the court said, an 
objective, hearer-based standard, which must be applied in light of 
 
 469. Hart, 212 F.3d at 1069–70. 
 470. Id. 
 471. Id. 
 472. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2001). While Dinwiddie and Hart construe FACE, the circuit’s 
threat jurisprudence cuts across statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 
1323–24 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that “we have adopted an objective standard for analyzing 
threats under 18 U.S.C. § 876 and we have stated, ‘If a reasonable recipient, familiar with the 
context of the communication, would interpret it as a threat, the issue should go to the jury’” 
and observing that “[s]ections 871 and 876 ‘recognize in their terminology that it is the 
making of the threat that is prohibited without regard to the maker’s subjective intention to 
carry out the threat’” (citations omitted)).  
 473. Hart, 212 F.3d at 1070. 
 474. Id. 
 475. Id. at 1070–71. 
 476. Id. 
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the Dinwiddie factors.477 Based on that approach, the court 
concluded, “[g]iven the context and manner in which Hart placed 
the Ryder trucks and the reaction of clinic staff and patients and 
others, . . . it was reasonable for the jury to find that Hart’s conduct 
constituted a ‘true threat’ of force.”478 
The Eighth Circuit’s approach produces results inconsistent with 
the implications of Supreme Court “true threats” jurisprudence. 
First, the trial court does not analyze whether the speech at issue is 
protected speech as a matter of law. Second, while the “factors” the 
circuit identified may be relevant, the pure negligence standard 
adopted—unless it were modified to contain an element of subjective 
responsibility—does not sufficiently protect freedom of speech 
consistent with basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence. 
Worse, in Dinwiddie, the district court admitted voluminous 
evidence regarding how the clinic workers, in fact, reacted, including 
their subjective fear and the safety precautions they took, thus 
undermining the supposed objective character of the test.479 
Affirming Dinwiddie’s conviction, the Eighth Circuit found Dr. 
Crist’s reaction to the statements crucial.480 But this analysis distorts 
the test. Whether Dr. Crist was, in fact, afraid is not the Eighth 
Circuit’s test for whether the speech constitutes a “true threat.” 
According to the circuit’s own decisions, what matters is whether a 
reasonable person in Crist’s shoes would deem the speech to be 
threatening harm from the speaker.481 In fact, Dinwiddie engaged in 
little more than classic “fire and brimstone”—highly vivid, 
passionate, and animated preaching—in her comments to Dr. Crist; 
her direct comments to Brous, of course, stand on a different 
footing. The job of the court was to distinguish “protected 
preaching” from “unprotected personal threats.” Instead, the court 
 
 477. Id. at 1072. 
 478. Id. Previously, the court clarified in United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 
1994), that “[e]vidence showing the reaction of the victim of a threat is admissible as proof 
that a threat was made” but that such evidence must be evaluated by asking “whether an 
objectively reasonable recipient would view the message as a threat.” Id. at 827–28. 
 479. The district court—upon proper objection by the defendant—should have excluded 
the evidence of the clinic workers’ wearing bullet-proof vests and the clinic hiring a security 
guard. That evidence, though arguably probative of whether a reasonable person would have 
deemed Dinwiddie’s speech threatening, is too prejudicial under FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 
403. See infra note 774 (discussion of admission of prejudicial evidence). 
 480. Hart, 212 F.3d at 1072. 
 481. See, e.g., id. 
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simply concluded that the context in which the “preaching” and the 
personal threats were made, including Crist’s reaction to them, was 
sufficient to support the verdict. That analysis cannot stand 
consistent with the First Amendment and basic principles of federal 
criminal jurisprudence. 
These criticisms apply, though less sharply, to Hart. First, the 
court upheld the jury’s verdict largely based on the clinic workers’ 
subjective reaction to the Ryder trucks.482 Accordingly, the court did 
not strictly adhere even to the objective negligence standard it 
adopted. Second, given the evidence from his father concerning 
Hart’s intent, the jury was entitled to find that Hart intended to 
exploit the Oklahoma City bombing.483 Nevertheless, absent that 
testimony, the evidence that the workers associated the trucks with 
Oklahoma City and felt threatened was nicely counter-balanced by 
the FBI agent’s testimony that she did not find Ryder trucks parked 
outside a building threatening, particularly as it was not a 
government building. Since the court did not focus its analysis on 
Hart’s state of mind in using the Ryder trucks, the Hart opinion is 
troubling—not for its result, which is appropriate enough on the 
facts—but for its analysis, which bodes ill for the First Amendment 
and basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence. 
To summarize, the approach of the Eighth Circuit is mixed. Its 
position on ambiguity (before speech is termed threatening the 
government must produce evidence to disambiguate utterances) 
should be the majority view; unfortunately, it is not.484 Neither 
judges nor juries should be able to take a speaker’s speech one way 
rather than another and turn it into a crime without solid evidence 
that the speaker himself or herself intended to cross the line.485 When 
the circuit adopted an objective, hearer-based test, but sadly let it 
turn on subjective reactions of the hearer, it substantially 
undermined its own test. When it makes the speaker’s rights turn on 
the persuasive character of the complaining witness’s testimony, 
moreover, it impermissibly legitimates a “heckler’s veto.”486 
 
 482. Id. 
 483. Id. 
 484. See supra note 459. 
 485. See infra Part VII.B.1. 
 486. MacDonald v. City of Chi., 243 F.3d 1021, 1033 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Because the 
City must authorize the parade or other event, hecklers cannot veto unpopular speech ‘by 
threatening to show up in large numbers and create traffic hazards of their own.’” (emphasis 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 979 
c. The Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit’s principal foray into an 
analysis of “true threats” is United States v. Viefhaus.487 There, 
Viefhaus and his fiancée were the leaders of a white supremacy 
organization in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The organization maintained a 
telephone hotline to disseminate its message under the listing “Aryan 
Intelligence Network.”488 Callers to the hotline heard taped 
messages from Viefhaus outlining the organization’s views. One of 
these messages formed the basis for Viefhaus’s prosecution: 
 It is time for all white people to realize that the current system 
of government is beyond repair. Our revolution is not about fixing 
this system, but to absolutely destroy it, by any means necessary. 
Only then can we build an Aryan society for our children and 
grandchildren. The first major step in solidifying the revolutionary 
mentality is to understand that there are only two classes in life, 
those who support our cause and the enemy. As is the case of the 
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building, the revolutionary 
understands and accepts no matter how painful that innocent 
people must be considered expendable if necessary, in order to 
successfully complete any action. . . . This is a war . . . racial . . . 
holy war. As an added ultimatum to those of you who are still 
unwilling to pick up a sword, a letter from a high ranking 
revolutionary commander has been written and received 
demanding that action be taken against the government by all 
white warriors by December 15th and if this action is not taken, 
bombs will be activated in 15 pre-selected major U.S. cities. That 
means December 15, 1996, one week from today. In other words, 
this war is going to start with or without you. For all of you out 
there that have been bragging about being ready and willing to 
jump in when the time comes, well you better lace up your jump 
boots.489 
Viefhaus was convicted on three separate counts, including one 
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) by using a telephone to transmit a 
bomb threat.490 He appealed that conviction, arguing that his speech 
did not constitute a “true threat” and that it was, at worst, “‘vulgar 
 
added) (citation omitted)); see supra note 133 (analysis of the personal character of 
constitutional rights). 
 487. 168 F.3d 392 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 488. Id. at 394. 
 489. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing Appellant’s Brief at 5, Viefhaus (No. 97-5207)). 
 490. Id. at 395. 
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political speech’ within the context of a ‘political agenda,’” relying 
primarily on Watts.491 The Tenth Circuit, however, affirmed the 
conviction. First, it explained that “[a] ‘true threat’ means ‘a serious 
threat as distinguished from words as mere political argument, idle 
talk or jest.’”492 It then defined a true threat as “a declaration of 
intention, purpose, design, goal, or determination to inflict 
punishment, loss, or pain on another, or to injure another or his 
property by the commission of some unlawful act.”493 The court 
continued: 
It is not necessary to show that defendant intended to carry out the 
threat, nor is it necessary to prove he had the apparent ability to 
carry out the threat. The question is whether those who hear or 
read the threat reasonably consider that an actual threat has been 
made. It is the making of the threat and not the intention to carry 
out the threat out that violates the law.494 
 
 491. Id. (citing Appellant’s Brief at 22, Viefhaus (No. 97-5207)). 
 492. Id. (citing United States v. Leaverton, 835 F.2d 254, 257 (10th Cir. 1987)). 
 493. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1480 (6th ed. 1990) and WEBSTER’S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged) 1176 (1993)). 
 494. Id. at 395–96 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit also 
approved of this objective, hearer-based approach when it was given as a jury instruction in a 
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1994) in United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247, 1256 
(10th Cir. 1983); it reiterated its approval in a second prosecution under § 871 in United 
States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 618 (10th Cir. 1984). Nevertheless, in Welch, the court applied 
a speaker-based standard: 
In United States v. Hart, 457 F.2d 1087, 1090 [(10th Cir. 1972)], . . . we approved 
an instruction stating that before a defendant can be convicted under this statute the 
jury “must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally 
made a statement, either written or oral, in a context and under such circumstances 
that a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by 
persons hearing or reading it as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily 
harm upon or to take the life of the President of the United States . . . .” 
  Applying this construction of § 871, we conclude that the evidence was 
sufficient here for the jury to find that a reasonable person would foresee that the 
statement would be interpreted by persons hearing it “as a serious expression of an 
intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President of the 
United States.” 
Welch, 745 F.2d at 619–20 (emphasis omitted). 
This contradiction is troubling, especially since the court in Viefhaus adverted to it at 
one point in its analysis. See Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 396 (“In determining the existence of a 
threat under similar statutes, we have adopted an objective test focusing on how a ‘reasonable 
person would foresee . . . the statement being interpreted by persons hearing or reading it.’” 
(citing Welch, 745 F.2d at 619–20)). Such unexplained jumping from test to test makes 
determining the position of the Tenth Circuit difficult; it indicates at the least that the court 
may be confused or is unable to distinguish between the different tests. Indeed, in another 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 981 
The Tenth Circuit concluded that “Viefhaus crossed the 
threshold from political rhetoric to criminal threat when he stated 
unequivocally that fifteen cities would be bombed.”495 “The fact that 
a specific threat accompanies pure political speech,” the court 
continued, “does not shield a defendant from culpability.”496 For the 
court, “Viefhaus’ statement regarding the imminent bombing of 
fifteen cities reasonably may be construed as a ‘true threat.’ 
Therefore, Viefhaus’ prosecution and conviction did not violate his 
First Amendment rights.”497 
Viefhaus also argued that “the district court should have resolved 
his First Amendment defense as a matter of law rather than submit 
the matter to the jury.”498 The Tenth Circuit demurred: 
We consistently have held that whether a defendant’s statement is a 
true threat or mere political speech is a question for the jury . . . . If 
there is no question that a defendant’s speech is protected by the 
First Amendment, the court may dismiss the charge as a matter of 
law. . . . Such a scenario, however, is not present here.499 
Thus, it affirmed the conviction.500 
Regrettably, the Tenth Circuit in Viefhaus failed to give proper 
effect to the Supreme Court’s First Amendment teachings or basic 
principles of federal criminal law. First, the district court should have 
analyzed initially, as a matter of law, whether the message was 
unprotected speech.501 The Tenth Circuit, too, should have enforced 
 
opinion on “true threats,” the Tenth Circuit avoided the issue entirely, simply describing its 
test as “an objective test, focusing on whether a reasonable person would find that a threat 
existed.” United States v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1311 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Viefhaus, 
168 F.3d at 396). The court later adverted that its test was hearer-based but did not 
specifically so state. See id. (discussing other circuits that have a “reasonable recipient test”). 
 495. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 396. 
 496. Id. (citations omitted). 
 497. Id. The court dismissed three other arguments that the message was outside the 
prohibitions of § 844(e) and therefore not punishable: “(1) [the defendant] did not directly 
communicate with anyone; (2) the warning in the message was conditional in that no bombing 
would commence if action was ‘taken against the government by all white warriors’; and (3) 
the message merely related a threat leveled by a third party.” Id. The court held that “a 
‘statement may constitute a threat even though it is subject to a possible contingency in the 
maker’s control,’” and that “a defendant who repeats a third party’s threat may be subjected to 
criminal liability.” Id. (citing Leaverton, 835 F.2d at 256). 
 498. Id.  
 499. Id. at 397. 
 500. Id. at 398. 
 501. See infra Part VII.A. 
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that approach. To say, as the circuit did, that political speech 
accompanying a threat does not shield the defendant from culpability 
begs the question.502 Under Supreme Court jurisprudence, that a 
threat was present here is hardly self-evident. Certainly, the 
statement about bombing fifteen cities was unequivocal. But Evers’s 
threat in Claiborne to break boycott violators’ necks was equally 
unequivocal.503 
Moreover, in Claiborne the defendant’s speeches were directed at 
those “threatened.”504 Here, people had to call a voice mail 
recording to hear the threat. Thus, Viefhaus looks more like Madsen. 
In Madsen, the Court held that the proper solution was for the clinic 
to shut its curtains.505 The same rationale applies here. No one 
needed to call the voicemail message in the first place. The language 
about bombing the cities, uttered in the context of albeit a 
distasteful message of social protest, was not a threat at all but mere 
political hyperbole. Thus, as in Madsen, the problem was best solved 
by ignoring it. 
3. The objective, viewpoint-neutral approach 
 a. The Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit’s most comprehensive 
treatment of the First Amendment and threat statutes is in United 
States v. Morales,506 which involved the prosecution of Eduardo 
Morales, an eighteen-year-old high school student from Houston, 
Texas. Morales entered into an Internet chatroom and engaged in a 
 
 502. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d at 396 (citations omitted). 
 503. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982). 
 504. Id. at 900 n.28. 
 505. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994). 
 506. 272 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2624 (2002). While the Fifth 
Circuit’s teachings on threats and the First Amendment are relatively new, the court’s 
recognition of the distinction between “true threats” and “incitement” under Brandenburg is 
not of recent vintage. In United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1983), the court 
refused to apply the Brandenburg test to determine whether the First Amendment protected 
threats that Howell made against the President. The court explained: 
While Howell’s statements may have been unlikely to incite or produce imminent 
lawless action, the Brandenburg test applies by its terms to advocacy, not to threats 
such as those made by Howell. The line between the two forms of speech may be 
difficult to draw in some instances, but this is not one of them. Far from attempting 
to influence others, Howell was merely stating his own unambiguous and apparently 
quite serious intention to take the life of the President. 
Id. at 1260–61 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of Brandenburg, see infra text 
accompanying notes 751–53 (comparison of Brandenburg and Watts). 
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virtual conversation with a stranger, Crystal Lees, who lived in 
Puyallup, Washington. The two exchanged the following series of 
instant messages: 
Morales: I will kill 
Lees: huh?—me You will kill what—me 
Morales: TEACHERS AND STUDENTS AT MILBY 
Lees: Why do you want to do that Where is Milby? 
Morales: CAUSE AM TIRED. . . . . .HOUSTON 
Lees: are you really going to go and kill people Who has made you 
mad r u ok do you want to talk to me 
Morales: YES F NE ONE STANDS N MY WAY WILL SHOT 
Lees: r u ok 
Morales: I HATE LIVE 
Lees: I am here 
Morales: YES MY NAME S ED HARRIS SEE U N A COUPLE OF 
MONTHS507 
Concerned for the safety of Milby High School students and 
teachers, Lees alerted the police. The high school principal was 
informed and increased security measures were implemented at the 
school.508 Within hours the police traced the Internet conversation to 
Morales who admitted that he was the individual who talked back 
and forth with Lees in the chatroom, but he insisted that he was only 
joking. He explained that “he was trying to joke that he was the 
ghost of Ed Harris, whom he mistakenly thought was the assailant at 
Columbine High School, who in fact was Eric Harris.”509 
The police were not amused; Morales was arrested and convicted 
of one count of transmitting, in interstate commerce, a threat to 
injure another, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). On appeal, he 
 
 507. Morales, 272 F.3d at 286. 
 508. Id. 
 509. Id. 
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raised three principal challenges to his conviction: (1) the 
communication was not a “true threat,” given the context in which 
it was delivered; (2) the statements were not cognizable under 
§ 875(c) because they were communicated to a third party, rather 
than to the persons threatened; and (3) the district court erred by 
failing to require the jury to find that Morales possessed the 
subjective intent to threaten.510 
The court began by addressing whether Morales’s statements were 
“true threats.” The court explained that in the Fifth Circuit “a 
communication is a threat under § 875(c) if ‘in its context [it] would 
have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator 
will act according to its tenor.’”511 This standard also “requires proof 
that the threat was made knowingly and intentionally.”512 Nevertheless, 
the court noted, the statute requires only “general intent.”513 Thus, the 
 
 510. Id. 
 511. Id. at 287 (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 512. Id. 
 513. No one who teaches criminal law for any length of time, as one of our number has 
for more than thirty-five years, ever fails to fall into despair at having students “get it right” 
when teaching “general” and “specific” intent. What Judge Learned Hand says about 
“willfulness” is apt for “general” and “specific intent.” See infra note 686 (“awful word” that 
ought to be “purged”). The ambiguities of the terms are set out in detail (and need not be 
discussed here) in LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 239 (concluding that “greater clarity could be 
accomplished by abandoning the . . . terminology”). In fact, the Model Penal Code is drafted, 
and well drafted, without using the distinctions. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND 
COMMENTARIES § 2.02, at 231 n.2 (1985) (stating that this step taken because “the concept 
of ‘general intent’ has been an abiding source of confusion and ambiguity in the penal law”). 
The Supreme Court itself indicated its dissatisfaction with the terminology in United States v. 
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402–06 (1980) (“Few areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the 
proper definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime. . . . At common law, crimes 
generally were classified as requiring either ‘general intent’ or ‘specific intent.’ This venerable 
distinction, however, has been the source of a good deal of confusion. . . . This ambiguity has 
led to a movement away from the traditional dichotomy of intent and toward an alternative 
analysis of mens rea.); see also Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985) (“We 
have also recognized that the mental elements in criminal law encompasses more than the two 
possibilities of ‘specific’ and ‘general’ intent”). Nevertheless, any expectation is idle that the 
courts will move away from their use and engage in an analysis of the real issues at stake. 
Maitland used to say, “Law schools make tough law.” FREDERICK MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW 
AND THE RENAISSANCE 25 (1901). Sadly, judges still remember what they “learned” in the 
first semester of law school. That they will move away from it and on to something new, 
different—and demonstratively—better is the hope of reformers, not practical people. 
Morales is a case study in why the distinctions should be abandoned. If the statute 
requires a showing of “intentional” conduct, as the court says, the court does not explain how 
liability could be established on a showing of only “knowledge.” Apparently, the court is 
unaware of the significant differences between the two states of mind. “Intent,” for example, is 
required for conspiracy and aiding and abetting; “knowledge” alone is insufficient. See supra 
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twofold state of mind requirement (“knowingly and willfully”) of the 
statute is met where 
[1] [a] threat is knowingly made if the maker of it comprehends 
the meaning of the words uttered by him, and [2] a threat is 
willfully made if in addition to comprehending his words, the 
maker voluntarily and intelligently utters the words as a declaration 
of an apparent determination to carry out the threat.514 
The court next noted the Supreme Court’s admonition that 
statutes that criminalize a form of pure speech “must be interpreted 
with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in mind. What is 
a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally 
protected speech.”515 Accordingly, the court explained, “statutes 
prohibiting threats initially require the Government to prove a true 
threat.”516 Such threats, the court continued, are to be distinguished 
from “political hyperbole” and examined “‘in context’ to determine 
whether they are true threats punishable by law.”517 To effectuate 
these principles, the court explained, in the Fifth Circuit, “a fact 
finder must determine that the recipient of the in-context threat 
reasonably feared it would be carried out.”518 
Applying this test to Morales, the court had little trouble 
affirming his conviction. Morales admitted making the statements, 
and he admitted that he did it to see how Lees would react. He also 
admitted that he was aware of a prior incident in which a Milby 
student made threats over the Internet, and he knew that his 
conduct was unlawful. The court easily concluded that these facts 
were sufficient to support Morales’s conviction under § 875(c), 
which it read as requiring only a “general intent.” In addition, the 
court agreed with the jury that the communication “in its context 
would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its 
originator will act according to its tenor.”519 The jury, after all, heard 
 
note 11. Accordingly, the analysis here is as muddled as the terminology it uses. More need 
not be said. 
 514. Morales, 272 F.3d at 287 (quoting United States v. Pilkington, 583 F.2d 746, 747 
(5th Cir. 1978)). 
 515. Id. (quoting Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)). 
 516. Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting Watts, 394 U.S. at 
708). 
 517. Id. 
 518. Id. (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 80 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 519. Id. at 288 (quoting Myers, 104 F.3d at 79). 
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evidence that Lees felt apprehension that the threat would be acted 
upon, that Morales repeated his threats to kill several times, and that 
he gave no indication in remarks that he was joking. Morales, too, 
admitted that he attempted to refer to Eric Harris, one of the 
perpetrators of the Columbine killings—and “[t]hus, his statement 
in context cannot be divorced from the reality of that tragedy.”520 
Finally, the court decided that Morales’s statements were easily 
distinguished from those in Watts: “[u]nlike Watts, Morales was not 
engaged in political speech as part of a public debate, in which the 
listeners laughed in response to Watts’s comments.”521 
After this cursory analysis, the court made equally short work of 
Morales’s remaining arguments. The court decided that it made no 
difference that the threats were made to a “random third party who 
had no connection with Milby High School”;522 it refused to draw a 
distinction between threats communicated to third parties and 
threats communicated directly to their targets. Instead, it held that 
“this character and context of the threat . . . is the relevant test.”523 
The court spent even less time rejecting Morales’s contention that 
the jury instructions should have required proof that he “specifically 
intended” to threaten.524 It reiterated its earlier statement that “the 
government was not required to prove that the defendant intended 
the statements to be threats” because “§ 875(c) contains nothing 
suggesting a specific intent requirement.”525 Accordingly, it affirmed 
Morales’s conviction. 
That Morales was convicted is fair enough on the facts, though it 
is troubling that a mere high school student can be federally 
convicted of a felony on the basis of random remarks made in an  
 
 
 520. Id. 
 521. Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)). 
 522. Id. 
 523. Id. 
 524. In relevant part, the jury instructions stated: 
The Government does not have to prove that the defendant subjectively intended 
for the recipient to understand the communication as a threat. The Government 
also does not have to prove that the defendant actually intended to carry out the 
threat. 
Id. at 288–89. Morales, however, sought an instruction that the jury must find that he 
“understood and meant [his] words as a threat” and that he “sent the words knowingly and 
willfully, that is, intending them to be taken seriously.” Id. at 289. 
 525. Id. at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Internet chatroom to an anonymous person located states away. 
That having been said, Morales’s statements contain nothing even 
arguably approaching social or political commentary. In fact, he 
baldly made repeated threats to kill students and faculty at Milby, 
and he gave no hint that he was anything other than serious.526 The 
Columbine allusion cannot be easily ignored. Indeed, Morales 
himself admitted that he intended to capitalize on the “context” of 
Columbine, and he hoped to use it to give his statements a tinge of 
menace. In addition, he candidly admitted that he “did it to see how 
[the recipient of the threats] would react,” and that he “could see 
why [she] ‘would get scared or why she reacted the way she did.’”527 
In short, Morales intended to cause fear and disruption, an intent 
that worked out precisely as he had hoped, apart from his troubles 
with the law. Accordingly, his conviction, on the facts, is 
unexceptional. 
Regrettably, however, whether or not the result of Morales is 
“right,” the standards enunciated by the Fifth Circuit for dealing 
with “true threats” under the First Amendment are, at best, 
muddled. Like many other circuits, the Fifth Circuit appears to 
espouse an objective standard for determining whether a 
communication is a threat—at least under § 875(c). But the 
language of the opinion in Morales is opaque on the perspective from 
which the communication should be viewed. The court holds that a 
statement constitutes a threat only when two different criteria are 
satisfied: (1) “‘in its context [it] would have a reasonable tendency to 
create apprehension that its originator will act according to its 
tenor’”528—here the perspective is, fairly enough, that of a 
viewpoint-neutral reasonable person—and (2) “‘the recipient of the 
in-context threat reasonably feared it would be carried out’”529—here 
the perspective is, inconsistently, that of a reasonable listener. Thus, 
while we characterize the Fifth Circuit as an objective, hearer-based 
jurisdiction, the standard is, in fact, unique to the circuit. 
Nevertheless, all of the objections we raise to the other circuit courts’ 
jurisprudence apply here. The trial court does not make an 
independent review of the application of the First Amendment.530 A 
 
 526. Id. at 286. 
 527. Id. at 287. 
 528. Id. (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 529. Id. (quoting Myers, 104 F.3d at 80). 
 530. See infra Part VII.A. 
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culpable state of mind (intent or purpose to make a threat) is not 
required; in fact, it is specifically rejected.531 Evidence of context is 
admissible without adequate guidance.532 Indeed, by emphasizing its 
requirement that the recipient of the “in-context threat reasonably 
feared that it would be carried out,” the court invites the 
introduction of highly prejudicial evidence. To let in myriad evidence 
about the “context” of the recipient and the recipient’s reaction to 
the alleged threat and to leave it to the jury to decide whether the 
reaction of a scared recipient is “reasonable” is hardly a strategy 
sensitive to the basic principles of federal criminal law and the First 
Amendment’s demands for breathing room. Guilt ought to be 
personal.533 Nor should these sensitive issues be thrown to a jury to 
sort out without careful pre-submission guidance.534 A trial-by-
hindsight, with only the possibility of deferential appellate review,535 
bodes ill for the freedom of speech and individual responsibility. 
Morales also squarely holds that neither the First Amendment 
nor basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence require a finding 
that a person convicted of a “true threat” subjectively intended to 
threaten.536 Strangely, given the force of the court’s holding, this 
conclusion represents a change of course in the circuit’s teachings. In 
Shackelford v. Shirley,537 the court upheld Shackelford’s conviction 
under a Mississippi telephone harassment statute, which made it 
“unlawful for any person or persons . . . to make a telephone call, 
with intent to terrify, intimidate, or harass, and threaten to inflict 
injury or physical harm to any person at the called number or to his 
property.”538 Shackelford “admitted to placing a telephone call to 
Otha Richardson, his former supervisor, and stating that the next 
time Richardson came by Shackelford’s car lot he would be ‘toting 
an a** whipping.’”539 Shackelford argued that this statement was 
protected by the First Amendment. The Fifth Circuit, however, 
disagreed: “As speech strays further from the values of persuasion, 
 
 531. See infra Part VII.B.1. 
 532. See infra Part VII.B.1. 
 533. See supra note 133 (discussing the personal character of constitutional rights). 
 534. See infra Part VII.D. 
 535. See supra note 137 (analyzing standards of review). 
 536. See supra text accompanying notes 528–29. 
 537. 948 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 538. Id. at 937. 
 539. Id. (alteration added). 
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dialogue and free exchange of ideas the first amendment was 
designed to protect, and moves toward threats made with specific 
intent to perform illegal acts, the state has greater latitude to enact 
statutes that effectively neutralize verbal expression.”540 After 
discussing Watts’s “true threat doctrine,” the court emphasized that 
because the Mississippi statute contained a “specific intent” 
requirement, the court felt confident that it prescribed for 
punishment “only a class of ‘true threats,’ and not social or political 
advocacy” threats, that would be outside the reach of First 
Amendment protection.541 Consequently, the district court 
instructed the jury “that they should convict only if they found that 
Shackelford ‘ma[d]e a telephone call to Otha Richardson with the 
intent to terrify, intimidate or harass, and threaten[ed] to inflict 
injury and physical harm to the said Otha Richardson.”542 The court, 
without difficulty, held that “the jury’s verdict represents a finding 
that Shackelford engaged in unprotected, threatening speech.”543 
The Shackelford court, then, thought it crucial for First 
Amendment purposes that the threat statute under which the 
defendant was convicted require proof that the defendant 
subjectively intended to threaten. Strangely, the Morales court did 
not discuss (much less cite) Shackelford before holding that a 
conviction under § 875(c) did not require that a defendant 
subjectively intend to threaten but was, nevertheless, acceptable 
under the First Amendment. Instead, the court relied on its prior 
decision in Myers, which discussed the state of mind required to 
sustain a conviction under § 875(c) but did not discuss the 
implications of the First Amendment on culpable state of mind or 
the basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence on the statute.544 
Like the other circuits, the Fifth Circuit manifestly needs to 
reexamine all aspects of its “true threat” jurisprudence, including the 
care with which it drafts its opinions. 
 
 
 
 
 540. Id. at 938. 
 541. Id. at 940. 
 542. Id. at 940 n.3. 
 543. Id. 
 544. See infra Part VII.B.1. The Myers court understandably did not discuss free speech 
implications, as the opinion gives no indication that they were argued before the court. 
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b. The Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit’s limited teachings 
on “true threats” are well-summarized in United States v. 
Callahan.545 There, Donald Callahan was convicted of mailing a 
letter threatening the lives of the President-elect and Vice-President-
elect in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 871(a). The letter Callahan sent was 
addressed to H.S. Knight, Director of the Secret Service and read: 
Dear Mr. Knight: 
It is essential that Reagan and Bush are assassinated on 
Inauguration Day in front of the television cameras. 
If you can arrange for me to get into the act, I will be willing to 
accept the responsibility. 
I don’t want anymore Protestant Scum in the White House. The 
separation of Church and State is a sacrosanct privilege to me and 
all Christians. 
The fate of the Christian West hangs in the balance. The forces of 
the Reformation must be destroyed before there is any possibility 
of dissolving the threat posed by Jewish Fascism and Communism. 
You know where I live. Just call, I will be in Washington in a few 
hours.546 
Callahan was convicted; he appealed and the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed. First, the circuit observed that “[v]iewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, . . . there was 
substantial evidence to support the jury verdict under the objective 
standard utilized in this circuit.”547 It then dismissed the defendant’s 
arguments that “his letter constituted a conditional statement that 
was nothing more than political hyperbole,” an argument that was 
buttressed by “the fact that the Secret Service did not respond 
immediately to the letter.”548 The Eleventh Circuit replied: 
 The defendant’s argument misses the mark. The question is 
whether there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant intentionally made the statement under 
 
 545. 702 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 546. Id. at 965. 
 547. Id. 
 548. Id. 
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such circumstances that a reasonable person would construe them 
as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon 
or to take the life of the persons named . . . . The government is 
not required to prove an actual intent to carry out the threat.549 
The circuit then concluded that the letter met this test: 
 That the letter contains certain political and religious statements 
does not serve to remove it from the prohibition of the statute. In 
Watts[,] . . . where the Court determined that the statements 
involved were expressions of political opposition rather than a true 
threat, the statements were made during a political debate, were 
expressly conditioned on the occurrence of an event, and both the 
maker and the crowd he addressed laughed at the statement.550 
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Callahan’s conviction. While the 
court did not address the First Amendment issues or the basic 
principles of federal criminal jurisprudence that surrounded 
Callahan’s prosecution, it did indicate that as long as a 
communication was a “true threat”—under the statute involved—its 
prosecution would not impinge upon constitutional rights.551 
This approach was also confirmed in an initial district court 
opinion from Alabama, Lucero v. Trosch,552 though the defendant was 
ultimately held not responsible in a subsequent opinion; both 
opinions merit, for that reason, careful analysis. In its first opinion, 
the district court, on a motion to dismiss a civil action under the 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE) and specifically 
under 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(1), discussed the requirement of a “threat 
of force” under that statute.553 Father David Trosch appeared on The 
Geraldo Show, which was filmed in New York City. This colloquy 
took place when the show’s host questioned the defendant about his 
abortion beliefs: 
Q: Father David Trosch would you murder an abortion doctor if 
you had the gun in your hand? 
A: No, I would not murder him, but I would kill him, there’s a 
difference. 
 
 549. Id. (citation omitted). 
 550. Id. at 966. 
 551. Id. at 965. 
 552. 904 F. Supp. 1336 (S.D. Ala. 1995). 
 553. Id. at 1340. 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
992 
. . . . 
Q: Sitting along side you, Dr. Bruce Lucero, a doctor who admits 
to performing abortions . . . 
A: . . . he is a mass murderer . . . 
Q: . . . would you kill him? 
A: He is a mass murderer and should be dead. Absolutely. 
Q: He should be dead? 
A: Should be dead. 
. . . . 
Q: Father Trosch, do you have the courage to say that you would 
kill him? 
A: He deserves to be dead, [a]bsolutely.554 
The district court also noted that “[t]he exchanges cited herein 
contain the only responses in which Trosch directly referred to 
Lucero. The transcripts indicate, however, that Trosch made many 
other comments containing his views that all physicians who perform 
abortions, as well as their ‘accomplices,’ should be killed in defense 
of innocent human life.”555 Two months earlier, Trosch appeared on 
The Shelly Stewart Show. There, he expressed the same views: that 
abortion providers should be killed in defense of innocent human 
life. He did not make any specific reference to Lucero.556 
The district court refused to dismiss the FACE complaint against 
Trosch. First, it examined the “threat of force” requirement of the 
statute, and it followed the objective standard announced in 
Callahan.557 The district court was, therefore, “unwilling to 
conclude as a matter of law that Trosch’s statements . . . [did] not  
 
 
 554. Id. at 1338–39. 
 555. Id. at 1339 n.2. 
 556. Id. at 1339. 
 557. Id. at 1340. 
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constitute threats of force.”558 Addressing Trosch’s First Amendment 
argument, the district court continued: 
 The defendant’s argument that his comments on Geraldo are 
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment represents 
the flipside of his contention that the statements were not threats 
of force. If Trosch’s remarks . . . were threats of force, then they 
cannot receive First Amendment protection. Given the court’s 
conclusion that the Access Act claim may not be dismissed on the 
ground that Trosch’s statements did not constitute threats of force, 
logic compels the court not to dismiss the claim on the ground that 
Trosch’s statements were expressive conduct protected by the First 
Amendment . . . .559 
Thus, the district court squarely determined that at least the First 
Amendment considerations were fully protected if the statute 
required a “true threat,” as defined by the Eleventh Circuit’s 
objective standard. 
While the district court refused to dismiss the FACE complaint 
on First Amendment grounds, it held after a bench trial that Lucero 
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
statements constituted, under the relevant circumstances, a “true 
threat” against him.560 Citing Cheffer v. Reno,561 the Lucero Court 
held that the test for “threat” under FACE was whether the 
statement would place a person “‘in reasonable apprehension of 
bodily harm.’”562 Citing United States v. Dinwiddie,563 the court held 
that the statement had to be “gauged in light of the entire factual 
context in which it was made.”564 The court then adopted the 
Dinwiddie factors, supposedly reflecting a hearer-based test, to 
evaluate the context.565 Accordingly, the court found it significant for 
 
 558. Id. 
 559. Id. at 1341. 
 560. Lucero v. Trosch, 928 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (S.D. Ala. 1996). The court limited its 
consideration to the statements made on The Geraldo Show; it held that, as a matter of law, the 
statements made on The Shelly Stewart Show were not directed at Lucero and that they could 
only be used for context. Id. at 1129 n.10. 
 561. 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). 
 562. Lucero, 928 F. Supp. at 1129 (quoting Cheffer, 55 F.3d at 1521). 
 563. 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). The court also cited United States 
v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994), and United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 457 (9th 
Cir. 1989). 
 564. Lucero, 928 F. Supp. at 1129. 
 565. Id. (quoting Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 925). 
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its decision against Lucero’s claim for relief that the comments were 
made on a daytime talk show that “explores and exploits” subjects 
and guests “to boost its ratings”; that the host “prodded” and 
“forced” guests to answer “complex, [and] loaded” questions in 
“sound-byte” form; that guests were not permitted to explain 
themselves; that Lucero and Trosch were intentionally seated next to 
each other in an attempt “to elicit negative interaction”; and that 
Lucero was “fully aware” of Trosch’s beliefs before he agreed to 
come on the show.566 The court specifically declined to credit 
Lucero’s testimony that he was “frightened and intimidated” by 
Trosch’s statements.567 Lucero himself also conceded that he had no 
contact with Trosch before or after the show and had not seen him 
at his home or clinic.568 Finally, Trosch’s statements, though 
extreme, were qualified, and he expressly presented them as a 
philosophical discussion of the doctrine of “justifiable homicide,”569 
in which his role was that of a “teacher,” not a doer.570 
 
 
 
 566. Id. 
 567. Id. at 1130. Significantly, the court also rejected the expert testimony of Dr. Dallas 
Blanchard, a sociologist. The court observed: 
Dr. Blanchard testified generally that abortion providers find themselves in a 
dangerous climate today, and that they should be fearful for their safety. He also 
asserted that the pronouncements of Fr. Trosch and other anti-abortion leaders have 
the effect of stigmatizing Dr. Lucero and rendering him a target. However, Dr. 
Blanchard’s testimony focused on the evil effects of the “justifiable homicide 
doctrine” itself, and largely ignored the specific threatening quality (if any) of Fr. 
Trosch’s statements to Dr. Lucero on Geraldo. In fact, Dr. Blanchard’s testimony 
apparently was that Dr. Lucero’s appearance on the Geraldo Show, in and of itself, 
caused Dr. Lucero to be more of a target, irrespective of any particular statements 
made by Fr. Trosch to Dr. Lucero. Therefore, Dr. Blanchard appeared to be of the 
opinion that the threat to Dr. Lucero stems from the general climate, and is 
heightened by Fr. Trosch’s pronouncements of the “justifiable homicide doctrine.” 
Though Dr. Blanchard’s testimony may well be accurate from a sociology 
standpoint, the court cannot hold Fr. Trosch liable under FACE either for the 
dangerous atmosphere facing abortion providers today or for his impassioned 
advocacy of the “doctrine of justifiable homicide,” in the absence of a threat of force 
directed at Dr. Lucero. 
Id. at 1131 n.12 (emphasis added); see supra note 130 (discussion of stigma in the context of 
culture wars). 
 568. Lucero, 928 F. Supp. at 1130. 
 569. Id. at 1130. The single best text treating the morality of homicide is PHILIP E. 
DEVINE, ETHICS OF HOMICIDE (Notre Dame 1990). 
 570. Lucero, 928 F. Supp. at 1130 n.11. 
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While the district court adopted the factors of Dinwiddie, it 
distinguished its result.571 Dinwiddie’s conduct extended over a six-
month period; her statements were accompanied by a physical assault 
of a staff member and a physical obstruction of the clinic.572 
Accordingly, the vastly different context distinguished the two 
situations, but the court did not give Trosch blanket permission to 
speak his mind in the future without regard to the context. 
Ominously, it observed: 
 The Court having found that Fr. Trosch’s statements on the 
Geraldo Show were not threats of force, the defendant cannot be held 
liable under FACE for having made those statements. However, the 
fact that Fr. Trosch has prevailed in this lawsuit does not mean that he 
may continue to make statements similar to those he articulated on 
Geraldo with impunity. The Court is not holding that statements such 
as those made by Fr. Trosch on Geraldo could never violate FACE. On 
the contrary, the Court’s decision is heavily influenced by the specific 
circumstances surrounding Fr. Trosch’s remarks. More to the point, 
this Court is of the opinion that Fr. Trosch’s comments could, in fact, 
have constituted a violation of FACE had the context in which they 
were made been different. Certainly, Fr. Trosch remains free to express 
his philosophical views to the full limits authorized by the First 
Amendment, recognizing that the First Amendment does not offer 
refuge to true threats of force. If Fr. Trosch chooses to articulate his 
rhetoric in a manner which could reasonably be construed by its 
recipients as a serious expression of an intent to inflict bodily harm, he 
does so at the risk of incurring criminal and civil penalties under 
FACE.573 
Trosch demonstrates how troubling the Eleventh Circuit’s 
approach is from a First Amendment perspective and the perspective 
of basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence. First, the district 
court treated the issue of whether the speech was a “true threat” as a 
fact question, rather than adjudicating it as a question of law.574 The 
holdings in the Trosch litigation simply cannot be justified as 
consistent with Watts and Claiborne. Thinking that abortion 
providers should be killed is not a crime, as it is not criminal treason 
 
 571. Id. at 1131. 
 572. Id. 
 573. Id. at 1131–32. 
 574. See infra Part VII.B.1. 
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to imagine the death of the President.575 Making thoughts 
punishable is a doctrine against which the Constitution turns its 
face.576 Watts made his statements at a W.E.B. DuBois club rally, an 
event held in a public place, in a vigorous effort to express his views 
on the Vietnam War.577 Similarly, Trosch made his remarks on a 
nationally televised program, in a vigorous effort to express his views 
on abortion.578 In Watts and in Trosch, the statements were 
conditional, that is, “I would kill him” and “he should be dead,” 
rather than “I will kill him.”579 Claiborne did not draw a distinction 
between social rather than political issues. 
The district court’s initial decision and the Eleventh Circuit’s 
general approach are hardly consistent, therefore, with either basic 
First Amendment jurisprudence or basic principles of federal criminal 
jurisprudence, particularly on the requirement of a culpable state of 
mind.580 Nor can the district court’s own “threat” to Trosch (after it 
found that his conduct was not a “true threat”) that he faced future 
criminal and civil penalties under FACE when and if, he “crosses the 
line,” be fairly described as anything other than a highly improper 
judicial effort to chill Trosch’s rights under the First Amendment. 
We do not share, as we suppose most Americans do not, Father 
Trosch’s particular beliefs about the doctrine of “justifiable 
homicide.” They are bad law581 and misguided moral philosophies.582 
 
 575. Treason is expressly defined by U.S. CONSTITUTION Article I, Section 9 (“Treason 
against the United States shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their 
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” (emphasis added)). See generally Cramer v. United 
States, 325 U.S. 1, 12–29 (1945) (reversing conviction of treason for aiding German saboteurs 
landed from enemy submarines; detailing history of treason clause, finding that aid and 
comfort requires more than mental activity and that more than an intentional act is required—
in fact, the defendant must “intend to betray his country by means of the act”). 
 576. Under the Treason Act, 25 Edw. 3, c. 2, Stat. 5, (1351) (Eng.), high treason was 
“imagin[ing] the death of our Lord the King.” 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 130 ¶ 4, at *76–
81, discusses the doctrine at length; it need not detain us here. See also Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 583 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“There was a time in England 
when the concept of constructive treason flourished. Men were punished not for raising a hand 
against the king but thinking murderous thoughts about him. The Framers of the Constitution 
were alive to that abuse and took steps to see that the practice would not flourish here.”). 
 577. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969). 
 578. See Lucero, 928 F. Supp. at 1338. 
 579. See Watts, 394 U.S. at 706. 
 580. See infra Part VII.B.1. 
 581. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Markum, 541 A.2d 347 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (finding 
that anti-abortion demonstrators who destroyed medical equipment are not entitled to assert 
defense of justification); United States v. Simpson, 460 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1972) (determining 
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But we—and the First Amendment—do share Voltaire’s attitude 
toward someone like Trosch: “[We] disapprove of what you say, 
but . . . [we] will defend to the death your right to say it.”583 The 
district court steps outside its proper judicial role of neutrality when 
it threatens or warns either side in a contentious public debate to 
watch its tongue in the future. Carefully framed injunctions, maybe, 
but judicial threats, never! 
c. The District of Columbia Circuit. The District of Columbia 
Circuit Court’s decisions do not reflect an articulate standard for 
judging “true threats.” In Alexander v. United States,584 the only 
 
that political protesters demonstrating against Vietnam War are not, in prosecution for 
destruction of government property, entitled to assert defense of justification); State v. 
Warshaw, 410 A.2d 1000 (Vt. 1979) (finding that environmentalists demonstrating against 
nuclear power are not entitled, in prosecution for trespass, to assert defense of justification). 
Markum’s holding in the abortion context is not an isolated decision. See, e.g., State v. 
O’Brien, 784 S.W.2d 187 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989). But see People v. Archer, 537 N.Y.S.2d 726 
(City Ct. 1988) (holding that, except for constitutionally protected first-trimester abortions, 
under N.Y. Penal Law § 35.05, the choice of evils provision, juries may assess choice under 
“ordinary standards of intelligence and morality”). Archer was found unpersuasive in City of 
Wichita v. Tilson, 855 P.2d 911, 916 (Kan. 1993). See generally James O. Pearson, Jr., 
Annotation, “Choice of Evils,” Necessity, Duress, or Similar Defense to State or Local Criminal 
Charges Based on Acts of Public Protest, 3 A.L.R.5th 521 (2001); James L. Cavallaro, Jr., The 
Demise of the Political Necessity Defense: Indirect Disobedience and United States v. Schoon, 81 
CAL. L. REV. 351 (1993). 
 582. Our review of the literature of moral philosophy, surprisingly, found a paucity of 
material that takes up the specific question of justifiable force in the context of the provision of 
abortion services. Nothing was found that argued that deadly force was morally permissible. In 
fact, those articles that considered the issue argued otherwise. See, e.g., Christopher Tollefsen, 
Donagan, Rebellion, and Civil Rebellion, 11 PUB. AFF. Q. 303 (1997) (using ALAN 
DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY (1977) as a base point and, after a review of a variety 
of sources, concluding that “most reflective proponents” of the tradition that hold abortion to 
be immoral, nevertheless, are properly unwilling to approve the use of force in defense of the 
potentially aborted fetus, since it would be a form of unjustified revolutionary violence). In 
addition, Father Trosch himself was appropriately suspended from official church duties for, in 
public appearances, calling bloodshed justifiable to protect the unborn. See Gustav Niebuhr, To 
Church’s Dismay, Priest Talks of ‘Justifiable Homicide’ of Abortion Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
24, 1994, at A12 (reporting that the archdiocese at Mobile, Alabama, stripped Father Trosch 
of his church position and barred him from saying mass in public because of his public position 
that slaying abortion providers is morally justifiable). 
 583. S.G. TALLENTYRE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907). In fact, Voltaire did not 
speak the quote in the text, though that is how it appears in most dictionaries of quotations. 
See FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 307 (16th ed. 1992). E. Beatrice Hall, “a woman biographer[,] 
said it for him.” JACQUES BARZUN, FROM DAWN TO DECADENCE 361 (2000) (noting that 
Hall wrote The Friends of Voltaire using the pseudonym S.G. Tallentyre (1906) and phrased 
the quote). Hall offered the quote as an “attitude,” not a “quotation.” History remembers it 
otherwise. 
 584. 418 F.2d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
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appeal dealing with “true threats,” the circuit reversed the conviction 
of Eugene Alexander who, while inebriated, made several harassing 
phone calls to the White House.585 “The calls, excluding 
interruptions, consumed a total of about 50 minutes, and were 
interspersed profusely with discussions of ‘the War in Viet Nam 
[sic],’ the ‘Russians,’ and other topics of a controversial political 
nature.”586 Based on the phone calls, Alexander was convicted on 
two counts of threatening the life of the President in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 871. The circuit court postponed the disposition of the 
appeal pending Watts. After the decision, the circuit court remanded 
the appeal for a new trial,587 observing that the jury was improperly 
instructed under Watts: “Neither ‘idle talk’ nor mere ‘jest’ is a ‘true 
threat’ . . . .”588 Accordingly, under Watts, the defendant “was 
entitled to have the issue as to whether his statements constituted a 
‘threat’ properly submitted to a jury.”589 
A more recent district court decision, however, sheds light on 
what the circuit court might do if faced with the issue of “true 
threats” today. In a memorandum decision denying Donald Adams’s 
motion to dismiss in United States v. Adams,590 the district court 
adopted an objective, viewpoint-neutral standard for determining 
whether a communication constitutes a “true threat.” 
On June 10, 1999, Adams “approached one of the gates of the 
White House and told one of the uniformed Secret Service officers: 
‘I want to kill the President.’ At the officer’s request, he repeated 
this intention, stating again ‘I want to kill the President.’”591 
Denying a motion to dismiss, the district court observed, “The 
courts have universally held . . . that the defendant’s intention or 
ability to carry out the threat he utters is irrelevant. The statute is 
violated so long as a reasonable person, hearing the threat, would 
consider it a serious expression of an intent to kill the President.”592 
 
 585. Id. at 1204–05. 
 586. Id. at 1204. 
 587. Id. at 1205. 
 588. Id. at 1206. 
 589. Id. 
 590. 73 F. Supp. 2d 2 (D.D.C. 1999). 
 591. Id. at 3. 
 592. Id. If it followed the district court’s apparent approach, the circuit court would be 
adopting a viewpoint-neutral approach. The district court’s opinion, however, is misleading; it 
cited three cases. The first two were from the Sixth and Second Circuits. The Second Circuit 
follows a two-step approach for dealing with “true threats.” The Sixth Circuit’s approach is in 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 999 
The court added, “Moreover, the defendant’s utterance was not 
made in the context of a political statement meaning that the First 
Amendment considerations animating the decision in Watts . . . are 
not present here. Prosecution of the defendant does not threaten in 
any way the nation’s interest in robust debate of political issues.”593 
The district court then concluded, “[a]bsent such considerations, 
the government’s limited burden at this stage of the proceedings was 
easily satisfied by testimony that a man arrived at the White House 
and expressed what certainly appeared to be a serious desire to kill its 
occupant.”594 To the extent that Adams represents the District of 
Columbia Circuit’s approach to true threats, it bodes ill for freedom 
of speech and basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence. That 
Adams had a serious intent to kill the President—if indeed he did—is 
irrelevant to his prosecution for making a threat. Watts might well 
have entertained a serious intention to kill the President—if the 
government made him carry a rifle.595 Evers might well have 
entertained a serious intent to break boycott violators’ “damn 
necks”—if they broke the boycott.596 Nevertheless, the intent to 
carry out a threat is not the appropriate culpable state of mind for a 
“threat.” The requisite state of mind for “threat” is intent to make a 
“threat,” that is, to utter the language with the intent or purpose 
that the person hearing it will either be put in fear or his affairs will 
be disrupted, or both.597 A “threat” becomes a “true threat” if, but 
only if, it is not privileged under the circumstances, in light of 
Adams’s First Amendment right to speak his mind, and the 
prosecution is otherwise consistent with basic principles of federal 
criminal jurisprudence. 
Requiring an intent to carry out the threat confuses “threat,” as a 
completed offense, with “threat” as an attempt. “Threat” is, in fact, 
a completed crime; it is not like an attempt to commit a battery; it 
 
flux. The court did not expressly indicate that it was adopting that approach; it merely 
dismissed First Amendment concerns, noting that the defendant’s “utterance was not made in 
the context of a political statement . . . .” Id. The third case was from the Tenth Circuit which 
follows an objective, viewpoint-neutral approach. See supra Part V.A.2.c. This approach is fully 
consistent with what the court did. Which approach the district court, in fact, adopted cannot 
be determined with great confidence from its brief opinion. 
 593. Adams, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 3. 
 594. Id. 
 595. See supra Part IV.A. 
 596. See supra Part IV.A. 
 597. See infra Part VII.B.1. 
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ought not, therefore, include an intent to achieve the objective of 
battery (physical injury). Nor should it require conduct going 
beyond mere preparation and commencing the consummation.598 
The courts are simply conflating basic principles of federal criminal 
jurisprudence. In short, a “threat” is not only “speech” but also 
“conduct,” the actus reus, of a crime. Accordingly, the mens rea of 
“true threat” ought to be the intent or purpose to threaten; that is, 
by speech alone to bring about those harms that the jurisprudence of 
threats and free speech recognizes as legally cognizable, or 
reasonable fear or reasonable disruption in another’s life, where that 
fear and disruption may not be squared with the right to engage in 
free speech in a free society. Indeed, “I want to kill the President” is 
a far cry from “I’m going to kill the President.” That this kind of 
speech which is probably little more than a caustic attack on the 
President’s performance of his duties is a “true threat” under District 
of Columbia jurisprudence bodes ill for the First Amendment in the 
District of Columbia; it also is a sad commentary on the court’s 
grasp of basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence. Much 
remains to be done. 
d. The Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence does 
not explicitly reflect how it would resolve clashes between “true 
threats” and protected “speech.” In Metz v. Department of the 
Treasury, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center,599 the court 
reviewed a decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board 
upholding the Department of the Treasury’s decision to remove 
Metz from his position as an instructor at the Federal Law 
Enforcement Training Center. Metz’s dismissal stemmed from his 
threat “to harm himself and others” after he was given a performance 
rating of “excellent” rather than “outstanding.”600 
The circuit court reviewed the Board’s decision “for errors of 
law” to decide “whether the board applied the proper legal test to 
 
 598. To the degree that the jurisprudence of threats is thought to protect against the 
possibility of the threatened conduct occurring, it does, of course, play the role of an inchoate 
offense. Some criminals feel a need to tell their victims what they intend to do, adding 
psychological terror to physical or other injury. Where the circumstances warrant, the law 
rightly intervenes after terror and before injury. But emphasis on this secondary role in the 
formulation of the definition of “true threat” distorts its proper articulation and undermines its 
primary functions, protection from fear and disruption. See infra text accompanying note 667 
(discussion of law of attempt). 
 599. 780 F.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 600. Id. at 1002. 
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determine if Metz actually threatened his superiors.”601 Explaining 
that “[t]he United States Supreme Court provided the basis for these 
standards by writing ‘the statute initially requires the Government to 
prove a true threat’” and—without citing to any precedent—that 
“[t]his standard applies to Government agency regulations as well as 
the statute construed in Watts,” the court indicated that it would 
apply an objective test.602 Specifically, it indicated that it would look 
to “the connotation which a reasonable person would give to the 
words’ in order to determine if the words constituted a threat.”603 
The court continued: 
In order to apply the reasonable person standard, however, the 
board must weigh the evidence. We direct the board to consider 
the following evidentiary factors in deciding whether an employee 
threatened his supervisors or co-workers: 
(1) The listener’s reactions; 
(2) The listener’s apprehension of harm; 
(3) The speaker’s intent; 
(4) Any conditional nature of the statements; and 
(5) The attendant circumstances.604 
Given the dictates of Watts, it added that the Board should not 
“disregard subjective evidence of fear or intent,” but it should “give 
objective evidence heavy weight.”605 Using this test, the court found 
that out of the five men whose testimony was used to sustain Metz’s 
removal, two did not perceive the statements as threats, two others 
did not expect Metz to harm his superiors—nor did they consider 
the statements serious enough to warrant reporting—and the final 
person’s testimony was discredited by the presiding official. 
Therefore, the court concluded that the Board’s decision was “not 
 
 601. Id. (emphasis added). 
 602. Id. at 1002–03 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 603. Id. at 1002 (citing Meechan v. United States Postal Serv., 718 F.2d 1069, 1075 
(Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
 604. Id. 
 605. Id. at 1003. 
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supported by substantial evidence.”606 Thus, the Circuit Court 
reversed the Board’s decision.607 
The teaching of Metz is, however, opaque. At a minimum, it 
shows that the Federal Circuit follows a practice adopted by the 
other circuits of choosing one standard for what constitutes a “true 
threat” and applying it to all statutes that require a showing of a 
“true threat.” While the court did not specifically refer to the First 
Amendment, it did discuss Watts’s “true threat” requirement. Read 
broadly, the decision might indicate that the Federal Circuit follows 
an objective test that both construes the “true threat” requirement 
around First Amendment concerns and then decides that speech or 
expressive conduct constitutes a “true threat” not protected 
“speech.” 
Nevertheless, Metz is not a correct application of the teachings of 
First Amendment or basic principles of federal criminal law. Each of 
the objections we raised against the teachings of the other circuits 
equally applies to the Federal Circuit’s holdings. An individual 
culpable state of mind was not required, as mandated by both the 
First Amendment and federal criminal jurisprudence.608 To say, too, 
that evidence of the subjective reaction of others may be, without 
qualification, considered in determining whether a communication 
constituted a “true threat” is to make one person’s constitutional 
rights dependant on another’s sensitivities, giving others a kind of 
“heckler’s veto.”609 Constitutional rights are personal; they cannot be 
lost merely because of another’s subjective feelings.610 Indeed, the 
approach of the Federal Circuit on this score is the least protective of 
any of the circuits, and it is squarely inconsistent with the guarantees 
of the First Amendment. Here, too, much remains to be done. 
 
 606. Id. at 1004. 
 607. Id. 
 608. See infra Part VII.B.1. 
 609. See supra note 133 (discussing the personal character of constitutional rights, 
including “the heckler’s veto”). 
 610. See id. 
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B. An Independent First Amendment Standard for Threats: The 
Second Circuit (and the Sixth?) 
1. The Second Circuit 
In United States v. Francis,611 the Second Circuit adopted an 
approach to “true threats” that differs markedly from the objective 
tests of the other circuits, in which the court first construes the 
statute around First Amendment concerns and then simply applies 
the statute. In Francis, the circuit faced an appeal by the government 
of a dismissal of an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), charging 
Michael Francis “with interstate transmission of threats to ‘blow the 
victim’s head off, cut the victim up into a thousand tiny pieces, slit 
the victim’s throat, and kill the victim.’”612 The district court 
dismissed the indictment because “the government failed to charge 
that Francis subjectively knew or intended his communication to be 
threatening.”613 
The Second Circuit reinstated the indictment, and it articulated a 
procedure for district courts to follow when facing “true threat” 
issues. To prosecute a defendant for a threatening communication, 
the government must demonstrate that the communication 
constituted a “true threat” within the meaning of the statute.614 The 
Second Circuit explained: 
 We have routinely used the term “true threat” in setting forth 
the second element of [a violation of § 875(c)]. While we continue 
to do so, we note that the question of whether a defendant’s 
communication is a true threat rather than speech protected by the 
First Amendment—a threshold question of law for the court . . . —is 
different from the question of whether a reasonable person would 
interpret the communication as a true threat—a question for the 
jury at trial . . . .615 
The circuit then held, “[s]o long as the threat on its face and in the 
circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, 
immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a 
 
 611. 164 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 612. Id. at 121. 
 613. Id. (quoting United States v. Francis, 975 F. Supp. 288, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). 
 614. Id. at 123 n.4. 
 615. Id. (emphasis added). 
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gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution, the statute 
may properly be applied.”616 “Once a statement meets this test,” the 
court observed, “it is no longer protected speech because it is so 
intertwined with violent action that it has essentially become conduct 
rather than speech.”617 
The court explained that after answering the First Amendment 
issue, a district court should then look to the statute and determine 
whether the communication constituted a “true threat” within its 
meaning. According to the court, the second question is objective. 
The court explained: 
[U]nder Section 875(c), the government need prove only that the 
defendant intentionally transmitted a communication in interstate 
commerce and that the circumstances were such that an ordinary, 
reasonable recipient familiar with the context of the 
communication would interpret it as a true threat of injury.618 
Consequently, the Second Circuit concluded, “Because the 
 
 616. Id. at 123 (citing United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976)); see 
also People v. Benitz, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (analyzing attempt and 
“true threat” under the California Penal Code section 422; reversing conviction, since jury 
instruction was not specific enough to protect free speech), review granted, 25 P.3d 1080 (Cal. 
2001), dismissed, 45 P.3d 1169 (Cal. 2002). California Penal Code section 422 prohibits 
“terrorist threats,” which, in brief, contain four elements: (1) willful threat of death or great 
bodily injury; (2) the intent that the threat be taken as threat; (3) threat on face or under 
circumstances, is unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific; and (4) threat caused 
other person reasonable fear. The original text of section 422 was found unconstitutionally 
vague in People v. Mirmirani, 636 P.2d 1130 (Cal. 1981). In redrafting section 422, the 
legislature, in part, followed United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(requiring unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific threat). Wisely, it went beyond 
the law of the Second Circuit when it imposed the intent requirement. Nevertheless, People v. 
Bolin, 956 P.2d 374, 403 (Cal. 1998) read Kelner and section 422’s third element of 
“unconditional” as a word of illustration not a word of limitation. The requirement is, Bolin 
held, designed to assure that the threat is a “true threat” under Watts. Similarly, In re M.S., 
896 P.2d 1365, 1372 (Cal. 1995) read “imminent” as a word of illustration, not limitation. 
 617. Francis, 164 F.3d at 123. 
 618. Id. (citing United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1997) (construing 18 
U.S.C. § 875(c)) (citing United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (construing 18 
U.S.C. § 876))). The test for whether a communication constitutes a “true threat” within the 
meaning of a particular statute was not always objective in the Second Circuit. See, e.g., United 
States v. Carrier, 708 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying a test under 18 U.S.C. § 871 
requiring that “the statute . . . be construed to proscribe all threats that the speaker intends to 
be interpreted as expressions of an intent to kill or injure the President”). Given Francis’s blunt 
rejection of an intent standard for § 875(c) and the age of the Carrier decision, whether the 
Second Circuit would apply its “specific intent” test to a present-day § 871 prosecution is 
problematic. 
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government need not prove that a defendant intended his 
communication to be threatening, it follows that the indictment is 
adequate.”619 
The Second Circuit’s approach to “true threats” is unique. The 
Second Circuit appropriately holds that the determination of 
whether speech is protected or an unprotected “true threat” is a 
question of law that a district court must resolve for itself rather than 
a question of fact for the jury. This approach is a necessary 
implication of Watts and Claiborne.620 Just as important, First 
Amendment freedoms are ensured by providing that a judge, who by 
the character of his or her position should be sensitized to First 
Amendment concerns and the protection of the rights of the holders 
of minority viewpoints, will screen out matters that should not get as 
far as the jury. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit standard, while more 
stringent than those of the other circuits, is still solely an objective 
standard; it impermissibly allows conviction solely based on what 
others think of speech or expressive conduct, rather than by what the 
defendant intended to speak or act. Such an approach is, therefore, 
inconsistent with the more recent teachings of the Supreme Court 
on state of mind in criminal jurisprudence, which generally requires a 
minimum showing of knowledge.621 Both the First Amendment and 
basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence mandate a culpable  
state of mind.622 In short, even Francis cannot be squared with 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.623 
 
 619. Francis, 164 F.3d at 123. Francis’s promise of greater protection for First 
Amendment value may not be fully redeemed in the district courts. See United States v. 
Anderson, No. 00-CR-15, 2000 WL 362024, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. March 30, 2000) (applying 
Francis but noting, in answering the threshold law question of whether the First Amendment 
protected speech in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 876, that “[d]efendant concedes that 
First Amendment limitations imposed on prosecutions for threatening communications apply 
in only the rarest cases”); see also id. (concluding that the “defendant’s communication is not 
protected speech” and adding that its “conclusion is buttressed by defendant’s inability to cite 
any cases other than Watts to this Court where the threatening communication was protected 
by the First Amendment, and the person uttering it was protected from prosecution”). 
 620. See supra Part IV.B. 
 621. See Blakey & Roddy, supra note 11, at 1622 (“The general rule is that knowledge is 
required on conduct, as well as factual, and, in appropriate circumstances, legal, surrounding 
circumstances of a liability character. Result, too, is knowledge.” (citations omitted)); see infra 
Part VI. 
 622. See infra Part VII.B.2. 
 623. The Second Circuit, in New York v. Operation Rescue National, 273 F.3d 184 (2d 
Cir. 2001), undertook a careful and detailed analysis of FACE—particularly the statute’s First 
Amendment implications—that stands in stark contrast to the cursory treatment given by the 
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en banc Ninth Circuit in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American 
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), and the Seventh Circuit in National 
Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001). For a discussion on 
American Coalition of Life Activists, see supra note 416. Unlike the Ninth and Seventh, the 
Second Circuit in Operation Rescue followed the Supreme Court’s mandate in Claiborne to use 
“precision of regulation.” In Operation Rescue, Mary Melfi and Michael Warren appealed 
injunctions applied against them under FACE. 273 F.3d 184. Acknowledging the 
constitutional issues raised by injunctions issued under FACE, the court undertook a de novo 
review of the record, “fulfilling [its] duty to conduct an independent examination of the record 
as a whole.” Id. at 195. 
 The court first examined “whether the District Court was justified in granting the 
injunction [under FACE]” with respect to each of the two defendants individually. Id. at 192, 
197. The court did not need to address the question of “intent” against Warren as it found 
that the district court had inadequate findings to support an injunction against him. Id. at 194. 
The injunction against Melfi was upheld because she “[did] not dispute the District Court’s 
determination that her behavior was intentional.” Id. Turning to Melfi’s conduct, the circuit 
held that the district court’s findings of prior FACE violations by the group with which Melfi 
was associated were “of limited utility with respect to Melfi. The validity of the District Court’s 
injunction against Melfi turns on the findings made with regard to her in particular. . . . The 
record is replete with consistently [violative] egregious conduct by Melfi . . . .” Id. at 194–95 
(emphasis added). The circuit then made a searching review of the district court’s findings and 
rejected them because they “failed to differentiate illegal protestor activity from protected and 
typical, albeit aggressive, protest activities.” Id. at 195. The circuit court continued, “protest 
activity [proscribed by the district court but] typically deserving of protection . . . . included 
those who protest in “an ‘angry’ tone,” and one protestor’s habit of shouting at arriving 
patients in ‘a loud deep voice.’” Id. 
The court made a surgical analysis of the “true threats” issue: “We are . . . troubled . . . 
by the District Court’s willingness to characterize a broad range of protestor statements as 
‘threats’ without giving them the full analysis required by the First Amendment.” Id. at 196. 
The court set out its own “true threat” standard: “When determining whether a statement 
qualifies as a threat for First Amendment purposes, a district court must ask whether ‘the threat 
on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, 
immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and 
imminent prospect of execution . . . .’” Id. (quoting United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 
1027 (2d Cir. 1976)). Relying on the now-overruled panel opinion in American Coalition, the 
court observed “a court must be sure that the recipient is fearful of the execution of the threat 
by the speaker (or the speaker’s co-conspirators).” Id. Applying this standard to Melfi’s 
statement to a clinic doctor (made soon after the murder of Dr. Bernard Slepian) that “killing 
babies is no different than killing doctors,” the court held that her “expression went to the 
core of her protest message, and the statement (even in context) did not suggest that Melfi was 
engaged in a plan to harm the clinic doctor . . . . [Nor did this] statement . . . indicate the 
‘unequivocal immediacy and express intention’ of a true threat.” Id. at 196–97 (quoting 
Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1027). Consistent with its duty to use “precision,” the court examined 
each of Melfi’s statements and acts separately. Although the circuit held that most of her 
statements were protected speech, two of them were found to construe “true threats” under 
the court’s definition. Id. at 196 n.5 (“You won’t be laughing when the bomb goes off,” and 
“You’re next, I hope you’re next, you’re next.”). On that basis the circuit upheld the 
injunction as applied to her. Id. The circuit then addressed Warren, concluding that general 
findings regarding groups to which Warren belonged were insufficient, without specific facts, 
to uphold an injunction against him. Id. at 197–98. 
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2. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit may still adhere to a construe-around, 
objective, hearer-based approach to true threats, but important 
evidence that the law in the circuit is in flux is found in United States 
v. Baker.624 Baker involved a University of Michigan student who was 
prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for posting graphic stories and 
sending graphic e-mails that described the torture, rape, and murder 
of one of his classmates.625 The district court began its analysis by 
observing that “[b]ecause prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) 
involves punishment of pure speech, it necessarily implicates and is 
limited by the First Amendment.”626 “Under Watts,” the court 
observed, this means that “to pass constitutional muster the 
government must initially prove a ‘true threat.’”627 
Next, the district court made an insightful observation: “The 
distinction between the two questions of whether a statement is a 
‘true threat’ for the purposes of First Amendment limitation, and the 
intention of the statement’s maker, is important but unfortunately 
often confused. The confusion results from too loose a use of the 
phrase ‘true threat.’”628 The court then addressed the first query, 
defining “true threats” for the purpose of the First Amendment. It 
 
After a brief look at state law nuisance and trespass claims also brought against the 
defendants, the circuit turned to the constitutionality of the terms of the FACE injunction 
issued by the district court. After finding that injunctions under FACE were generally content-
neutral, the circuit undertook a site-by-site and injunction-by-injunction analysis to ensure that 
“provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary.” Id. at 201–03 (quoting 
Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994)). During this survey, the 
circuit noted, “The viability of injunctive restrictions on speech activities often rises and falls on 
its overall effect on free speech activity.” Id. at 206. The circuit specifically addressed the 
individual sites and injunctions to ensure that they, consistent with Madsen, were as narrowly 
construed and proscribed as little speech as possible. The court continued, “every incremental 
expansion in the size of buffer zones brings smaller benefits to patients and clinics, with greater 
injury to free speech. At some point, the balance shifts decisively.” Id. at 209. The Ninth and 
Seventh Circuits could learn much about First Amendment jurisprudence by carefully 
examining Operation Rescue. 
 624. 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., United 
States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 625. Neither the content of the messages nor the stories is crucial to the court’s analysis; 
they need not—and therefore ought not—be republished here. For an example of the 
defendant’s work, see Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d at 1497 n.1 (Krupansky, J., dissenting). 
 626. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1381. 
 627. Id. The court rejected the government’s argument that Watts establishes a separate 
standard for political speech and instead held that it applies to all speech. Id. at 1381 n.10. 
 628. Id. at 1381. 
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pointed out that “[t]he only extended discussion of the 
constitutional dimension of the ‘true threat’ requirement with regard 
to § 875(c) is found in [Kelner],”629 and it reiterated the Kelner 
objective standard.630 The government objected, arguing that the 
Sixth Circuit followed a less stringent test of the objective, hearer-
based variety, to wit, only that 
the defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, in a 
context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person 
would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to 
whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious 
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or take the 
life of the President, and that the statement not be the result of 
mistake, duress, or coercion. The statute does not require that the 
defendant actually intend to carry out the threat.631 
The district court rejoined: “Lincoln addresses the statute’s 
intent requirement . . . . [But it] does not speak to the constitutional 
‘true threat’ requirement imposed by the First Amendment and 
elucidated in Watts and Kelner.”632 In fact, the district court added, 
Sixth Circuit precedent in the area—United States v. Glover633 and 
United States v. Vincent634—similarly addressed the “statutory intent 
requirement rather than the constitutional limits of the statute. None 
of these cases indicate that a different constitutional standard for 
prosecution under § 875(c) applies in the Sixth Circuit than in the 
Second Circuit.”635 The court then explained: 
The confusion between the two requirements is understandable, 
because the phrase “true threat” has been used in the context of 
both requirements. . . . That the phrase “true threat” has been used 
to described both the statutory intent requirement and the 
constitutional “unconditional, unequivocal, immediate and  
 
 
 629. Id.; see United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976) (producing the 
independent legal standard that the Second Circuit adopted in United States v. Francis, 164 
F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
 630. See supra note 611 and accompanying text. 
 631. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1382 (quoting United States v. Lincoln, 462 F.2d 1368, 
1368 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)). 
 632. Id. 
 633. 846 F.2d 339, 343–44 (6th Cir. 1988). 
 634. 681 F.2d 462, 464 (6th Cir. 1982). 
 635. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1382. 
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specific” requirement does not imply that the two requirements are 
identical, or that any statement which meets the intent requirement 
may be prosecuted . . . without running afoul of the First 
Amendment. Typically, the in cases focussing [sic] the intent 
requirement, there is no dispute that the statement satisfies the 
constitutional standard, and the defendant seeks dismissal or 
reversal of his conviction on the ground that he or she lacked the 
requisite intent.636 
It added: “Kelner’s standard for prosecution under [§ 875(c)] is not 
only constitutionally required, but also is consistent with the 
statute’s legislative history.”637 Moreover, “[w]hether or not a 
prosecution under § 875(c) encroaches on constitutionally protected 
speech is a question appropriately decided by the court as a threshold 
matter.”638 The court then dismissed the charges, noting that 
“[w]hatever Baker’s faults, and he is to be faulted,”639 his messages 
“fall short of the Kelner standard of an unequivocal, unconditional, 
immediate and specific threat conveying and imminent prospect of 
execution and therefore are not ‘true threats’ unprotected by the 
First Amendment.”640 
The district court’s opinion in Baker is commendable, but it is 
not yet fully the law of the circuit. On appeal, the circuit affirmed, 
but avoided the First Amendment issue: 
Neither the district court’s opinion, nor the parties’ briefs contain 
any discussion regarding whether Baker’s e-mail messages initially 
satisfy the requirements of Section 875(c). For the reasons stated 
below, we conclude that the indictment failed, as a matter of law, 
to allege violations of Section 875(c). Accordingly, we decline to 
address the First Amendment issues raised by the parties.641 
 
 636. Id. at 1383. 
 637. Id. 
 638. Id. at 1385. The district court referred to the Second Circuit’s assertion that 
“‘[m]ost cases are within a broad expanse of varying fact patterns which may not be resolved as 
a matter of law, but should be left to a jury,’” but, significantly, it added that “where the 
factual proof of a ‘true threat’ is ‘insufficient as a matter of law,’ the indictment is properly 
dismissed before reaching the jury.” Id. (citing United States v. Carrier, 672 F.2d 300, 306 
(2d Cir. 1982)). 
 639. Id. at 1390–91. 
 640. Id. at 1385. 
 641. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1493 (6th Cir. 1997). Something about 
the prosecution struck a nerve in the Sixth Circuit; it announced a new standard for 
prosecution under § 875(c). The Sixth Circuit said: 
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While the district court’s approach in Baker is praiseworthy, the 
prospects for its adoption are, unfortunately, not bright.642 
VI. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 
Any proposal to reform the law of threats in the circuit courts of 
appeal must reflect basic principles of federal criminal law. The en 
banc opinion in American Coalition wrongly viewed the policy issues 
it faced as if the general jurisprudence of federal criminal law played 
no role.643 We disagree. We set out here the basic principles of the 
federal criminal law because we believe the en banc majority was 
twofold mistaken in failing to consider them: first, in construing the 
statute, which is a part of title 18, of the federal criminal code, and 
second, in fitting the laws of threats into First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit is not alone in its 
failure to integrate these principles into its “true threat” 
jurisprudence. Much needs to be done. 
Federal criminal law is written against a common law 
background.644 Under the common law, “[c]rime . . . [was] a 
 
to achieve the intent of Congress, we hold that, to constitute ‘a communication 
containing a threat’ under Section 875(c), a communication must be such that a 
reasonable person (1) would take the statement as a serious expression of an 
intention to inflict bodily harm (the mens rea), and (2) would perceive such 
expression as being communicated to effect some change or achieve some goal 
through intimidation (the actus reus). 
Id. at 1495 (emphasis added). 
 642. Indeed, in United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1080 n.5 (6th Cir. 2001), the 
court squarely rejected the Kelner standard. (“[The Kelner standard] differs from the rule in 
this circuit, as set forth in Alkhabaz, and we decline to apply it.”); see supra note 641 
(discussing Alkhabaz standard). Nevertheless, Landham does not directly address Baker’s 
crucial distinction between “threat” within a statute and “true threat” for the purposes of the 
First Amendment, though it seemingly equates the two questions. See Landham, 251 F.3d at 
1080 (noting the Alkhabaz standard and then stating in conclusion that “it is well established 
that true threats, unlike political hyperbole and other protected speech, are not protected by 
the First Amendment”). If, despite Landham, the Sixth Circuit, on more mature reflection, 
redeems the promise of Baker, it will make an advance in the law. 
 643. See Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the subjective state of mind 
serves no “threat” related policy purpose). 
 644. ¶1. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 262 (1952). But see Carter v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 255, 264–65 (2000) (holding that even though “take,” employed in 
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1994) (bank robbery), is a word that is part of the common law 
definition of larceny (“take and carry away”), the statute is not read in light of common law, 
which required “intent to steal” for the purpose of inference of state of mind in statutory text). 
Because Carter did not follow the teaching of Morissette, it is an anomaly in the Court’s 
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modern criminal law jurisprudence; it is also a profound disappointment to those who follow 
the work of the Court, when in recent years, it appeared that the Court’s state of mind 
jurisprudence was finally going to be straightened out. 
¶2. The importance of Morissette to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of state of mind 
and federal criminal law can hardly be overstated. Before Morissette, the Court was moving 
toward a position that largely abandoned the traditional position in the criminal law of an 
indispensable requirement of state of mind (mens rea) and prohibited conduct (actus reus) for 
statutory offenses—the bulk of federal law, since the federal government under United States v. 
Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), does not have common law criminal 
jurisdiction. Morissette reversed that course of decisions and returned the Court to its 
traditional position, at least for major offenses. Understanding that turn in the jurisprudence of 
the Court requires putting it into a historical perspective. 
¶3. The jurisprudence of state of mind in the nineteenth century in the Supreme Court 
was largely unremarkable. In Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699 (1877), one of the earliest 
decisions of the Court squarely to raise a state of mind issue, the Court had to determine the 
meaning of “willfully” in an Act of July 20, 1868. The government argued in its brief that 
consciousness alone of the prohibited conduct was sufficient. Government’s Brief at 10, Felton, 
96 U.S. 699. Instead, the Court construed “willfully” to mean, “not only a knowledge of the 
thing, but a determination with a bad intent to do it or to omit doing it.” Felton, 96 U.S at 
702 (emphasis added). The Act of 1868 dealt with drawing off spirits by a distillery; it 
prohibited drawing them off in the course of a fraud on the federal revenue tax on distilleries. 
Because the spirits were drawn off accidentally (the cistern into which the spirits flowed was 
inadvertently designed too small to handle the volume of production), the Court refused to 
permit the imposition of a $1000 penalty solely on a showing of mere conscious awareness of 
the facts. “The spirit and purpose of the act,” Justice Field observed, “are not to be lost sight 
of in a strict adherence to its letter.” Id. 
¶4. Significantly, Justice Field in Felton relied on Chief Justice Shaw’s earlier holding in 
Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206, 220 (1838) (stating that the Act of 
1782, based on the Provincial Act of 1670, prohibited “willfully blasphem[ing] the holy name 
of God”; “The word wilfully, in the ordinary sense [of the word] . . . means not merely 
‘voluntarily,’ but with a bad purpose. . .”). Shaw is one of the giants of nineteenth century 
jurisprudence, and his influence on the law of his day was almost without parallel. In 1938, 
Dean Roscoe Pound, in his classic little volume, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW, 
rightly counted Shaw among the “great judges” in America during the nineteenth century. Id. 
at 84. See generally, LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF 
JUSTICE SHAW 207–28 (1957) (reviewing Shaw’s contribution to the criminal law and 
concluding that while he was an innovator in the law of homicide, conspiracy, and insanity, he 
largely reworked and restated the traditional criminal law articulated by Chief Justice Matthew 
Hale in the seventeenth century and Sir William Blackstone in the eighteenth century, in 
particular that the “lawless and ungoverned will” was the principal object of the criminal law; 
thus, “only free moral agents could justly be held criminally responsible for their acts, because 
only the exercise of a free and rational will could cause a crime”). 
¶5. Shaw’s justly famous decision in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 
123–24 (1842), which articulated the modern definition of “conspiracy,” (“concerted action 
to accomplish . . . unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose, not in itself criminal or 
unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means”), was also adopted by the Supreme Court in 
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893). See 1 WORKING PAPERS OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION OF REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL 381, 386–95 (1970) 
(containing report of G. Robert Blakey, “Conspiracy and Organized Crime,” that traces the 
origins of the law of conspiracy and its development in federal criminal law). In addition, 
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Shaw’s equally famous decision in Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 501 
(1844) which drew the basic distinction between the sane and the insane for criminal 
responsibility (“to constitute a crime a person must have [sufficient] intelligence and 
capacity . . . to have a criminal intent and purpose. . .[, a] . . .will, . . .a conscious or controlling 
mental power[, that is, be a] responsible moral agent”), was adopted in Davis v. United States, 
160 U.S. 469, 484–85, 493 (1895), though the Court declined to place the burden of proof 
on the issue on the defendant, as Shaw did. 
¶6. In brief, the Court’s reliance on Shaw in Felton put it in the main stream of its time 
in following the insistence of judges writing in the common law tradition on culpable state of 
mind and prohibited conduct as indispensable elements in the definition of criminal offenses. 
Accord Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 735 (1899) (The Court held that it was error to 
exclude evidence of lack of willfulness where defendant acted without purposeful ignorance or 
gross indifference to the facts and believed in good faith sufficient funds were in account. “The 
wrongful intent is the essence of the crime.”); Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 445–46 
(1894) (holding it was error to exclude evidence of good faith in charge of “willful” 
certification of check without sufficient funds). 
¶7. On the other hand, Shaw’s understanding of “willfully” is not the law everywhere 
today, including in Massachusetts. See Commonwealth v. Luna, 641 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 
(Mass. 1994) (The Court held that failure to instruct on “bad purpose” was not error in 
charge of “willfulness” in perjury prosecution, thus rejecting Shaw’s classic definition. “[T]he 
modern definition is that ‘wilful means intentional’ without making reference to any evil 
intent . . .” (citations omitted)); 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE PENAL CODE OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 763, at 280 (1865) (“The term ‘willfully’ when applied to the 
intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit 
the act or the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to injure 
another of or to acquire any advantage.”). The 1865 Report is of the proposed, but not 
adopted, yet highly influential “Field Code,” named after one of its commissioners David 
Dudley Field, the brother of Justice Field; the Code’s recommendation for the definition of 
“willfully” was, for example, followed in the California Penal Code of 1872, section 7.1; in all, 
it was adopted in sixteen jurisdictions. 3 POUND, supra note 178, at 712. 
¶8. During the early part of this century, the Supreme Court handed down a series of 
ill-fated decisions that departed from this early common law understanding of the basic 
requirements of criminal responsibility: culpable state of mind and prohibited conduct. In 
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910), the Court faced a relatively simple 
issue: Was the imposition of double damages on a “casual and involuntary” trespasser for 
cutting timber on state land a violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment? The 
arguments of counsel for the company, however, substantially roiled the matter, which led to 
unfortunate constitutional dicta on state of mind by the Court that would come back to afflict 
its subsequent jurisprudence. Even though the state only asked for a civil remedy under the 
statute, the company sought to have its appeal reviewed by the Court in light of provisions in 
the statute that authorized both civil sanctions and criminal sanctions. Brief of Shevlin-
Carpenter Co. at 16–19, Shevlin-Carptenter Co. (No. 139). It also sought to characterize the 
imposition of multiple damages as “penal” and to raise a double-jeopardy objection to the 
possibility that criminal and civil sanctions might be imposed on it for the same conduct. Id. at 
44–47. Finally, it argued that the imposition of a criminal sanction (apart from public welfare 
offenses or negligence) without a showing of “criminal intent” was unconstitutional. Id. at 66. 
To decide the appeal, the Court only had to refuse to consider issues relating to criminal 
sanctions that were never imposed, to postpone consideration of the double-jeopardy question 
until it was properly before it, and to decline to characterize double damages as “penal.” The 
Court had, of course, no duty to look at matters not before it (its duty was, in fact, to abstain 
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from them); furthermore, the fact that “multiple damages” need not be considered a 
“criminal” sanction was more that amply established in the Court’s jurisprudence. See generally 
G. Robert Blakey, Of Characterization And Other Matters: Thoughts About Multiple Damages, 
60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 102 (1997) (reviewing the history of various forms of 
damages, including nominal, liquidated or penal, actual, accumulative, and punitive damages in 
Biblical, Greek, Roman, English, and modern law and concluding that it “is a simplistic 
idea . . . that blithely asserts that all damages are either ‘actual’ or ‘punitive,’” that the purpose 
for which the particular form of recovery is authorized is the key to classifying it, and that 
multiple damages may be properly used for a variety of civil, not criminal, purposes). 
Nevertheless, while the Court refused to consider the authorization of criminal sanctions in the 
statute, since they could be separated from the civil sanctions, and found the claim of double 
jeopardy premature, Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 218 U.S. at 65–67, it did far more than merely 
reject the company’s claim that the multiple damages could not be imposed without a showing 
of “criminal intent”; it took the arguments of counsel to the contrary, twisted them around, 
and used them against him. Counsel’s argument was that “criminal intent” was required before 
multiple damages could be imposed except for public welfare and negligent offenses. But the 
Court thought that the “concession of exceptions . . . destroy[ed] the principle.” Id. at 68. 
“[T]he principle, if it exist [sic] at all, must be universal.” Id. at 69. If the Constitution 
required “criminal intent,” a “conception of the public welfare” could not be “substituted” for 
the requirement of the Constitution. Id. at 68. “[I]f intent . . . [were] essential to the legality 
of penalties, it must be so, no matter under what power of the State they are prescribed.” Id. 
Fatefully, the Court then unnecessarily added, “[P]ublic policy may require that in the 
prohibition or punishment of particular acts it may be provided that he who shall do them shall 
do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance.” Id. In 
fact, the Court never squarely decided the question before it: the characterization of multiple 
damages. Instead, tacitly assuming that multiple damages were a “penalty,” as counsel argued, 
it upheld them against the arguments advanced by counsel against them, but the reasoning of 
the Court on these points was all a superfluous exercise. 
¶9. Sadly, the unwise constitutional dicta in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. soon led to the 
adoption of an equally unwise general principle of statutory interpretation in United States v. 
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922). There, a district court dismissed an indictment under the 
Harrison Act, 38 Stat. 786 (1914) (making it unlawful for “any person to sell, barter, 
exchange, or give away” opium or coca leaves without a written order blank from the 
government), since the indictment did not charge “a scienter—that is, that it failed to allege 
that the defendants had knowingly sold the drugs in question.” Brief of the Government at 2, 
Balint (No. 480). The government appealed; the defendants did not file a brief. While the 
government’s brief extensively reviewed English and American authorities on the requirement 
of state of mind in common law offenses and statutory enactments, its argument boiled down 
to the assertion that no state of mind for the facts was constitutionally required under Shevlin-
Carpenter Co., so the issue was purely a matter of statutory interpretation. Id. at 5, 17 (“The 
extent and character of the evil, . . . the ease with which the law may be evaded, [and] the 
nature of the drugs in and of themselves . . . all lead to the conclusion that Congress would 
naturally provide an external standard, easily determined, and would make the subjective 
knowledge of the offender immaterial.”). In a painfully short opinion by Chief Justice Taft, the 
Court reinstated the indictment. Relying on Shevlin-Carpenter Co.’s constitutional dicta as a 
backdrop, the Court held, “[State of mind] is a question of legislative intent to be construed 
by the court.” 258 U.S. at 252. It then offered purely consequential reasoning for not finding 
a state of mind in the statute: “Congress weighed the possible injustice of subjecting an 
innocent seller to a penalty against the evil of exposing innocent purchasers to danger from the 
drug, and concluded that the latter was the result preferably to be avoided.” Id. at 254. 
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¶10. In turn, Balint’s approach to statutory interpretation was extended in United States 
v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922), to a physician who in good faith dispensed drugs to a 
patient. The physician argued that he could only be found guilty if he acted outside his 
“professional practice,” an exception, “in bad faith [or with an] unlawful intent.” Brief on 
Behalf of the Defendant at 4, Behrman (No. 582). Without such an allegation, the indictment 
was, he argued, bad. Id. The government countered, as in Balint, that the statute 
“contemplate[d] merely an external standard and [did] not require either guilty knowledge or 
guilty intent . . . ,” Brief on Behalf of the United States at 10, Behrman (No. 582), and that 
“professional practice” was a question of law for the court. Id. at 19. In another altogether 
short opinion, the Court, by Justice Day, relying on Balint, simply held, “If the offense be a 
statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the indictment need not 
charge such knowledge or intent.” 258 U.S. at 288. Justices Holmes, McReynolds, and 
Brandeis dissented, not on the question of state of mind, but on the construction of the statute 
that the physician was not within his “professional practice.” Id. at 289–90. 
¶11. Finally, the series ended with United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
There, the government charged Buffalo Pharmacal Co., a drug “jobber” (a company that 
obtains drugs from manufacturers and then packages, labels, and sends them to others in the 
distribution chain), and Dotterweich, its president and general manager, under the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which prohibited “any person” from “introduc[ing] into interstate 
commerce . . . any . . . drug . . . that is . . . misbranded.” 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version 
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–392 (2002)). The jury found the corporation not guilty, but convicted 
Dotterweich. The Court affirmed the conviction. Relying on Balint, and adopting its purely 
consequential reasoning, Justice Frankfurter, for the Court, characterized the Act as a “now 
familiar type of legislation [in which] penalties serve as effective means of regulation . . . [and 
which] dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some 
wrongdoing. . . . [i]n the interest of the larger good, . . . put[ting] the burden of acting at 
hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public 
danger.” 320 U.S. at 280–81. Dotterweich fell within “any person,” the Court held, rejecting 
the effort of the lower court to read into the Act immunity for individuals under a provision of 
the statute that applied if drugs were received under a guarantee from the manufacturer. The 
Court observed: 
Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the 
transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting. Balancing 
relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it upon those who have at least 
the opportunity of informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for 
the protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather that to throw 
the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless. 
320 U.S. at 284–85. 
¶12. Thus, a fateful series of decisions that began in 1910 with ill-advised dicta that 
made the absent state of mind, that is, strict liability, agreeable with due process ended thirty-
three years later with a holding that made conduct statutorily unnecessary. From the common 
law position that prided itself on requiring both state of mind (mens rea) and prohibited 
conduct (actus reus) as indispensable prerequisites to individual responsibility under the 
criminal law, the jurisprudence of the Court came to rest on an underpinning that balanced 
relative interests and legitimated not only strict, but also vicarious criminal liability. 
¶13. In 1952, a unanimous Court, in a masterful opinion by Justice Jackson, in 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), brought to an abrupt close this line of 
decisions in the Court’s jurisprudence. The twin requirements of state of mind and prohibited 
conduct for federal criminal law were resoundingly reaffirmed. There, Morissette, by trade a 
fruit stand operator in the summer and a scrap iron collector in the winter, went deer hunting 
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in the Michigan back woods country, as was the custom of the community, on land that had 
been leased by the Air Force from the State of Michigan to use as a government bombing 
range. Finding no deer, he decided to meet expenses by salvaging spent bomb casings that 
were dumped over the years in various heaps and were rusting from exposure to the weather. 
He realized $84 for his efforts. Soon, he was visited by FBI agents, to whom he freely told his 
story. The visit was followed by an indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 641 (“Whoever embezzles, 
steals, purloins, or knowingly converts” property of the United States commits an offense) that 
charged him with “unlawfully, willfully and knowingly steal[ing] and convert[ing]” the 
property of the United States. Morissette testified that he did not “intend to steal” anything; 
he said that he believed that the casings were “abandoned.” The trial judge was unimpressed, 
and he instructed the jury that, on the facts the prosecution proved and the admissions of 
Morissette, “abandonment” was not an issue and that if Morissette took property that 
belonged to the government from government land, as he admitted—though the facts were 
ultimately up to the jury for its decision—he was guilty as charged. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
over a powerful dissent by Judge McAllister. 187 F.2d 427, 431–40 (1951) (arguing that 
under the common law principle of noscitur a sociis (a thing is known by the company it 
keeps), the various offenses in the statute carried with them a common, but an implicit 
requirement of animo furandi, or intent to steal, as at common law, a dissent that 
foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s ultimate reversal of Morissette’s conviction). The Sixth 
Circuit found that § 641, because of the “or” that separated the words, prohibited discrete 
offenses and that “knowingly converts” stated an individual offense that carried with it no 
additional “felonious intent” under the now well-accepted approach to statutory 
interpretations of Behrman and Balint. Id. at 430 (terming Balint an “outstanding” 
precedent). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: 
knowing conversion [by Morissette] require[d] more than knowledge that [he] was 
taking the property into his possession. . . .[; h]e must have had knowledge of the 
facts, though not necessarily the law, that made the taking a conversion. . . . 
[W]hether the mental element that Congress required be spoken of as knowledge or 
as intent . . . Morissette could [not] have knowingly or intentionally converted 
property that he did not know could be converted . . . if it was in fact abandoned or 
he truly believed it to be abandoned . . . . 
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 270–71. The issue of the required state of mind was, the Court held, 
for the jury; it was up to it to “brand”—or not—Morissette “as a thief.” Id. at 256. 
¶14. The holding of Morissette is far less important than its reasoning. Justice Jackson 
began his landmark decision, which owed little to the parties’ briefs, by commenting that the 
decision “would have remained a profoundly insignificant case to all except its immediate 
parties had it not been so tried and submitted to the jury as to raise questions both 
fundamental and far-reaching in federal criminal law . . . .” Id. at 247. His decision is divided 
into two major parts: first, the proper approach to the general interpretation of federal criminal 
statutes, and second, the proper approach to the interpretation of § 641. First, he candidly 
conceded that Behrnman and Balint, if they were “precedents for principles of construction 
generally applicable to federal penal statutes,” authorized the conviction. Id. at 250. 
Nevertheless, he suggested, that because an “effect . . . [was] ascribed to them . . . inconsistent 
with our philosophy of criminal law,” id., a resume of their historical background was 
necessary. In brief, Justice Jackson’s skillful opinion transformed them from the status of 
general rules for interpreting federal criminal statutes to interpretive exceptions to be employed 
narrowly. “The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by 
intention,” he observed, “is no provincial or transient notion.” Id. “It is as universal and 
persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent 
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.” Id. It was, he 
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wrote, the basis of the English and American criminal law in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Id. at 251–52. “Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from 
concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense 
individualism and took deep and early root in American soil.” Id. at 251–52. However 
described—as scienter, mens rea, or guilty knowledge—courts always sought to use the concept 
“to protect those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common-
law crimes.” Id. Behrnman and Balint dealt, he suggested, instead with exceptions to this 
salutary approach; they dealt solely with “public welfare offenses.” Id. at 255. These offenses 
did not easily fit into any of the traditional categories of crimes against “the state, the person, 
property, or public morals.” Id. at 252.  Lawmakers, wisely or not, he observed, citing Felton v. 
United States, 96 U.S. 699, 703 (1877) (“the law . . . is not so unreasonable as to attach 
[liability and punishment] where there is no intention to evade its provisions”), created new 
regulations required by the conditions of modern civilization, and they sought to make them 
effective by imposing criminal sanctions, but dispensing with “any ingredient of intent.” Id. at 
253. He recognized that the distinction between “common-law offenses” and “public welfare 
offense” was not always easy to draw. Significantly, he emphatically rejected one rationale for 
distinguishing them: that requiring state of mind might “obstruct” their enforcement. Id. at 
257. Nevertheless, he did not attempt a close-end definition of the “public welfare offenses” 
category; instead, he referred to scholarship that described them, offering, in effect, an 
ostensive definition of the category. Id. at 262 n.20 (citing Francis Sayer, Public Welfare 
Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 73–84 (1933) ((1) liquor, (2) impure foods, (3) misbranded 
articles, (4) narcotics, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) traffic regulations, (7) motor-vehicle laws, 
and (8) police regulations for community safety, health or well-being)); see infra Appendix A 
(Definition) (analyzing various approaches to definitions). Accordingly, when Congress drafted 
new statutory offenses that were like traditional common law crimes, they would be read as 
reflecting “the cluster of ideas” traditionally associated with common law crimes unless 
Congress “otherwise instructed.” Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263. Silence alone, that is, “mere 
omission,” on the question of scienter would not be read as a “departure” from traditional 
concepts of criminal responsibility. Id. 
¶15. Unfortunately, Justice Jackson’s opinion at this point is twofold ambiguous. First, 
scienter is to be implied into common law-type offenses. But the common law knew various 
states of mind, ranging from intent or purpose to recklessness or negligence. He does not tell 
us which form of scienter is to be read into the new statutory offenses. Presumably, he meant 
the nearest appropriate state of mind, as “intent to steal” would be read into larceny-type 
offenses, as Judge McAllister argued in dissent in the Sixth Circuit. Second, he does not tell us 
which elements of the offense would carry which states of mind, for different elements 
appropriately might have different states of mind: You could, for example, require 
“knowledge” for the conduct (method of “escape,” that is, “climbing” a fence or “digging” a 
tunnel) and for the result (achieving the goal of “escape”), two elements of the offense of 
“escape” under 18 U.S.C. § 751, but require only recklessness or negligence on the factual 
surrounding circumstance of the confinement. See United States v. Baily, 444 U.S. 395, 406–
07, 409 n.7 (1980) (following Morrissette, silence alone is not sufficient to have strict liability; 
finding conduct of escape is knowledge, but recklessness or negligence on surrounding 
circumstance of escape not decided). From hindsight, these questions were not adequately 
fleshed out in Jackson’s opinion, but noting them should not be read as detracting from the 
principal work of part one of the opinion, which remains a masterpiece of judicial 
craftsmanship. 
¶16. Next, Justice Jackson turned to § 641 itself. He read its language, which was 
enacted as part of the codification of 1948, as simply bringing together from “scattered 
sources” “kindred” offenses that belonged “in one category.” Morissette, 342 U.S. at 266. “If 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 1017 
 
one crime without intent” was included in § 641, it was, he suggested, like Judge McAllister, 
“smuggled into a section whose dominate offenses do require intent. . . .” Id. at 269. It was 
“put,” he said, “in ill-fitting and compromising company.” Id. At this point, too, Justice 
Jackson’s opinion is unfortunately ambiguous. The conventional interpretation of the opinion 
puts the issue: “Does the mental state ‘knowingly’ apply (a) only to ‘converts,’ or (b) to 
‘government property’ as well?” MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 
54 (2002) (reading the opinion as holding (b)). In fact, the opinion can also be interpreted as 
reading an “intent,” that is, “intent to steal,” into the section as a whole. See, e.g., Morissette, 
342 U.S. at 261 n.19, 271 (The Court cites a series of “intent to steal” decisions, but only 
describes them as demonstrating the retention of a requirement of “intent” in larceny-type 
offenses. “[W]hether the mental element that Congress required be spoken of as knowledge or 
as intent. . . . it is not apparent how Morissette could have knowingly or intentionally 
converted property that he did not know could be converted . . . .”) (emphasis added). Thus, 
“abandonment” would have been a mixed question of fact and law, where a mistake of fact or 
law would have exculpated Morissette. But cf. id. (“had knowledge of the facts, though not 
necessarily the law”) (emphasis added). The point is of little moment to the outcome in 
Morissette, but its identification and resolution might have affected the reasoning, if not 
necessarily the result, in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 
(1985) (Brennan, J.) (issue is syntactically ambiguous whether “knowingly” modifies “use” 
and “unauthorized manner”; under background assumption of state of mind following 
Morissette and principle of lenity held to modify both); id. (White, J., dissenting) (background 
assumption of state of mind balanced by assumption of not requiring knowledge of law under 
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 403 U.S. 558, 564–65 (1971)). In 
Liparota, the Court evaluated 7 U.S.C. § 2024, which prohibited “knowing[] use of” food 
stamp coupons “in any manner not authorized.” Id. at 419. Treating § 2024 like a larceny-
type offense and reading into it “intent to steal” would have made the issue one of contextual 
ambiguity disambiguated by the principle of Morissette, and it would obviate the dissent of 
White and made Brennan’s comment about not implicating an issue of “mistake of law” inapt. 
See id. at 426 n.9. On the distinctions between syntactical and contextual ambiguity in the 
interpretations of statutes, see infra Appendix B ¶¶ 2–5 (Natural Language: Generality, 
Ambiguity, and Vagueness.). 
¶17. The Court’s unanimous volte-face in Morissette is open to a number of 
explanations. On the surface of the opinion, it is merely a clarification of the law and an explicit 
reaffirmation of an older position. Nevertheless, we think the significance of the decision runs 
much deeper, in particular in Justice Jackson’s case. Jackson had just returned from 
Nuremberg where he had to come to grips with the concept of individual responsibility in 
horrendous circumstances: the wartime (and previous) atrocities perpetrated by followers of 
National Socialism. Did anyone bear personal responsibility for the enormity of the war and its 
planning, its war crimes, and its crimes against humanity (including the persecution and “final 
solution” of the Jews), all committed in the name of the German people, but each one 
committed by individuals, singularly or in groups, one by one? If so, under what legal—or 
moral—standards? Jackson, the other prosecutors, and the defense counsel had to argue these 
points not abstractly, but concretely in the context of men on trial for their lives, where the 
ultimate decision of the tribunal would carry the force of law in the possible subsequent trials 
of thousands of other individuals in Germany and the occupied countries for these offenses, if 
they be criminal offenses. The defenses of the men on trial rested on two elementary 
arguments: (1) The prosecution itself was illegal, ex post facto; that is, no valid international 
criminal provision banned their conduct, which, they argued, was in accordance with German 
law and they were, in any event, only “following orders”; and (2) Apart from that violation of a 
basic principle of law, no showing of individual responsibility was made; that is, “I , for one, 
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did not know of these horrible actions.” That the Supreme Court, led by Jackson, returned to 
its roots and drew an acute distinction between Western society, with its traditional emphasis 
on individual responsibility and freedom, and the totalitarian ideology of the Nazis is hardly 
surprising. In fact, what needs to be accounted for is not the decision in Morissette, but the 
Court’s abandonment of its traditional moral roots in the years before 1952. See generally 
supra note 416 ¶¶ 7–17 (discussing the Nuremberg trial and Jackson’s prominent role in 
setting it up and acting as Chief United States Prosecutor, including his (and others’) 
arguments before the International Military Tribunal on the questions of state of mind and 
individual responsibility). 
¶18. Increasingly, the indispensable character of blameworthiness is recognized in 
enlightened criminal jurisprudence. Canada treats the question of state of mind in criminal 
offenses as a matter of the “principles of fundamental justice,” and where imprisonment is 
authorized, Canadian law prohibits it under its Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Section 7, 
Part I, of the Constitution Act of 1982, as enacted by the Canada Act of 1982 (U.K.), c. 11. 
In re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 24 D.L.R.4th 536. While no consensus 
is present in the academic world (it never is), we believe that the position that sees “moral 
blameworthiness” at the heart of the criminal law is correct, but more important, it reflects the 
moral experience of those who live the law. Compare Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally 
Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 1511, 1518 (1992) (“A moral agent, must be implicated in the breach of a moral norm 
that fairly obligates the agent’s compliance under the circumstances where that breach can be 
fairly attributed to the agent’s conduct.”), with LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND 
JUSTICE 209 (1987) (“[E]ven in that small corner of our lives when moral responsibility is 
relevant, there can really be no desert, because our conduct is so much affected, for better or 
worse, by its underserved antecedents.”), and MAX RADIN, LAW AS LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE 
13 (1940) (“If we then gladly abandon logic as the life of the law and turn to experience, the 
first question that must be answered is: ‘Whose experience?’ And certainly the answer is 
inevitable. Not the experience of lawyers . . . [but] the great mass of the community . . . .”), 
and DENNIS LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 64–67 (1983 prtg.) (“The difficulty of reaching any 
agreement as to the true demands of morality has in some quarters led to a reaction in favour 
of trying to eliminate moral judgments from the criminal law, and concentrating on achieving 
its social purposes: to protect society and reform the prisoner. . . . It seems improbable that, at 
any rate in the present stage of human society, . . . [any] substitute for the morally based 
criminal would be either intelligible to the community as a whole or that it would appear to be 
in accord with the sense of justice of ordinary people upon which the effective administration 
of the law so largely depends. . . . To many minds the risks involved in eliminating or reducing 
the sense of moral responsibility of the individual remain markedly greater than the obvious 
imperfections of the existing system.”). Yet the judiciary continues to struggle with the 
implication of states of mind, particularly knowledge of law. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 
159 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1988) (Bauer, J.) (knowledge of facts, not law, solely required; under 
18 U.S.C. § 922, unlawful for any person subject to a restraining order to possess a gun 
shipped in interstate commerce); id. (Posner, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024 
(1999) (Because of the obscure character of the law, knowledge of the law is required. “It is 
wrong to convict a person of a crime if he had no reason to believe that the act for which he 
was convicted was a crime, or even that it was a wrongful. This is one of the bedrock principles 
of American law. It lies at the heart of any civilized system of law.”). Indeed, in sharp contrast 
to the consequential reasoning of Balint or Dotterweich, modern economic analysis and 
utilitarian positions are in accord with traditional notions of moral blame in requiring state of 
mind. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 255–59 (5th ed. 1998); 
Arenella, supra, at 62–63. See generally Richard S. Murphy & Erin O’Hara, Mistake of Federal 
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Criminal Law: A Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 217, 219 
& nn.9–11 (1997) (collection of economic literature); John Shepard Wiley, Not Guilty By 
Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 
1080 (1999) (The article contains a comprehensive analysis of decisions and review of the 
general literature and a collection of literature on criminal law as moral condemnation. It finds, 
“Strict criminal liability is bad for a simple reason. Our criminal process is a theater of shame 
for those convicted of serious criminal charges. This powerful condemnation should be 
reserved of those who deserve it.”). 
 645. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 175–76 
(“[C]onduct, to be criminal, must consist of something more than a mere bad state of 
mind. . . . [In addition,] conduct to be criminal must consist of something more than mere 
action (or non-action where there is a legal duty to act); some sort of bad state of mind is 
required . . . .”); PERKINS, supra note 56, at 831 (“The actus reus is essential to crime but is 
not sufficient for this purpose without the necessary mens rea, just as mens rea is essential to 
crime but is insufficient without the necessary actus reus.” (emphasis added)); JEROME HALL, 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 70 (2d ed. 1960) (“The principle of mens rea is the 
ultimate evaluation of criminal conduct . . . . Its paramount role in penal theory also results 
from the fact that mens rea is the fusion (‘concurrence’) of the elementary functions of 
intelligence and volition. ‘Only’ its projection into reality, its actualization in the external 
world, is required to form criminal conduct. . . .”); CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 56, at 
232–33 (“Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea is the product of an effort to capture a theory 
of criminal responsibility, resting upon and requiring concurrence of a wrongful intent and 
wrongful act, in a maxim.”). See also ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 126–
27 (1930) (“[T]he starting point of the criminal law . . . [in] the [nineteenth] century . . . 
[was] that a criminal was a person possessed of free will who, having before him a choice 
between right and wrong, . . . freely and deliberately chose[] . . . to [do] wrong . . . .”); 2 
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 449–
511 (2d ed. Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1898) (tracing the development of the common 
law felonies before the time of Edward I, which ultimately came to comprise homicide, 
mayhem, wounding, false imprisonment, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, and larceny, and 
which embodied a principle that made a person responsible for conduct “no matter what may 
have been his intentions or his motives” (any “such ideas as the Roman culpa . . . are but 
slowly fashioned”), but which later, as a result of the “Christian church, . . . [which] exercised 
a not inconsiderable influence,” were mitigated, and caused a move away from the strict 
culpability of the early law; referring to St. Augustine as the original source of the later 
common law maxim: “Et actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.”). 
The rationales offered for the sanctions of the criminal law are generally stated as 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 22–26. 
The historical development of the various rationales of the criminal law, which did not 
(unfortunately for the consistency, at least, of criminal law theory) operate so that each 
replaced the previous but rather came to overlay one another, even though on particular 
matters they were logically at odds (e.g., sentencing is fixed under retribution (death or life for 
murder) but flexible for incapacitation/rehabilitation (if reformed, release is indicated no 
matter how much, if any, of a sanction is fulfilled; if not reformed, continued imprisonment or 
other restraint is appropriate even if his or her initial sanction is fulfilled)), is comprehensively 
traced in CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL LAW (1916); 
additional sources are extensively collected and perceptively analyzed in Katherine P. Blakey, 
The Indefinite Civil Commitment of Dangerous Sex Offenders Is an Appropriate Legal 
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Blackstone wrote: 
[A]s a vitious [sic] will without a vitious act is no civil crime, so, on 
the other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vitious will is no 
crime at all. So that to constitute a crime against human laws, there 
must be, first, a vitious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act 
consequent upon such vitious will.646 
These two basic requirements of the criminal law are called mens 
rea (state of mind) and actus reus (conduct). “The basic premise that 
for criminal liability, some mens rea is required is expressed by the 
 
Compromise Between “Mad” and “Bad”—A Study of Minnesota’s Sexual Psychopathic Personality 
Statute, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 227, 227–99 (1996) (approvingly 
anticipating the Supreme Court’s decision in Kansas v. Hendrick, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) 
(upholding continuing civil commitment of dangerous sexual predators after end of service of 
criminal term)). But see Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (obtaining the civil 
commitment of a dangerous sexual predator requires a finding of the lack of ability to control 
behavior). 
Matthew A. Pauley in The Jurisprudence of Crime and Punishment from Plato to Hegel, 
39 AM. J. JURIS. 97 (1994), convincingly demonstrates that each of the contemporary 
approaches to crime and punishment are closely linked to various, but not always consistent, 
assumptions about human nature. Compare James William Cecil Turner, The Mental Element 
in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 31, 37–48 (1936) (arguing that the 
development of common law crimes was from strict liability, through culpable negligence, to a 
minimum of recklessness), with OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 34–62 
(Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (arguing that the development of common law crimes was 
(1) from the desire for vengeance against intentional wrongs (subjectively assessed) to the 
desire to prevent dangerous conduct (objectively assessed) and (2) from moral retribution 
based on the assumption of a responsible person to utilitarian deterrence based on the 
assumption of behaviorism), and United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 227–37 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (tracing the history of criminal responsibility as a natural 
development of the concept of mens rea, based on the theory of punishing the vicious will). 
 646. BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at *21. Blackstone’s exposition of the common law 
of England is authoritative for federal law. See, e.g., Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 
(1904) (“Blackstone’s Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of the 
common law of England.”). Blackstone himself wrote for the educated gentlemen of his day in 
a language accepted by all with a common, classical schooling. Nevertheless, Blackstone was 
also widely read by others, particularly in the colonies. In his famous Conciliation Speech in 
the House of Commons in 1775, Edmund Burke noted that the publishers sold nearly as many 
of BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES in America as in England. A.E. HOWARD, THE ROAD 
FROM RUNNYMEDE 131–32 (1968). Men as different as James Kent (1763–1847), the first 
professor of law at Columbia College and Chancellor of New York, and Abraham Lincoln 
(1809–1865), a self-taught Illinois country lawyer and president, learned their law from 
Blackstone. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW, preface, 3–4 
(1958). “From Blackstone,” Boorstin observed, “we can learn even more about what the 
American colonists were defending than by reading the violent tracts of Thomas Paine.” Id. 
The King James Bible, Shakespeare, and Blackstone were literary models and libraries for two 
or more generations of American lawyers; in particular, Blackstone’s perspective on the law, 
including the criminal law, became the American perspective. 
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Latin maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea (an act does not 
make one guilty unless his mind is guilty).”647 The concept of 
 
 647. ¶1. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 225. 
¶2. The issue of state of mind in criminal law is carefully surveyed from ancient times to 
the present era in Max Radin, Criminal Intent, in I ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 126–27 (1944): 
[H]istorically the necessity for the existence of any mental element is the late 
requirement. The right of satisfaction recognized by early law is an undifferentiated 
claim which may in modern terminology be based on tort, crime or breach of 
contract . . . . Since the right . . . is a right to reparation, the question of the 
wrongdoer’s intent is considered irrelevant. [Nevertheless, i]n . . . Numbers 27–28 
a . . . distinction was made between “ignorant” and “presumptuous” wrongs 
because in theocratic society sins and crime are similarly regarded . . . . [I]n Plato’s 
Laws voluntary and involuntary injuries are systematically distinguished . . . . This 
conception was adopted . . . more fully in the mature Roman law . . . . The term 
dolus malus [wittingly and willfully] . . . became . . . the embodiment of the concept 
of wrongful intent. While public punishment was permissible only if dolus was 
present, culpa, or negligence, sufficed for the delicta privata [private wrong]. A 
criminal theory had to be recreated for western Europe during the Middle Ages. 
The concept of law of the Germanic tribes consisted almost entirely of . . . elaborate 
tariffs of compensation for injuries. Practically no account was taken of intent or of 
wrongful purpose . . . . But contact with the Roman Law and especially the canon 
law—the developed Christian theology went the full distance of considering only 
the wicked will as really punishable and the harm done as immaterial—forced men 
once more to pay attention to the subjective condition of the wrongdoer. 
¶3. The philosophical psychology reflected in the basic principles of the criminal law is 
principally rooted in Aristotle’s ethical theories, as more fully developed in light of Christian 
moral philosophy by St. Thomas Aquinas. Compare Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in GREAT 
BOOKS, supra note 130, at 339, with 1–2 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas, Part I of the Second Part, in 19–20 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 583, 
1–378. Those theories were fully developed in light of Christian moral philosophy and 
integrated with Roman law by the Spanish Natural Law School, of which the most original 
thinkers were the Dominican, Francisco deVitoria (1480–1546) (his principal works include 
De Justitia and Indis et Jre Belli) and the Jesuit, Francisco Swarez (1548–1617) (his principal 
works include Disputationes Metaphysical and De Legibus acc Deo Legislatore). See generally 2 
FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 375–87, 398–411 (1950) (outlining St. 
Thomas’s philosophical psychology and moral philosophy); id. at 335–36, 350–52, 380–405 
(tracing the development and influence of Spanish legal philosophers, in particular, Swarez); 
JULIÁN MARIÁS, HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 205–09 (Dover ed. 1967) (tracing the history of 
Spanish legal philosophy). From there, they found their way into the writings of Hugo Grotius 
(1583–1645) (his principal work is DeJure Belli acc Pacis), Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) 
(his principal work is De Jue Nataurae Et Gentium), Charles de Secondat Montesquieu (1689–
1755) (his principal works include Persian Letters and Spirit of Laws), Francois Voltaire (1694–
1778) (his principal works include Concerning the English Nation and Candide, a satirical 
novel), and Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794) (his principal work is On Crime and Punishment). 
See generally CHARLES S. EDWARDS, HUGO GROTIUS (1981) (tracing Grotius’s thought to 
various sources, including Aquinas, Victoria, and Swarez); MARCELLO T. MAESTRO, VOLTAIRE 
AND BECCARIA AS REFORMERS OF CRIMINAL LAW 1–13, 124–51 (1972) (describing the 
criminal law at the beginning of the eighteenth century and the success of the reforms by the 
beginning of the nineteenth century). 
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¶4. Montesquieu’s SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (1750) included the first articulation of the 
doctrine of separation of power, which inspired the American Constitution as well as the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man; Beccaria’s ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1767) was 
the first succinct treatment of the thinking of Enlightenment figures on the rationale of 
criminal punishment; it formed the critical background that “helped Blackstone to crystallize 
his ideas” on English criminal law. 11 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 578 (1938); MAESTRO, supra, at 132 (“[T]he influence of Montesquieu and Beccaria 
[are clearly shown in] . . . Blackstone’s work . . . .”). For contrasting modern examinations of 
those philosophical foundations, compare RALPH MCINERY, AQUINAS ON HUMAN ACTION 
(1992) (resting Aquinas’s view on a concept of “human nature”), with JOHN FINNIS, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS (1983) (resting Aquinas’s view on a concept of “human goods”). 
¶5. Needless to say, those philosophical foundations are no longer generally accepted. 
That they are not poses difficult issues for the theory of criminal law as well as its relation to 
theories of civil liberties. We may here put to one side the generally ignored historical 
wellspring of these liberties in early Christian writers seeking freedom of religion under the 
Roman Empire. See supra note 181. In fact, our modern concepts of civil liberty are typically 
traced historically no further back than the writings of John Locke (1632–1704), an English 
Puritan, whose views were solidly rooted in scripture but colored by his radical individualism, 
and an empiricist, whose views were firmly rooted in experience but colored by his religious 
perspectives; Locke, in fact, never reconciled the various strands of his thought; their 
conciliation, in fact, is problematic. See infra Appendix A ¶¶ 6–15. On the one hand, he rested 
man’s “natural rights,” expressed in a comprehensive understanding of “property,” not so 
much on man’s relation to God, but on “reason” and a “self” that preexisted government. 
John Locke, Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay, ch. V, Of Property, in 35 GREAT 
BOOKS, supra note 130, at 30–31 [hereinafter Locke, Second] (“[E]very man has a ‘property’ 
in his own ‘person.’ This nobody has any right to but himself.”). 
¶6. Locke’s concepts of “self” and “property” are fundamental to the liberalism of the 
Lockean legacy that underlies modern liberal-democratic theory. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE 
POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962), summarizes 
the legacy when he suggests that the defining character of seventeeth century individualism was 
found in its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own 
person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The individual was seen 
neither as a moral whole, nor as a part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of 
himself. The relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the 
critically important relation determining their actual freedom . . . was read back into 
the nature of the individual. The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is 
proprietor of his person and capacities. The human essence is freedom from 
dependence on the wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession. 
Id. at 3. 
¶7. On the other hand, Locke’s nominalism, espoused in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, in 35 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 93 [hereinafter Locke, Essay] led him 
to raise questions, which he never wholly resolved, about “self” and “personal identity.” Id. at 
218–28. First, he recognized that “self” and “personal identity” were necessary for the “justice 
of reward and punishment.” Id. at 225; see also id. at 227 (“‘person’ a forensic term . . . [for] 
appropriating actions and . . . merit”). But then, he had difficulty squaring them with his 
radical nominalism; in the end, he moved on, leaving it up to the “goodness of God.” Id. at 
223. He attributed his difficulty to “this ignorance we are in of the nature of that thinking 
thing that is in us, and which we look on as ourselves.” Id. at 227. Locke’s ideas were, of 
course, shaped by his understanding of scripture, which taught him that each person was 
uniquely valuable because he was made in the image and likeness of God. See Genesis 1:26 
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(“And God said: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness . . . .”). He found no 
conflict between his view of the teachings of scripture and his understanding of the teachings 
of reason. See Locke, Second, supra ¶ 5, at 26 (“[A]nd reason . . . teaches all mankind . . . that 
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or 
possessions; for men being the all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise 
Maker . . . they are His property . . . made to last during His, not one another’s pleasure.”). 
¶8. The influence of Locke on the Declaration of Independence of 1776 is manifest: 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed 
by their creator with certain unalienable rights: that among these are life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776); 1 Stat. 1 
(1790); 43 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 1; see also 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra ¶ 4, at 129–
39 (noting that the political theories of Locke applicable to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 
were only partially applicable to a modern, democratic polity and concluding that while Great 
Britain lost the greater part of her empire, her “rules of law . . . left deep marks . . . upon the 
Constitution of the United States”). But see 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra ¶ 4, at 118–21, 129–39 
(noting that the American Revolution was justified on various bases, including laws of nature, 
but concluding that the “recognition of the [unqualified] sovereignty of Parliament [meant 
that they] . . . rested upon a political theory which the establishment of the modern state had 
rendered obsolete”). 
¶9. That concept of equality was, tragically, not fully embodied in the Constitution of 
1789 or the Bill of Rights of 1791; it was, however, at the heart of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (“equal protection of the laws”) that set aside Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 
393, 407 (1857) (explaining that African-American slaves and their descendants were 
“regarded as beings of an inferior order [having] . . . no rights which the white man was 
bound to respect”). It took a civil war costing 600,000 lives to turn Dred Scott around. See 
supra note 178 (figures on civil war deaths). Even then, the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise 
of equality was not legally redeemed until Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
See WILLIAMS, supra note 178 ¶ 9 (discussing the story and jurisprudence behind formulation 
and argument in Brown). 
¶10. While individuality, equality, responsibility, and civil liberty are, apart from Locke’s 
religious perspective, central values of the Enlightenment’s secular political theory, its 
empiricist epistemology always threatens to undercut them. In its rejection of the perspective 
of the Enlightenment itself, post-modernity takes square aim at these values and their 
foundation in secular theory. See POST-MODERN LAW: ENLIGHTENMENT, REVOLUTION AND 
THE DEATH OF MAN (Anthony Carty ed., 1990). Anthony Carty observes: 
  There is a very consistent argument to post-modernity . . . . The 
Enlightenment . . . purported to secularise thought to render “Man” independent 
of a religious or metaphysical ground of “Being,” to liberate him from the 
“darkness” of history, tradition and authority. Its model of law . . . is above all 
perfectly clear. It is libertarian and contractarian. Man gives himself his law; men 
give to one another “their” law. The existence of “rights” means that man in society 
recognises that he has constituted a system of institutions, procedures, etc. which 
provide a context for these rights. About this there is no “mystery.” There is no 
need to reach out to “ultimate” foundations. . . . [A] post-modern perspective . . . 
[argues that] the Enlightenment . . . [fails] in its own terms, precisely in that it 
incorporated fundamentally religious/metaphysical assumptions into its own 
categories of thought. . . . Law, with a capital L, reason with a capital R, and man 
with a capital M, make up a defunct Trinity. 
Id. at 2. 
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¶11. Carty notes that post-modern thinkers are “celebrated in the worlds of aesthetics 
and literary theory.” Id. But their “implications for legal theory” are not yet fully “elaborated.” 
Id. Nevertheless, “[p]ost modern thought sets a limit to the Enlightenment . . . [project] by 
being ‘deconstructive.’” Id. at 4. “It is not necessary to deconstruct or ridicule the Rights of 
Man. They will,” he says, “fall apart of their own accord because [of human] death . . . .” Id. 
“The deconstruction of secular rationalism is central to post-modernism . . . . The implications 
for modernist law are never far away. They concern, above all, the disappearance of the Rights 
of Man with Man’s own disappearance.” Id. at 5. 
¶12. That disappearance was foreshadowed in Enlightenment thought itself. David 
Hume (1711–76), an empiricist like Locke, but unlike Locke a skeptic and an atheist, 
possessed no illusions about the goodness of God—though he, too, expressed his inability to 
develop a satisfactory theory of “self” and “personal identity.” In his TREATISE OF HUMAN 
NATURE, section VI, at 251–52 (1992), he concluded, “But self or person is not any one 
impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a 
reference . . . . But there is no impression constant and invariable. . . . [C]onsequently there is 
no such idea [of self or person].” Id. at 299–300; see also id. app. at 636 (“I cannot discover 
any theory [about self or person] which gives me satisfaction . . . . I must plead the privilege of 
a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding.”). 
¶13.WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM (1995), speaks for the modern, secular, American 
mind, which follows in the path marked out by Locke and Hume: 
  Our personal identity, then, consists, for Locke, solely in pragmatically 
definable particulars. Whether, apart from these verifiable facts, it also inheres in a 
spiritual principle, is a merely curious speculation. Locke, compromiser that he was, 
passively tolerated the belief in a substantial soul behind our consciousness. But his 
successor Hume, and most empirical psychologists after him, have denied [the 
separate existence of] the soul. 
Id. at 45. 
¶14. James, too, recognizes the implications of radical empiricism for a regime of ethics 
or accountability, when he, as he must, empirically rejects “free will.” See id. at 54–57; see also 
2 WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 569–79 (1950) (finding that the means 
to resolve empirically the appearance of freedom with the fact of determinism, the basic 
postulate of science, are lacking; James resolves it ethically in favor of freedom, but excludes it 
from his treatment of the science of psychology). 
¶15. Without a defensible basis for “self,” or “personal identity,” or “accountability,” 
that is, individual blame or merit, the basic principles of the criminal law remain, to be sure, as 
law, but they are without extra-legal support; it is, in short, one paradox of post-modernism. 
See WAYNE MORRISON, JURISPRUDENCE: FROM THE GREEKS TO POST-MODERNISM 108–13 
(1997). Morrison comments: 
  Thus Hume graphically describes the crisis of grounding or foundationism. We 
search for an absolute position to secure those calculations which will constitute the 
intellectual foundations of truly modern institutions but cannot find 
certainty. . . . This problem is at the centre of the so-called crisis of social sciences in 
late-or post-modernity. It was recognised in Hume’s time as the argument that 
without God there would be no way of guaranteeing our demarcation of good from 
evil, and ultimately nothing to give human life secure meaning; nihilism threatened. 
It continues to do so; how is it countered? Hume appeared to advocate a stoic 
acceptance of some natural flow underlying life’s ultimate mystery. The converse 
argument of Nietzsche—to take courage and create our own “truths”—has been 
seen to lead to irrational programmes. 
Id. at 113–15 (footnote omitted). 
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¶16. See also JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1957). Mill writes: 
When the philosophic minds of the world can no longer believe its religion, or can 
only believe it with modifications amounting to an essential change of its character, 
a transitional period commences, of weak convictions, paralysed intellects, and 
growing laxity of principle, which cannot terminate until a renovation has been 
effected in the basis of their belief leading to the elevation of some faith, whether 
religions or merely human, which they can really believe: and when things are in this 
state, all thinking or writing which does not tend to promote such a renovation, is 
of very little value beyond the moment. 
Id. at 153. 
¶17. Similarly, Friedrich Nietzsche, in BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 67 (1989), writes: 
[F]ormerly, one believed in “the soul” as one believed in grammar and the 
grammatical subject: one said, “I” is the condition, “think” is the predicate and 
conditioned—thinking is an activity to which thought must supply a subject as 
cause. Then one tried with admirable perseverance and cunning to get out of this 
net—and asked whether the opposite might not be the case: “think” the condition, 
“I” the conditioned; “I” in that case only a synthesis which is made by thinking. 
¶18. Writers as diverse as BERTRAND RUSSELL, LET THE PEOPLE THINK 61–79 (1941), 
an atheist, and Pope John Paul II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR 48–49, 62–66, 68–72, 122–23 
(n.d.), a believer, powerfully argue that epistemological relativism, or the idea that objective 
truth does not exist, and epistemological pragmatism, or the idea that truth is usefulness, are 
linked with authoritarian and totalitarian ideas. 
¶19. Accord ROSCOE POUND, JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW 22–23, 91 (1951): 
It is now held by many that an ultimate theory of values cannot be found. We are 
told that it is unscientific to seek to formulate values. They are held to be purely 
subjective. Objective valuations cannot be reached. . . . But it is significant that [the] 
experience of totalitarian government convinced [German legal theorist Gustav] 
Radbruch that he must modify his [legal positivist] teaching. There did seem to be 
certain fundamental expectations involved in life in civilized society . . . . 
. . . . 
[T]heories of the impossibility of justice according to law . . . have developed side by 
side with[] absolute theories in politics. . . . The real foe of absolutism is law. 
¶20. Radbruch’s rethinking and new insights into the inadequacy of his prior positivistic 
perspective in light of the Nazi regime, that is, from a relativist to one who espoused objective 
values, is explored in W. FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 192–196 (5th ed. 1967). See, in 
particular, id. at 191-206. 
¶21. Radbruch was not the only thinker to reconsider this thought after having 
witnessed the horrors of World War II. Jerome Frank, l’enfant terrible of realism in American 
in the 1930s, concluded in his FATE AND FREEDOM 105 (1945): 
  The deterministic-ascetic outlook has had even worse consequences. Its 
treatment of human values as irrelevant has created paralyzing doubts as to the reality 
of those values, and has encouraged a perspective which culminates in brutalitarian 
Nazism, with its life-negating philosophy, its irreverence for the dignity of man. . . . 
  Scientific fatalism is but a faith, a dismal and cruel one. We need not accept it. 
There is no reason why we should forsake the American faith—which rests on the 
facts of daily experience—that human purposes are real. 
See also JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND, at xvii–xviii (6th prtg. 1949) (“I do 
not understand how any decent man today can refuse to adopt, as the basis of modern 
civilization, the fundamental principles of Natural Law, relative to human conduct, as stated by 
Thomas Aquinas. . . . Natural Law aims at justice, and at moderate certainty, in the man-made 
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rules, that is, in the more or less abstract generalized, human formulations of what men may or 
may not lawfully do.”); see infra note 793 (discussing a more nuanced consideration of relation 
between the general principles of natural law and its particular applications). 
¶22. For a recent, comprehensive analysis of the natural law tradition, see John Finnis, 
Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in JULES COLEMAN & SCOTT SHRPIO, THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1–60 (2002). 
¶23. See also 5 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 368–426 (1946–49) (Opening Statement of M. Francois de Menthon, 
Chief Prosecutor of the French Republic) (arguing that National Socialism denied all 
traditional spiritual, rational, or moral value and plunged humanity back into barbarism by 
adopting race as the unit of value, rejecting the value of the individual, save as an element of 
race, and taking Nietzsche’s will to power as the ultimate value as well as disregarding any 
sense of justice, or even pity, that then gave rise to a policy of terrorism, which resulted in 
atrocities that were perpetrated, not under mad passion, but as a result of cold calculation, of 
perfectly conscious methods and preexisting doctrine). But see MARK LILLA, THE RECKLESS 
MIND 193–216 (2001) (arguing that neither an excess of reason nor of emotion in the shifts 
in the intellectual currents is to blame for the politics of authoritarism but rather the failure is 
to be sought in individual character that does not control the natural tendencies of human 
conduct). 
¶24. Hans Kung aptly describes the post-modern world: 
  In the second half of the twentieth century, [Nietzsche’s new man, rooted in 
the will to power] has become only too well known: men without God, whose 
relationships with one another are concretized even into the private sphere, 
determined by functional and practical values, guided by power interests, the weak 
everywhere being the victim of the stronger, superior, less scrupulous. The horizon 
of meaning is in fact effaced, there are no longer any supreme values, reliable 
guiding principles, absolute truth. In practice, does this not mean that a nihilism of 
values is determining human behavior? Has that not come to pass which Nietzsche 
foresaw—more clearsightedly than many before him? But it is often a mild, 
concealed, unemotional nihilism, without the passion of a Zarathustra but no less 
dangerous. Many today are distrustful toward a loud, public nihilism, and no 
politician, anyway, could afford to indulge in it. But people permit themselves a 
mild, private nihilism, often guilelessly, innocently, perceiving the consequences 
only at a very late stage. For, after so many taboos were broken in the war years and 
subsequently, so many traditions disappeared, conventions were dropped, 
humanisms were emptied of meaning, despite all the prosperity and better 
education, in many families parents no longer know to which values, guiding 
principles, ideals, norms, to which truth, they should cling and to which they should 
educate their children: devaluation (often without any revaluation) of values, the 
loss of which can then be noted, but can be canceled only with difficulty. In 
education, culture, economy, science, politics, “an incomplete nihilism” lived in a 
middle-or upper-class style, feeble and only half affirmed: “we live in the midst of 
it.”  
  Sometimes, however, more is involved. Nihilism presents many faces, from 
bored, intellectual skepticism to brutal political anarchism. Undoubtedly it is not 
only because of a whole packet of social factors but in the last resort also because of 
a nihilistic lack of orientation and lack of norms, that there has been an alarming 
increase in the number of thefts, robberies, crimes of violence, murders, by children, 
young people, students (more and more of them female), that the number of drug 
addicts, dropouts, suicides has risen tremendously in the past decade, that 
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susceptibility to ideologies has often amounted to mania. The ‘meaning deficit’ and 
‘meaning vacuum’ in the Western affluent society, for a long time now, has not only 
provided the middle classes with intellectual titillation in the ‘theater of the absurd’ 
of an Ionesco or a Beckett, has not only been diagnosed and deplored by 
psycholotherapists and psychiatrists. It is beginning to be a political fact. 
HANS KUNG, DOES GOD EXIST? AN ANSWER FOR TODAY 411 (Edward Quinn trans., 1980) 
(citations omitted). 
¶25. St. Augustine terms the view that everything is uncertain as “madness.” St. 
Augustine, City of God, in 18 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 523. “Regarding matters 
which it apprehends by the mind and reason it has most absolute certainty, although its 
knowledge is limited because of the corruptible body pressing down the mind . . . . It believes 
also the evidence of the senses . . . for he is more wretchedly deceived who fancies he should 
never trust [the senses].” Id.; see also St. Augustine, The Retractions, in 60 THE FATHERS OF 
THE CHURCH 6–11 (1968) (discussing his writings and the New Academy, a school of Greek 
philosophy that questioned all dogma and adopted a modified form “scepticism” (all dogmas 
are to be questioned) and “probabilism” (only that which is, in light of a balance of reasons, 
“probable” should be, at least provisionally, accepted as “true”)). COCHRANE, supra note 181, 
at 431, sums up Augustine’s position as “at once intellectual and moral. It thus depended . . . 
upon the [intellectual] conviction that there could be no significant doubt except upon the 
presumption of actual knowledge . . . and the [moral] fear that the acceptance of probabilism 
[of the New Academy] as a way of life would engender in many minds an utter despair of any 
truth to be discovered . . . .” 
¶26. The prospect for a general change in viewpoint, however, is not bright. For too 
many among us, other people are no longer valuable in themselves; they are merely means to 
an end; and no limits are placed on the means to be chosen to achieve a particular end, save 
those of utility in achieving the end. Intellectually, the result can be (and has been) ominous 
from a traditional perspective. If you abandon the individual as the unit of analysis (it is merely 
a “construct”), use group (e.g., “race”) as the unit, and adopt consequentialisms without any 
limit on the means to be employed, the policies of the Third Reich become—perversely—
“rational.” A “life unworthy of life” or a “useless eater” (lebensunwerten Leber or unnutze 
Esser), that is, a handicapped person, a Gypsie, a homosexual, or a Jew, even six million of 
them, may simply be eliminated. The issue is not basically moral; it is merely technical. If you 
think you need land, seize it by forceful diplomacy or force without diplomacy. The 
consequences of that philosophical perspective in World War II were breathtaking. See supra 
notes 178, 416 (discussing Third Reich and Nuremberg Trial). 
¶27. For devastating critiques of the standard form of consequentialism, see J.R. LUCAS, 
RESPONSIBILITY 33–56 (1993) (arguing that consequentialism, where the individual is the unit 
of analysis, dilutes responsibility, as it imposes unlimited negative responsibility, and therefore, 
has ironically, bad consequences; and in a world of more than one actor—our world—is a poor 
maximizing strategy (i.e., is again, ironically, “bad” consequentialism), unless it takes into 
consideration the decisions of others, which in fact, requires shared responsibility in a 
community); Philippa Foot, Utilitarianism and the Virtues, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS 
CRITICS 241 (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988) (arguing that consequentialism proceeds from the 
premise that morality is a device for achieving a certain end state, but that premise is itself a 
premise of consequentialism that must be established (i.e., it begs the question to start with a 
premise of consequentialism if the validity of consequentialism is itself on the table for 
discussion); “morality” need not have any meaning beyond which the “virtues” give it; if this 
action is “unjust,” a “moral” person need not engage in it without worrying about 
“consequences”; and concluding, “If we accustom ourselves to the thought that there is simply 
a blank where consequentialists see ‘the best state of affairs’ we may be better able to give 
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rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition.648 Nevertheless, under the 
 
other theories the hearing they deserve”); infra note 656 (discussing theory of virtues); see also 
CICERO, ON MORAL ENDS 41 (Julia Annas ed., 2001) (“By ‘moral’ . . . I mean that which can 
justly be esteemed on its own account, independently of any utility, and of any reward or profit 
that may accrue.”). 
¶28. Nevertheless, for a sustained, if concededly inconsistent, effort to describe a 
“liberal” but “foundationless” culture that “copes” and an expression of a hope that it will be 
free of violence and characterized by “conversation” among its “diverse” people, see RICHARD 
RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (ESSAYS: 1972–1980), at xiii–xvii (1982) (arguing 
that for pragmatists, “truth” is just the name of a “property” which all “true” statements share, 
but not much can be said about the common features between true statements; modern 
pragmatists also see certain acts as “good,” but similarly doubt that anything general may be 
said about what makes them all “good”; finally, that modern pragmatists find the Platonic 
tradition of absolute “good” as having outlived its “usefulness”; modern science does not 
enable us “to cope” because its theories “correspond to reality”; it just plain enables us “to 
cope”); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 163 (First Princeton 
Paperback prtg. 1980) (arguing that the original dominating metaphor of philosophy was 
having our beliefs determined by a “face to face” confrontation (“seeing”) with the object of 
belief (“reality”), which was the “foundation,” that is, the framework within which knowledge, 
life, and culture must be believed (“correspondence”) as “true or false” and the “standard” 
against which “conduct” must be measured as “good or evil,” but that we need not go, in fact, 
beyond “conversation” in our own society; it is sufficient “to cope”; and the search for 
“confrontation” or “correspondence” may be abandoned); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, 
IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY XV–XVI (1989) (arguing that we must drop the demand for a 
unifying theory of truth or goodness, “face” up to the “contingency” of our own most central 
beliefs and desires and abandon the idea that those central beliefs and desires refer back to 
something; a post-metaphysical culture is no more impossible than a post-religious culture, and 
it is “equally desirable”). But see KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (3d ed. 
1968) (“I believe that we simply cannot do without something like . . . [an] idea of a better or 
worse approximation to truth.”). 
¶29. For a less sanguine view than Rorty about life in a post-modern society, see JOHN 
LUKACS, THE HITLER OF HISTORY 115 n.* (1997) (Hitler: “There can be only one dogma, in 
brief: what is useful is right.”); KERSHAW, supra note 130 ¶ 9, at 30–31 (“Hitler [lacked] 
genuine warmth and affection . . . . [O]ther human beings . . . were of interest to him only as 
long as they were useful. . . . In his own eyes . . . he was the only person that mattered. His 
wishes, his feelings, his interests alone counted.”). Indeed, Hitler may be aptly characterized as 
the perfect embodiment of Friedrich Nietzsche’s (1840–1900) ubermensch, the superman, or a 
“person” quintessentially post-modern. See D.W. HAMLYN, A HISTORY OF WESTERN 
PHILOSOPHY 262–65 (1990) (summarizing Nietzsche’s views on the ubermensch as the 
individual who transcends “the guilt-laden inhibitions of ordinary men” and who affirms a 
“radical subjectivity,” for whom, without “access to facts independent of human points of 
view,” truth “lies in the superiority of a point of view,” which secures “dominance,” where 
truth is “power,” “God is dead,” and Christianity, in particular, merely reinforces a “slave 
morality” or subservience, rather than a “master morality,” a slave morality rooted not in love, 
but the resentment by those unable to use power, the use of which for the master morality is 
not only “the supreme value, it is the only reality”). 
 648. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 645, at 476–78 (tracing the influence of 
Christianity on the development of the common law felonies). 
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Old Covenant in the Mosaic Decalogue, responsibility was collective, 
not individual.649 The ancient Semitic world was “collectivistic[;] the 
individual person did not have . . . importance . . . . [Phrases like] 
the dignity of man [and] personal liberty . . . would have been idiot’s 
jargon to the men of Mesopotamia . . . .”650 Individual responsibility 
was prophesied as a New Covenant in Jeremiah651 and Ezekiel.652 
The dignity of the human person and the values of human life 
rest[ed for the Hebrews,] on a belief in the inner worth of the 
human person, a worth which consist[ed] in this, that there is a 
kinship . . . between man and God that is not shared by the lower 
animals. Otherwise, man is trapped in the organic cycle of birth, 
nutrition, and decay, and there is no hope more foolish than the 
hope that he can escape from this cycle.653 
Today, that responsibility is based on personal conduct and state 
of mind is fundamental.654 
 
 649. See, e.g., Exodus 20:1–5 (A violation of God’s commandment to have no “other 
gods besides me” resulted in “inflicting punishment for their father’s wickedness on the 
children of those who hate me, down to the third and fourth generations.”). 
 650. JOHN L. MCKENZIE, THE TWO-EDGED SWORD: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD 
TESTAMENT 78 (1966); see also supra note 181 (discussing the ideal of human worth in the 
ancient world before the impact of Christianity); THE CODE OF HAMMURABI §§ 229–30, in 
BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS, CONTRACTS AND LETTERS (Legal Classics 1987): 
  If a builder has built a house for a man, and has not made his work sound, and 
the house he built has fallen, and caused the death of its owner, that builder shall be 
put to death. If it is the owner’s son that is killed, the builder’s son shall be put to 
death. 
 651. Jeremiah 31:30 (“But every one shall die for his own iniquity . . . .”). 
 652. Ezekiel 18:4 (“[t]he man who has sinned, he is the one who shall die”); see J. 
HOLLAND SMITH, UNDERSTANDING THE BIBLE 232 (1968): 
Ezekiel effected one of the most important revolutions in moral thinking . . . For to 
make every human being personally responsible for his or her own actions is to make 
every human being a complete person, an individual in his or her own right, no 
longer merely a son or daughter of so-and-so, the tribal father, but also a separate 
individual with a personal . . . destiny. 
 653. MCKENZIE, supra note 650, at 130–31. 
 654. ¶1. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 203–24 (1961) (“In our 
jurisprudence guilt is personal.”); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 243 
(1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[I]f any fundamental assumption underlies our system it is 
that guilt is personal and not inheritable.”). That is not to say that the law does not know 
exceptions to individual responsibility. See, e.g., N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. 
United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493–95 (1909) (holding that, consistent with due process, a 
corporation may be held criminally liable for acts of agents or employees done with intent to 
benefit the corporation); United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125–26 (1958) 
(same rule followed in a partnership). The point is that these rules are exceptions. Not only is 
responsibility personal in the law, so, too, are constitutional rights, including free speech rights. 
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See supra note 133 (discussing the personal character of constitutional rights). 
¶2. Ultimately, this notion of individual responsibility became fundamental in the 
jurisprudence of the federal criminal law. But even more basic is the notion of human freedom 
that lies behind it, a notion in itself that merits at least some exploration in these materials. “To 
act freely is to be unhindered in ‘the pursuit of’ your purposes . . . .” ROBERT KANE, THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL 4 (1996). “[T]o will freely . . . is to be the ultimate creator . . . 
of your own purposes . . . .” Id. The notion of “ultimate creator” is “obscure,” but its 
meaning “can be captured” in an image: “when we trace the . . . explanatory chains of action 
back to their sources in the purposes of free agents, these causal chains must come to an 
end . . . in the willing choices, decisions, or efforts of the agents . . . .” Id. In turn, if these 
willings were themselves caused by something else, so that the explanatory chains could be 
traced back further “to heredity or environment, to God, or fate,” then the final cause of our 
conduct “would not lie with the agents but with something else.” Id. Thus, the idea is that 
“ultimate responsibility lies where the ultimate cause is—where the buck stops.” Id. This 
image, too, accounts for “the association of free will with human dignity.” Id.; see also 
GREGORY A. BOYD, SATAN AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 56 (2001) (“[T]he total set of 
antecedent causes does not determine a truly free action. While factors outside the agent are 
influential in every decision an agent makes, such factors are never coercive when the decision 
is in fact free. Thus, appealing to factors external to the agent can never exhaustively explain the 
free choice of the agent. In light of all influences and circumstances, agents ultimately 
determine themselves.”). 
¶3. Religiously, the notion of human dignity may be rooted in the Biblical teaching that 
“humans are made in [the] image of God.” Id.; see also supra note 181 ¶ 6 (discussing image 
and likeness of God). Rationally, it may be rooted in the notion of the “autonomy [of the 
human person] arising from his freedom” that gives rise to his “personality” by virtue of which 
he is “an end in himself.” IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 155–56 (1st 
ed. 1788). Kant’s moral or practical postulates are summarized at id. 238–41 (immortality of 
self, freedom of self, the existence of God, and the objective reality of the summum bonum or 
highest good); IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 40 
(1960) (“Man himself must make or have made himself into whatever, in a moral sense, 
whether good or evil he is or is to become . . . ; for otherwise he could not be held responsible 
for it and could not be morally good nor evil.”); see also ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXPLANATIONS 291–399 (1981) (reviewing choice and indeterminism, determinism and 
aligning with value, and retributive punishment); 1–2 MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE IDEA OF 
FREEDOM: A DIALECTICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM (1958) 
(constituting the collaborative work of the Institute for Philosophical Research: classifying 
theories of freedom, drawing out of them their common elements, and identifying 
controversies). 
¶4. The notion of “freedom” outlined here is variously termed “self-determining 
freedom,” “libertarian freedom,” or “incompatibilist freedom” (in contradistinction with 
“compatibilist freedom,” that is, freedom that either is or is not “compatible” with one or 
more forms of “determinism”); see BOYD, supra ¶ 2, at 417–30 (glossary of terms, including 
“compatibilism,” “incompatibilistic freedom,” “mechanistic worldview,” “quality of freedom,” 
self-determining freedom). As so understood, it frankly faces formidable objections from two 
radically dissimilar sources: theology and science (including the philosophy of science). 
¶5. Theology (literally “talk about God”) must reconcile God’s omniscience (perfect 
knowledge of past, present, and future events, including human action) and omnipotence (all 
that was, is, and will be, was, is, and will be by virtue of divine power) with human free will. 
How is it that God’s grace or power, which by definition is infallible in effect, can be 
reconciled with the free consent of the human will? 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 1031 
 
¶6. Caught up in this issue, too, is the vexing question of human suffering. If God is 
pure love or unqualified good, how is it that humans, apparently just, suffer at the hand of a 
righteous God? Various answers to this insistent question are given in the Western tradition. 
For Jews, the question is most prominently considered in the book of Job, which because of its 
artistic structure, elegant style, and deep theological meditations, is universally marked as one 
of the literary masterpieces of all time. In this eponymous book, Job knows himself to be 
righteous, but he suffers not only from physical pain, but also from the conventional 
explanations of human suffering presented to him by his “friends,” which he knows to be false, 
at least in his case, creating a classic conflict between doctrine and experience. Not finding an 
answer in human wisdom, Job cries out to God for an answer, an “answer” he gets in Chapter 
40 “out of the storm.” Job 40:6 (“Will we have arguing with the Almighty by the critic?”). In 
short, God tells him that he is not capable of understanding the “answer,” an “answer” Job 
accepts in faith. Id. at 42:3 (“I have dealt with great things that I do not understand; things 
too wonderful for me, which I cannot know.”). 
¶7. Christians find their “answer” in, among other places, Paul. See Colossians 1:24 
(“Now I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I am filling up what is lacking 
in the afflictions of Christ on behalf of his body, which is the church . . . .”). This cryptic 
passage is one of the most difficult to interpret in Holy Scripture. See, e.g., A CATHOLIC 
COMMENTARY ON HOLY SCRIPTURE 1135 (1953) (setting out alternative readings and 
concluding that while “exegete here can advance only with caution,” “suffering can be, not a 
terrifying enigma . . . but something very precious, since it is the instrument God chose to 
redeem us, and we can make our sufferings serve in the cause of Christ’s Passion.” (citations 
omitted)). See generally, PETER KREEFT, MAKING SENSE OUT OF SUFFERING (1986) 
(comprehensive analysis of objections and considerations on the issue for the modern but 
questioning mind). Other traditions offer other “answers,” but we need not survey or analyze 
all of them. Needless to say, for some modern Americans, if not most, this sort of general 
intellectualizing based on readings of sacred scripture is too abstract for our pragmatic 
character; it is, too, hardly satisfying to a person actually in pain (unless he is already a saint), 
even among believers, to say nothing about nonbelievers, who typically find it all simply 
unintelligible. 
¶8. The reconciliation of God’s omniscience and omnipotence in theology came to a 
head among Catholic theologians in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Two 
sides of the question developed, one represented by the Dominican Order (Domingo Bañez 
(1528–1604) was a leading figure) that emphasized the efficacy of Divine grace, the other was 
represented by the Society of Jesus (“Jesuits”) (Luis de Molina (1535–1600) was a leading 
figure). The Jesuit position came to be called “Molinism”; it emphasized the unrestrained 
character of human freedom of the will. The Dominicans declared that the Jesuits conceded 
too much to human free will, tending toward the Pelagian heresy that denied the corrupted 
character of human nature and thought that humans could “do good” by themselves without 
Divine grace. In turn, the Jesuits thought that the Dominicans did not sufficiently safeguard 
human liberty, tending toward the Calvinists’ heresy of predestination. Eventually, the matter 
was referred to Rome for decision by the Pope, then Clement VIII, who set up a commission 
to hear the matter (Congregatio de Auxiliis). Between 1602 and 1605, he personally heard no 
less than sixty-eight debates between the contenders for each Order’s position, which were 
passionately delivered. He died in 1605 without having rendered a decision on the matter. 
After the brief reign of Leo IX, Paul V, his successor, heard no less than seventeen debates on 
the issue. Then, in 1607, a Papal degree was issued that allowed each party to continue to 
defend its own doctrine, but solemnly enjoined each from condemning the other as embracing 
heresy and told them both to await the final decision of the Apostolic See. The decision is, as 
of this date, still pending. See generally CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, Congregatio de Auxiliis 
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(1999) (online edition at www.newadvent.org/cathen); id. (Domingo Bañez); id. (Luis de 
Molina); id. (Molinism). 
¶9. Science (and its philosophy) (literally, “talk about wisdom”), too, quarrels with the 
traditional notion of freedom. Excellent collections of essays on the question, which continues 
to spill much ink and to fell many trees, may be found in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL 
(Robert Kane ed., 2002); AGENTS, CAUSES AND EVENTS (Timothy O’Connor ed., 1995); 
THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL (Willard F. Enteman ed., 1967); DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM 
(Sidney Hook ed., 1958). A scientific objection to freedom in a popular form is RICHARD 
DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976). 
¶10. Any short review or analysis of these materials is daunting. The arguments and 
counter arguments do not lend themselves easily to summary or verification or falsification. 
But while the traditional conception of free will, at least since the seventeenth century, 
continues to be attacked, a supreme irony, which merits identifying, stands out: Many of the 
values, ideas, and institutions that modernity (and post-enlightenment modernity) ranks high, 
for whatever reason, that is, value pluralism, fallibilism, individual autonomy, individual 
dignity, freedom of speech, abhorrence of totalitarianism, etc., are “intimately related” to free 
will. OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FREE WILL, supra ¶ 9, at 212. If free will was, as it is seen 
traditionally, “free,” then these are the values, ideas, and institutions that those who so hold 
would “promote.” Id. Yet, for many moderns, the belief is prevalent that free will cannot be 
squared with science, which today replaces religion “as the last court of appeal.” Id. Free will is 
“obscure and mysteriously better suited (like ghosts and witches) to premodern, religious 
world views.” Id. If it is “related,” the relation is a “coincidence.” Id. 
¶11. Nevertheless, our “basic intuitions regarding the nature of personhood, moral 
responsibilities, human dignity and individuality depend on the conviction[, illusion or not,] 
that our deeds are in our control.” BOYD, supra ¶ 2, at 56–57. Rejection of the basic notion of 
freedom “fails to explain our basic sense of morality . . . [, and] our phenomenological 
experience of ourselves as self-determining personal agents.” Id. at 65. Indeed, we see that 
strict “Calvinists and deterministic behaviorists alike simply do not and cannot live in congruity 
with their beliefs about the nature of the world and of themselves.” Id. at 68. They, too, carry 
day planners or Palm Pilots. Those who hold firmly to the traditional idea of free will or 
freedom can readily concede that the issue is not all or nothing; that it is a question of degree. 
Circumstances—heredity and environment—do influence choices, but over time, we form our 
own characters, create our personality, and form who we are, for good or for ill, one choice at 
a time. Ultimately, our characters are of our own making. See supra note 656 ¶¶ 2–6 
(discussing the concept of character). 
¶12. At the same time, the resolution of the theological or scientific issues underlying 
our traditional notion of free will, though it is fundamental to our notions of individual 
responsibility in federal criminal jurisprudence, is not a judicial issue. Nothing in the process of 
nomination, confirmation, swearing in, or donning a black robe qualifies judges or justices to 
take one side or another in these controversies. Nor does merely gaining tenure in the 
academic process in a law school warrant inflexible or dogmatic judgments on these issues. We 
have no quarrel with Justice Holmes’s insight: “[A]lthough practical men generally prefer to 
leave their major premises inarticulate, yet even for practical purposes theory generally turns 
out the most important thing in the end.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal 
Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 420 (1899). Yet Holmes was talking about theory at an 
intermediate level, while we are here at this point in these materials are dealing with theory at a 
higher level. Understanding what freedom ultimately means and its implications for the law is 
necessary, but accepting it as fact in your individual life is hardly necessary, as Holmes’s career 
itself indicates in ample measure. See supra note 178 ¶¶ 5–10 (discussion of Holmes as a 
skeptic and an agnostic). Holmes was, as these materials show, despite his soulless philosophy, 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 1033 
Christianity did not change the commandments of Mount 
Sinai;655 it added the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount.656 But 
 
one of those who contributed mightily to our understanding of what free speech means in a 
free society. While it is valuable to go beyond the law, as it is, to try to understand ultimate 
issues as they are, nothing in the administration of justice at the level of day-to-day choices on 
particular issues requires answering ultimate issues. In the last analysis, the law is practical; it 
can be administered well enough by those who disagree on ultimate questions, but can find 
practical compromises on particular issues. See infra Appendix A (Definition); see also infra 
note 919 (work of Jacques Maritain on the adoption of Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights). 
 655. Exodus 19–20. 
 656. ¶1. Matthew 5:1–48. In the Hebrew Scriptures, for example, the law of Moses 
forbade “adultery,” focusing primarily on conduct; in the Christian Scriptures, Christ 
condemned “lust,” focusing primarily on the interior disposition that leads to “adultery.” 
Compare Exodus 20:14, and Deuteronomy 5:18 (“Neither shalt thou commit adultery.”), with 
Matthew 5:27–28 (“You have heard that it was said; you shall not commit adultery. But I say 
to you, everyone who looks on a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in 
his heart.”). 
¶2. This vivid contrast marks the beginning of a peculiarly Christian undertaking, the 
complementary definitions of “virtue” and “vice,” though the basic idea of “virtue,” of course, 
goes back to the Greeks and the Romans. See, for example, the justly famous dialogue of 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 B.C.), the Roman orator, statesman, and one of the writers 
who did much to popularize the philosophical ideas of the ancient world. CICERO, ON MORAL 
ENDS 43 (Julia Annas ed., Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy 2001) (discussing, in 
the form of a Socratic dialogue, the role of “virtue” in Epicurean, Stoic, and Aristotelian 
ethical theory and noting the principal virtues: “wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance”); 
see ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 121–80 (2d ed. 1984). 
¶3. Cicero’s influence on St. Thomas Aquinas, whose traditional, philosophical 
psychology is the psychology of the modern criminal law, see supra note 647 ¶ 3, can hardly be 
understated. See E.K. RAND, CICERO IN THE COURTROOM OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 4 
(1946) (“The ancient Latin authors to whom St. Thomas most frequently refers are Cicero, 
Seneca and Boethius.”). Rand writes that St. Thomas followed Cicero when he adopted the 
four cardinal virtues of the Greco-Roman world. Id. at 25–26 (noting that Cicero in his De 
Inventione began his discussion of the relation between the right (honestum) and the expedient 
(utitle) with a description of the four cardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, bravery, and 
temperance, though St. Thomas titled them: “Wisdom, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance 
(Prudentia (not philosophy itself, Sapientia), Iustitia, Fortitudo, and Temperantia)”). 
¶4. Though the idea of “virtue” goes back to the Greco-Roman world, the theological 
idea of “sin” does not. To be sure, “sins are abundantly and vividly . . . described in the Old 
Testament . . . the idea of sin is preeminently a construction of Christian theology.” HENRY 
FAIRLIE, THE SEVEN DEADLY SINS TODAY 7 (1978). No word in the Hebrew Scriptures 
“means precisely theological sin.” JOHN L. MCKENZIE, DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE 817 
(1965). The word commonly translated as sin is het or hatta’t, which, like the Greek hamartia, 
means “miss the mark.” Id. In context, the texts often mean “rebellion,” “breach of 
agreement,” “disloyalty,” or “folly.” Id. at 817–18. In Judaism, “sin” is “primarily an offense 
against the law. . . .” Id. at 819. 
¶5. The Christian Scriptures are, of course, written against this background of the Old 
Testament, but “sin” becomes in Christian writing a theological concept. Id. Three new 
elements are added: sin as (1) a single act, (2) a state or condition, and (3) a power. The fullest 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
1034 
 
theology of sin appears in St. Paul’s writings, in particular in his Letter to the Romans. Id. at 
820. In the Middle Ages, “our concept of human personality was continually expanded by the 
models . . . with which Christian theology went about its work.” FAIRLIE, supra ¶ 4, at 7. The 
“emphasis in the Sermon on the Mount is very different from that in the commandments that 
Moses brought down from Sinai. The commandments have been translated into the 
beatitudes.” Id. at 9. 
¶6. In Christian theological and moral philosophy, “virtue” is fully categorized: the 
theological virtues (Faith, Hope, and Charity); the cardinal virtues (Prudence, Justice, 
Fortitude, and Temperance); the capital virtues (Humility, Liberality, Chastity, Meekness, 
Temperance, Brotherly Love, and Diligence); and, contrasting the capital virtues, the seven 
deadly sins: Pride (Humility), Envy (Generosity), Anger (Meekness), Sloth (Zeal), Avarice 
(Liberality), Gluttony (Temperance), and Lust (Chastity). JOHN A. HARDON, POCKET 
CATHOLIC DICTIONARY 60–62 (1985) (“Theology justifies the number by pointing to the 
goods that human nature seeks to attain or the evils it wants to avoid.”). These distinctions are 
embodied in the comprehensive notion of “character,” which reflects “an elaborate intellectual 
construction . . . intended to illustrate profound moral truths.” FAIRLIE, supra ¶ 4, at 34. As 
the Sermon on the Mount went beyond an ideal of law to hold up an ideal of love, so each 
virtue was an aspect of love, as each sin was a failure to love, i.e., pride is inordinate self-love. 
See generally id. at 39–58. “But it is only when we know the working of Pride in us that we see 
how deeply the [various deadly] sins are interwoven.” Id. at 43. “Here is the keystone of the 
arch, and once we recognize that it runs through almost everything that we do, everywhere in 
our natures, we are in a better position to fight the other [capital] sins.” Id. “Modern nihilism 
feeds our Pride.” Fairlie writes: 
  We may decide what is and is not good, what is and is not absurd, and what 
does and does not exist, and what deserves and does not deserve to live. It tells us 
we are gods in this small moment in which we live. The kinds of debased nihilism 
that run through so many attitudes today are, like Pride itself, a denial of human 
limitation and the boundaries of real life. 
Id. at 49. 
¶7. These concepts about the human condition and human character were once 
embodied in great literature. “If it is the greatness of Dante[’s The Divine Comedy] that he lays 
bare our souls in his exposition of the sins, it is no less the greatness of Chaucer [in the 
“Parson’s Tale” in The Canterbury Tales] that he lays bare our conduct.” Id. at 12–13; see 
RAND, supra ¶ 3, at 25 (Rand quotes some as saying, “Dante is nothing but Aquinas set to 
music.”). So, too, in Shakespeare, though he can “hardly be described as a Christian writer, . . . 
the Christian vision of man . . . inform[s] his own vision.” FAIRLIE, supra ¶ 4, at 8. 
¶8. Needless to say, these concepts are largely meaningless to most modern Americans. 
That transformation is comprehensively traced in MACINTYRE, supra ¶ 2, as well as, 
GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALIZATION OF SOCIETY 9 (1996). Himmelfarb 
summarizes the process: 
  Long before the advent of that bourgeois, democratic era, those classical 
virtues had been supplemented or displaced by the Christian virtues of faith, hope, 
and charity—the latter in its original meaning of the love of God. Where Aquinas 
saw these religious virtues as complementing the classical ones, Augustine saw them 
as irreconcilable, virtues that have no reference to God being “rather vices than 
virtues.” Later secular philosophers, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
subverted the classical virtues more subtly, and the Christian ones more radically. 
But all of them insisted upon the importance of virtues not only for the good life of 
individuals but for the well-being of society and the state. And all of them believed 
in the intimate relation between the character of the people and the health of the 
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polity. Even those philosophers like Montesquieu who assigned different virtues to 
different regimes, and different moeurs to different societies, did not denigrate or 
deny the idea of virtue itself. 
. . . .  
  It was not until the present century that morality became so thoroughly 
relativized and subjectified that virtues ceased to be “virtues” and became “values.” 
This transmutation is the great philosophical revolution of modernity, no less 
momentous than the earlier revolt of the “Moderns” against the “Ancients”—
modern science and learning against classical philosophy. Yet unlike the earlier 
rebels, who were fully conscious of the import of their rebellion, the later ones (with 
the notable exception of Nietzsche) seemed almost unaware of what they were 
doing. There was no “Battle of the Books” to sound the alarm and rally the troops. 
Even the new vocabulary, which was so radical a departure from the old and which 
in itself constituted a revolution in thought, passed without notice. 
  This is all the more curious because the inspirer of the revolution and the 
creator of the new language was acutely aware of the significance of it all. It was in 
the 1880s that Friedrich Nietzsche began to speak of “values” in its present sense—
not as a verb, meaning to value or esteem something; nor as a singular noun, 
meaning the measure of a thing (the economic value of money, labor, or property); 
but in the plural, connoting the moral beliefs and attitudes of a society. Moreover, 
he used the word consciously, repeatedly, indeed insistently, to signify what he took 
to be the most profound event in human history. His “transvaluation of values” was 
to be the final, ultimate revolution, a revolution against both the classical virtues and 
the Judaic-Christian ones. The “death of God” would mean the death of morality 
and the death of truth—above all, the truth of any morality. There would be no 
good and evil, no virtue and vice. There would be only “values.” And having 
degraded virtues into values, Nietzsche proceeded to de-value and trans-value them, 
to create a new set of values for his “new man.” 
  When, early in the twentieth century, shortly after Nietzsche’s death, the 
sociologist Max Weber borrowed the word “values,” he had no such nihilistic 
intentions, which is perhaps why he did not comment on the novelty of the term, 
still less attribute it to Nietszche. Instead he used the word matter-of-factly, as if it 
were part of the accepted vocabulary and of no great moment. For that reason, 
because it seemed so familiar and unthreatening, it was all the more effective, for it 
was absorbed unconsciously and without resistance into the ethos of modern 
society, as it was absorbed into the vocabulary. “Values” brought with it the 
assumptions that all moral ideas are subjective and relative, that they are mere 
customs and conventions, that they have a purely instrumental, utilitarian purpose, 
and that they are peculiar to specific individuals and societies. (And, in the current 
intellectual climate, to specific classes, races, and sexes.) 
  So long as morality was couched in the language of “virtue,” it had a firm, 
resolute character. The older philosophers might argue about the source of virtues, 
the kinds and relative importance of virtues, the relation between moral and 
intellectual virtues or classical and religious ones, or the bearing of private virtues 
upon public ones. They might even “relative” and “historicize” virtues by 
recognizing that different virtues characterized different peoples at different times 
and places. But for a particular people at a particular time, the word, “virtue” carried 
with it a sense of gravity and authority, as “values” does not. 
  Values, as we now understand that word, do not have to be virtues; they can 
be beliefs, opinions, attitudes, feelings, habits, conventions, preferences, prejudices, 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
1036 
 
even idiosyncrasies—whatever any individual, group, or society happens to value, at 
any time, for any reason. One cannot say of virtues, as one can of values, that 
anyone’s virtues are as good as anyone else’s, or that everyone has a right to his own 
virtues. Only values can lay that claim to moral equality and neutrality. This 
impartial, “nonjudgmental,” as we now say, sense of values—values as “value-
free”—is now so firmly entrenched in the popular vocabulary and sensibility that 
one can hardly imagine a time without it. 
Id. at 9–12 (footnotes omitted). 
¶9. Himmelfarb also set out the etymology of “value”: 
  It is odd that the Oxford English Dictionary, the generally accepted authority 
for the early usage of words, cites neither Nietzsche nor Weber as the source of 
“values.” The word, in the plural, does not appear at all in the 1928 edition. In the 
1986 supplement and in the new edition of 1989, the earliest citation is from 
William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America 
(published in English in 1918), a work much influenced by Weber. A German-
English dictionary of the 1940s still does not give “values,” Werte, its present sense 
or recognize the distinctive meaning of the plural. Even the article on “Values” in 
the revised edition of the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968) 
ignores both Nietszche and Weber. Yet Nietzsche’s works were translated into 
English in the 1890s and acquired something of a notoriety in the circles of 
Havelock Ellis and George Bernard Shaw. And although Weber’s Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism was not translated until 1920, the German version of 
1904–5 had generated a good deal of interest and controversy in England long 
before. Weber himself was sufficiently well known in America to be invited to 
address the Congress of Arts and Science in Saint Louis in 1904; his paper was one 
of the highlights of the session. 
  It is also strange that although Weber’s “fact-value” distinction has generated a 
good deal of controversy, and although Weber himself professed to be dissatisfied 
with the meaning generally attached to “value-free” (Wertfrei), there has been little 
or no discussion of his use of “values” as distinct from “virtues.” The editor of an 
English translation of one of Weber’s works supplies many footnotes about the 
meaning and translation of German words, but does not footnote the word 
“values.” The index to another English translation has several references to “values” 
but only one to “virtues”: “Virtues, in Chinese Annals.” Weber himself, in the 
Sociology of Religion, uses “virtues” only in the context of religious virtues. 
  There are a few, but probably only a few, earlier usages of “values” in English, 
in the current sense, that escaped the OED. T.H. Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics 
(1883) refers at one point to a “universe of values.” But this is an isolated use of the 
word. It appears in a chapter entitled “Virtue as the Common Good”; it is followed 
by a sentence dealing with the “impalpable virtues of the character and disposition”; 
and in the book as a whole (a very long book), the words “virtue” and “good” (but 
not “values”) appear on almost every page. 
Id. at 19–20 (endnotes omitted). 
¶10. For perspectives that reject the Enlightenment’s classic distinction (in particular 
David Hume’s distinction) between “objective fact” and “subjective value,” see MORTIMER J. 
ADLER, TEN PHILOSOPHICAL MISTAKES 108–27 (1985) (Adler analyzes the views of Aristotle, 
David Hume, and A.J. Ayer, among others; he concludes that the proper distinction is 
between “wants” that are subjective (“apparent goods”) and “needs” that are objective (“real 
goods”); he finds that Hume’s famous criticism of traditional morality—that one should not 
improperly draw an ethical conclusion (“ought”) from a factual premise (“is”)—is logically 
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correct, but rejects the conclusion that all ethical conclusions are relative as improper, since the 
basic ethical standard is self evident (“do good, avoid evil”); the basic ethical standard can then 
be used to provide an “ought” premise that would support an “ought” conclusion (i.e., do 
whatever is good; fulfilling needs is good; this is a need; this, therefore, ought to be done)); 
JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 33–47(1980) (reviewing and rejecting 
the Humean objection to a late scholastic view of ethics that arguably made an illicit inference 
from fact to norm, that is, its natural law reasoning preceded first from a knowledge of human 
nature and only then to an understanding of natural norms; following Aquinas who proceeded 
from a grasp of human goods attained by action and practical reasoning about them that 
arguably does not make an illicit inference from fact to norm, but moves from action to goods 
to action); RALPH MCINERNY, ETHICA THOMISTICA: THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS 
AQUINAS 44–59 (rev. ed. 1997) (explaining Aquinas’s view of the natural law, that is, man is 
peculiarly a rational agent, so the perfection of rational activity is man’s end, noting that 
“natural law precepts are rational directives aiming at man’s comprehensive good”; and 
rejecting C.E. Moore’s Principica Etheica (1903), which developed a doctrine known as the 
Naturalic Fallacy (e.g., the properties of a thing can account for our calling it “good” (i.e., if a 
car runs fast, it is a good car)), explaining that Moore thought that it was a fallacy to attempt 
to bridge the gap between fact and values by citing facts about the valued thing; “good” only 
registered “approval”; following Peter Geach who points out that Moore fails to distinguish 
between attributive (value: it is a good car) and predicative (fact: it is fast car) adjectives; noting 
that as such, “good” could not be reduced to “approval”; finding that it was, not a predicate 
of a thing, but an attribute of it) (citing P.T. Geach, Good and Evil, 17–18 ANALYSIS (Bernard 
Mayo ed., 1967)). 
¶11. These contrasting views of “character” are not solely of interest to religion, 
philosophy, or history, but they are also tellingly relevant to the practical concerns of lawyers, 
and not just in reference to the concepts of individual responsibility based on personal conduct 
and state of mind, which are of paramount importance to these materials. These two views of 
“virtue” and “vice,” in fact, inform debates about “character” in the law today, though the 
participants hardly know the sources of the attitudes they represent. When the Federal Rules of 
Evidence were processed in Congress on the floors of the Senate and House and in hearings 
before each body, the “admissibility of convictions to impeach [the defendant was one of the] 
most controversial [issues] . . . .” 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 6131 (1993). The traditional argument for admitting convictions to impeach 
the defendant is that the evidence is probative of credibility, “since one who has committed a 
crime is more likely to lie than is a person with a spotless record.” Id. Julia Annas writes: 
  [I]t is implausible [for the ancients] that you could make correct judgments in 
only one area of life, isolating considerations of bravery, say, from those of justice 
and issues of what is worth standing up for. Hence there is a tendency in all ancient 
schools to see the virtues as mutually dependent. Some emphasize this point to the 
extent of thinking of virtue as . . . excellent practical reasoning in all spheres. 
CICERO, supra ¶ 2, at xix. 
¶12. On the other side, the modern argument assumes that a conviction for a crime is of 
little probative value, where the crime itself does not have anything to do with 
“untruthfulness.” WRIGHT ET AL., supra ¶ 11, at 143. The question then is a matter of unfair 
prejudice to the defendant, that is, will the jury convict based on his “character” instead of his 
“conduct.” Id. The traditional argument reflects a general view of “character.” See, e.g., Gertz 
v. Fitchurg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884) (Holmes, J.) (The fact of conviction is 
introduced under “the general proposition that . . . [the witness] is of bad character and 
unworthy of credit.” (emphasis added)). The modern perspective disagrees. See, e.g., Rationale 
of Judicial Evidence, in VII THE WORKS OF JEREMY B. BENTHAM 413 (John Bowling ed., 
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Christianity worked a revolution in thought and action on the 
Greco-Roman world.657 While Roman law generally reflected 
concepts of individual responsibility, it did not fully distinguish 
between crime and tort.658 In Roman Law, the distinction was 
“between crime, which [fell] within the province of the public law, 
 
1843) (arguing that a man who engages in a duel, for example, to uphold his reputation for 
truthfulness, nevertheless, commits a felony, from which we should hardly conclude that he 
might lie under oath). Bentham, of course, successfully refutes by falsification through a single 
imaginative illustration the proposition that all felons are liars, but he does not establish the 
contrary proposition that the records of felons should never be considered. Neither position 
stated without qualification is supportable. The wisdom of a judge deciding on all the relevant 
circumstances, case by case, when, if at all, to admit prior convictions is manifest. The views are 
contrasted in WRIGHT ET AL., supra ¶ 11, at 193–200, but largely in terms of modern, 
empirical psychology. Noticeably, the traditional philosophical concept of “character” as an 
integration of virtues—or vices—closely interwoven, one with another, so that the absence of 
one (the commission of a serious crime) cannot be so easily separated from another 
(willingness to lie about a serious matter) is wholly missing. Except as an unspoken 
assumption, it is no longer part of our modern intellectual world. 
 657. For a powerful analysis of the impact of Christianity on various aspects of classic 
civilization, including philosophy and law, see generally COCHRANE, supra note 181. The 
impact of Christianity on the concept of responsibility is also well-summarized by Clarence 
Crane: 
  Christianity so sets the way Westerners, even Westerners who would hate to 
think of themselves as Christians, think and feel about morals that it is worth . . . 
while . . . to put the broad lines of that way and its difficulties as succinctly as 
possible. 
  The individual, endowed with an immortal soul of priceless value, is a free 
moral agent. Once he is mature, he knows, by the grace of God and through the 
teachings of the church, right from wrong. If he chooses to do wrong, the 
conscience God has made part of, or a function of, his soul tells him he is guilty. He 
can perhaps plead physical duress, and, to a limited extent, ignorance, but he cannot 
plead total irresponsibility, cannot claim that he acted under cosmic necessity. He is, 
through his conscience, aware of the ‘civil war within the breast,’ aware within 
himself of something that drives him to sin, and of something within himself that 
urges him to virtue. Put in another way, he is aware of the contrast between his soul 
and his body, and aware that the soul ought to be the master of the body. 
CLARENCE N. CRANE, A HISTORY OF WESTERN MORALS 109 (paperback ed. 1990); see also 
id. at 171 (“In modern times . . . . the chief threat to . . . [the] Christian [view] has been a 
heresy as profound as any Christianity has faced. The doctrines . . . [of the] Enlightenment . . . 
the natural goodness . . . of man and . . . [its] corollary, the belief that evil is the product of 
environment . . . mostly of human or socio-economic environment . . . .”). That “heresy” also 
plagued Greek thought. See Plato, Laws: Book X, in 7 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 757–
71 (arguing against a view of nature based on chance (tuché) and for a view of nature based on 
design (techné) as necessary for absolute, not relative, moral standards, as materialism breeds 
relativism, which corrupts into skepticism and then degenerates into nihilism). 
 658. See generally BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 207–26 
(1962). But see supra note 181 ¶ 6 (discussing the Greek notion of “idiot”). 
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and delict, which [was] a matter of private law.”659 Delict had four 
essential elements: (1) actus, (2) iniuria, (3) damnum, and where 
relevant, (4) title to property in the plaintiff. Originally, iniuria 
meant non iure, that is, without justification; it came to mean dolus 
or culpa, or fault.660 
The common law first grew, of course, from Germanic, not 
Roman, roots.661 “Law in its earliest days tries to make men answer 
for all the ills of an obvious kind that their deeds bring upon their 
fellows.”662 Nevertheless, it, too, felt the powerful influence of 
Christianity, and it slowly began to consider issues of state of 
mind.663 Today, that responsibility is based on personal conduct and 
state of mind is basic.664 
“Ancient law has as a general rule no punishment for those who 
have tried to do harm but have not done it.”665 Eventually, those 
who molded common criminal responsibility drew a distinction 
between the completed crimes and the attempt.666 The conduct and 
 
 659. NICHOLAS, supra note 658, at 208. 
 660. See id. at 222. 
 661. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 645, at 470. 
 662. Id. 
 663. Id. at 478. 
 664. But see supra note 644 ¶¶ 8–11. (discussing exceptions to state of mind). The law 
knows exceptions to the requirements of conduct and state of mind. The point is that they are 
exceptions. 
 665. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 645, at 509. 
 666. The crime of attempt is a “relatively recent development of the common law . . . .” 
LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 535. Indeed, Blackstone did not even mention the concept. For 
general discussions of the doctrine, its rationale, and its various applications, see generally 
PERKINS, supra note 56, at 611–42; HALL, supra note 645, at 558–99; CLARK & MARSHALL, 
supra note 56, at 202–31. 
The classic article is Francis Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARV. L. REV. 821, 822–37 
(1928). Occasionally, early common law judges convicted for a felony where a complete felony 
had not occurred. “These convictions apparently were rested upon the doctrine that voluntas 
reputabitur pro facto . . . .” LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 535. The maxim is best translated as, 
“The will is taken for the fact.” Nevertheless, the general rule was that mere intent would not 
suffice. See Sayre, infra, at 822 n.5 (“So as if a man had compassed the death of another, and 
had uttered the same by words or writing, yet he should not have died for it, for there wanted 
an overt deed tending to the execution of his compassing.” (quoting EDWARD COKE, THIRD 
INSTITUTE 5 (1644))). Even then, such early convictions were “confined to attempts to 
commit the more heinous felonies; even these are . . . rare.” Id. at 827. The general 
conception of attempt, in fact, developed only later. Sayre concludes that the earlier doctrine 
was abandoned by the time Sir Matthew Hale wrote his justly famous treatise in the 
seventeenth century. Id. at 821–22; see 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITOR UM 
CORONAE 532 (1678) (“yet the law is held otherwise at this day”). 
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state of mind of attempt received a classic treatment by Justice 
Holmes, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in 
Commonwealth v. Peaslee: 
That an overt act, although coupled with an intent to commit the 
crime, commonly is not punishable . . . is expressed in the familiar 
rule that preparation is not an attempt. But some preparations may 
amount to an attempt. It is a question of degree. If the preparation 
comes very near to the accomplishment of the act, the intent to 
complete it renders the crime so probable that the act will be . . . 
[an offense.] [T]he degree of proximity held sufficient may vary 
with circumstances, including among other things the 
apprehension which the particular crime is calculated to excite.667 
 
The modern formulation of a general doctrine begins with dicta in Rex v. Sutton, 95 
Eng. Rep. 241 (1736) (Lee, J.). In Sutton, the defendant was indicted for possession of stamps 
for counterfeiting coins with intent to counterfeit. His counsel objected that the common law 
did not take notice of bare intent. In response, Justice Lee agreed, but commented: “[Y]et 
when joined with acts whose circumstances may be tried, it is so; so an action innocent in itself, 
may be made punishable by an intention joined to it . . . .” Id. (citing 1 HALE, supra, at 229 
(“[T]he best trial of an intention is by the act intended when it is done, yet the intent . . . may 
be tried . . . by circumstances of fact, by words, letters, and a thousand evidences besides the 
bare doing of the fact. . . . [F]or tho bare intentions cannot receive any trial, yet intentions 
joined with an overt act . . . may be tried and discovered by circumstances.”)). Nevertheless, 
the defendant’s conviction rested, not on the common law, but a particular statute that 
prohibited the defendant’s precise conduct. 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 26 (1703) (Eng.). Lord 
Mansfield turned the Sutton dicta into a rule of law in Rex v. Scofield, Cald. 397 (K.B. 1784), 
where an indictment was upheld for an attempt to commit arson on a showing that the 
defendant put a lighted candle among small pieces of wood with intent to burn a house. 
Mansfield observed: 
  The intent may make an act, innocent in itself, criminal . . . . So long as an act 
rests in bare intention, it is not punishable by our laws; but immediately when an act 
is done, the law judges [take notice of it] not only of the act done, but of the intent 
with which it is done; and, if it is coupled with an unlawful and malicious intent, 
though the act itself would otherwise have been innocent, the intent being criminal, 
the act becomes criminal and punishable. The case cited of the King v. Sutton is an 
express authority. We are therefore of opinion that the indictment is good. 
Id. at 400–03 (citation omitted). Scofield and Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng. Rep. 269 (1801), 
which followed Scofield, “settled the law.” Sayre, supra, at 836. 
 667. 59 N.E. 55, 56 (Mass. 1901) (indicting defendant for attempt to burn a building 
with intent to injure the insurers; alleging that the defendant arranged combustibles (wood in 
a pan of turpentine) with a candle and he solicited another to light it; the person refused; the 
defendant turned his wagon and drove it toward the building with the person who refused; 
after riding away, he announced that he changed his mind, and he drove away; a motion to 
quash the indictment or direct a verdict was sustained, not on the facts, but a point of 
pleading). 
The narrow definition of attempt articulated in Peaslee was thought to be superceded 
statutorily in Commonwealth v. Mehales, 188 N.E. 261, 263 (Mass. 1933), but it still retains 
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The mens rea for common law attempt was, therefore, intent to 
engage in the conduct constituting the completed offense.668 
The conduct element, the actus reus, of attempt received various 
formulations.669 “The situation is . . . complicated,” as LaFave rightly 
suggests, “by the fact that the acts in question may be committed in 
so many different ways because of the great number of offenses on 
which the crime of attempt may be overlaid.”670 Nevertheless, 
LaFave characterizes the common law and modern approaches as 
ranging from, on the one hand, the “Proximity Approach” to the 
“Model Penal Code Approach” on the other hand.671 Each reflects a 
varying emphasis on which purpose of the criminal law should be the 
focus in articulating the crime of attempt: retribution, deterrence, or 
law enforcement intervention.672 The greater the emphasis on 
 
vitality. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d. 698, 703–04 (Mass. 1990) (Peaslee cited 
with approval and followed); see also HOLMES, supra note 645, at 54: 
Attempt and intent, of course, are two distinct things. Intent to commit a crime is 
not itself criminal. There is no law against a man’s intending to commit a murder 
the day after tomorrow. The law only deals with conduct. An attempt is an overt act. 
It differs from the attempted crime in this, that the act has failed to bring about the 
result which would have given it the character of the principal crime. If an attempt 
to murder results in death within a year and a day, it is murder. If an attempt to steal 
results in carrying off the owner’s goods, it is larceny. 
 668. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 540 (“an intent to commit [the target] crime”). 
 669. Id. at 545, summarizes the general formulations: 
  [W]hat kind of act is required is not made . . . clear by the language . . . used 
by courts and legislatures. It is commonly stated that more than an act of 
preparation must occur, which . . . is of some help, although the situation is 
confused somewhat because courts occasionally say that preparatory acts will be 
enough under certain circumstances. The traditional attempt statute requires an “act 
toward the commission of” some offense, although slightly different wording is also 
to be found: “conduct which tends to effect the commission of” a crime; an act “in 
furtherance of” or “tending directly toward” or which “constitutes a substantial step 
toward” the commission of an offense. Similarly, the courts use a wide variety of 
phrases: “a step toward the commission of the crime,” an “act in part execution of 
the intent”; “a direct movement toward the commission of the offense”; “the 
commencement of the consummation”; or “some appreciable fragment of the 
crime.” 
(citations omitted). 
 670. Id. 
 671. Id. at 546–54. 
 672. Id. at 538–40; see also supra note 645 (discussing the rationales of the criminal law). 
Compare Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 48 N.E. 770 (Mass. 1897) (Holmes, J.) (“As the aim of 
the law is not to punish sins, but is to prevent certain external results, the act done must come 
pretty near to accomplishing that result before the law will notice it.”), and Hyde v. United 
States, 225 U.S. 347, 387–88 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Sherman Act) (“[I]ntention 
and overt act may all be present without amounting to a criminal attempt—as if all that were 
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done should be an agreement to murder a man fifty miles away and the purchase of a pistol for 
the purpose. There must be dangerous proximity to success.”), with Glanville Williams, Police 
Control of Intending Criminals, 1955 CRIM. L. REV. 66, 66–69: 
  In a rational system of justice the police would be given every encouragement 
to intervene early where a suspect is clearly bent on crime. Yet in England, if the 
police come on the scene too early they may find that they can do nothing with the 
intending offender except admonish him.  
  This is largely because of the rule that an attempt, to be indictable, must be 
sufficiently “proximate” to the crime intended . . . . One is led to ask whether there 
is any real need for the requirement of proximity in the law of attempt. Quite apart 
from this requirement, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused 
intended to commit the crime . . . and that he did some act towards committing it. 
If only a remote act of preparation is alleged against him, that will weigh with the 
court in deciding whether he had the firm criminal intention alleged against him. If, 
however, the court finds that this intention existed, is there any reason why the 
would be criminal should not be dealt with by the police and by the criminal courts? 
and GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 632 (2d ed. 1961) 
(footnote omitted): 
  Another way of supporting the proximity rule is to say that it results from the 
notion of crime as a punishable wrong. Society has not thought it desirable to 
extend the scope of punishment too widely. So long as the law was purely deterrent 
or retributive in its aim, this circumscription of the offence of attempt was perhaps 
justified. At the present day, when courts have wide powers of probation, there is 
much to be said for a broader measure of responsibility. Any act done with the fixed 
intention of committing a crime, and by way of preparation for it, however remote it 
may be from the crime, might well be treated as criminal. The rational course would 
be to catch intending offenders as soon as possible, and set about curing them of 
their evil tendencies: not leave them alone on the ground that their acts are mere 
preparation. It must be said, however, that this opinion is not generally held in the 
legal profession. 
and MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1961): 
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, 
he: 
  . . . . 
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as 
he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a 
course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime. 
(2) Conduct Which May Be Held Substantial Step Under Subsection (1)(c). 
Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under Subsection (1)(c) of 
this Section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose. 
Without negativing the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly 
corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a 
matter of law: 
(a) lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the 
crime; 
(b) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to 
the place contemplated for its commission; 
(c) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; 
(d) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is 
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retribution or deterrence, the greater the conduct requirement; 
conversely, the greater the emphasis on law enforcement 
intervention, the less the conduct requirement. 
Federal law contains no generally applicable attempt provision. If 
at all, attempt to commit a particular federal offense—in or outside 
of title 18—is criminal only if the specific statutory provision also 
expressly criminalizes attempt.673 Moreover, nowhere in title 18 (or 
outside of it) is “attempt” defined; thus, its definition in each section 
in which attempt language is contained is a matter of judicial 
construction, which varies between the circuits and between different 
offenses. Judge W. Eugene Davis’s opinion in United States v. 
American Airlines, Inc.674 is illustrative. Reviewing the law of the 
Fifth Circuit, in a proceeding under the Sherman Act,675 he contrasts 
attempt under the Act, which reflects the teaching of Justice 
Holmes,676 with the law of attempt generally applicable in the 
Circuit, which, in turn, reflects the Model Penal Code approach. 
Judge Davis writes: 
The focus of dangerous probability of success [under the Sherman 
Act] is upon the likelihood of the prohibited result, whereas the focus 
of the substantial step toward commission [under the general law of 
attempt] is upon a defendant’s intent. The move along the increasing 
 
contemplated that the crime will be committed; 
(e) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, 
which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful 
purpose of the actor under the circumstances; 
(f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the 
commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, 
where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the 
actor under the circumstances; 
(g) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element 
of the crime. 
The illustrations of Section 5.01(2) are not designed to not reflect common law fact 
patterns, but to assure that the issue is a jury, not a judge decision, in effect setting aside the 
narrow common law rules. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 5.01, at 297 (1985). 
 673. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994) (attempted extortion); id. § 2113 (attempted 
bank robbery). 
 674. 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that mere solicitation may constitute an 
attempt under the Sherman Act; offer to fix prices mutually made by the president of one 
airline to the president of another airline, where if combined, the airlines possessed market 
power, constituted an attempt). 
 675. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (“attempt to monopolize”). 
 676. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (Sherman Act) 
(“dangerous probability”). 
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scale of proximity of attempt to offense carries with it a corresponding 
shift in focus from intent alone to substantive result.677 
Consistent with the principle of legality, federal criminal law 
defines substantive offenses using the building blocks of the common 
law.678 The conduct element is constitutionally required.679 The state 
of mind element is not a question of constitutional law but a 
question, at least for now, of legislative intent680 (except—significant 
to these materials—under the First Amendment).681 
 
 677. Am. Airlines, 743 F.2d at 1119 (citing United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 
376 (5th Cir. 1974) ((1) culpability required by offense and (2) substantive step)). The federal 
jurisprudence on attempt is most thoroughly worked out, as might be surmised, under 18 
U.S.C. § 2113 (attempted bank robbery), a statute first enacted in 1934. The major decisions 
are collected in Russell J. Davis, Annotation, What Constitutes Attempted Bank Robbery Under 
18 U.S.C.A. § 2113(a) Making It Offense To Take or Attempt to Take, by Force, Violence, or 
Intimidation, Any Property, Money, or Other Thing of Value from Bank, 37 A.L.R. FED. 255 
(1978). The law of the circuits is also ably surveyed by Judge Harry Pregerson in the context 
of a defense of impossibility under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994) (attempted extortion) in United 
States v. Brooklier, 459 F. Supp. 476, 480–81 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d on other grounds, 685 
F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1982). The many decisions on attempt under the Hobbs Act, first enacted 
in 1934, are collected in Howard J. Alpern, Annotation, Elements of Offense Proscribed by Hobbs 
(18 U.S.C. § 1951) Against Racketeering in Interstate or Foreign Commerce, 4 A.L.R. FED. 
881 (1998). See also United States v. Everett, 700 F.2d 900, 903–08 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(collecting decisions on attempt and impossibility under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994) (attempted 
sale of drugs)). When Congress wishes to avoid the complexity of the jurisprudence of the 
common law on impossibility and attempt, it uses the term “endeavors,” rather than 
“attempts.” See United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 143 (1921); Osborn v. United States, 
385 U.S. 323, 332–33 (1966). 
 678. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (The 
Court found that the federal government does not possess common law crime jurisdiction. 
“[T]he legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to 
it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence [sic].”). HALL, supra note 
645, at 27–28 (“In a very wide sense, the principle of legality—the ‘rule of law’—refers to and 
requires not only a body of legal precepts but also supporting institutions, procedures, and 
values . . . . [T]he principle of legality so far as the criminal law is concerned . . . is usually 
called nulla poena sine lege [no punishment without law].”). 
 679. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that status of being an 
addict cannot be made criminal consistent with the principle of cruel and unusual 
punishment). 
 680. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 41–56 (1996) (plurality opinion) (finding that 
a right to present evidence of intoxication to negate “purpose” or “knowing” causing death 
is not a matter of historical due process); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604–06 
(1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985); United States v. Balint, 258 
U.S. 250, 253 (1922). But cf. Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 225–26 (1921) 
(construing possession of counterfeit check to require “conscious” possession to avoid 
constitutional issue). 
 681. As an exception to the general rule that state of mind is not constitutionally 
required, the First Amendment, for an obscenity prosecution, requires “knowledge” of the 
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Three distinct states of mind may be differentiated: “intent” 
(purpose), “knowledge” (conscious awareness), and “recklessness” 
(conscious risk taking); “negligence” (should have known), must 
also be considered.682 Despite conceptual difficulties, negligence may 
also be a lesser form of state of mind.683 Other words are used to 
denote state of mind, but they do not necessarily carry separate 
meanings.684 The words used to denote “state of mind” are also 
semantically ambiguous. “Intent” can mean “state of mind” or 
“purpose.”685 “Willfully” is also semantically ambiguous.686 
 
sexually explicit character of materials (a factual matter), though it does not require 
“knowledge” that the materials themselves are “legally obscene” (a legal matter). See United 
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 n.3 (1994) (citing Hamling v. United 
States, 418 U.S. 87, 120 (1974) (need not know sexually explicit materials are legally 
obscene); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959) (requiring “knowledge” of sexually 
explicit character of obscene material). 
 682. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403–06 (1980) (distinguishing between 
“general intent” and “specific intent”; “purpose,” “knowledge,” “recklessness,” and 
“negligence”; requiring element by element analysis); Liparota, 471 U.S. at 423 n.5 (same); 
United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (same); United States v. Freed, 401 
U.S. 601, 612–14 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring) (same). But see Rex. v. Tolson, 23 Q.B.D. 
138, 185 (Q.B. Div’l Ct. 1889) (Stephen, J.) (“It seems confusing to call so many dissimilar 
states of mind by one name.”). See generally Paul Robinson & Jane Grall, Element Analysis in 
Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983); 
Matthew Ficker & Kelly Gilchrist, Note, United States v. Nofzinger and the Revision of 18 
U.S.C. § 207: The Need for a New Approach to the Mens Rea Requirement of Federal Criminal 
Law, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 803 (1990) (application of element analysis to federal criminal 
law in context of historical background and proposals for a new federal criminal code); Richard 
Singer & Douglas Husak, Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since 
Herbert Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 859 (1999); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by 
Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021 
(1999); Katherine R. Trumble, Humpty Dumpty on Mens Rea Standards: A Proposed 
Methodology for Interpretation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 521 (1999). 
 683. Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 320 (1896) (holding manslaughter as 
lesser-included offense in murder; cited with approval in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 
at 705, 720 (1989) (requiring lesser included offense to be subject of greater offense)). 
 684. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 224–26 (“willfully,” “maliciously,” etc.); 1 NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 119 (1970) 
[hereinafter WORKING PAPERS] (identifying “a staggering array” of words used to denote state 
of mind in federal offenses). 
 685. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES 223 (1985). 
 686. In Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191–96 (1998) (citing, as “correctly 
observed,” Justices Jackson’s dissenting opinion in Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 
U.S. 337, 345 (1952) (“the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual 
knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law”)), the Court undertook to bring 
together its confusing and contradictory jurisprudence on the definition of the word 
“willfully.” After a review of a plethora of federal and state decisions, the Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Stevens, held that “willfully,” within 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D) (1994) (firearms), 
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Each element of an offense must be considered separately on the 
issue of state of mind.687 Typically, this gives rise to a syntactical 
ambiguity.688 Congress drafts legislation against a common law 
background.689 Viewed against that background, strict liability 
becomes the exception, and silence is not enough to infer that 
Congress intended strict liability on any element.690 The general rule 
is that knowledge is required on conduct elements.691 Knowledge is 
required on factual-surrounding-circumstance elements if they 
establish liability, but not if they establish only jurisdiction or 
grading.692 Sometimes knowledge of surrounding circumstances of a 
 
requires proof only that the defendant knew his conduct was unlawful, not that he also knew 
of the specific federal legal requirements under the licensing provisions of the statute. The 
Court then confined Cheek v. United States, 489 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (knowledge of the law 
required for tax evasion, but not knowledge of the Constitution) and Ratzlaf v. United States, 
510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994) (knowledge of the law required for structuring) to “highly technical 
statutes that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent 
conduct.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at 195. It also confined Liparota, 471 U.S. at 428–30 (1985) 
(knowledge of law required in unauthorized use of food stamps) to situations where the statute 
itself “dictates a different result,” a dubious distinction at best. Compare Bryan, 524 U.S. at 
193 n.15, with infra Appendix B (Natural Language: Generality, Ambiguity, and Vagueness) ¶ 
4 (discussing syntactical ambiguity). See also United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700–03 
(9th Cir. 1976) (deliberate ignorance or willful blindness); Rollin M. Perkins, “Knowledge” as 
a Mental State Requirement, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 953 (1978). Compare Browder v. United 
States, 312 U.S. 335, 341–42 (1941) (construing “willful” to denote “intentional,” as 
opposed to “accidental”), with United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394–95 (1933) 
(construing “willfully” to denote done with a bad purpose, that is, to violate the law, including 
conduct marked by careless disregard”), and MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES 249 
(1985) (“Judge Hand: . . . . [Willfully is] an awful word! It is one of the most troublesome 
words in a statute that I know. If I were to have [an index of words] purged ‘willful’ would 
lead all the rest in spite of its being at the end of the alphabet.” (citing ALI Proceedings 160 
(1955)), and WORKING PAPERS, supra note 684, at 148–51 (discussing “willfulness”). 
 687. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1994); Liparota, 471 
U.S. at 423 n.5 (citing Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405–06). 
 688. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 227 (“[W]hat, for instance, does ‘knowingly’ modify 
in . . . ‘knowingly sells a security without a permit[?]’. . . As a matter of grammar . . . it is not 
at all clear how far down the sentence the word . . . travel[s].”); see infra Appendix B (Natural 
Language: Generality, Ambiguity, and Vagueness) ¶ 4 (discussing syntactical ambiguity). 
 689. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. at 70 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 
246, 248 n.20 (1952)); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 (1993). 
 690. Staples, 511 U.S. at 605; Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 
522–23 (1994); Bailey, 444 U.S. at 406 n.6 (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. at 263); see also 
United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (“an interpretative [sic] 
presumption that mens rea is required”). 
 691. Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd., 511 U.S. at 523; Bailey, 444 U.S. at 408. 
 692. Staples, 511 U.S. at 604 (character of gun as automatic weapon); see infra notes 700 
and 946 (discussions of jurisdiction, legal, and grading elements). 
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legal693 character is required.694 Result elements are also 
knowledge.695 The requirement of a state of mind for factual 
elements gives rise to the general rule that a mistake of fact is a 
defense, which is reflected in the Latin maxim ignorantia facti 
excusat (ignorance of the fact excuses). On the other hand, a mistake 
in reference to the existence, meaning, or application of a legal 
principle is not typically a defense, since state of mind is generally not 
required for legal elements.696 That general rule is reflected in the 
 
 693. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140–49 (1994) (finding the “willful” 
character of structuring of financial transaction act as unlawful); Liparota v. United States, 471 
U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (finding the “knowingly” character of use of food stamps as unlawful). 
 694. See also United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598–602 (1995) (in a case involving 
obstruction of justice, if intent accompanies conduct, knowledge properly accompanies the 
factual circumstances, other than conduct or result). But see Bailey, 444 U.S. at 407, 409 n.7 
(declining to decide whether “recklessness” or “negligence” suffices for factual circumstance in 
crime of escape); United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 US. 558, 561–62 
(1971) (construing knowingly violate regulation not to require knowledge of regulation). 
 695. U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 444 n.21 (In an antitrust suit, “conduct was undertaken 
with knowledge of its probable consequences.”). But see Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 
8–9 (1954), involving the use of mail and interstate transportation: 
[Where] one does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the 
ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even 
though not actually intended, then he “causes” the mails to be used . . . . It is 
common knowledge that . . . checks must be sent to the drawee bank for collection, 
and it follows that Pereira intended the El Paso bank to send . . . [the] check across 
state lines. 
(citing United States v. Kenofskey, 243 U.S. 440, 443 (1917) (“bringing about”); United 
States v. Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379, 391 (1946) (“One who induces another to do exactly what 
he intends . . . hardly can be held not to ‘cause’ what is so done.”)). See generally Blakey & 
Roddy, supra note 11, at 1410–18 (discussion of “cause” in federal criminal law). 
 696. See Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 149 (Despite “the venerable principle that ignorance of the 
law generally is no defense to a criminal charge,” knowledge of the legal regulation is 
required.); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (“The general rule that 
ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted 
in the American legal system.”); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 238 (1945) 
(bigamy is mistake of law on validity of divorce; no due process violation; “[m]istaken notions 
about one’s legal rights are not sufficient to bar prosecution for crime”); Sinclair v. United 
States, 279 U.S. 263, 299 (1929) (contempt of Congress; good faith reliance on advice of 
counsel question not pertinent: “his mistaken view of the law is no defense”); Horning v. 
District of Columbia, 254 US. 135, 137 (1920) (Holmes, J.) (conducting criminal loan-
sharking business in District of Columbia from Virginia; “[i]t may be assumed that he intended 
not to break the law but only to get as near to the line as he could, . . . but if the conduct . . . 
crossed the line, the fact that he desired to keep within it will not help him”); Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878) (religious belief is not a defense against charges of 
bigamy; “[i]gnorance of a fact may sometimes be taken as evidence of a want of criminal 
intent, but not ignorance of the law . . . . belief that the law ought not to have been 
enacted . . . [is] still belief and belief only”). 
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Latin maxim ignorantia juris quod quisque tenetur scire, neminen 
excusat (ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, 
excuses no man).697 Regulatory698 and child sex699 offenses, where 
strict liability is the norm, are exceptions to the general requirement 
of state of mind, at least on certain aspects of the offense. Similarly, 
strict liability generally applies in all offenses on elements that play 
only a grading or a jurisdiction role.700 Nevertheless, some awareness 
that the item may be subject to regulation because of its dangerous, 
deleterious, or obnoxious character is required even in regulatory 
offenses.701 The regulatory offense category, too, is not closed-
ended.702 Accordingly, in light of the general interpretative 
 
 697. See generally BLACKSTONE, supra note 130, at *27 (“But this must be an ignorance 
or mistake of fact, and not an error in point of law.”); HALE, supra note 666, at 42 
(“Ignorance of the municipal law of the kingdom . . . doth not excuse any . . . because every 
person . . . is bound to know the law, and presumed so to do . . . . But in some cases 
ignorantia facti doth excuse . . . .”). But see Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 136. (“Congress may decree 
otherwise.”). Radin, supra note 647, at 129 observes: 
  To realize the full reach of the doctrines of criminal responsibility it is also 
necessary to consider the effects of the doctrines of mistake or ignorance of fact or 
law . . . . The general tendency in all mature legal systems has been to excuse 
mistake of fact . . . . On the other hand, errors of law have been very rarely excused. 
However, for . . . the Roman law . . . it has been disputed whether a consciousness 
of criminality was necessary. The Roman law seems to have allowed the plea of 
ignorantia juris to be made by rustics or women . . . . [M]ens rea in English law was 
never held to mean that ignorance of the criminal law was an excuse. In the German 
common law down to the end of the eighteenth century the rule was error juris non 
excusat. . . . In fact[, however,] many continental theorists are in favor of abrogating 
or at least modifying the generally prevailing old rule . . . [, since] modern criminal 
norms are so complex that the average citizen cannot be expected to know them all. 
 698. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 606–16 (1994) (rejecting strict criminal 
liability for regulatory offenses in context of crime of possessing certain kind of gun). 
 699. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.2 (1994) 
(recognizing the Morissette principle that common law presumption of mens rea does not 
necessarily apply to sex offenses). 
 700. Id. at 469 n.3 (citing United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 671 (1975) (assault on 
federal officer; conspiracy)); LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 808 n.18 (“[O]ne who steals a valuable 
necklace, believing it to be costume jewelry, is guilty of grand larceny”). But see United States 
v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 75 n.14 (1984) (involving a false statement in federal jurisdiction 
and holding, despite Feola, that the “actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction” element 
is not required but not deciding whether the element was “negligence”); Commonwealth v. 
Murphy, 42 N.E. 504, 505 (Mass. 1896) (“The defendants in [this statutory rape prosecution] 
knew that they were violating the law. Their intended crime was fornication, at the least.”). 
 701. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 607. 
 702. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (“We attempt no closed 
definition [of regulatory offenses], for the law on the subject is neither settled nor static.”); 
supra note 644 ¶¶ 13–17 (discussion of “public welfare offenses” in Morissette). 
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presumption of mens rea, but the less-than-precise regulatory 
exception, federal criminal statutes that do not expressly set out a 
state of mind for each element are contextually ambiguous. In a 
sharply narrow class of cases, liability may also be both strict and 
vicarious.703 General common law defenses are often not expressly 
included in the elements of particular offenses. Sometimes they are 
statutory; sometimes they are implied in particular offenses.704 This 
contextual ambiguity in federal criminal law is pervasive. 
Once Congress selects the elements of an offense, the government 
is constitutionally required to prove each element of the offense to a 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.705 The burden of proof on elements 
 
 703. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 668–72 (1975) (holding corporate officer 
strictly liable for his subordinates’ failure to prevent contamination of food shipped in 
interstate commerce, but mandating affirmative defense of impossibility); United States v. 
Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (noting in dicta that knowledge that the items where 
misbranded or adulterated was not required for a statute criminalizing the shipment of 
adulterated or misbranded drugs); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68–70 
(1910) (holding, consistent with due process, that accidental removal of trees may be criminal 
and subject to multiple damages); infra Appendix B (Natural Language: Generality, 
Ambiguity, and Vagueness) ¶ 5 (discussion of contextual ambiguity). 
 704. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. 2000) (insanity); Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993) (“Those who petition government for 
redress are generally immune from antitrust liability.”); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 
399–400 (1980) (duress as defense to escape from prison); United States v. Pa. Indus. Chem. 
Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 670–75 (1973) (misleading defendant by government conduct); United 
States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475, 487 (1967) (same); Cox v. Lousiana, 379 U.S. 559, 569–71 
(1965) (same); Raley v. Ohio , 360 U.S. 423, 437–40 (1959) (same); Brown v. United States, 
256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.) (“[I]f a man reasonably believes that he is in 
immediate danger of death or grievous bodily harm from his assailant he may stand his ground 
and . . . if he kills him he has not exceeded the bounds of lawful self-defense.”); Cunningham 
v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75–76 (1890) (recognizing federal public duty defense as defense to 
state murder charge); Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 555 (1896) (self-defense; 
provocation and withdrawal); United States v. Vigol, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 346, 347 (1795) (duress 
or terror as defenses to treason); LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 7 (“The substantive criminal law 
is . . . concerned with much more than is found in the definitions of the specific crimes, for 
there are many general principles . . . [that] apply to more than a single crime.”). 
 705. Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 2417 (2002) (explaining that Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not overrule McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 
(1986); brandishing a weapon during the course of a narcotics offense is a sentencing factor 
that may be found by the judge if it does not extend the authorized term.); Ring v. Arizona, 
122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002) (overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); 
sentencing judge may not find aggravating circumstances necessary for the imposition of 
capital punishment since they operate as the “functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
offense” under Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (citations omitted)); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466 (Except 
for prior convictions, each element of an offense, including a factor of aggravation that 
enhances the offense beyond authorized term, must be included in the charge and submitted 
to the fact finder for its determination.); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995) 
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of the offense may not be shifted to the defendant.706 But the burden 
of proof may be shifted to the defendant on affirmative defenses.707 
Affirmative defenses may also carry different burden-of-proof 
requirements.708 “Presumptions,” if they are understood as permissible 
inferences, are also not a violation of due process.709 These, too, are 
basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence. 
 
(“The Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty 
of all the elements of the crime with which he is charged.”); see also Blanton v. N. Las Vegas, 
489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989) (“[A] defendant is entitled to a jury trial whenever the offense for 
which he is charged carries a maximum authorized prison term of greater than six months.” 
(citing Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970)); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact regardless of whether accused 
is an adult or a child; “Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he 
is charged”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (Defendant accused of a crime 
punishable by two years in prison is entitled to a jury trial; “the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—were they to be tried in a federal 
court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 22(b) (12 
member jury unless stipulated); FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a) (requiring unanimity). 
 706. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703–04 (1975) (holding it impermissible under 
due process clause for state to shift burden of proof to defendant to establish heat of passion to 
reduce murder to manslaughter). Compare Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 525 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring) (“Federal and State legislatures may reallocate burdens of proof by labeling 
elements as affirmative defenses . . . or they may convert elements into ‘sentencing factors’ for 
consideration by the sentencing court.” (quoting McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85–
86 (1986))), with Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (2000) (other than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for an offense beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to the jury for decision under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard). 
That Apprendi represents a “shift[ing of] tectonic plates insofar as criminal sentencing is 
concerned,” United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115, 123 (1st Cir. 2001)), and, if so, to 
what extent, is beyond the scope of these materials. See generally B. Patrick Costello Jr., Case 
Comment, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Who Decides What Constitutes a Crime? An Analysis of 
Whether a Legislature is Constitutionally Free to “Allocate” an Element of an Offense to an 
Affirmative Defense or a Sentencing Factor Without Judicial Review, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1205 (2002), for a comprehensive and insightful, though disapproving, review of the relevant 
materials. 
 707. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206–09 (1977) (permitting New York to 
require homicide-defendant to prove by preponderance of evidence the affirmative defense of 
extreme emotional disturbance to reduce murder to manslaughter); accord Martin v. Ohio, 
480 U.S. 228, 235–36 (1987) (allowing Ohio to place burden of proving self-defense on 
defendant charged with committing aggravated murder). 
 708. Compare LeLand v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798–99 (1952) (allowing Oregon to 
require a defendant to prove the affirmative defense of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt), 
with Martin, 480 U.S. at 230–31 (allowing Ohio to require a defendant to prove the 
affirmative defense of self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence). 
 709. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 841–47 (1973) (holding due process clause 
not violated by presumption that defendant in possession of recently stolen checks had 
knowledge that such checks were stolen). 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 1051 
We vigorously argue that, contrary to the current approach of 
the circuit courts of appeals, these basic principles of federal criminal 
jurisprudence must be taken into consideration in any formulation of 
the jurisprudence of “true threats.” Sadly, the jurisprudence of the 
circuits on “true threats” is today seriously defective in its failure to 
take these principles into account and give them their just due. 
Accordingly, any effort at reform must reflect not only the 
jurisprudence of the First Amendment but also the jurisprudence of 
the federal criminal law. We turn now to that task. 
VII. DEALING WITH TRUE THREATS: A PROPOSAL 
The various circuits currently espouse tests, usually objective 
(speaker, listener, or reasonable person based) or similar approaches, for 
deciding if speech or expressive conduct is protected speech or an 
unprotected “true threat.” Yet no approach, as currently administered 
by trial and appellate courts—including, in particular, the admission of 
evidence of “context” and the implementation of the special safeguards 
(pleading, etc.) mandated by Claiborne—conforms with the free speech 
guarantees of the First Amendment rightly glossed by the Supreme 
Court. Nor do they reflect an appreciation of the basic principles of 
federal criminal law, particularly the requirements of personal conduct, 
culpable state of mind, and the crucial distinction between an attempt 
and a completed offense. Nevertheless, the circuits’ work, especially that 
of the panel opinion in American Coalition, provides helpful ideas that 
can be used to formulate an approach that will produce results 
consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence and basic principles of 
federal criminal law. Apart from the special safeguards of Claiborne, 
three areas are of paramount importance: 
 
(1) whether speech or expressive conduct constitutes a “true 
threat” is initially and independently a question of law for a 
judge or is, in most cases, to be submitted to fact finder; 
that is, the relative roles of courts—trial and appellate—and 
fact finders; 
 
(2) what ought be the appropriate standard for determining 
whether speech or expressive conduct is a “true threat”; 
that is, ought it be objective, and if so, what ought to be 
the proper perspective (speaker, listener, or perspective  
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neutral), and ought it, if at all, include a subjective 
element (intent, knowledge, or recklessness); and 
 
(3) ought evidence of “context” be admitted for any reason, 
including to establish a standard of reasonableness in 
reference to the speech or expressive conduct, or 
showing the state of mind of the speaker, and if so, what 
kinds of evidence of “context” ought to be considered 
(including limitations). 
A. Roles of Court and Fact Finder 
While the question of the appropriate standard against which to 
measure whether speech or expressive conduct is a prohibited “true 
threat” is crucial, articulating a standard for “true threats” that will 
ensure breathing room for free speech and be consistent with the 
basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence is, by itself, not 
enough. Just as important as the standard is the role of a court or 
jury in implementing it.710 The best way to ensure that a speaker 
whose language strays close to the boundary of unprotected “true 
threats” receives the full protection of the First Amendment is to 
make the question an independent issue of law for the judge, as in 
the Second Circuit.711 The approach enforced by the other circuit 
courts of appeal, submitting all but the least disputable cases of 
protected speech or expressive conduct to the jury (the usual fact 
finder, even with an appropriate instruction), substantially 
undermines First Amendment freedoms.712 The reasons supporting 
judicial review in the first instance are compelling. Two stand out. 
1. Independent decision maker 
First, judges, who by background and experience are generally 
neutral and sensitized to First Amendment concerns, are better able 
to draw the line between protected and unprotected speech—
 
 710. JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 1 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970), included in 
his definition of “complete law” not only the rules themselves but also sanctions (“proximate 
subsidiary law”) and enforcement procedures (“remote subsidiary law”). His point is well 
taken, though expressed in typically infelicitous phraseology. See generally HILIARE Q. 
MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, JURISPRUDENCE 10–31 (3d ed. 1999) (reviewing the 
theories of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Austin (1790–1850)). 
 711. See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 712. See, e.g., United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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particularly in close cases. Professor Anderson points out the 
importance of judges as decisionmakers in the context of libel, 
another categorical exception to the First Amendment: 
The constitutional libel law reforms of the past quarter century 
have been effective in protecting speech primarily because they have 
transferred a great deal of power from juries to judges . . . . 
. . . . 
 Ironic as it may be, the shift of power away from juries is 
unquestionably necessary. Today it is the prejudice and profligacy 
of juries that threaten free speech, not the criminal law of libel . . . . 
On the whole, judges are more sympathetic to speech interests than 
jurors and more sensitive to subtle threats against those interests. 
We may as well be candid: constitutional protection of speech 
against the chilling effects of libel consists primarily of rules 
encouraging judges to decide factual matters that previously were 
left to juries.713 
 
 713. David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 539–
40 (1991); accord Frederick Schauer, The Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 
CAL. L. REV. 761, 765 (1986): 
What emerges from looking at the history is the conclusion that much of the history 
of free speech thinking in the eighteenth century is a history of promoting free 
speech by promoting the power of the jury. 
  Today, in sharp contrast, the tables have turned. We no longer view juries as 
primary or even important protectors of free speech. On the contrary, much of 
contemporary [F]irst [A]mendment doctrine, theory, and commentary is devoted to 
protecting speech from the jury. Where 250 years ago, more jury power was taken as 
coincident with greater freedom of speech, more jury power now is taken as just the 
opposite. 
On another occasion and in another place, we might be willing to essay our opinion on 
negligence as a basis of criminal as opposed to civil liability and on the central role of the jury 
in making a determination that it is present. Here, in the First Amendment context, only a few 
comments are required. Negligence is not one of a series of alternative “states of mind” used to 
assess culpability. “It is distinguished from purposeful, knowing or reckless action in that it 
does not involve a state of awareness.” MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 
cmt. 4 (1985) (emphasis added). Accordingly, it must be used with care in a system of 
responsibility that assesses moral or legal culpability. If negligence possesses any place, at least 
in the criminal law, it is surely limited to the handling of physically dangerous things, 
including, particularly vehicles or weapons. See LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 246 (careless 
driving, negligent conduct causing death or serious bodily harm or destruction of property). 
But that is not our task in these materials. Here, we consider what role, if any, negligence (an 
objective standard of responsibility) should play by itself (the current approach in the circuits) 
for “true threats,” or in connection with an additional requirement of a subjective state of 
mind (intent or purpose to make a “threat”) coupled with heightened judicial review at the 
trial and appellate level. We conclude that an objective standard is appropriate to test the 
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meaning of speech or expressive conduct, but more ought to be required to impose civil or 
criminal liability for a “true threat.” In addition, an intent or purpose to make a threat (but not 
necessarily to carry it out) ought to be an additional prerequisite for liability, and the process of 
assessing that culpability should be subject to heightened judicial review for First Amendment 
concerns at the trial and appellate levels. See supra Part VII.A and infra Part VII.B. Given the 
realities of our diverse and contentious society, especially in public discourse, but even if that 
private discourse that takes place face to face, the application of the traditional concepts of tort 
law to areas of speech or expressive conduct is bound to create the unacceptable danger of 
chilling freedom of speech or expressive conduct. The reasonable person standard for 
liability—apart from issues of speech or expressive conduct—serves admirably the essential 
function of imposing a socially determined and “acceptable [civil] limit on the freedom of an 
individual to act with relation to others.” Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 275 
(1971). But when speech or expressive conduct is at issue, negligence alone is insufficient, and 
other factors must be placed in the balance. Id. A community that imposes civil or criminal 
liability on all statements deemed “threats” solely by an objective standard (speaker based, 
listener based, or otherwise) to be decided by a jury where a material question of fact is raised 
(the usual situation, see supra note 137 (discussing standards of review)), would in our 
judgment be abandoning the basic protections of the First Amendment to the vicissitudes of 
juries that may be enflamed by the hot button questions of the day. Likewise, the 
preponderance of the evidence standard “plays an indispensable role in the control of private 
negligence.” Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 275. Here, however, we deal with speech or 
expressive conduct, where mere negligence ought not to play the determining role, wholly 
apart from the question of the burden of proof imposed. See infra note 768 (discussion of 
burdens of proof). That a case posing issues touching on speech or expressive conduct goes 
one way or another is not a matter largely of indifference. Freedom may be at stake, not mere 
money or property. Where the preponderance standard is employed, “we view it as no more 
serious in general for there to be an erroneous verdict in the defendant’s favor than for there to 
be an erroneous verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring). But the possibility of error itself “would create a strong impetus 
toward self-censorship, which the First Amendment cannot tolerate.” Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971) (Brennan, J.). Our easy acceptance of a negligence 
standard in civil law—and even in criminal law—too often inures us to the threats it poses 
where speech or expressive conduct is at stake. If substantial objections may be lodged against 
a negligence standard in criminal law at all, and they can, any doubt about the propriety of its 
use as the principal standard of liability where issues touching on speech or expressive conduct 
are raised ought to be resolved against its use as the primary method of drawing the line 
between freedom and tort or crime. 
The controversy over the use of a negligence standard for criminal responsibility is 
recognized but rejected in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND 
COMMENTARIES 243 n.31 (1985) (“No one has doubted that purpose, knowledge, and 
recklessness are properly the basis for criminal liability, but some critics have opposed any penal 
consequences for negligent behavior. . . . [N]egligence, as here defined, [in a manner 
considerably more rigorous than simple negligence as usually treated in the law of torts] should 
not be wholly rejected as a ground of culpability . . . .”). The issue is perceptively discussed in 
Peter Arenell, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Charter to Our Moral 
Culpability Judgments, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 59, 70–71 (1990). The case for its use, at least 
as the Model Penal Code limits it, is well put by the author of the Commentaries on the Model 
Penal Code in Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common Law and Mistakes of Fact: 
Recklessness, Negligence or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 539 (1988). The classic essay on 
negligence and the criminal law is H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 136–57 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 1055 
Second, the Supreme Court insists—albeit to date only on appellate 
review—that the First Amendment requires an independent 
examination of the facts that cannot be delegated to the finder of fact.714 
Currently, it independently examines records to ensure protection of 
First Amendment freedoms in cases involving other categorical 
exceptions, i.e., defamation,715 obscenity,716 and incitement.717 
Litigation involving alleged “true threats” warrants similar treatment. 
Moreover, holding that two different rules apply—one to 
appellate judges and another to trial judges—is anomalous and 
hardly defensible. That a defendant is not entitled to a judge’s 
uniquely qualified interpretation of his or her constitutional rights 
 
(1968) (discussing the views of Glanville Williams, Jerome Hall, and James William Cecil 
Turner, generally rejecting the role of negligence in assessing criminal responsibility, and 
pointedly questioning the often tacit assumption in discussions of negligence and criminal 
responsibility that the rest of the criminal law is wholly subjective while negligence is wholly 
objective). 
 714. Cf. Schauer, supra note 713, at 765–66 (footnotes omitted): 
The role of juries, involved in a wide range of cases with free speech implications, is 
a recurrent issue in areas such as defamation, speech by public employees, obscenity, 
invasion of privacy, and incitement. The common wisdom is that if juries were given 
more decisional power in these areas, either by increasing the range of issues they 
could consider or by granting juries greater immunity from appellate review, free 
speech would suffer a crippling blow. 
  The contemporary distrust of juries has numerous manifestations. A long line 
of cases . . . has increased the power and obligation of appellate courts to review 
juries’ factual determinations about activity that, depending on the jury’s verdict, 
may fall within the protection of the [F]irst [A]mendment. This obligation of 
independent appellate factual review extends not only to the determination of malice 
at issue in Bose, but also to the question . . . whether a given publication can be 
considered defamatory at all. Similarly, appellate courts routinely evaluate materials 
found obscene by juries against an independent standard of constitutionality. 
Likewise, questions of imminence and likelihood in the application of 
Brandenburg . . . are not left even to properly instructed juries, but . . . remain 
subject to judicial scrutiny. 
For further discussion of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), see infra notes 751–53 
and accompanying text and accompanying text (comparing Brandenburg and Watts v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)). 
 715. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984); Old 
Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 280–87 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g 
Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283–85 
(1964). 
 716. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974); Miller v. California, 413 
U.S. 15, 29–30 (1973); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (1964) (plurality opinion); 
Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (plurality opinion); Kingsley Int’l 
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 708 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 717. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107–09 (1973). 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
1056 
unless he or she first subjects himself or herself to a jury trial and a 
losing verdict cannot be argued with a straight face. The power of a 
trial judge to determine, initially and independently, the 
constitutional question of whether a speech or expressive conduct is 
protected under the First Amendment must be the same as—no 
more than and no less than—that of an appellate judge.718 
2. The gatekeeper function 
Leaving the decision of whether speech or expressive conduct is 
protected to a jury—however well-instructed—necessarily chills free 
speech, even under the most protective “true threat” standard. 
Particularly in civil threats litigation, the chill comes not principally 
from an opponent obtaining a judicial remedy against you but from 
 
 718. One author makes a similar argument in the related context of libel: 
  Having abandoned the fact of jury hegemony in libel, we should now abandon 
the fiction of it. Allowing judges to make these determinations early in the litigation 
avoids the expense and delay of unnecessary jury trials. These benefits are lost when 
judges make their decisive judgments only after a jury has made its own 
determination of the matter. We cling to the notion that the judge’s role, though 
“independent” of the jury, is still one of “review.” In some cases, judges convert the 
power of independent review into a power of preliminary disposition by fudging on 
the usual summary judgment standards. In most cases, however, to preserve an 
illusion of deference to the jury, judges exercise their power only at the end of 
litigation. Even though the eventual holding is that no liability can be 
constitutionally imposed whatever the jury may find, that judgment is not made 
until after jury trial. 
Anderson, supra note 713, at 540. Our argument here, too, draws on the insightful work of 
Professor Henry P. Monaghan. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985). As Professor Monaghan so aptly puts it: 
[I]n addition to the familiar judicial duty to “say what the law is,” the [F]irst 
[A]mendment imposes a special duty with respect to law application: both trial and 
appellate judges must examine the evidence, marshal (sic) the relevant adjudicative 
facts, and then apply the controlling [F]irst [A]mendment norms to those facts . . . . 
Id. at 229 (footnotes omitted). We could not say it better or more succinctly, though 
Monaghan here is expressing not his own view but his understanding of the law. 
Three distinct functions, not analytical distinctions that allocate roles between court and 
jury, are implicated: law declaration, fact identification, and law application. Id. at 234. We 
believe that in the First Amendment area, wise policy gives the trial and appellate courts wide 
power to play a crucial role in all three functions. But see id. at 276 (“The judicial duty of 
appellate courts . . . [is] limited to saying what the law is [where the review is of lower federal 
and state courts, though at least federal appellate courts possess a competence to independently 
review constitutionally decisive facts, but it] goes too far to convert this competence into a 
duty[, and] a persuasive case for treating the [F]irst [A]mendment differently [has not been 
made by Bose].”). For a comprehensive discussion of the law and the relative functions of court 
and jury in a wide range of areas, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 596–627 (4th ed. 1996). 
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the various aspects of the litigation itself—including time spent in 
discovery and trial, money spent on legal and related fees, and the 
loss of peace of mind from the prospect of an adverse legal 
judgment, however unlikely it might be. And of course, in criminal 
litigation, while discovery battles may be less protracted, the fear of 
an adverse criminal judgment is potentially more incapacitating that 
that of an adverse civil judgment. Money, while important, is, after 
all, only money; prison is something else entirely. Unless the 
standard for pleading is, for example, heightened in civil cases in the 
area of the First Amendment (as under current jurisprudence it 
should be719 but often in fact it is not) a complaint that will survive a 
 
 719. Justice Souter, in his concurrence in National Organization for Women, Inc. v. 
Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 264–65 (1994), for example, recognized a line of cases that would, if 
universally followed, soften the chilling effect by requiring heightened pleading for cases where 
the pendency of an action itself would threaten to chill First Amendment freedoms. See id. at 
264 (“[T]he First Amendment may limit the relief that can be granted against an organization 
otherwise engaging in protected expression.”). 
The seminal circuit court decision in this line, which Justice Souter regrettably failed to 
mention, is Franchise Realty v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Board of Culinary Workers, 
542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976). That decision states: 
[I]n any case, whether antitrust or something else, where a plaintiff seeks damages 
or injunctive relief, or both, for conduct which is prima facie protected by the First 
Amendment, the danger that the mere pendency of the action will chill the exercise 
of First Amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise 
be required. 
Id. at 1082–83. 
In fact, district courts in all but two circuits (the Fourth and the Fifth) ostensibly follow 
Franchise Realty. See Kottle v. N.W. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998); Or. 
Natural Res. Council v. Mohla, 944 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1991); Hydro-Tech. Corp. v. 
Sundstrand Corp., 673 F.2d 1171, 1177 n.8 (10th Cir. 1982); Mark Aero v. Trans World 
Airlines, 580 F.2d 288, 297 (8th Cir. 1978); Letica Corp. v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 790 F. 
Supp. 702, 705–06 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Cash Energy v. Weiner, 768 F. Supp. 892, 899 (D. 
Mass. 1991); Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 627 F. Supp. 957, 966 
(N.D. Ill. 1985), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds, Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Elec. 
Contractors Assoc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987); St. Joseph’s Hosp. v. Hosp. Auth. of Am., 
620 F. Supp. 814, 833 n.22 (S.D. Ga. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 795 F.2d 948 (1986); 
Spanish Int’l Communications Corp. v. Leibowitz, 608 F. Supp. 178, 182–84 (S.D. Fla. 
1985), aff’d, 778 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1985); Caplan v. Am. Baby, 582 F. Supp. 869, 871 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (copyright and trademark); WIXT Television v. Meredith Corp., 506 F. 
Supp. 1003, 1035 (N.D.N.Y. 1980); Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 497 F. Supp. 
323, 326–27 (D. Del. 1980); Gainesville v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 488 F. Supp. 1258, 
1266–67 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Fed. Prescription Serv. v. Am. Pharm. Assoc., 471 F. Supp. 126, 
129 (D.D.C. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 663 F.2d 253 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Realco Servs. v. 
Holt, 479 F. Supp. 880, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Miller & Son Paving v. Wrightstown Township 
Civic Ass’n, 443 F. Supp. 1268, 1273 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d on other grounds, 595 F.2d 1213 
(3d Cir. 1978); Bethlehem Plaza v. Campbell, 403 F. Supp. 966, 971 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
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motion to dismiss on the pleadings is not difficult to draft; nor do 
the standards for criminal pleading erect high burdens for 
prosecutors.720 Further, a well-pleaded complaint of a violation of a 
 
If all district and appellate courts followed this line of precedent faithfully and required 
more specific pleading in cases where a “true threat” is alleged—which they do not—a 
defendant could, in proper cases, get a suit dismissed before having to incur the substantial 
costs of civil discovery; it would not be necessary to proceed through to summary judgment, 
and, if unsuccessful, on a FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56 motion, to a trial on the 
merits. Because of the material question of fact standard of Rule 56, many complaints, in fact, 
might well go to trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986). Such an approach would give speakers confidence to 
exercise their constitutional rights as they would be secure in the knowledge that staying close 
to the boundary separating “true threats” from unprotected speech or expressive conduct 
would not subject them to unduly expensive legal proceedings when they stay on the correct 
side of the boundary. 
 720. As Justice Holmes once aptly observed: “We . . . need education in the 
obvious . . . .” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW AND OTHER WRITINGS 102 
(1913). We turn thus to the obvious, the effect of which is lost on too many of us. Civilly, a 
plaintiff need only file a pleading containing “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds 
upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, . . . (2) a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the 
pleader seeks.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). If a plaintiff meets these minimal requirements, then the 
pleadings are legally sufficient to proceed unless the defendant can show that the pleadings 
“fail[] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. at 12(b)(6). For the vast majority 
of defendants, this standard is possible to meet since the Supreme Court makes clear, “[A] 
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 
relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). Thus, provided a plaintiff sets out in 
the pleadings any recognized claim for relief, the defendant will be subjected to discovery at 
least. In addition, two recent Supreme Court decisions squarely reaffirm Conley. See 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 122 S. Ct. 992, 998 (2002) (The standard of Rule 8 is notice 
pleading; “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 
exceptions.”); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1993) (“[F]ederal courts and litigants must rely on summary 
judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than 
later.”). In short, efforts by lower courts to impose heightened pleading standards, despite the 
plain language of the federal rules, to certain claims for relief were scratched by Leatherman. 
Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 782 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, C.J.) 
(other rules not “authoritative after Leatherman”). Indeed, those efforts abound. See, e.g., 
Powers v. British Vita P.L.C., 57 F.3d 176, 192 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that facts giving rise 
to a “strong inference” of state of mind must be pled); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (deciding that a factual basis must be set out for RICO conspiracy); 
Beck v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that elements of 
RICO enterprise must be specifically pled), overruled sub nom. on other grounds, United States 
v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc). Whether the lower courts will 
reconsider these rules in light of Sorema and Leatherman is problematic. 
The general pleading standards in criminal prosecutions are also not particularly 
vigorous. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 7(c)(1) requires only “a plain, concise 
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civil threat statute gives plaintiffs the right to depose individuals and 
call for the production of documents.721 Civil discovery, necessary in 
most types of civil litigation,722 imposes crushing costs on those who 
might protest where their opponents are of a mind to take the 
controversy out of the public forum—where the First Amendment 
assigns it—and put it into the judicial forum, in an effort to enlist the 
powers of the courts on their side of the controversy. Because the 
 
and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Every 
element must, of course, be alleged. United States v. DeBrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1983). The 
standard assures the defendant can prepare his defense and, if necessary, plea double jeopardy 
in any subsequent proceeding. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763–64 (1962). In 
addition, the indictment must also negate any statutory exception so incorporated into the 
definition of the offense that it cannot be stated accurately if the exception is omitted. United 
States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (1 Wall.) 168, 173 (1872). Generally, an indictment is sufficient if it 
only charges the offense in the language of the statute, Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 
117 (1974), unless the face of the statute omits an essential element of the offense, where that 
element must be alleged. United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881). While the courts 
require, at least according to some decisions, more definite civil pleadings where First 
Amendment issues are at stake, similar requirements are not imposed on criminal pleadings. See 
United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283, 298–99 (3rd Cir. 1994) (holding that the Speech or 
Debate Clause does not require specificity of pleading, but it may require pretrial hearing to 
determine if particular allegations may be the subject of a trial), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1003 
(1995). One of our number, Blakey, argued that appeal. Some flexibility may be found under 
FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 7(f) that provides for a Bill of Particular; yet its 
filing lies within the discretion of the court. Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 82 
(1927). Its purpose “is to inform the defendant of the nature of the charges brought against 
him to adequately prepare this defense, to avoid surprise during the trial and to protect him 
against a second prosecution for an inadequately described offense.” United States v. 
Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 63–64 (3d Cir. 1971) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 936 
(1972). The government may be required to define “vague” terms in the indictment. See, e.g., 
United States, v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 80 (D.D.C. 1979) (“covertly”). But the 
jurisprudence under the Rule does not speak to the issues raised here. The cases under the 
Speech and Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1, may offer an analogy that could be 
used to terminate a prosecution that would be improper under the First Amendment. There, if 
necessary, a factual hearing may be held to supplement the allegations to determine if a trial 
may be held on the indictment. United States. v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213, 223 (4th Cir. 1973) 
(assessing the sufficiency of an indictment in light of the Speech or Debate Clause), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S. 823 (1973). The government may also be required to make an offer of proof 
to flesh out its allegations. See, e.g., United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 363 (1980) (text 
of offer of proof in Speech or Debate prosecution set out in appendix to the lower court 
opinion at 587 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1978)); see also United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. 609, 
616 (S.D.N.Y 1973) (government required to file an additional memorandum in connection 
with “critical factual issues” in prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1951). In brief, the Rules, as 
currently written or interpreted, do not offer much hope of stopping at the pleading stage a 
prosecution that would, if held, violate the First Amendment. Greater flexibility is needed to 
protect free speech or expressive conduct rights. 
 721. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(5). 
 722. See id. 
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pleading requirements to survive a motion to dismiss are so minimal, 
individual protesters must bear the enormous costs of even a 
successful defense of threat litigation.723 
In criminal cases, “precision of regulation,” as required by the 
First Amendment, demands—in light of Claiborne—more than 
special pleading rules. Claiborne squarely points to appropriate 
limitations on arguments,724 evidence,725 instructions,726 etc., in an 
effort to discriminate between individual and group conduct and 
results brought about by protected conduct and unprotected 
conduct. Accordingly, the circuit and district courts must also begin 
to implement—with due vigilance—these essential aspects of the 
necessary procedural protections required by the interests protected 
by the First Amendment. Getting the standard right is necessary, but 
it is not sufficient in a free society that rightly values more than paper 
rights. Regrettably, these aspects of Claiborne are largely ignored—
wittingly or unwittingly.727 
B. The Appropriate Standard 
When they consider the issue of what standard to employ for 
“true threats,” the circuit courts are uniform in adopting some 
 
 723. In the related area of libel, one commentator argues similarly: 
  When the determination depends upon full development of facts, there can be 
no preliminary disposition no matter who makes the decision. Many cases, though, 
are ultimately disposed of on the basis of judicial analysis of the publication itself. 
Cases are litigated for years, only to have an appellate court eventually decide that 
the statement itself is constitutionally incapable of supporting a libel judgment. 
Anderson, supra note 713, at 541 (footnotes omitted). 
 724. See supra note 416 (discussing the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Scheidler, imposing 
liability on individuals, based on group conduct, without compliance with the teaching of 
Claiborne). 
 725. Id. 
 726. Id. 
 727. Here, too, our analysis draws on Professor Monaghan’s impressive work, though 
this time we find ourselves in agreement not only with his analysis but with his conclusions. 
Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment Due Process, 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 519 (1970): 
If the Constitution requires elaborate procedural safeguards in the obscenity area, a 
fortiori it should require equivalent procedural protection when the speech 
involved—for example, political speech—implicates more central [F]irst 
[A]mendment concerns. Like the substantive rules themselves, insensitive 
procedures can “chill” the right of free expression. . . . The government . . . may 
regulate certain types of activity, but it must make sure, via proper procedural 
safeguards, that protected speech is not the loser. 
Id. at 519–20 (footnotes omitted). 
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variation of an objective standard, that is, some form of 
“negligence.” Needless to say, they do not agree on what that 
objective standard should be. Most espouse a general reasonableness 
standard while the Second Circuit requires a heightened showing of 
a threat, albeit still based on an objective standard. Nor do the 
circuits agree from which viewpoint the speech or expressive conduct 
should be analyzed—that of the speaker, of the hearer, or of a 
“reasonable person.” Ultimately we see, as did the en banc decision 
in American Coalition, little in the opinions of the various courts by 
way of difference in results brought about by the various 
formulations.728 In short, none of the current standards achieves that 
high level of protection for free speech demanded by Supreme Court 
jurisprudence or basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence. A 
different approach is required. 
First, the interests behind a prohibition of “true threats” must be 
carefully identified. In R.A.V., the Supreme Court identified the 
three crucial interests: “protecting individuals [1] from the fear of 
violence, [2] from the disruption that fear engenders, and [3] from 
the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”729 To begin, a 
distinction must be drawn between these interests and formulation. 
Each interest at issue need not be represented in the formulation if 
other bodies of law meet that interest and, in particular, if 
representing the interest in the formulation would be accompanied 
by adverse side effects. Indeed, that the standard for “true threats” 
should reflect in its formulation the possibility that the threatened 
violence will occur is problematic. 
A multitude of federal and state criminal statutes and forms of 
civil liability already protect independently against violence itself. 
One example, but certainly not the least important, is the law of 
homicide, that is, “murder” and “wrongful death.”730 Obviously, its 
prosecution criminally and civilly vindicates the social interest in the 
sanctity of life. More is not required. To the degree that the 
 
 728. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 729. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992); accord Am. Coalition, 290 
F.3d at 1076 (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377). 
 730. Famously, after his acquittal for the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson, his wife, and 
Ronald Lyle Goldman, a waiter who was bringing her glasses to her home, O.J. Simpson was 
successfully sued for wrongful death. See Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492 (Ct. App. 
2001). For further discussion of wrongful death, see generally WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER & 
PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 127, at 945–61 (5th ed. 1984). 
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jurisprudence of “true threats” is focused not only on fear or 
disruption but also on the prevention of threatened conduct that 
might endanger life (or property or other protected interests), its 
focus is mistakenly shifted from its role as a complete offense to that 
of an inchoate offense.731 To be sure, if offenders telegraph future 
violence, the law ought to read the message, intervene, and prevent 
it. Barn doors ought to be locked before horses are stolen; guards, 
too, may be appropriately posted at barn doors before the thief 
arrives. 
Nevertheless, fundamental principles of criminal law are 
implicated by the shift. Inchoate offenses rightly require a 
heightened showing of state of mind as their prohibited conduct 
element moves further away from conduct that the law ultimately 
seeks to prevent. Under its traditional formulation, murder, for 
example, is a “general intent” (“knowledge”) offense, but attempted 
murder is a “specific intent”(“intent to murder”) offense.732 In brief, 
the principal legal interest behind a prohibition of threat of violence 
is not the violence itself but rather the fear it generates or the need 
to protect a person from the disruption that taking a threat seriously 
generates; the prohibition only secondarily serves to prevent the 
violence itself. Other bodies of law serve well enough to protect from 
attempted violence, violence itself, conspiracy, or solicitation to 
 
 731. See supra text accompanying note 598 (discussing the difference between a 
completed offense and an inchoate offense). 
 732. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 540 (citations omitted; emphasis added), illustrates the 
general law: 
  Some crimes, such as murder, are defined in terms of acts causing a particular 
result plus some mental state which need not be an intent to bring about the result. 
Thus, if A, B, C, and D have each taken the life of another, A acting with intent to 
kill, B with intent to do serious bodily injury, C with reckless disregard of human 
life, and D in the course of a dangerous felony, all three are guilty of murder 
because the crime of murder is defined in such a way that any one of these mental 
states will suffice. However, if the victims do not die, then only A is guilty of 
attempted murder; on a charge of attempted murder it is not sufficient to show that 
the defendant intended to serious bodily harm, that he actual is reckless disregard 
for human life or that he was committing a dangerous felony. Again, this is because 
intent is needed for the crime of attempt, so that attempted murder requires an intent 
to bring about that result described by the crime of murder (i.e., the death of another). 
Needless to say, we are dissatisfied, as is the teaching profession and the Supreme Court but 
not all of the courts of appeal, with the traditional distinction between “general intent” and 
“specific intent” crimes. See supra note 513 (discussing the troublesome distinction between 
“general intent” and “specific intent”). 
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commit violence.733 Accordingly, if we look at a “true threat” as if it 
were an attempt offense, the appropriate state of mind would be 
“intent to accomplish the threatened result.” But courts now are in 
universal agreement that the defendant need not intend to carry out 
the threat, and we have no quarrel with these holdings. Indeed, we 
agree that they make eminently good sense. The legal mistake is to 
conclude—in the same breath—that the defendant need not have 
any state of mind at all, much less the preferred result, requiring an 
“intent to threaten.” We now turn to that preferred result. 
While a pure negligence standard (objective evaluation of the 
speech whether formulated as speaker-based, hearer-based, or 
neutral) may well advance the basic policies behind proscribing “true 
threats,” it does not adequately protect the policies mandated by the 
First Amendment nor is it consistent with the basic principles of 
federal criminal law requiring individual conduct and a culpable state 
of mind. First, as we repeatedly emphasize in these materials, free 
speech rights are personal.734 An individual’s right to free speech 
ought not be defined in the first instance by how it might affect 
others. In particular, it ought not be allowed to ebb and flow with 
the special sensitivities of listeners.735 Indeed, affecting other persons 
is precisely why people in a free society engage in speech or 
expressive conduct. Change is, in short, its objective. 
The First Amendment, too, protects speech and expressive 
conduct precisely because the doors to change must always be kept 
unlocked in a free society. Locking them only pents up social, 
economic, and political unrest; inevitably, as history teaches, and as 
we can see throughout the world today, it produces problems far 
more serious than the toleration of the expression of differences in an 
increasingly pluralistic society. Ironically, our increasingly diverse 
society is also one that is ever more unified economically and 
through mass communication. Unfortunately, the present tests (as 
adopted and administered by the circuit courts) necessarily lead to 
self-censorship by speakers or actors, who are forced to guess where 
the line between protected and unprotected speech or expressive 
conduct will be drawn. The application of the tests often takes place 
only after the litigation finds its way to the appellate level, well after 
 
 733. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (conspiracy). 
 734. See supra note 133 (discussing the personal character of constitutional rights). 
 735. See supra note 133. 
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the speakers spoke and the actors acted. If non-violent protestors are 
protected by the First Amendment—and they are—but lose that 
protection when they utter a “true threat,” then when protestors 
raise issues that are sufficiently contentious to bring into the struggle 
other violent individuals for whom they are not legally responsible, 
non-violent protestors will decide to exercise less than the full 
measure of their constitutional freedoms. Indeed, protestors who 
should be protected by the First Amendment736 will be inevitably and 
justifiably afraid of crossing the murky line between vociferous 
protest into the area of “true threat.” 
Ineluctably, given the current state of the law, protestors will 
necessarily lack the ability to gauge accurately the extent to which a 
“context” created by others will be taken into account—well after 
the fact—by a court or a jury in evaluating their speech or expressive 
conduct.737 When tested against the possibility of the imposition of a 
criminal sanction, this fear remains real, though the sound exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion may well limit the danger, assuming that 
those in charge of the administration of the law are not pursuing an 
agenda of their own.738 Nevertheless, where political, social, 
economic, or other opponents are given the powerful weapon of civil 
 
 736. That proposition is beyond argument. Planned Parenthood of the 
Columbia/Willamette Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 
2001); Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 700 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 737. As the ACLU Foundation recognized: 
  Whenever First Amendment rights are at stake, clear and understandable rules 
are often the only safeguard against the chilling effect of self-censorship that follows 
from imprecise and uncertain applications of ambiguous standards. If the line 
between protected and unprotected speech is unclear, a speaker is likely to refrain 
from engaging in protected speech in order to avoid the potentially serious adverse 
consequences of making a wrong decision. Such adverse consequences may include 
not only criminal punishment but also civil damage awards, including punitive 
damages. 
Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc. at 2–3, Am. Coalition, 244 F.3d 
1001. 
 738. See United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In Lynch, Bishop 
George Lynch and Franciscan friar Christopher Moscinski were prosecuted for criminal 
contempt of an anti-demonstration order issued under FACE by District Court Judge John 
Sprizzo. Judge Sprizzo found them “not guilty.” Despite the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, the government appealed; it lost. Undaunted, the government sought a 
rehearing en banc but lost again. The story of this sad chapter in prosecutorial abuse in the 
appeals process is ably told in Christopher J. Bellotti, The Double Jeopardy Category Is . . . 
Abortion Protest: United States v. Lynch, the United States’ Appeal from a Criminal Acquittal 
in the Southern District of New York, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 235 (2001). One of our number, 
Blakey, argued the appeal. 
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litigation to curtail the free speech or expressive conduct of the 
opposition, a weapon not limited by prosecutorial discretion, that 
fear is fully justified, and First Amendment freedoms are not only 
unjustifiably curtailed but also the fundamental principles of the 
criminal law are impermissibly distorted.739 
The appropriate balance of all interests is only fairly struck by the 
adoption of a hybrid, subjective/objective standard. Justice Marshall 
once advanced a compelling argument in favor of such a standard. 
We wholeheartedly agree with it. In his concurring opinion in Rogers 
v. United States,740 a prosecution for threatening the President under 
18 U.S.C. § 871, Marshall observed, “The District Court and the 
Court of Appeals adopted what has been termed the ‘objective’ 
construction of the statute. . . . [T]his Court has expressed ‘grave 
doubts’ as to its correctness . . . .”741 
He then pointedly commented on the objective standard: 
I believe that the statute should be construed to proscribe all 
threats that the speaker intends to be interpreted as expressions of 
an intent to kill or injure the President. This construction requires 
proof that the defendant intended to make a threatening statement, 
and that the statement he made was in fact threatening in nature. 
Under the objective construction by contrast, the defendant is 
subject to prosecution for any statement that might reasonably be 
interpreted as a threat, regardless of the speaker’s intention. In 
essence, the objective interpretation embodies a negligence 
standard, charging the defendant with responsibility for the effect 
of his statements on his listeners. . . . [W]e should be particularly 
wary of adopting such a standard for a statute that regulates pure 
speech.742 
He continued: 
If [the statute] has any deterrent effect, that effect is likely to work 
only as to statements intended to convey a threat. Statements 
 
 739. Both RICO and FACE, for example, provide for both criminal and civil sanctions 
for certain kinds of threats; they may, therefore, be used by public prosecutors and private 
plaintiffs, as the American Coalition litigation well illustrates. 
 740. 422 U.S. 35 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 741. Id. at 43 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)). The lower 
courts did not respond appropriately to the Supreme Court’s expression of concern in Watts 
with the Distrist of Columbia’s state of mind requirement. See supra note 81 (discussing the 
inadequate response of the lower courts to the Supreme Court’s comment in Watts). 
 742. Id. at 47 (citation omitted). 
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deemed threatening in nature only upon “objective” consideration 
will be deterred only if persons criticizing the President are careful 
to give a wide berth to any comment that might be construed as 
threatening in nature. And that degree of deterrence would have 
substantial costs in discouraging the “uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open” debate that the First Amendment is intended to 
protect.743 
Finally, he concluded: 
I would therefore interpret [the statute] to require proof that the 
speaker intended his statement to be taken as a threat, even if he had 
no intention of actually carrying it out. The proof of intention 
would, of course, almost certainly turn on the circumstances under 
which the statement was made . . . . But to permit the jury to 
convict on no more than a showing that a reasonably prudent man 
would expect his hearers to take his threat seriously is to impose an 
unduly stringent standard in this sensitive area.744 
We cannot say it better. We would also emphasize that basic 
principles of federal criminal law point toward Justice Marshall’s 
suggestion, as they do toward our proposal. Accordingly, our hybrid 
standard incorporates two elements: (1) that the speaker subjectively 
intended to threaten an unlawful result, and (2) that the speech or 
expressive conduct was objectively threatening in character. These 
two elements square nicely with the two main reasons for proscribing 
“true threats” (fear; disruption) with the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment jurisprudence (state of mind before sanctions applied to 
restrict free speech; personal character of free speech rights) and with 
basic principles of federal criminal law (personal conduct; appropriate 
state of mind; the distinction between inchoate and completed 
offenses). 
1. The subjective element 
The first element—whether the speaker intended his 
communication be taken as a threat—is, given the circuits’ uniform 
adoption of a purely objective standard and their consistent rejection 
of a requirement of a subjective state of mind, the more controversial 
aspect of our proposal (as well as Justice Marshall’s). Nevertheless, it 
 
 743. Id. at 47–48 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 744. Id. at 48 (emphasis added). 
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should be adopted if the law is to remain faithful to fundamental 
First Amendment principles and the demands of the federal criminal 
law. First, a listener is certainly likely to be placed in legitimate fear 
by speech or expressive conduct when a speaker or actor actually 
intends that his communication be taken as a “threat.” Similarly, the 
effectiveness of threat-proscribing statutes is likely to be highest 
when applied to speech and expressive conduct that the speaker 
intends to be threatening. Accordingly, a subjective intent, or 
purpose, requirement serves to protect listeners from either fear or 
disruption745 while at the same time permitting a maximum amount 
of free speech—speech that will be, in fact, largely free from the self-
censorship that speakers would have to engage in to avoid 
prosecution if the standard were wholly objective. 
Second, the Supreme Court already imposes a state of mind 
requirement in free speech cases when the issue is squarely presented 
to it. We read those decisions to prohibit, as a matter of current law, 
a purely objective standard for “true threats,” though we readily 
concede that we are ahead of the curve on our reading of the cases. 
Strict liability is, for example, unconstitutional under well-established 
 
 745. An intent standard is actually more protective of the interests of victims of “true 
threats” since it increases the extent to which damages may be recovered for more remote 
consequences and tends to cut off arguments about supervening causes. The Supreme Court in 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 926 (1982), rested its decision on a failure 
to meet the incitement to violence standard, but it noted that “[u]nquestionably, these 
individuals [that engaged in violence or threats of violence] may be held responsible for the 
injuries that they caused.” The Court in Claiborne did not elaborate on its understanding of 
“cause.” 
On the role of “intent” in assessing “cause,” see CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES §§ 72–76 (1935) (If there is intentional wrongdoing, 
the range of responsibility for remote and less foreseeable consequences widens and even if a 
new agency plays a principal role in bringing about the result, the chain of causation is not 
broken if the wrongdoer could have appreciated that his conduct would create a substantial 
risk of the new agency’s action.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979) 
(intentionally causing injury); id. § 425 (If the consequences are intended, liability may be 
proper even if, where negligent, no liability would obtain.); and id. § 435B (“[R]esponsibility 
for harmful consequences should be carried further in the case of one who does an 
intentionally wrongful act than in the case of one who is merely negligent . . . .”). 
On the substantial limitation posed by the doctrine of supervening cause, see Exxon Co. 
v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 836–42 (1996) (The common law doctrine of proximate cause in 
admiralty includes the doctrine of superseding cause as a necessary limit on liability; ship owner 
whose own extraordinary negligence led to the grounding of a ship that broke its moorings 
that were negligently attached not permitted to recover from the dock company based on the 
dock company’s negligence.). 
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precedent in the obscenity area.746 Surely, “obscenity” is not 
deserving of more protection than “speech or expressive conduct” 
generally? Nor may libel, where a public figure is alleged to be 
defamed, rest on less than a showing of “malice.”747 Indeed, the 
analogy is compelling between the equally well-established principles 
of the First Amendment applicable to public discourse, truth, and 
falsehood and the general area of speech and expressive conduct.748 
Here, too, Brandenburg v. Ohio,749 on state of mind, is crucial.750 
 
 746. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73 n.3 (1994). 
 747. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (requiring actual malice in suits 
for defamation of public officials). 
 748. Judge Berzon, in Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. 
Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), aptly observes: 
  Like “true threats,” false, defamatory speech can severely disrupt peoples’ lives, 
both by affecting them emotionally (as does apprehension of danger) and by 
impairing their social ties, their professional activities, and their ability to earn a 
living (as does the perceived need to protect oneself from physical harm). 
  The Supreme Court since the 1960’s has developed . . . doctrinal protections 
within defamation law that minimize self-censorship of truthful speech. Those 
protections are based upon realistic assessment of the vagaries of litigation and the 
fear of crippling damages liability. 
 749. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 750. “True threats” and “incitement to violence” are distinct theories, and we do not 
mean to equate the two theories, as does Professor Gey who argues that the Supreme Court’s 
“incitement to violence” jurisprudence in Brandenberg should govern “true threats.” See Gey, 
supra note 42, at 591 (arguing that “it is not difficult to adapt Brandenburg principles to guide 
courts in separating intimidating political speech from true threats”). Under current Supreme 
Court “incitement to violence jurisprudence,” speech may be proscribed if: (1) the speaker 
subjectively intends incitement; (2) in context, the words spoken are likely to produce 
imminent, lawless action; and (3) the speaker’s words objectively encourage, urge, and provoke 
imminent action. See also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973). The third prong of this test 
comes, in fact, not from Brandenburg but from Hess. 
Gey’s suggestion is not without plausibility as “true threats,” like “incitement to 
violence,” are a categorical exception to protected speech, as is “obscenity.” Unfortunately for 
Gey (as for our suggestions), the courts uniformly reject it. See, e.g., United States v. 
Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 922 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The Brandenburg test applies to laws that 
forbid inciting someone to use violence against a third party. It does not apply to statutes . . . 
that prohibit someone from directly threatening another person.”); McCalden v. Cal. Library 
Ass’n, 955 F.2d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that Brandenburg and Claiborne 
involved advocacy at public speeches and not privately communicated threats, which are not 
protected); United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1983) (“While Howell’s 
statements may have been unlikely to incite or produce imminent lawless action, the 
Brandenburg test applies by its terms to advocacy, not to threats such as those made by 
Howell. The line between the two forms of speech may be difficult to draw in some instances, 
but this is not one of them.”); see also United States v. Brock, 863 F. Supp. 851, 857 n.7 (E.D. 
Wis. 1994) (finding counsel’s argument that “because th[e] proscription [at issue] is not 
limited to the traditional ‘fighting words’ and ‘incitement to imminent lawless action’ 
categories, it is unconstitutional” not “persuasive” because “[i]t is well-settled that, 
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Like Watts, Brandenburg was decided in 1969 and was a per curiam 
decision. Like Watts, too, it dealt with a categorical exception: 
“incitement to violence.” Accordingly, Brandenburg and Watts each 
share a common constitutional heritage, since each springs from 
Holmes’s “clear and present danger” test.751 Significantly, for our 
analysis, the Court in Brandenburg adopted a highly protective hybrid 
standard for “incitement,” similar to that which Justice Marshall and we 
propose for “true threats.”752 The Court explained that “the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a 
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”753 
Given the common history of “incitement” and “true threats” 
(each is a categorical exception and each must be carefully applied to 
 
notwithstanding the ‘fighting words’ and subversive advocacy doctrines, the First Amendment 
does not prohibit Congress from outlawing threats”). 
In fact, the three elements of the Court’s “incitement to violence” jurisprudence look 
like the reasons for proscribing threats outlined in R.A.V. Nevertheless, the third element—
that the words used by the speaker objectively encourage, urge, and provoke imminent 
action—is more concerned with preventing violence than with preventing the bad results of 
the speech itself, that is, fear and disruption. Other statutes directly deal with the violence 
itself; threat statutes serve their most important purpose by focusing on fear and disruption. See 
generally United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1357 (7th Cir. 1985) (construing 18 
U.S.C. § 1513 (1994), and observing that “[w]hen making a threat one hopes not to have to 
carry it out; one hopes that the threat itself will be efficacious. Most threats, indeed, are bluffs. 
But if the bluff succeeds in intimidating the threatened person, or at least . . . is intended to 
succeed, it ought to be punished . . . . And a bluff has no more to do with the marketplace of 
ideas than a serious threat”). Thus, while incitement jurisprudence is helpful in giving content 
to a “true threats” standard, simply uprooting it, modifying it slightly to address “threats,” 
rather than “incitement,” and applying it in the true threats context is inappropriate. These 
two categories are different because the interests they protect are different. They also implicate 
different principles of criminal jurisprudence and First Amendment freedoms. Maintaining 
separation will, therefore, better protect these different interests. 
 751. See 4 ROTUNDA, TREATISE, supra note 133, at 309. 
 752. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 754 (1975) (arguing that 
Brandenburg combines the most protective elements of Learned Hand’s First Amendment 
vision, which placed emphasis on what the speaker actually said rather than on the purported 
impact of those words on the audience in order to prevent the government from suppressing 
speech based on a fear of future harm, “with the most useful elements of the clear and present 
danger heritage,” which emphasized the importance of proving harm so imminent that it 
might occur before there is an opportunity for full discussion to prevent the government from 
suppressing speech to which the opportunity for more speech would constitute adequate 
protection). 
 753. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 
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avoid exposing speakers and actors to constitutionally adverse 
consequences, or equally as bad, self-censorship and the chilling of 
otherwise protected speech or expressive conduct), the Brandenburg 
test offers strong support for—if it does not demand—the adoption 
of Marshall’s and our proposed approach that requires a subjective 
element (intent) in the analysis of “true threats.”754 If speech or 
expressive conduct about controversial and emotionally charged 
issues can become a “true threat” and lose its First Amendment 
protection—without specific proof of an intent to threaten—the line 
between protected and unprotected speech will be far less certain755 
than what the First Amendment requires if speech is to be 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”756 
Nor may basic principles of the federal criminal law be ignored 
here. We develop those principles at length in these materials.757 In 
summary, when drafting legislation, Congress acts with a common-
law background in mind. That the text of a statute is silent on the 
issue of state of mind, as are most threat statutes, does not mean that 
they are strict liability statutes. The Supreme Court applies a fairly 
well-developed body of law to govern the interpretation of criminal 
statutes on state of mind. Strict liability requires more than silence to 
warrant its imposition. The Court requires a minimum showing of 
“knowledge”; neither “negligence” nor “recklessness” is, apparently, 
in the Court’s lexicon.758 Where appropriate, as here, since the 
 
 754. As Marshall himself emphasized, of course, the operative state of mind here is not 
that the speaker intends to carry out his threat. If it were, that would go to preventing the 
actual violence, which is, as we argue supra note 598, not the principal function of threat 
statutes. Prevention of violence is a side effect of the enforcement of threat statutes. If the side 
effect is given principal attention, it will either distort this law of threats or federal criminal law. 
Rather, the subjective portion of our hybrid test merely requires that a speaker subjectively 
intended to threaten his victim, not that he actually intended to carry out the threat, which 
would be required if a threat was viewed as an inchoate offense. See supra note 732 (analysis of 
attempted murder). 
 755. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (“The separation of legitimate 
from illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools . . . .”). 
 756. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 757. See supra Part VI. 
 758. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1951), requires that in common law-type 
statutes a “scienter” must be read into a statute otherwise silent on the issue of state of mind. 
The Court did not specify which state of mind (intent or purpose, knowledge, etc.) should be 
read into which elements. See supra note 644 (detailed discussion of Morissette). United States 
v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980), identifies these two issues and holds that “knowledge” should 
be read into conduct, but it left open whether to read “recklessness or negligence” into 
surrounding circumstances. See supra note 644 ¶15 (discussing Morissette’s ambiguities and 
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defendant’s state of mind relates to the result he seeks to achieve 
(fear or disruption), not merely to surrounding circumstances, 
“intent or purpose” should be the proper state of mind to imply.759 
We read this jurisprudence not to prohibit the implication of 
“negligence or recklessness,” but to require a special justification at 
the minimum for “negligence,” since “negligence” is not a state of 
mind, but an imputed condition.760 That special showing before 
negligence is implied is not made anywhere in the “true threat” area 
of which we are aware. We believe it cannot be made in light of First 
Amendment considerations.761 
Finally, a speaker must intend to threaten unlawful conduct. The 
Supreme Court squarely holds that “[t]o the extent that [a] court’s 
judgment [sanctioning “speech”] rests on the ground that . . . 
citizens were ‘intimidated’ by ‘threats’ of ‘social ostracism, 
vilification, and traduction,’ it is flatly inconsistent with the First 
Amendment.”762 Justice Holmes put it aptly: 
[T]he word “threats” often is used as if, when it appeared that 
threats had been made, it appeared that unlawful conduct had 
begun. But it depends on what you threaten. As a general rule, 
even if subject to some exceptions, what you may do in a certain 
event you may threaten to do—that is, give warning of your 
intention . . . .763 
 
 
Bailey). Since Bailey, the Court shows no willingness to read either “recklessness or 
negligence” into federal criminal statutes. Indeed, it poses the issue as if the choice were 
between “knowledge and strict liability,” and then chooses “knowledge.” See, e.g., Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605–19 (1994) (holding that the National Firearms Act requires 
“knowledge” on the automatic character of a firearm; “[T]he usual presumption that a 
defendant must know the facts that make his conduct illegal should apply” (citing Morissette, 
342 U.S. 246, and its progeny)). 
 759. Compare Posters ‘N’ Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 522–25 (1994) 
(Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act requires “knowledge” of character of 
paraphernalia shipped; general rule is that “knowledge “ not “intent or purpose” is implied; 
“knowledge” of the applicability of the statute to the material not required). 
 760. Recklessness, on the other hand, is a subjective state of mind. We readily concede 
that we are ahead of the curve on our interpretation of these cases. 
 761. See supra note 713 (discussing “negligence” as a proper or improper culpability 
standard). 
 762. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 921 (1982); see Planned 
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 
1058, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the applicability of Claiborne). 
 763. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896). 
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Thus, a mere showing that a speaker intended to put a hearer in 
“fear” is flatly insufficient to show the existence of a “true threat.” A 
“warning” of what may happen when the speaker is not in control of 
the course of events is not a “threat.” It is a warning, a statement of 
fact or probable fact. In short, the speaker must intend to put the 
hearer in “fear” of unlawful conduct by the speaker or others for 
whom the speaker is legally responsible. For example, a “threat” to 
sue another or to enforce a contract may cause “fear,” but it is not a 
“threat” that may be characterized as “extortion.”764 To be sure, as 
some courts recognize in adopting an objective standard, prosecutors 
or plaintiffs may often find it difficult to show the required subjective 
state of mind.765 But in a society where freedom of speech is a core 
value, the price to pay is small; errors should always be on the side of 
 
 764. See, e.g., Union Nat’l Bank v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 860 F.2d 847, 856–57 
(8th Cir. 1988) (good faith exercise of contract claims is not extortion); First Pac. Bancorp, 
Inc. v. Bro, 847 F.2d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 1988) (threat of suit not extortion); I.S. Joseph Co. v. 
Lauritzen, 751 F.2d 265, 267 (8th Cir. 1984) (mere threat to sue, even groundlessly, is not 
extortion); Iden v. Adrian Buckhannon Bank, 661 F. Supp. 234, 237–39 (N.D. W. Va. 1987) 
(the process through which a bank loan in danger of default was renegotiated was not 
extortion); see also Brokerage Concepts, Inc. v. U.S. Health Care, Inc., 140 F.3d 494, 522–53 
(3d Cir. 1998) (“wrongful” within Hobbs Act, 180 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994), absent force, is a 
word of limitation that excludes legitimate business practices). But see Battlefield Builder, Inc. 
v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 765. Compare United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1997) (defending the 
use of a purely objective standard for true threats, arguing that “[t]his approach also protects 
listeners from statements that are reasonably interpreted as threats, even if the speaker lacks the 
subjective, specific intent to threaten, or, as would be more common, the government is 
unable to prove such specific intent which, by its nature, is difficult to demonstrate”), with 
United States v. Merkt, 764 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1985) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) 
(1994), a criminal statute that prohibits transporting an alien who is in the United States in 
violation of law and finding that the statute required that the defendant specifically intend to 
further the alien’s violation). In Merkt, the Fifth Circuit reasoned: 
  The government . . . asserts, in essence, that it is difficult to establish that a 
defendant acted with the specific intent necessary to establish a violation of this 
section. The statute, however, punishes only an intentional act. No matter how 
difficult it may be to establish the defendant’s state of mind, the government must 
prove this portion of its case, like every other element of the alleged crime, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The government’s problems of proof do not warrant an 
instruction that removes one of the essential elements of the offense from the jury’s 
consideration. 
  Given that the jury must ultimately determine [the defendant’s] intent, it 
should be instructed to consider all of the evidence it finds credible about her 
intentions, direct as well as circumstantial . . . . 
Id. at 272. But see supra note 644 ¶ 14 (discussing Supreme Court’s rejection, in Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1951), of difficulty of proof as rationale for setting proper state 
of mind). 
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free speech or expressive conduct. In criminal cases, too, the burden 
of proof rightly rests on the prosecution to prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt.766 That commitment of basic due process 
expresses our society’s value of individual liberty.767 Civil cases are 
different, but the substantive standard, if not the burden of proof, is 
the same.768 In addition, proof of individual responsibility—shown 
 
 766. See infra note 70568 (discussing shifting or allocating burdens of proof). 
 767. As Justice Brennan observed in In re Winship: 
The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our 
criminal procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution 
has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he 
may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be 
stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and 
freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime 
when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt. As we said in Speiser v. Randall: 
“There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, 
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest 
of transcending value–as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is 
reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . 
persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless 
the Government has borne the burden of . . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.” 
To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable, for it “impresses on the 
trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in 
issue.” 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970) (citations omitted). 
 768. ¶1. See supra note 314 (discussion of Claiborne’s requirement of “clear proof”).  
¶2. We believe that the Court already requires clear and convincing proof to establish a 
claim for relief that overcomes a free speech justification that draws the line between free 
speech or expressive conduct and true threat. See supra note 314 (analysis of procedural and 
evidentiary aspects of Claiborne). We readily concede that our reading of Claiborne is ahead of 
the curve. At the same time, our reading of Claiborne is not rejected by any court; in brief, it is 
an aspect of the decision that is today unrecognized. Accordingly, we consider the issue here as 
if the matter were open. 
¶3. “‘Proof’ is an ambiguous word.” MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 783 (Edward Cleary 
ed., 1972). It can mean “evidence” (testimony, documents, etc.) or that which must be proven 
(an element of a claim for relief). Id. “‘[B]urden of proof’ shares this ambivalence.” Id. 
Classically, two meanings of burden of proof are identified: coming forward with evidence 
(introducing evidence in a proceeding), and persuasion (having the risk of loss on a failure of 
proof on an issue). Id. (citing Powers v. Russell, 30 Mass. (13 Pick) 69, 76 (1832) (Shaw, 
C.J.)). Generally, three standards for burden of persuasion are recognized, ranging from the 
preponderance of the evidence standard employed in most civil cases to the clear and 
convincing standard (however phrased) reserved to protect particularly important interests, to 
the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal prosecutions. 
California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros. Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90 (1981) (per 
curiam) (declining to impose “beyond a reasonable doubt” on an action for a public nuisance 
against theaters showing obscene motion pictures). The function of a standard for the burden 
of persuasion is to instruct the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence the law 
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mandates he or she must possess in the correctness of a factual conclusion; it serves to allocate 
the risk of error between litigants and to indicate the relative importance the law attaches to 
the fact finder=s ultimate decision. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (citing In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. at 370, 423 (Harlan, J. concurring)). We use burden of proof in both 
senses. We believe that the defendant in litigation involving drawing the line between 
protected speech or expressive conduct and true threat ought to come forward with evidence 
that puts in issue a free speech justification but that once the matter is in issue, the plaintiff 
ought to persuade the fact finder by clear and convincing evidence that the free speech 
justification does not apply; he or she must, in short, carry the risk of loss on the free speech 
justification by the heightened burden of proof. 
¶4. Traditionally, the standard for the burden of persuasion applied in federal civil claims 
for relief is left by the Congress to the courts. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755–56 
(1982). Nevertheless, the issue is generally one of legislative intent. Steadman v. SEC, 450 
U.S. 91, 96 n.10 (1981); Vance v. Terrazar, 444 U.S. 252, 265 (1980). In a criminal 
prosecution, however, the government is constitutionally tested by “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361–68. Generally, the plaintiff in a civil claim for relief is 
tested by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 
U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (securities fraud preponderance); Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302, 307–
11 (1971) (antitrust treble damages; preponderance of evidence, except for authorization by 
union, which is governed by Norris-LaGuardia Act (29 U.S. § 106 (1994)) (“clear proof”); 
Steadman, 450 U.S. at 97–104 (government administrative proceeding for fraud by 
preponderance); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 440 U.S. 228, 252–53 (1989) (defendant Title 
VII refutation of gender discrimination allegation preponderance); Grogan v. Garner, 498 
U.S. 279 (1991) (fraud exception to bankruptcy discharge preponderance); cf. Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 491 (1985) (civil RICO preponderance); accord 
United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 
(1975) (action by government); Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1303 (7th Cir. 
1987) (action by private person), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 917 (1989). See generally, G. Robert 
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennet v. Berg, 58 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 237, tbl. 258 n.59 (1982) (legislative history, analogies, and economic 
analysis); Leigh Ann Mackenzie, Note, Civil RICO: Prior Criminal Conviction and Burden of 
Proof, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 566, 580–88 (1985) (analyzing history and policy 
considerations for imposing different standards of burden of proof). Whatever the rationale 
offered for the rule, it “expresses a preference for one side=s interests,” Herman & MacLean, 
459 U.S. at 387–91, and for that reason alone, the Court is reluctant to impose a higher 
burden of persuasion than preponderance in civil proceedings. Crawford v. Britton, 523 U.S. 
574, 594 (1998) (Achang[ing] the burden of proof for an entire category of claims would stray 
far from the traditional limits on judicial authority@). Nevertheless, substantial numbers of civil 
claims for relief or particular issues in the trials of the claims are tested by the clear and 
convincing evidence. MCCORMICK, supra ¶ 3, at 797–98 (e.g., undue influence, lost will, 
etc.). The Court itself imposes a clear and convincing standard (sometimes as a matter of 
constitutional due process) on civil proceedings that implicate important individual or societal 
rights. See, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 315–17 (1984) (action for diversion 
of water); Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766–67 (action to terminate parental rights); Addington, 441 
U.S. at 433 (action for involuntary civil commitment); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285–86 
(1966) (action for deportation). Our reading of the interests implicated by the jurisprudence 
of free speech and individual responsibility fully warrant the imposition of the clear and 
convincing standard. We do not argue that all First Amendment issues need to be resolved by 
a heightened burden of persuasion. See, e.g., Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry. Employees, 466 U.S. 435, 
457 n.15 (1984) (invoking First Amendment on issue of use of dues by union insufficient to 
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by a culpable state of mind, subjective (not objective or imputed by 
law) and personal (not vicarious conduct, except on a showing under 
the most stringently applied standards)—is what our most sacrosanct 
traditions in the criminal law manifestly demand. Free speech 
considerations dictate similar standards on the civil side. 
2. The objective element 
The second element of the hybrid test—the objective element—
tracks the objective tests now followed in the circuits. It is aimed at 
the second policy behind proscribing “true threats,” that is, avoiding 
the unlawful fear and disruption that such threats engender. When a 
statement is, in fact, threatening in nature, it is likely to create fear or 
disrupt the activities of the hearer. While the circuits vacillate on the 
correct viewpoint from which to approach this element, and 
Marshall’s test is silent on that score, the best approach is to ask 
whether a reasonable person in the position of the hearer would 
understand the speech or expressive conduct to be threatening. 
Justice Holmes’s point about the interpretation of statutes is relevant 
here: “We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only 
what the statute means.”769 State of mind is relevant to assess 
responsibility, but the meaning of speech and expressive conduct is a 
 
impose heightened standard of proof). But we do argue that drawing the difficult line between 
protected speech or expressive conduct and true threat is too important an issue in a free 
society, which is increasingly characterized by diversity, to be left to the fact finder to resolve 
by a matter of probabilities. 
¶5. We have no illusions. Defendants who raise free speech justifications will not be 
saved from perdition by altering the burden of persuasion. More often than not, the standard 
for the burden of persuation is little more than a matter of words in a jury instruction. See 
MCCORMICK, supra ¶ 3, at 784 n.6 (“‘burden of persuasion’ has become very largely a matter 
of the technique of the wording of instructions to juries”). The experience of one of our 
number, Blakey, for forty years as a prosecutor, committee counsel, counsel for civil litigants 
(plaintiffs and defendants), juror, and defense counsel is that few trials turn on the standard for 
the burden of persuasion; in brief, it is not outcome determinative in the vast majority of cases. 
In fact, counsel for litigants of all kinds generally try mightily to win the case wholly 
independent of whatever the standard of the burden of persuasion. Leaning on the burden of 
persuasion rather than undertaking to prove your contentions is a risky business. Even in 
criminal prosecutions when the defense does have a defense, it undertakes to prove it just as 
surely as the prosecution undertakes to prove the elements of the offense. But the standard for 
the burden of persuasion in a select few cases can cue sensitive jurists and jurors how to resolve 
close issues. There—and only there—the issue is crucial, and its resolution is telling on the 
character of the law=s commitment to its highest ideals and most important values. 
 769. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 
419 (1899). 
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matter, as Holmes says, “[of] whatever . . . convention has attached 
to them.”770 No one should be able, in short, to assert a Lewis 
Carroll Defense.771 Because this approach is hearer-based, it makes 
this second element more protective of the hearer’s interests, as 
opposed to the subjective intent element, which primarily protects 
the speaker’s constitutional rights. But because it is objective, it 
ensures that no speaker will be penalized simply because of 
heightened sensitivity on the part of the recipients of his message.772 
C. A Proposed Standard for “True Threats” 
In sum, to protect freedom of speech under the First 
Amendment and the basic principles of federal criminal jurisprudence 
while at the same time protecting an individual’s right to freedom 
from threats, the courts should adopt a hybrid standard for 
determining the existence of a “true threat.” A “true threat” may be 
found, if and only if: 
 
(i) a person speaks or engages in expressive conduct, 
intending it to be taken as a threat of unlawful result 
that would place the listener in fear of his or her injury 
(to a protected interest)—regardless of whether the 
speaker intends to carry out the threat; and 
 
 
 770. Trimble v. City of Seattle, 231 U.S. 683, 688 (1914). 
 771. CHARLES L. DODGSON (LEWIS CARROLL), THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 186 
(Signet Classic ed. 1960) (“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful 
tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’ ‘The question is,’ said 
Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’”). See generally R.L. 
TRASK, KEY CONCEPTS IN LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS 285–300 (1999). 
 772. Analogizing to the law of torts, an exception to the objective standard could, of 
course, be made when a speaker knows of his hearer’s heightened sensitivities. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) (defining the tort of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly 
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional 
distress . . . .”); id. cmt. f (“The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise 
from the actor’s knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by 
reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. The conduct may become heartless, 
flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it 
would not be so if he did not know.”); see also Emery v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 71 F.3d 1343, 
1346 (7th Cir. 1995) (targeting a vulnerable population with fraud affects the equation of 
“ordinary prudence,” a limitation on what constitutes a fraudulent misrepresentation); cf. ITT 
Cont’l Bakery Co. v. F.T.C., 532 F.2d 207, 218 (2d Cir. 1976) (factor of children affects 
lawfulness of trade practice). 
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(ii) a reasonable listener, in context, would interpret the 
speech or expressive conduct as communicating a 
serious expression of an intent to harm unlawfully the 
listener. 
 
Only on a showing of (1) an intent to threaten unlawful conduct 
and (2) objectively threatening speech or expressive conduct should 
courts be free to act to suppress speech or expressive conduct. Unless 
these basic showings are made, fundamental principles of the First 
Amendment and federal criminal jurisprudence would be 
compromised by the imposition of criminal or other sanctions.773 
 
 773. We turn here to the question: “Why?” See supra note 17. Our answer is not 
singular. Jacques Maritian, the French philosopher, recognized a crucial point when he came 
to see that practical people did not need to obtain agreement on ultimate questions. See 
Appendix A (Definition) ¶ 24. We believe that here, too, those who hold various positions on 
the ultimate questions can come together and agree that pervasive reform is needed of the 
jurisprudence of threats, particularly in the context of free speech values and the fundamental 
presuppositions of our traditional criminal and civil laws. 
The various proposals we make in these materials can, of course, be supported, in whole 
or in part, out of the Judeo-Christian heritage that gave rise to our concepts of freedom in the 
context of a society where dissent literally meant martyrdom. See supra note 181 ¶¶ 5–6. We 
are made in the image and likeness of God; we can know right from wrong; we can freely 
choose to do what is right or what is wrong, a freedom that carries with it a responsibility for 
the consequences of our actions. That we squarely affirm. From that perspective, we also 
believe that the central case for responsibility ought to be put as a matter of subjective choice, 
intent, or purpose; it should not be imposed on another for mere reasons of public policy on a 
purely objective standard, certainly not through the criminal process. Accordingly, we ought to 
be treated as “ends” and not as “means” for another’s purposes. But we do not expect—and 
have no right to expect—that all will agree with our fundamental positions. 
Our proposals may also be supported by those who no longer see themselves as 
connected with any religious heritage or come at these issues from a religious heritage new to 
America. They can be supported as reflecting the most cherished secular values of our society 
that stem from the Enlightenment: the individual dignity of the human person and a free 
society in which free speech and individual responsibility are central values. See supra note 654. 
¶ 11. We have in the modern world faced great challenges to our values. Some who decided 
that they could no longer accept the values of our traditional society remain in their beliefs. 
But others in the face of the stark consequences of turning away from these values have 
returned to belief in their core significance. See supra note 647 ¶¶ 18–21. Members of either 
group can find their values reflected in our proposals. 
Those among us who are participants in our legal system may find a presumption in 
favor of keeping our legal traditions either because they believe they reflect the values they 
believe in or because no one is coming up with alternatives that can be assured would work 
better. See supra note 644. 
We also point out that whatever those who pride themselves on things of the mind 
must temper their judgments by the frank recognition that whatever values the law reflects 
must be intelligible to those to whom it is to be applied. See supra note 644 ¶ 18. Most 
people in our society, for religious or other reasons, still believe in the value of human 
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D. The Problem of Context 
The panel opinion in American Coalition squarely faced the issue 
of context evidence, emphatically arrived at the correct result, but 
failed to articulate workable standards for the proper role for 
evidence of context; the en banc opinion not only reached the wrong 
result but placed no meaningful limitations on evidence of context. 
Accordingly, the issue of context evidence is another crucial 
shortcoming of the current effort by the circuits to define and apply 
their doctrines of “true threat.”774 In light of the en banc court’s 
 
dignity, the freedom of the individual, and the central value of individual praise and blame. 
Those beliefs should be respected and reflected in the law under which they live out their 
lives. 
We are now a diverse society undergoing, as all modern societies undergo, persuasive 
cultural change. In fact, we are in the midst of a “culture war” over the meaning of America 
that is, or should be, a matter of argument among fellow citizens. See supra note 130. But it is 
also a live war between those who share the values of Western society and those who share the 
values of very different traditions. See supra note 53. Various sides of the various battles of the 
culture war seek to carry the day by delegitimating the other by the use of labels; if these 
efforts are confined to public and private forums, they are the stuff of any culture struggle, but 
when efforts are made to enlist the power of government to coerce a victory, they trespass on 
what ought to be the neutral character of the judiciary. See supra note 130 ¶¶ 7–8. The victors 
will win in name only. Persuasion is the only way to create a new society in which all, or at least 
most of us, learn to live together in peace. Even then, some will remain out of the main 
stream. They should be respected in their right to choose their own way of life, not because we 
agree with them, but because we respect the right of individuals to work out such matters for 
themselves. Freedom includes, in short, the right to be wrong. Thus, we should respect each 
person, not his or her various positions. In brief, the culture war must be a matter of struggle 
in which persuasion carried the day without enlisting judicial degrees. All sides in these matters 
have the same stake in seeing that the process is neutral among contenders. 
Accordingly, our answer to the question “Why?” is no answer at all, but a series of 
answers that can be connected to various aspects of the sort of people we are or strive to be. 
We only seek to secure agreement on the practical proposals that we make. Anything else, we 
put off into the indefinite future as beyond our competence or ability. Compare Appendix A 
(Definition) ¶14, with infra note 795. 
 774. The admission of “context evidence” is a troubling flaw. The courts generally do a 
good job in dealing with other kinds of evidence, despite what one author suggests. In a 
Comment in the Harvard Law Review, the author concludes that in determining whether a 
communication constitutes a true threat, courts should exclude all evidence of the hearer’s 
subjective reaction. See Recent Case, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1110, 1113–14 (1998) (arguing that 
“[t]he court should have created a blanket rule . . . that all subjective reaction testimony is 
unduly prejudicial”). While the author’s concerns are well-taken, the author’s proposal is too 
restrictive. First, such a rule would be inconsistent with Watts, where the Court found it 
important, in analyzing whether a speaker’s statement constituted a true threat, that the 
statement’s hearers laughed. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). Second, 
the author insufficiently credits the court’s ability to admit or bar such evidence—whether by a 
trial judge’s correct rulings or an appellate court’s cure—on a case-by-case basis using the 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing that relevant evidence “may 
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revolutionary holding on the admissibility of evidence of context, the 
need for proper analysis of this issue is all the more urgent. 
Following Watts, the circuit courts of appeal uniformly find 
context evidence relevant and important. How to treat it, however, is 
critical. Under the approach to “true threats” we advocate in these 
materials, the proper place for consideration of context evidence is in 
the second, objective element—whether a reasonable listener would 
interpret the speech or expressive conduct as communicating a 
serious expression of an intent to inflict or cause unlawful harm to 
the listener. 
Consideration of this kind of context evidence is envisioned by 
the Court’s decision in Watts, which found it important that Watts’s 
statements were made during a political debate, were made 
conditional on an event that he said would never happen, and 
provoked laughter as a response from the crowd to which he spoke. 
Nevertheless, despite the holding of the en banc opinion in 
American Coalition that found it to be inapposite,775 Claiborne, in 
fact, qualified the appropriate use of context evidence when threats 
of violence “occur[] in the context of constitutionally protected 
 
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury”). Indeed, this ability is exemplified by the case 
the author reviews. See United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1496–1502 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(discussed supra Part V.A.1.a). 
In Fulmer, the defendant was prosecuted for threatening an FBI agent. At trial, the 
district court admitted a veritable panoply of contextual evidence of the hearer’s reaction, 
much of which was prejudicial. The evidence included testimony by the agent regarding the 
Oklahoma City bombing and subsequent bomb threats; several of the agents’ bullets; 
testimony by the agent regarding the agent’s reactions to the “threats,” including that he felt 
more safe because there was an extra magazine of ammunition in his car on the night he 
received the “threat”; and testimony by the agent’s supervisor regarding the agent’s reactions 
to the “threats.” Id. On appeal, the First Circuit correctly recognized that “a trial court’s on-
the-spot weighing under Rule 403” may be reviewed only “for abuse of discretion,” and it 
would reverse that judgment “only in extraordinarily compelling circumstances.” Id. at 1497. 
Accordingly, the circuit properly upheld the admission of evidence of the agent’s subjective 
reactions to the threats (e.g., that he “felt threatened”). Id. at 1499–1501. Nevertheless, it 
found that the district court abused its discretion and overturned the conviction since the 
prejudicial effects of some of the admitted evidence far outweighed its probative value. Id. at 
1503. In particular, it found that “the district court erred in admitting into evidence: actual 
bullets; testimony regarding ammunition in [the agent’s] car on the night he received the 
alleged threat; and testimony regarding the Oklahoma City bombing.” Id. The work of the 
First Circuit stands in sharp and unfavorable contrast to the approach of the majority in 
American Coalition. See supra Part V.a.1.d. 
 775. Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1072–75 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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activity . . . .”776 There, the Court held, “‘precision of regulation’ is 
demanded. . . . [T]he presence of activity protected by the First 
Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds that may give rise to 
damages liability and on the persons who may be held accountable 
for those damages.”777 Under basic principles of federal criminal law, 
individual liability must be based on individual conduct.778 
Indeed, the facts of Claiborne paint a vivid picture of the kind of 
“context of violence” evidence that the en banc opinion in American 
Coalition finds may permissibly convert facially non-threatening 
speech into a “true threat.”779 At an NAACP meeting, Charles Evers 
specifically threatened that any black citizen who violated the 
boycott of white merchants would have his neck broken by members 
of the group.780 The boycott was enforced by “deacons” who stood 
outside of white merchants’ stores and recorded the names of 
boycott violators. In fact, harm did befall several violators: a brick 
was thrown through a windshield, a flower garden was destroyed, 
and gunshots were fired into at least two homes.781 
Nevertheless, in analyzing Evers’s possible liability for his 
inflammatory speeches, the Court pointedly observed: 
Petitioners were engaged openly and vigorously in making the 
public aware of respondent’s . . . practices. Those practices were 
offensive to them, as the view and practices of petitioners are no 
doubt offensive to others. But so long as the means are peaceful, 
the communication need not meet standards of acceptability.782 
Commenting on the speeches themselves, the Court observed: 
While many of the comments in Evers’ speeches might have 
contemplated “discipline” in the permissible form of social 
ostracism, it cannot be denied that references to the possibility that 
necks would be broken and to the fact that the Sheriff could not 
sleep with boycott violators at night implicitly conveyed a sterner 
 
 776. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982). 
 777. Id. at 916–17 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)). 
 778. Id. at 919 (finding that “guilt by association alone, without [establishing] that an 
individual’s association poses the threat feared by the Government, is an impermissible basis 
upon which to deny First Amendment rights” (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 
(1972) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 779. See, e.g., Am. Coalition, 290 F.3d at 1082–83. 
 780. See infra Appendix C (The Speech of Charles Evers). 
 781. Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 904. 
 782. Id. at 911 (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). 
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message. In the passionate atmosphere in which the speeches were 
delivered, they might have been understood as inviting an unlawful 
form of discipline or, at least, as intending to create a fear of 
violence whether or not improper discipline was specifically 
intended.783 
Significantly, however, the Court found that the First 
Amendment fully protected Evers’s speeches.784 It held that “there is 
no evidence—apart from the speeches themselves—that Evers 
authorized, ratified, or directly threatened acts of violence.”785 In 
sharp contrast with the en banc opinion in American Coalition, the 
Court refused to permit a “context of violence” to convert Evers’s 
speeches—which themselves did arguably contain explicit threats of 
unlawful violence to an identifiable class of individuals (recalcitrant 
Blacks whose names were recorded by the deacons)—into 
unprotected activity. Under its “precision of regulation” approach, 
liability could not attach to Evers’s speeches unless Evers himself 
created the context of violence (i.e., by authorizing violent activities, 
etc.). Apart from the speeches themselves, such evidence was not 
presented. That ended the matter. 
Under Claiborne, the expansive notion of “evidence of context” 
permitted under the Ninth Circuit’s majority opinion in American 
Coalition cannot be squared with First Amendment freedoms or 
basic notions of individual responsibility that are the foundations of 
the federal criminal law. “Precision of regulation,” which Claiborne 
requires, demands that individual liability be based on individual 
conduct. Assessing liability for one person’s speech on the basis of 
another person’s conduct is improper. Unless a speaker authorized, 
directed, or ratified the context of violence himself, evidence of a 
“context of violence” ought not be used to convert his speech into a 
“true threat.”786 Reform here is not required in the jurisprudence of 
 
 783. Id. at 927. 
 784. Id. at 929 (concluding “that Evers’s addresses did not exceed the bounds of 
protected speech”). 
 785. Id. 
 786. 18 U.S.C. § 842 (1994), which prohibits loansharking, is illuminating on 
“context.” Section 842 adopts an approach that is similar to the approach we advocate: 
(a) Whoever makes any extortionate extension of credit, or conspires to do so, shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. 
(b) In any prosecution under this section, if it is shown that all of the following 
factors were present in connection with the extension of credit in question, there is 
prima facie evidence that the extension of credit was extortionate, but this 
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the First Amendment or of the federal criminal law. Courts should 
apply the law. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The panel opinion in American Coalition went a long way 
toward securing Americans’ First Amendment freedoms. While it did 
not look to basic principles of the federal criminal law in reaching its 
result, that result was consistent with those principles. Sadly, it no 
longer states the law, at least in the nine western states covered by 
the Ninth Circuit. Nevertheless, even under the panel opinion, 
 
subsection is nonexclusive and in no way limits the effect or applicability of 
subsection (a): 
. . . . 
(3) At the time the extension of credit was made, the debtor reasonably 
believed that either 
(A) one or more extensions of credit by the creditor had been collected or 
attempted to be collected by extortionate means, or the nonrepayment 
thereof had been punished by extortionate means; or 
(B) the creditor had a reputation for the use of extortionate means to 
collect extensions of credit or to punish the nonrepayment thereof. 
Id. Thus, context is relevant in this statute only when the accused himself created the context 
(§ 842(b)(3)(B)) or specifically intended to exploit it (§ 842(b)(3)(A)). See, e.g., United States 
v. DiSalvo, 34 F.3d 1204, 1212–13 (3d Cir. 1994) (lawyer connected to organized crime 
family convicted of an extortionate collection of credit, where he used the reputation for 
violence of a family member to put debtor in fear); United States v. Annoreno, 460 F.3d 
1303, 1309 (7th Cir. 1972) (conviction for extortionate extension of credit upheld; threats 
need not be explicit; fact that loans were thirty times commercial rates and made on street 
corners, taverns, pool halls, and closed barber shops “would inform the average borrower in 
metropolitan Chicago that loans were extortionate in nature”) (citing United States v. 
Prochaska, 222 F.2d 1, 1–2 (7th Cir. 1955) (“words or phrases take their character as 
threatening or harmless from the context in which they are used, measured by the common 
experience of the society in which they are published”), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955)). 
For a comprehensive analysis of the law of loan sharking, see Ronald Goldstock & Dan 
Coenen, Controlling the Contemporary Loanshark: The Law of Illicit Lending and the Problem of 
Witness Fear, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 127 (1980). 
The law of “fear” within the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994), is also well-
developed beyond the most blatant “or else.” See, e.g., United States v. Blanton, 793 F.2d 
1553, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986) (Hobbs Act violation may be shown “even if the threats used to 
extort are merely subtle and indirect.”); United States v. Lisinski, 728 F.2d 887, 891 (7th Cir. 
1984) (threats need only be “implicit”); United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994, 1006–07 (2d 
Cir. 1971) (pouring acid on windows; “actions speak louder than words”). State law is similar. 
See, e.g., Iowa v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 271 (Iowa 1996) (threats “need not be explicit”). 
Needless to say, extortionate speech is not protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., 
United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1268 (5th Cir. 1975) (“It may categorically be stated 
that extortionate speech has no more constitutional protection than that uttered by a robber 
while ordering his victim to hand over the money, which is no protection at all.”); accord 
United States v. Hutson, 843 F.2d 1232, 1235 (8th Cir. 1988) (18 U.S.C. § 876). 
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defendants are forced to expend the substantial sums of time and 
money associated with discovery, trial, and appeal and undergo the 
anxiety that necessarily stems from the entry of an enormous jury 
verdict and draconian injunction against them before it can be 
reversed on appeal. That kind of victory is truly called “Pyrrhic.”787 
But the panel opinion no longer obtains; the jury verdict and the 
injunction were upheld. Accordingly, First Amendment freedoms are 
in peril, and our sacrosanct notions of individual responsibility are in 
jeopardy. 
Outside of the Ninth Circuit, too, the current state of the “true 
threats” jurisprudence is similarly inconsistent with Supreme Court 
teachings under the First Amendment and basic principles of federal 
criminal law. The law today everywhere poses a significant threat to 
constitutionally protected freedom of speech and fundamental 
notions of individual responsibility. By imposing liability on 
individuals on the basis of a negligence standard, it penalizes 
protected speech and expressive conduct and cultivates an 
atmosphere of self-censorship in which free speech and expressive 
conduct are necessarily chilled. Objective responsibility, too, is 
imposed where subjective culpability ought to be required. That the 
district court’s decision in the American Coalition litigation was 
largely consistent with Ninth Circuit law prior to an appeal that is 
now affirmed—and with the law of most other circuits—
demonstrates in stark fashion how far the circuit courts of appeal are 
straying from the vigorous protection of free speech that is 
guaranteed in America by the First Amendment. Nor should the 
basic principles of federal criminal law be distorted because of the 
push and pull of political, social, and other controversies.788 That 
 
 787. See 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 945 (2d ed. 1989) (“Pyrrhic Victory: a 
victory gained at too great a cost; in allusion to the exclamation attributed to Pyrrhus after the 
battle of Asculum in Apulia (in which he routed the Romans, but with the loss of the flower of 
his army), ‘One more such victory and we are lost.’”). Compare 9 PLUTARCH’S LIVES 417 
(Bernadotte Perrin trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1920) (“Pyrrhus said to one who was 
congratulating him on his victory, ‘If we are victorious in one more battle with the Romans, 
we shall be utterly ruined.’”), with JACOB ABBOTT, PYRRHUS 139 (Werner Co. n.d.) (“One of 
Pyrrhus’s generals congratulated him on his victory [after the battle of Asculum in 279 B.C.]. 
‘Yes,’ said Pyrrhus; ‘another such victory and I shall be undone.’”). 
 788. While obvious to us, this point bears making. The Supreme Court in Atkins v. 
Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), held that the imposition of capital punishment on mentally 
handicapped individuals violated the Eighth Amendment. The majority opinion canvassed 
public opinion polls. Id. at 2249 n.21. The dissents by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia took great pains in expressing their disagreement with letting public opinion shape the 
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resolution of constitutional decisions. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “I write separately . . . to 
call attention to the defects in the Court’s decision to place weight on foreign laws, the views 
of professional and religious organizations, and opinion polls in reaching its conclusion.” Id. at 
2252–53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). He commented further, “The Court’s uncritical 
acceptance of the opinion poll data brought to our attention, moreover, warrants additional 
comment, because we lack sufficient information to conclude that the surveys were conducted 
in accordance with generally accepted scientific principles or are capable of supporting valid 
empirical inferences about the issue before us.” Id. at 2253. 
While we agree with the dissents that the “uncritical acceptance” of these sorts of polls 
by the majority is troubling, it is just as troubling that the Chief Justice may be suggesting how 
to make public opinion polls more useful rather than reminding the Court such polls ought 
not be used at all. Indeed, he explicitly recognizes in other decisions that the duty of the Court 
is not to be swayed by public opinion. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 958–59 (1992), Chief Justice Rehnquist observed, “[B]ecause the 
Court’s duty is to ignore public opinion and criticism on issues that come before it, its 
Members are in perhaps the worst position to judge whether a decision divides the Nation 
deeply enough to justify such uncommon protection.” 
The Constitution attempts to protect judges from being swayed by public opinion; it 
does not recommend that Courts utilize national and international opinion polls to support 
their constitutional decisions. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the 
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour [sic], and shall, at 
stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during 
their Continuance in Office.”). The most likely reason the Founders included this particular 
language can be found in the Declaration of Independence: “He [King George] has made 
Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and 
payment of their salaries.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776), in 
43 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 2. Alexander Hamilton, in THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 
also explained the reason for granting the federal judiciary tenure subject only to good 
behavior: 
  That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the constitution, and of 
individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can 
certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary 
commission . . . . If the judiciary was selected by the people there would be too great 
a disposition to consult popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be 
consulted but the constitution and the laws. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), in 43 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 
232–33 (emphasis added). 
Justice Scalia argues in his dissent in Atkins, as he argues elsewhere, that referencing 
foreign viewpoints on American constitutional issues is not proper. (“We must never forget that it 
is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding. . . . Where there is not 
first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened 
the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans though the 
Constitution.” Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2264–65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868–69 (Scalia, J., dissenting )). Justice Scalia aptly made this point 
again while awarding “accolades” to the majority: “But the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble 
Effort to fabricate ‘national consensus’ must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) 
to the views of assorted professional and religious organizations, members of the so-called ‘world 
community,’ and respondents to opinion polls.” Id. at 2264 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Justice Stevens himself wrote in Republican Party v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2547 
(2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added): 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 1085 
 
  There is a critical difference between the work of the judge and the work of 
other public officials. In a democracy, issues of policy are properly decided by 
majority vote; it is the business of legislators and executives to be popular. But in 
litigation, issues of law or fact should not be determined by popular vote; it is the 
business of judges to be indifferent to unpopularity. 
He added: 
Nevertheless, the elected judge, like the lifetime appointee, does not serve a 
constituency while holding that office. He has a duty to uphold the law and to 
follow the dictates of the Constitution. If he is not a judge on the highest court in the 
State, he has an obligation to follow the precedent of that court, not his personal 
views or public opinion polls. 
Id. (emphasis added). We agree with Justice Stevens that issues of law or fact should not be 
determined by popular vote, but we, like Justice Scalia, wonder if Justice Stevens believes that 
if he were a judge on the highest court of the State, his obligation to follow precedent, not 
personal views or public opinion polls, would cease to exist. See id. 2540 n.12 (providing 
Justice Scalia’s discussion on this point). Referencing Justice Stevens’s decision in Atkins, the 
answer is not mysterious. 
Under First Amendment jurisprudence, a bedrock principle requires ignoring the opinions of 
the people. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an 
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”). By the time the current 
Court majority gets to the Eighth Amendment, the bedrock principle is paradoxically restated in 
Atkins: “[The Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)). In contrast, Justice Blackmun used Trop in his dissent to the decision in 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 409 n.7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (1972): 
  The Court has recognized, and I certainly subscribe to the proposition, that the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause “may acquire meaning as public opinion 
becomes enlightened by a humane justice.” And Mr. Chief Justice Warren, for a 
plurality of the Court, referred to “the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.” Mr. [Thomas] Jefferson expressed the same thought 
well. “Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them 
like the ark of the covenant, too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the 
preceding age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond 
amendment. I knew that age well; I belonged to it, and labored with it. It deserved well 
of its country. It was very like the present, but without the experience of the present; 
and forty years of experience in government is worth a century of book-reading; and this 
they would say themselves, were they to rise from the dead. . . . I know . . . that laws 
and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that 
becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths 
disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, 
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. We might as well require a 
man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain 
ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors. . . . Let us follow no such 
examples, nor weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking 
care of itself, and of ordering its own affairs. Let us, as our sister States have done, avail 
ourselves of our reason and experience, to correct the crude essays of our first and 
unexperienced, although wise, virtuous, and well-meaning councils. And lastly, let us 
provide in our Constitution for its revision at stated periods.” 
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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push and pull, moreover, may only be expected to become more 
hardened when anti-war demonstrations come before the courts, as 
they surely will in the years ahead. Here, too, Justice Holmes’s point 
needs to be recalled: “Great cases like hard cases make bad law.”789 
It will happen again if we are not vigilant in our efforts to protect 
freedom as we make efforts to protect security. This country, too, does 
not have an attractive track record on civil liberties in war time. 
Reference need only be made to the infamous Sedition Laws790 
 
Justice Blackmun used Trop and Jefferson to make a different point. The Constitution 
itself allows for constitutional and legislative change, but that process of change should take 
place through actions detailed in Articles I and V, not Article III. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I 
(dealing with the legislative power), and id. art. V (detailing the constitutional amendment 
process), with U.S. CONST. art. III (creating the federal judiciary). 
While the Court shows few signs of retreat from using “the evolution of society’s 
standards of decency,” this “evolution” ought not mutate into an endorsement of a theory of 
“context of evidence” within the First Amendment threats area. In the spheres most affected 
by “true threat” litigation, the Court ought not allow a reliance upon “public opinion” to 
determine the level of First Amendment protections or distort basic principles of federal 
criminal law, which people can change, if they so desire, by legislation. 
 789. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 790. The Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273–76 (1964) 
(citations and footnotes omitted) reviewed the sordid history: 
[T]he great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798 . . . first crystallized a 
national awareness of the central meaning of the First Amendment . . . . That statute 
made it a crime, punishable by a $5,000 fine and five years in prison, “if any person 
shall write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or 
writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the 
Congress . . . , or the President . . . , with intent to defame . . . or to bring them, or 
either of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either of 
any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States.” The Act allowed 
the defendant the defense of truth, and provided that the jury were to be judges 
both of the law and the facts. Despite these qualifications, the Act was vigorously 
condemned as unconstitutional in an attack joined in by Jefferson and Madison. In 
the famous Virginia Resolutions of 1798, the General Assembly of Virginia resolved 
that it 
doth particularly protest against the palpable and alarming infractions of the 
Constitution, in the two late cases of the ‘Alien and Sedition Acts,’ passed at 
the last session of Congress . . . . [The Sedition Act] exercises . . . a power not 
delegated by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, expressly and positively 
forbidden by one of the amendments thereto—a power which, more than any 
other, ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against the right 
of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication 
among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only 
effectual guardian of every other right. 
  Madison prepared the Report in support of the protest. His premise was that 
the Constitution created a form of government under which “The people, not the 
government, possess the absolute sovereignty.” The structure of the government 
dispersed power in reflection of the people’s distrust of concentrated power, and of 
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following the Revolutionary War or to the Palmer raids during the 
Red Scare of the First World War period.791 Wisely, George Santayana 
 
power itself at all levels. This form of government was “altogether different” from 
the British form, under which the Crown was sovereign and the people were 
subjects. “Is it not natural and necessary, under such different circumstances,” he 
asked, “that a different degree of freedom in the use of the press should be 
contemplated?” Earlier, in a debate in the House of Representatives, Madison had 
said: “If we advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the 
censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government 
over the people.” Of the exercise of that power by the press, his Report said: “In 
every state, probably, in the Union, the press has exerted a freedom in canvassing 
the merits and measures of public men, of every description, which has not been 
confined to the strict limits of the common law. On this footing the freedom of the 
press has stood; on this foundation it yet stands . . . .” The right of free public 
discussion of the stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, a 
fundamental principle of the American form of government. 
  Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its 
validity has carried the day in the court of history. Fines levied in its prosecution were 
repaid by Acts of Congress on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Calhoun, 
reporting to the Senate on February 4, 1836, assumed that its invalidity was a matter 
“which no one now doubts.” Jefferson, as President, pardoned those who had been 
convicted and sentenced under the Act and remitted their fines, stating: “I discharged 
every person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law, because I 
considered, and now consider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if 
Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image.” The invalidity of the 
Act has also been assumed by Justices of this Court. See Holmes, J., dissenting and joined 
by Brandeis, J., in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630; Jackson, J., dissenting in 
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288–89 . . . . These views reflect a broad consensus 
that the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public 
officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment. 
See generally Andrew Lenner, Separate Spheres: Republic Constitutionalism in the Federalist Era, 
41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 250 (1997). 
 791. See DAVID A. SHANNON, BETWEEN THE WARS: AMERICA, 1919–1941, at 28–29 
(1965). Shannon observes: 
  When [Thomas W.] Gregory left the office [of Attorney General,] Wilson replaced 
him with his floor manager at the 1912 Democratic convention, A. Mitchell Palmer of 
Pennsylvania. This war-like Quaker instituted an unprecedented reign of federal 
repression. Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson, given the administration of the 
immigration laws, rounded up a large number of alien radicals during 1919, charged 
them with being illegally in the United States, and had them deported. The aliens, 
among them the famous anarchist Emma Goldman, left on a ship popularly know as the 
“Soviet Art.” Palmer, who had ambitions for the 1920 Democratic presidential 
nomination and thought a reputation as a vigorous antiradical would help him politically, 
soon made Secretary Wilson seem a model of restraint. On the night of January 2, 1920, 
and again three nights later, Department of Justice agents in thirty-three American cities 
conducted raids on known local radicals. More than five thousand people were arrested. 
Whether there was an arrest warrant or not, whether the person arrested was an alien or 
not, made no difference. In some communities even those who came to jail to visit 
relatives and friends were thrown behind bars. 
Id. 
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observed, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to 
repeat it.”792 We are masters of our fate, if only we will learn from our 
experience.793 As Justice Brandeis so eloquently observed: 
 
The parallels between this country’s reaction to communism during the Red Scare and 
to today’s reaction to the terrorism of September 11, 2002, are haunting. See supra note 53; 
see generally CHARLES H. MCCORMICK, SEEING REDS 145–87 (1997); CURT GENTRY, J. 
EDGAR HOOVER: THE MAN AND THE SECRETS 74–84 (1991). 
 792. GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 82 (1998). Justice Holmes makes a 
related point: “[H]istoric continuity . . . is not a duty, it is only a necessity.” Holmes, supra 
note 178 ¶ 7, at 139. 
 793. Shaw, on the other hand, commented, that the only thing history teaches is that 
history does not teach. GEORGE BENARD SHAW, HEARTBREAK HOUSE 45 (6th ed. 1927); see 
also GEORGE HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 6 (J. Sibree trans., rev. ed. 1900) (“[W]hat 
experience and history teach is this,—that peoples and governments never have learned 
anything from history . . . .”). 
One of our colleagues commented on an earlier draft of these materials that while our 
analysis was “within the range of plausibility,” it was “not much more persuasive than this sort 
of legal analysis usually is—which is to say, not very persuasive.” The original meaning of the 
First Amendment did not “compel” our conclusions, nor did any of the current theories of the 
First Amendment’s purpose or scope. While Watts and Claiborne supported our thesis, they 
were “old” cases, and the circuit courts of appeal did not read them as we did. In brief, our 
colleague thought that while our “argumentation is what lawyers do,” and “are supposed to 
do,” the “argument isn’t—probably can’t be—very compelling.” Here, significantly, our 
colleague was, we frankly acknowledge, in light of the en banc opinion in American Coalition, 
prescient in his reading of Watts and Claiborne. We trusted in the force of legal precedent and 
proffered rationale; as it turned out, he had a better grasp of the fluid character of the law. 
With all due respect, our colleague (and the misguided author of the en banc opinion), 
however, forgets his Aristotle: “[P]recision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions, any 
more than in all the products of the crafts. . . . [We can only] look for precision in each class of 
things just so far as the nature of the subject matter admits . . . .” Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics, in GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 339–40. Our colleague is, of course, in esteemed 
company. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 63 (2001) (“Like 
other moral theories, it seems to me . . . spongy and arbitrary.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 348 (1990) (“I am skeptical that moral philosophy has much 
to offer in the way of answers to specific legal questions or even in the way of general 
bearings . . . . [Moral philosophy] reinforces the lesson of skepticism, a leitmotif of this 
book. . . . [W]hen it comes to specific cases, it lets us down.”) (footnote omitted). 
Nevertheless, JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 77 (1983) (emphasis in original) 
aptly observes: 
  Here, as elsewhere, the skeptic is a disappointed absolutist, and we must reject 
the sophistical dilemma, “all or nothing.” In particular, we must beware of the 
(often unconscious) legalism which supposes that if there is no uniquely correct 
solution to a moral problem, no solution to that problem is objectively right (or 
wrong). The language of “right” and “wrong” must not lure us into assuming that 
for every problem or situation there is one solution or choice which is the right one. 
Neither moral nor legal reasoning necessarily moves, in each instance, by way of 
deduction from demonstrated premises to demonstrated conclusions. Legal reasoning is, after 
all, a form of “moral” reasoning, which is, as Cicero says, about “wisdom,” the “art of living.” 
CICERO, ON MORAL ENDS 17 (Julia Annas ed. 2001). St. Thomas Aquinas, in his Summa 
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[The] freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are 
means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth; . . . without free speech and assembly discussion would be 
futile; . . . with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; . . . the 
greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; . . . public discussion 
is a political duty; and . . . this should be a fundamental principle of 
the American government.794 
Thoughtful Americans ought to accept no less.795 
 
Theologica, in 20 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 227–28, draws a helpful distinction 
between the ways in which moral reasoning proceeds. The first is “as a conclusion from 
premises” (conclusiones ex principiis); the second is as “by way of determination of certain 
generalities” (sicut deterinationes quaedam aliquorum communium). Aquinas’s Latin 
determinatio is usually translated “determination.” Its primary meaning, however, is “fixing of 
a boundary.” OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 530 (1982). In a legal context, it might also easily 
be translated “to make a judgment.” Aquinas calls the first way as “like to that by which, in 
science, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from principles.” Aquinas, supra, at 228 
(emphasis added). He calls the second as “likened to that whereby, in the arts, common forms 
are determined as to details: thus, the craftsman needs to determine the common form of a 
house to the shape of this or that house.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id. (“the judgment[s] 
of expert and prudent men [who] see . . . what is the best thing to decide”) (citing Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, in 20 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 227–28 (“[W]e ought to attend 
to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of 
practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye 
they see aright.” (emphasis added))). Accordingly, our analysis here is not offered as a 
“compelling conclusion” in the first sense, that is, as in science but as “a judgment,” in the 
second sense, that is, as in art. Whether we are either “expert” or “prudent,” as Aquinas says, 
or have “practical wisdom,” as Aristotle says, is shown (or not shown) by the quality (or lack of 
quality) of our analysis. That judgment rests with others. 
 794. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). We 
would only add that fundamental principles of the federal criminal law must also be kept 
sacrosanct. 
 795. When a “committee of twelve distinguished attorneys and law professors criticized 
Attorney General Palmer . . . the excesses subsided even if the mood of intolerance was to 
linger for years.” SHANNON, supra note 791, at 29. Sadly, we doubt that we can expect a 
similar group to speak out against the American Coalition litigation and its outcome to date in 
the courts. 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
1090 
APPENDIX A 
DEFINITION 
¶1. Broadly, four tendencies in the various views about 
“definition” may be distinguished: essentialist, prescriptive, 
linguistic, and pragmatic.796 These tendencies are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, and individual thinkers often manifest one or 
more together. According to the essentialist tendency, definitions 
convey more exact and certain information than empirical 
descriptions. That information is obtained from things by a process 
of conception, different from sensation, variously described as 
intellectual vision or abstraction; but in either case, essentialist 
definitions are an act of reason, not an act of the will. Such 
definitions may be true or false, that is, accurate or inaccurate in their 
relationship to things themselves; they may be roughly assimilated to 
declaratory sentences. According to the prescriptive tendency, 
definitions do not convey information; instead, they are nominal, not 
real, and an act of the will. Such definitions are not true or false; 
instead, they are consistent or inconsistent, that is, coherent in their 
relationship among themselves; they may be roughly assimilated to 
imperative sentences. According to the linguistic tendency, 
definitions are descriptions obtained from an empirical observation 
of linguistic use. Such definitions are true or false, that is, accurate or 
inaccurate in their relationship to linguistic use; if stipulations, they 
may also be consistent or inconsistent, that is, coherent in their 
relationship among themselves; they may be assimilated to 
declaratory or imperative sentences, and they are an act of reason or 
an act of the will. According to the pragmatic tendency, definitions 
are, in one respect, stipulated an act of the will; they are consistent or 
inconsistent, that is, coherent in their relationship among themselves; 
they may be roughly assimilated to imperative sentences. 
Nevertheless, such definitions are, in another respect, descriptions 
obtained from an empirical observation of the way things work. They 
are good or bad, that is, useful or not useful, in relation to a 
 
 796. See generally Abelson, supra note 233, for an elaboration of these distinctions. 
Other treatments of “definition” include JUAN C. SAGER, ESSAYS ON DEFINITION (2000); 
ANNABEL CORMACK, DEFINITIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR SYNTAX, SEMANTICS AND THE 
LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT (1998); JAMES H. FETZER ET AL., DEFINITIONS AND DEFINABILITY: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (1991). The classic treatment remains RICHARD D. 
ROBINSON, DEFINITION (1954). 
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particular purpose; they are an act of the will; they are also a 
description obtained from an empirical observation of the way things 
work. For a particular purpose to be achieved in the context of the 
way things work, the definition, while it may be a stipulation, must 
also be an adequate reflection of an empirical description of how 
things work. Such definitions are prescriptive, descriptive, and 
predictive. 
¶2. These various tendencies may be well-illustrated by the 
examination of the thought of twelve thinkers. St. Thomas Aquinas 
makes the point: “The study of philosophy does not mean to learn 
what others have thought but to learn what is the truth of things.”797 
¶3. Western philosophy begins in Greece, in the fifth century 
B.C. at the end of the Golden Age of Pericles (480–399 B.C.), a 
historical context that illuminates that beginning.798 As a result of a 
long struggle between an aristocracy of land-owning families and an 
urban poor, Athens was a democracy by the middle of the century. 
Elected annually as the first citizen, Pericles not only extended the 
empire of the Athenian city-state throughout Greece, but he also 
skillfully balanced the interests of all classes. Athens flourished; 
domestic industry and widespread trade gained for the people great 
material prosperity; vast building projects were undertaken; and most 
important, literature, arts, and intellectual life reached unparalleled 
heights. Greece itself was, however, split between the Athenian 
Empire (which was democratic, commercial, and industrial) and 
Sparta (which was authoritarian, militaristic, and agricultural). 
Tragically, war broke out in the spring of 431 B.C., and Sparta 
defeated Athens, in part because of an uncontrollable plague in the 
city, but also because of the floundering of the democratic 
government in its conduct of the war, a war that impoverished the 
old aristocracy. At its conclusion, the noble families, now alienated 
from democracy, instigated a revolution, which brought about a 
reign of terror. Ultimately, though, democracy reasserted itself. 
 
 797. JOSEF PIEPER, THE SILENCE OF ST. THOMAS 35 (1957) (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, 
COMMENTARY TO ARISTOTLE’S DE CAELO ET MUNDO, bk. 1, lec. 22, § 229, at 92 (Studium 
philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserin, sed qualiter se habet veritas 
rerum)). John Finnis offers an alternative translation: “[P]hilosophy’s concern is not to find 
out what people have thought but what is the truth of the matters in question.” JOHN FINNIS, 
AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY, 18–19 (1998). 
 798. See generally T.Z. LAVINE, FROM SOCRATES TO SARTRE: THE PHILOSOPHIC QUEST 
10–13 (1984). 
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¶4. One of the first acts of those who restored the rule of the 
people was to put on trial and execute, on a charge of corrupting the 
youth of the city, Socrates (c. 470–399 B.C.), the philosopher who 
rightly ranks as the father of the Western tradition in philosophy. 
The trial and execution of Socrates profoundly influenced Plato (c. 
429–347 B.C.). Plato was one of Socrates’ young students. He was 
also the son of an aristocratic family that suffered notably during the 
war. Arguably, Plato’s opposition to the democratic party grew, in 
part, out of his family’s troubles. We know that from Plato’s brilliant 
pen Socrates’ teachings were either preserved or developed. Socrates 
observed in the Apology, one of Plato’s dialogues, that “the 
unexamined life is not worth living . . . .”799 For Socrates, that 
examination begins in a dialogue, in which a seeker after the truth or 
the goodness of things asks a question such as, what is piety? In the 
Euthyphro, a dialogue on the propriety, consistent with piety, of a 
son prosecuting a father for murder, Socrates, brushing aside answers 
to his questions given by the knowledgeable theologian Euthyphro, 
who gave examples, but did not provide a definition of piety, 
explained the sort of definition he sought: one that gives the 
“general idea” that “makes all pious things . . . pious,” that is, “a 
standard to which I may look and by which I may measure 
actions.”800 In short, Socrates sought the “essence” of the thing. 
Subsequently, to refute the simplistic creed of a businessman, 
Cephalus, and the cynical creed of a Sophist, Thrasymachus, one of a 
group of the first Greek skeptics,801 Plato802 reported Socrates 
distinguishing between two objects of knowledge: (1) sensible 
things, that is, “appearances,” and (2) abstract forms, that is, 
“essences.” He also distinguished between two modes of knowledge: 
(1) sense perception, and (2) intellectual vision, each of which 
corresponds to our objects of knowledge. Sense perception, the 
product of empirical observation, gives rise to “opinion,” which is 
more or less, an approximation of “essences.” Intellectual vision, 
attained by the power of dialectic, however, gives rise to “essences,” 
that is, certain knowledge of the truth of things or the goodness of 
actions. “Essences” alone may be properly embodied in 
 
 799. Plato, Apology, in 7 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 210. 
 800. Id. at 193. 
 801. BLACKBURN, supra note 233, at 349. 
 802. Plato, Republic, in 7 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 373–88. 
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“definitions.”803 For example, as a subject (David) is modeled in a 
sculpture (Michelangelo’s David), so piety ought to be instantiated 
in the action of a son in the prosecution his father for murder. A 
proper “definition” of “piety” ought, therefore, to capture the 
“essence” of piety. When a “definition” of “piety” is derived by 
dialectic, it gives a reliable and certain standard against which 
particular actions may be judged as “pious” or “impious”—precisely 
the sort of “definition” Socrates sought in the Euthyphro. Thus, 
Plato, in the voice of Socrates, articulated for a disenchanted, 
intellectual elite—as against a broader mass of people, including 
tradesmen and Sophists—a philosophical standard for the true and 
the good, and he occupies in the history of Western philosophy, the 
position of, as Raphael portrays him in his School of Athens, a thinker 
whose hand is raised upwards, pointing to the super-sensual world of 
the mind and the eternal abode of ideas.804 
¶5. “The safest general characterization of the European 
philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to 
Plato.”805 Whitehead’s point is not that Plato himself said it all, but 
that the general positions of most subsequent thinkers were 
represented, or at least adumbrated, in Plato’s dialogues. As Plato 
was the voice of the defeated aristocracy, Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), a 
pupil of Plato, was the voice of a prosperous middle class; his 
philosophical oeuvre and subsequent impact was to prove as 
formidable as that of his master.806 Aristotle articulated the basic 
axiom of logic: the principles of contradiction.807 His ideal form of 
reasoning was deductive, though “he recognize[d] that a syllogism, 
to avoid begging the question, must presuppose a wide induction to 
 
 803. See also Plato, Theaetetus, in 7 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 535 (“mind, by 
power of her own, contemplates the universals in all things”). 
 804. For a view of this history with more nuance, see generally KARL R. POPPER, 
CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 75–93, 399–
401 (3d ed. 1968); David K. O’Connor, Socrates and the Socratics, in THE COLUMBIA 
HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 23 (Richard H. Popkin ed., 1999); Gerald A. Press, 
Plato, in THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 32. 
 805. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, PROCESS AND REALITY 53 (1957). 
 806. See generally Richard Boeus, Aristotle, in THE COLUMBIA HISTORY OF WESTERN 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 804, at 52. 
 807. Aristotle, Metaphysics, in 8 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 524 (“the same 
attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same 
respect”); see also BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 72 (1970) (law of 
identity: “Whatever is, is”; the law of contradiction: “Nothing can both be and not be”; the 
law of the excluded middle: “Everything must either be or not be”). 
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make its major premise probable.”808 He systematically catalogued 
and attempted to refute the fallacies of the Sophists.809 He wrote 
treatises on the criteria for the good of life for an individual810 and 
for the good of life for a community.811 He wrote, “Great then is the 
good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and 
sufficient property; for where some possess much, and the others 
nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; 
or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme . . . .”812 
He also said: 
[H]e who bids the law rule may be deemed to bid God and Reason 
alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast, 
for desire is a wild beast, and passion perverts the minds of rulers, 
even when they are the best of men. Law is reason unaffected by 
desire.813 
Disagreeing with Plato’s concept of intellectual vision, and seeking a 
middle way between Plato’s theory of certain knowledge and the 
rejection of any certain knowledge by Greek Sophists, Aristotle, in 
the Physics, distinguished four “causes” (aitia) in things: the material 
(bronze in a statue), that out of which it is made; the formal (the 
shape of the finished statue), the expression of what it is; the efficient 
(the sculptor), the means by which it is made; and the final end or 
telos (the purpose for which the statue was sculptured), the end for 
which it is made.814 Aristotle’s word aitia, which is usually translated 
as “cause,” is misleading to modern minds, since we understand 
“cause” not as Aristotle did, “purpose,” but in the sense that it is 
used in modern physics “mechanical.”815 The word that Aristotle 
used, aition, is the neuter nominative singular form (aitia its plural 
form) of the adjective aitios, which is best translated as “blame, 
charge, [or] accusation.”816 For lawyers, the best translation is “cause 
 
 808. WILL DURANT, THE LIFE OF GREECE 527 (1939). 
 809. Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, in 8 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 227. 
 810. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 339. 
 811. Aristotle, Politics, in 9 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 445. 
 812. Id. at 496. 
 813. Id. at 485. 
 814. Aristotle, Physics, in 8 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 271 (hence “teleology,” 
the study of ends or the purpose of things); BLACKBURN, supra note 233, at 374. 
 815. See generally Richard Taylor, Causation, 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 56 
(Paul Edwards ed., 1967). 
 816. JAMES DONNEGAN, A NEW GREEK AND ENGLISH LEXICON 40 (1846). 
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of action” or “claim for relief,” that is, the who, what, where, when, 
how, and, in particular, the why of a thing in a court proceeding.817 
Aristotle’s key concept, however, was final cause, or telos, which is 
best translated as “end, purpose, or perfection.”818 For Aristotle, the 
essence of a thing was its end, purpose, or perfection, which was 
abstracted by a person through conception from particular things, 
which, in turn, were apparent to the person through their sensible 
attributes.819 In contrast, for Plato, definition was articulating the 
genius, species, and differentia of things.820 Aristotle went further. In 
the Topics, Aristotle developed six rules for testing definitions from 
an essentialist perspective: (1) give essential, not accidental 
properties, (2) give genus and differentia, (3) do not define by 
synonyms, (4) be concise, (5) do not define by metaphors, and (6) 
do not define by negative terms or the opposites of correlatives.821 
These rules are still widely quoted, though essentialism is hardly the 
way of modern thought.822 
¶6. Aristotle was more than just a pupil of Plato; he was a master 
in his own right. He was also a tutor to Alexander the Great (356–
325 B.C.), whose Macedonian army conquered Greece and most of 
the known world at that time, spreading Greek culture and Greek 
philosophy in the wake of its victories. On the death of Alexander, 
however, Aristotle left Athens because of an anti-Macedonian 
feeling, which resulted in his indictment for impiety. Unlike 
Socrates, who stayed for his trial and execution, Aristotle fled, saying 
that he would not give Athens a second chance to sin against 
philosophy.823 Thus, Aristotle, Plato’s pupil, occupies a position in 
Western philosophy of, as Raphael portrays him in his School of 
 
 817. See Aristotle, supra note 814, at 275 (“the number [of causes is answered by] the 
question ‘why[?]’”); Aristotle, supra note 807, at 501 (“[T]he ‘why’ is reducible finally to the 
definition, and the ultimate ‘why’ is a cause and a principle.”). 
 818. DONNEGAN, supra note 816, at 755. See generally Alan Gotthelf, Aristotle’s 
Conception of Final Causality, in PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN ARISTOTLE’S BIOLOGY 204 (Allan 
Gotthelf et al. eds., 1987). 
 819. See Aristotle, supra note 814, at 271 (“men do not think they know a thing til they 
have grasped the ‘why’ of it”). 
 820. See Plato, supra note 803, at 548–49. 
 821. Aristotle, Topics, in 7 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 192–206. 
 822. See Abeleson, supra note 233, at 320–22, for a withering and persuasive critique of 
Aristotle’s rules from a pragmatic perspective. 
 823. GEORGE GROTE, ARISTOTLE 23 (Alexander Bain & G. Croom Robertson eds., 
1872). 
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Athens, a thinker whose hand is held out, even with the sky and the 
ground, taking a middle course. While Plato and Aristotle disagreed 
on how an essence was realized by the mind—dialectic or 
abstraction—Plato and Aristotle were in agreement that definition 
sought to express the essence of a thing. For this reason, each of 
these thinkers (from his own perspective) is a classic example of the 
essentialist tendency. 
¶7. Plato and Aristotle represent one tendency in Greek thought, 
though not the only one to develop in Greece. Skepticism preceded 
Plato and Aristotle, and it succeeded them. Pyrrho (c.365–275 B.C.), 
a Greek skeptic, said that Plato and Aristotle disagreed about 
everything—except the possibility of attaining knowledge, and of 
that he was sure they were in error.824 Unfortunately, that line of 
thought leads into a cul-de-sac in any analysis of definition.825 
¶8. Western philosophy took an empirical turn in England, away 
from the Aristotelian Scholasticism of the late Middle Ages and the 
Christian Platonism of the Renaissance, in 1573 when Francis Bacon 
(1561–1626 A.D.) entered Trinity College, Cambridge. There, he 
tells us, “he first fell into the dislike of the philosophy of 
Aristotle.”826 He judged it “a philosophy . . . strong for disputations 
. . . but barren of the production of works for the benefit of the life 
of man . . . .”827 Bacon published his alternative to Aristotle’s logical 
treatises, The Organum, forty-seven years later in Novum Organum, 
in which he sought to establish a “prudent mean” between “the 
arrogance of dogmatism and the despair of scepticism [sic].”828 
Bacon thought that when thinkers followed Aristotle, “notions” 
were “confused and carelessly abstracted from thing[s] . . . .”829 
Hope lay, he thought, only in “genuine induction.”830 Nevertheless, 
Bacon identified four “idols of the mind” that stood in the way of 
human progress: those of “The Tribe” (human nature itself, e.g., a 
 
 824. DURANT, supra note 808, at 642. 
 825. See 2 SEXTUS EMPIRICIUS: OUTLINES OF SCEPTICISM 123–24 (Julia Annas & 
Jonathan Barnes trans., 1994) (“[D]ogmatists think . . . [that] definitions [are] 
indispensable . . . for apprehension or for teaching. If, then, we suggest that they are useful for 
neither of these things, we shall . . . turn about all the vain effort which the Dogmatists have 
bestowed on them.”). 
 826. 1 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 4 (James Spedding et al. eds., 1858). 
 827. Id. 
 828. Francis Bacon, Novum Organum, in 30 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 105. 
 829. Id. at 107–08. 
 830. Id. 
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tendency, for the sake of tidiness, towards supposing more order in a 
field of inquiry than is actually present), those of “The Den” 
(individual peculiarities, e.g., one person sees likeness, another 
difference; one may focus on detail, another totality), those of “The 
Market” (defects for which language itself is responsible), and those 
of “The Theater” (prior philosophical dogmas).831 In particular, 
Bacon was troubled by “The Idols of the Market.” The words of our 
language are formed, he wrote, in “a popular sense,” but when a 
“more diligent observation is [made], and [an effort is taken] to 
adapt them more accurately to nature,” the “words [themselves] 
oppose it.”832 Controversies ensue, therefore, “about words,”833 not 
things. “[I]t would be better,” he thought, to imitate “the caution 
of mathematicians . . . [and] to proceed more advisedly in the first 
instance . . . [framing] definitions.”834 For Bacon, definitions did not 
reflect essences, but merely clarified the sense of words, one of the 
first steps required before systematic observation.835 Nevertheless, 
Bacon observed that definitions “consist themselves of words . . . so 
that we must necessarily have recourse to particular instances, and 
their regular series and arrangement . . . .”836 Knowledge was 
corrupted by the “logic . . . of Aristotle” and the “natural 
theology . . . of Plato.”837 “Nothing is rightly inquired into, or 
verified, noted, weighed, or measured [for] indefinite and vague 
observation produces fallacious and uncertain information.”838 
Speculation, he thought, gave “offense” when “wasted on words, or, 
at least common notions,” when the mind “ought to be fixed on 
things . . . .”839 Build, Bacon observed, “a real model of the world in 
the understanding, such as it is found to be, not such as man’s 
reason” alone distorts it.840 “Truth . . . and utility are . . . ,” he 
 
 831. Id. at 109–10. 
 832. Id. at 112. 
 833. Id. 
 834. Id. 
 835. See also Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, in 23 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 56 
(“Seeing that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names . . . , a man that seeketh precise 
truth . . . [as] in geometry . . . [ought to begin by] settling the significance of the words . . . by 
definitions and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.”). 
 836. See Bacon, supra note 828, at 112. 
 837. Id. at 126. 
 838. Id. at 126–27. 
 839. Id. 
 840. Id. at 133. 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
1098 
thought, “perfectly identical, and effects are . . . pledges of truth.”841 
For Bacon, therefore, that “which is most useful in practice is most 
correct in theory.”842 Here, Bacon, a believing Christian, followed 
scripture.843 
¶9. The step from Bacon’s empirical turn to John Locke’s 
(1632–1704 A.D.) nominalism was not inevitable, but it was soon 
taken. Bacon wrote at the height of the English Renaissance, the age 
of Shakespeare (1564–1616 A.D.) and Elizabeth I (1533–1603 
A.D.), who reigned from 1558–1603 A.D. Locke wrote at the time of 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which ended the restored Stuart 
Monarchy and assured the dominance of the outlook of the English 
middle class in literature, arts, and the intellectual life. In particular, 
Locke was the voice of that new order of things. But Locke straddled 
two worlds: that of the character of the Puritan Christianity that 
formed the climate in which he lived, and that of the emerging 
scientific revolution, which was to replace it. Like Bacon in an earlier 
time, he was a believer and an empiricist. Famously, in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding,844 Locke rooted his perspective 
on human understanding in “experience.” Rejecting the classic 
notion of conception, independent of sensation, Locke thought 
instead that reflection on sensation gave rise to ideas, but that man, 
contrary to Plato and Aristotle, did not know “real essences.”845 
Locke observed, “Nature makes many particular things, which do 
agree one with another in many sensible qualities . . . but it is not . . 
. [an] essence that distinguishes them into species; it is men . . . 
[who set the boundaries of the species] . . . .”846 In short, men 
distinguish things by “nominal, . . . not by their real essences[; such 
essences, as they are,] are made by the mind, and not by 
nature . . . .”847Because “real essences” are “utterly unknown to us,” 
they cannot furnish us “standards” against which “ideas” and 
 
 841. Id. 
 842. Id. at 138. 
 843. See Sirach 27:5–6 (“the test of what the potter molds is in the furnace”; “the fruit of 
the tree shows the care it has had”); Luke 6:44 (“For every tree is known by its own fruit.”). 
 844. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in 35 GREAT BOOKS, 
supra note 130, at 85. 
 845. Id. at 258–59. 
 846. Id. at 279. 
 847. Id. at 274. 
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“words” may be “adjusted,” “established,” or “rectified.”848 
Mortimer J. Adler, a modern student of Aristotle, thought that 
Locke’s nominalist turn was disastrous; it led, as Hume was to see, 
inexorably to skepticism or solipsism.849 Adler’s argument (as St. 
Thomas Aquinas’s) retains the distinction between conception and 
sensation—that ideas are “that by which” we know, not “that 
which” is known.850 
¶10. Locke applied his insight in the first instance to natural 
entities. The question, for example, whether “a bat be a bird” was 
for Locke “merely verbal,” and it should be resolved, he thought, by 
agreement on the “signification” of the “two names.”851 Locke 
thought, too, that this insight possessed particularly sharp force for 
“moral words,” that is, those words that could not be reduced to 
“sensible objects,” as, for instance, “murder.”852 “What the word 
murder . . . signifies can never be known from things 
themselves . . . ; the intention of the mind . . . which make a part of 
murder [has] no necessary connexion [sic] with the . . . visible action 
of him that commits . . . [it].” 853 For Locke, “moral words” were 
“assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind, 
pursuing its own ends of discourse, and suit[ed] to its own notions, 
whereby it designs not to copy anything really existing . . . .”854 
¶11. While Locke drew a distinction between the nominal and 
the real, he was too much the levelheaded Englishman to divorce 
entirely the nominal from the real. For Locke, “virtue and vice” were 
“moral words” that could not be reduced to sensible objects; they 
were, instead, rooted in “praise or blame.”855 Nevertheless, he 
thought, the “advanc[ing]” of the “general good of mankind” 
generally focused “praise” and “blame” “on the side of that [which] 
really deserved it . . . .”856 
 
 
 848. Id. at 288. 
 849. MORTIMER J. ADLER, TEN PHILOSOPHICAL MISTAKES 13–24 (1985). 
 850. Id. at 14 (citing Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, in 19 GREAT BOOKS, supra 
note 130, at 454). 
 851. See Locke, supra note 844, at 301. 
 852. Id. at 304. 
 853. Id. at 286. 
 854. Id. 
 855. Id. at 230. 
 856. Id. at 231; see also id. at 305 (“must agree with the truth of things as well as with 
men’s ideas”). 
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¶12. Like Bacon—and following him—Locke gave due attention 
to language and its uses and its imperfections as well as its abuses and 
their remedies.857 Like Bacon, Locke thought little of abstract 
Aristotelian disputes; instead, he focused on the practical. Locke 
believed that the “unscholastic statesman” gave men “peace, 
defenses and liberties,” while the “condemned mechanic” gave men 
the “improvements of useful arts.”858 Locke observed: 
Nor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties, or curious empty 
speculations; it hath invaded the great concernments of human life 
and society; obscured and perplexed the material truths of law . . . ; 
brought confusion, disorder and uncertainty into the affairs of 
mankind; and if not destroyed, yet in a great measure rendered 
useless . . . justice.859 
“[D]oth it not often happen,” Locke noted, that a man “of 
ordinary capacity very well understands a . . . law, that he reads, till 
he consults an expositor, or goes to counsel; who, by that time he 
hath done explaining . . . [he] makes words signify either nothing at 
all or what he pleases.”860 
¶13. “Common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well,” 
Locke observed, “for common conversation . . . .”861 Common 
usage, however, does not serve so well for more complex matters. 
Locke observed: “[I]n the interpretation of laws . . . there is no end; 
comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for 
explications; and of limiting, distinguishing, varying the signification 
of . . . moral words there is no end. These ideas of men’s making are, 
by men still having the same power, multiplied in infinitum.”862 But 
Locke added: “I say not this that I think commentaries needless; but 
to show how uncertain . . . [moral words] naturally are, even in the 
mouths of those who had both the intention and the faculty of 
speaking as clearly as language was capable to express their 
thoughts.”863 
 
 
 857. See id. at 285–306. 
 858. Id. at 293. 
 859. Id. at 294. 
 860. Id. 
 861. Id. at 286. 
 862. Id. at 287 (emphasis omitted). 
 863. Id. 
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¶14. Locke also thought that definitions had an important role 
to play in clearing up mere verbal disputes. “Definition . . . was 
nothing but making another understand what the names of simple 
ideas . . . stand for . . . .”864 If “men would tell what ideas they make 
their words stand for, there could not be half . . . [such] obscurity or 
wrangling in the search or support of truth . . . .”865 
¶15. The turn in Western philosophy away from the essentialism 
of Plato and Aristotle in the period following Locke eventually 
forked in three not necessarily alternative directions: the linguistic, 
the stipulative, and the pragmatic. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873 
A.D.), one of the most influential liberal thinkers of nineteenth 
century England, illustrates the complexity of the directions taken. 
The son of James Mill, he was given a private education at home by 
his father, beginning with Greek at three (including six of Plato’s 
dialogues) and Latin at eight.866 Mill himself reported that the 
Theaetetus might have been too much for him at that early age.867 An 
empiricist, Mill sought to construct a theory of knowledge for social 
and scientific affairs. Mill devoted to “definition,” chapter VIII, 
book I of his A System of Logic.868 In Logic, Mill defined “definition” 
as “a proposition declaratory of the meaning of a word; namely, 
either the meaning which it bears in common acceptation, or that 
which the speaker or writer . . . intends to annex to it.”869 Mill 
rejected the Aristotelian concept that definition is of things, rather 
than ideas: 
All definitions are of names, and of names only; but, in some 
definitions, it is clearly apparent that nothing is intended except to 
explain the meaning of the word; while in others . . . it is intended 
to be implied that there exists a thing, corresponding to the 
word . . . . This [last] assertion is not a definition, but a postulate 
[of fact].870 
Mill also distinguished definition by “connotation” from definition 
by “denotation”; “connotation” defines by attributes; “denotation” 
 
 864. Id. 
 865. Id. at 295. 
 866. JOHN STUART MILL, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 5–6 (1957). 
 867. Id. at 6. 
 868. JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC (8th ed. 1879). 
 869. Id. at 105. 
 870. Id. at 112–13. 
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defines by designating members of the class defined.871 Nevertheless, 
Mill considered definition by denotation “imperfect.”872 “All 
definitions are,” he thought, “of names,” but names “can neither be 
true nor false; the only character . . . [they are] susceptible of is that 
of conformity or disconformity to usage . . . .”873 On the other hand, 
Mill added, “A name . . . admits of definition . . . [if] we are able to 
analyze, that is, to distinguish into parts, . . . the attributes . . . which 
constitute the meaning both of the . . . name and of . . . [its] 
corresponding [idea] . . . .”874 “Definitions are properly of names 
only, and not of things,” Mill continued, but “it does not follow 
from this that definitions are arbitrary. How to define a name . . . 
may involve consideration . . . into the nature of the things which are 
denoted by the name.”875 “[I]nquires which form the subjects of the 
most important of Plato’s Dialogues” go, Mill observed, beyond 
“ascertaining the conventional meaning of a name. They are inquires 
not so much to determine what is, as what should be, the meaning of 
a name . . . .”876 “[L]ike other practical questions,” they “require[] 
for [their] solution[s], . . . [inquiry] into the properties not merely of 
names but of the things named.”877 As Abelson commented, Mill’s 
shift in reference in his various discussions of his idea of definition 
represents differences in focus; at times he “identified the meaning of 
a term with the object it ‘names,’ at other times with the customary 
usage of the word, and at still other times with an abstract object or 
‘idea’ capable of being divided into simpler parts.”878 For Mill, 
therefore, “a definition . . . [could be] the stipulation of a name 
[including reference to the nature of the thing named], a report of 
linguistic usage, or the analysis of a complex idea into its constituent 
parts.”879 
¶16. The thought of Bertrand Russell (1872–1970 A.D.) and 
Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947 A.D.) in their monumental 
 
 871. Id. at 34–41. 
 872. Id. at 108. 
 873. Id. at 112–13. 
 874. Id. at 107. 
 875. Id. at 117. 
 876. Id. (emphasis added). 
 877. Id. 
 878. Abelson, supra note 233, at 320–21. 
 879. MILL, supra note 868, at 98. 
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Principia Mathematica880 also illustrates a concept of definition that 
is stipulative: 
A definition is a declaration that a certain newly-introduced 
symbol . . . is to mean the same as . . . other . . . symbols of which 
the meaning is already known . . . . For a definition is concerned 
wholly with the symbols, not with what they symbolise. Moreover, 
it is not true or false, being the expression of a volition.881 
Like Mill, they also expressed a less than unalloyed concept of 
definition. The purely stipulative character of their concept lost 
much of its force when they added that “when what is defined is . . . 
something already familiar, . . . the definition contains an analysis of 
a common idea.”882 
¶17. The pragmatic turn in modern philosophy is well-illustrated 
by the thought of Willard van Orman Quine (1908–2000 A.D.)883 
Following Bacon, Locke, and Mill, Quine stands squarely in the 
empiricist tradition. In his classic, the Web of Belief,884 Quine rested 
“our whole system of beliefs . . . [on] our own direct 
observations.”885 But Quine parted company with Locke (and 
others) when he did not limit our observations to “sensory 
events.”886 “What we ordinarily notice and testify to are rather the 
objects and events out in the world.”887 Those observations are then 
embodied in language, in the form of an “observation sentence,” 
which, he said, any “second witness would be bound to agree with 
me on all points then and there, granted merely an understanding of 
my language.”888 
¶18. According to Quine, language is learned primarily 
“ostensively,” not by definition, but by “learning to associate the 
heard words with things” or “the circumstances that [an 
 
 880. 1 ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD & BERTRAND RUSSELL, PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA 
(2d ed. 1957). 
 881. Id. at 11. 
 882. Id. at 12. 
 883. Compare ROGER F. GIBSON, JR., THE PHILOSOPHY OF W.V. QUINE (1982) 
(approving forward by W.V. Quine), with CHRISTOPHER HOOKWAY, QUINE: LANGUAGE, 
EXPERIENCE AND REALITY (1988) (expository review, but critical questions raised). 
 884. W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN, THE WEB OF BELIEF (2d ed. 1978). 
 885. Id. at 21 (including other people’s reports). 
 886. Id. at 22 (that “way lies frustration”). 
 887. Id. 
 888. Id. at 23. 
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observation] sentence reports.”889 Quine’s insight, at this point, 
reflects a long tradition that extends back to figures as diverse as St. 
Augustine (a Platonist) and Locke (an empiricist), and it represents 
an aspect of the consensus of modern child psychologists who 
examine language empirically, not philosophically.890 
¶19. Nevertheless, Quine believed that ostension “accounts 
for . . . only a modest part of our language.”891 Other elaborate, but 
largely unconscious, processes are at work, including observed use 
and “definition,” the simplest form of which “is that in which the 
new expression is equated outright to some expression that is 
presumed to have been already intelligible.”892 Other kinds of 
definition do not draw on usage or synonymity. An expression is 
simply made synonymous with another expression for a particular 
purpose.893 Still another kind of definition is contextual, that is, 
words are not equated with each other, but criteria are given in the 
definition for its application.894 
¶20. “[E]veryday terms are mainly suited for everyday affairs, 
where lax talk is rife.”895 Accordingly, another “variant type of 
definitional activity . . . does not limit itself to reporting” or 
artificially creating synonymity; its “purpose” is “to improve” upon 
 
 889. Id. at 24. 
 890. Compare Augustine, Confessions, in 18 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 287, and 
Locke, supra note 844, at 255, with DAVID CRYSTAL, Child Language Acquisition, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 242–47 (1987) (ostensive learning 
is not thought, however, to account fully for the learning of various grammatical constructions 
or for all of the functions of all kinds of words). See also LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, 
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 83e (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953) (examples and 
practices, that is, rules of usage, account for language learning); POPPER, supra note 804, at 
42–59 (Popper analyzes and refutes David Hume’s (1771–1776) skeptical position in A 
TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 155–76 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1958)). According to Popper, 
Hume argues that experience begins with the observation of a series of discrete facts; these 
facts give rise to theory that cannot be justified save on the basis of psychological habit. Popper 
then shows, on the contrary, that theory is first required to make an observation of a fact. 
Theories must then be at least corroborated or refuted by a process of falsification through 
which human knowledge, that is, an approximation of truth, can not only be attained, but also 
can progress. See infra note 903 (discussion of Popper’s theories). 
 891. QUINE & ULLIAN, supra note 884, at 27. 
 892. Id. 
 893. WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 26 (1953) 
(“created expressly for the purpose of being synonymous”). 
 894. QUINE & ULLIAN, supra note 884, at 27 (“brother of x” means “male other than x 
whose parents are the parents of x”). 
 895. Id. at 100. 
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the expression by “refining or supplementing its meaning.”896 Quine 
observed, “Any word worth explicating has some contexts which, as 
wholes, are clear and precise enough to be useful; and the purpose of 
explication is to preserve the usage of these favored contexts while 
sharpening the usage of other contexts.”897 
¶21. For Quine, the function of explications is to introduce 
precision as a “step toward clarity.”898 Illustrating the concept, he 
observed: 
[J]udicial decisions contribut[e] to the sharpening of legal concepts 
even without recourse to explicit definitions. Decisions . . . may 
give new guidelines for determining the range of . . . concepts. . . . 
[O]ld decisions [may be used] as criteria as long as possible, and 
then, when old lines fail, . . . finer lines [are drawn] through fresh 
decisions.899 
Out of this complex, but not fully understood, process learners build 
a “coherent system” of beliefs.900 That system of beliefs, however, is 
a “man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the 
edges.”901 “Observation sentences are [merely] the bottom edge of 
language, where it touches experience.”902 Over time, inconsistent 
observations may create a crisis for the web of belief. But “[e]ven 
when observations persist in conflicting,” the web of belief “will not 
necessarily be abandoned forthwith” until a “plausible substitute is 
found.”903 
 
 896. QUINE, supra note 893, at 25 (“explication”). 
 897. Id. 
 898. QUINE & ULLIAN, supra note 884, at 100. 
 899. Id. 
 900. Id. at 29. 
 901. QUINE, supra note 893, at 42. 
 902. QUINE & ULLIAN, supra note 884, at 28. 
 903. Id. at 30 (citing THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
67–68 (1962)). Compare WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM 77–78 (Bruce Kucklick ed., 1981) 
(“[O]ur knowledge grows in spots. The spots may be large or small, but the knowledge never 
grows all over: some old knowledge always remains what it was . . . . [W]e patch and tinker 
more than we renew.”), and WILLIAM JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH 266–67 (1909) 
(“Truth absolute” is “an ideal set of formulations toward which all opinions may be expected 
to converge in the long run of experience.”), with CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, COLLECTED 
PAPERS 565–66 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weeks eds., 1934) (“Truth is that concordance of 
an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would 
tend . . . .”). Their definitions of truth are similar, but James and Peirce are different kinds of 
pragmatists; Peirce is “logical” and “realist”; James is “psychological” and “nominalist.” 
SUSAN HAACK, MANIFESTO OF A PASSIONATE MODERATE 25 (1998); see also POPPER, supra 
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¶22. As he did with Locke, Quine departed company with other 
empiricists, including Alfred Jules Ayer (1910–1989 A.D.), a logical 
positivist who argued that knowledge is either analytic (known to be 
true from an understanding of the terms employed, e.g., “All 
bachelors are unmarried”), synthetic (known to be true by 
observation, e.g., “Eric is a bachelor”), a subjective reaction (ethics), 
or nonsense (metaphysics or theology), and that the meaning of a 
synthetic statement lies in its verification (the verifiability principle, 
that is, no statement is “meaningful” without the possibility of 
verification or falsification).904 Quine rejected the analytic/synthetic 
distinction.905 He rejected, too, the verification principle, at least in 
so far as it was applied to statements; he believed that “the unit of 
empirical significance” was the web of belief itself.906 
¶23. Quine believed that we can improve our web of belief, bit 
by bit, like a mariner who rebuilds his ship on the open sea.907 But 
“we cannot detach ourselves from it and compare it 
objectively . . . .”908 Accordingly, “[o]ur standard for appraising basic 
changes . . . must be, not a realistic standard of correspondence to 
reality but a pragmatic standard.”909 “Concepts are language, and the 
purpose of . . . language is efficacy in communication and in 
prediction. Such is the ultimate duty of language . . . , and it is in 
 
note 804, at 28, 129 (“Knowledge cannot start from nothing—from a tabula rasa—nor yet 
from [pure] observation [without theory]. The advance of knowledge consists, mainly, in the 
modification of earlier knowledge. . . . Pessimistic and optimistic espistemologies are about 
equally mistaken.” He continues, “[W]e cannot start afresh . . . . We must carry on a certain 
tradition. . . . It tells us that people have already constructed in this world a kind of theoretical 
framework—not perhaps a very good one, but one which works more or less; it serves us as a 
kind of network . . . . We use it by checking it over, and by criticizing it. In this way we make 
progress.”) 
 904. See generally ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 5–26 (1952). 
 905. QUINE, supra note 893, at 46. 
 906. QUINE & ULLIAN, supra note 884, at 42 (“The whole of science”). But see POPPER, 
supra note 804, at 238–39 (criticizing Quine’s “holistic” view of empirical testing and arguing 
that all criticism must be “piecemeal”). 
 907. QUINE, supra note 893, at 79 (referring to Otto Neurath’s famous ship metaphor). 
See Otto Neurath, Protocol Sentences, in LOGICAL POSITIVISM 199, 201 (A.J. Ayer ed., 1959); 
OTTO VON NEURATH, ANTI-SPENGLER 75–76 (1921) (translated from German by Eva M. 
Steinberger, visiting scholar, Notre Dame Law School, 2001) (“Sailors may try to reconstruct 
their boat on the open sea, but they cannot work on the whole boat at the same time. When 
one piece is taken apart, a new one is needed immediately. The boat can be reconstructed 
completely, but only step by step.”). 
 908. QUINE, supra note 893, at 79. 
 909. Id.; see also id. at 46. 
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relation to that duty that . . . [our web of belief] has . . . to be 
appraised.”910 
¶24. For lawyers with a legal, not a philosophical bent, resolving 
which combination of these tendencies to adopt is not difficult. The 
resolution of difficult issues of epistemology and metaphysics may be 
put off to another day. Whatever is true of natural entities, strictly 
legal concepts do not have an “essence,” at least, not in the 
essentialist’s sense; they do not have a standard outside themselves 
against which they may be adjusted, established, or rectified on an 
objective basis.911 In addition, (Plato, Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke to 
the contrary) lawyers ought not “expect mathematical certainty 
from . . . language.”912 Seeking an essentialist definition—the every 
and only of mathematics—is like seeking water at a mirage in a desert. 
In fact, “[p]hilosophy has been misled by the example of 
mathematics; . . . even in mathematics . . . ultimate . . . principles . . . 
[are] beset with difficulties, as yet insuperable.”913 Human purpose 
and linguistic function are the only practical keys. Whatever the case 
with natural entities, assuming that they exist and the human mind is 
capable of knowing them, law is sculptured by human hands, which 
have, or ought to reflect, a human purpose in an Aristotelian sense of 
final cause, an answer to the question “why?”; law is, at least for 
lawyers, made, not found.914 “[A]lthough we may welcome the fact 
 
 910. Id. at 46; see also id. at 44 (“a tool . . . for predicting future experience in the light 
of past experience”). But see POPPER, supra note 804, at 107–14 (describing and critiquing 
instrumentalism) (“[I]strumentalism is unable to account for the importance to pure science of 
testing severely even the most remote implications of its theories, since it is unable to account 
for the pure scientist’s interest in truth and falsity. . . . [T]he attitude of instrumentalism (like 
that of applied science) is one of complacency at the success of applications.”). See SANTAYANA, 
supra note 178 ¶ 10, at 218–19. 
 911. See F.R. PALMER, SEMANTICS 21 (2d ed. 1981) (“[T]he problem of semantics is to 
establish what classes there are. . . . [In fact, the] words of a language often reflect not so much 
the reality of the world, but the interest of the people who speak it.”). 
 912. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972); see also Aristotle, supra 
note 807, at 513 (“The minute accuracy of mathematics is not to be demanded in all 
cases . . . .”). 
 913. WHITEHEAD, supra note 805, at 12. 
 914. The law is made primarily, but it is also found, as Fuller notes:  
[A judge ought to realize] his responsibility to see that his decision was right—right 
for the group, right the in light of the group’s purposes and things that its members 
sought to achieve through common effort. Such a judge would find himself driven 
into an attempt to discover the natural principles underlying group life, so that his 
decision might conform to them. He would properly feel that he, no less than . . . 
engineers . . . [,] carpenters, and cooks . . . was faced with the task of mastering a 
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that Aristotle’s substance has disappeared from physics, there is nothing 
wrong . . . in thinking anthropomorphically about man; and there is 
no philosophical or a priori reason why it should disappear from 
psychology.”915 Bacon also recognized the utility of the Aristotelian 
concept of “final cause” or “purpose” in the “intercourse of man with 
man.”916 Rightly, Justice Holmes, a skeptic about objective truth from 
an essentialist’s perspective, thought “general purpose . . . more 
important . . . than . . . grammar or formal logic” in fixing a 
meaning.917 To be sure, as Mill observed, definition, though guided 
by human purpose, must reflect not only things as they are (at least as 
known by persons) but also as they “should be.”918 Law is, however, 
practical, not speculative; it concerns action, not belief. At the time of 
the founding of the United Nations, Jacques Maritain, a convinced 
Thomist, put it well: “The ideological agreement which is necessary 
between those who work . . . [for] peace . . . is restricted to a certain 
body of practical points and principles of action. . . . [No one] is . . . 
entitled to demand that others subscribe to his own [ultimate] 
justification of the practical principles . . . .”919 
 
segment of reality and of discovering and utilizing its regularities for the benefit of 
the group. 
[Law] is a combination of reason and fiat . . . ; in part the discovery of an order and 
in part the imposition of an order. In the language of legal philosophy . . . it [is] . . . 
a system of “positive law” that approaches to an indefinite degree “natural law.” 
Fuller, supra note 15, at 378–79 (alteration in original). 
 915. POPPER, supra note 804, at 81 n.26. 
 916. Bacon, supra note 828, at 137; see also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 
145 (2d ed. 1969) (“[L]aw [is] . . . a purposeful enterprise, dependent for its success on the 
energy, insight, intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who conduct it, and fated, because 
of this dependence, to fall always somewhat short of a full attainment of its goals.”); POPPER, 
supra note 804, at 105–06 n.17 (“[O]ne might adopt the view that certain things of our own 
making—such as clocks—may well be said to have ‘essences,’ viz. these ‘purposes’ (and what 
makes them serve these ‘purposes’). And science . . . might . . . be claimed by some to have an 
‘essence,’ even if they deny that natural objects have essences.”). 
 917. United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905). Similarly, Judge Learned 
Hand, a skeptic about objective truth from an essentialist’s perspective, thought “purpose . . . 
[was] the surest guide to . . . meaning . . . .” Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 
1945), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945); see LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 24 (1959) 
(skepticism is the teaching of “experience”). But see Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the 
Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 539–43 (1947) (“That aim, that policy is not 
drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statute as read in the 
light of other external manifestations of purpose. . . . While courts are no longer confined to 
the language, they are still confined by it.”). 
 918. MILL, supra note 868, at 117. 
 919. Jacques Maritain, Inaugural Address to the Second International Conference of 
UNESCO, in THE SOCIAL & POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JACQUES MARITAIN 144, 154 
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¶25. Technically, definitions serve several linguistic functions for 
the lawyer.920 They reflect linguistic usage or seek to create it.921 
“Usage” is “the collective speaking and writing habits of a particular 
group of people, or a particular one of these habits.”922 Lexical 
definitions “assert a meaning corresponding to actual usage in the 
given speech community.”923 “Speech community” is a “group of 
people who regularly interact by speaking.”924 Stipulative definitions 
differ from actual usage; they attempt to shape language usage.925 
¶26. Definitions are of several types. Definition may be by a 
synonym or a paraphrase that is thought presumably to be more clear 
to the speech community for whom the definition is drafted. 
“Fracture,” for example, means “break.”926 Such definitions are not, 
however, often employed in legal materials. 927 Definition may be by 
analysis; that is, a set is identified and the expression is defined by set 
and subset and the features that distinguish the set and the subset.928 
Definitions may also be by synthesis; the expression is defined by its 
 
(Joseph W. Evans & Leo R. Ward eds., 1956) (emphasis added). See generally MARY ANN 
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW 51, 77–78, 147, 230 (2001) (Glendon describes Maritain’s 
pivotal role in the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and quotes him 
explaining how people with violently opposed ideologies could agree on a list of fundamental 
human rights: “Yes, we agree about the rights but on condition no one asks us why.”); RALPH 
MCINERNY, AQUINAS ON HUMAN ACTION 207–19 (1992) (arguing (1) that Maritain’s point, 
if valid, shows that “embedded in everyone’s practical knowledge are certain truths, and they 
have bubbled to the surface in the declaration, despite the wild and various theoretical 
constructs that might be brought forward to justify them” and (2) that “human rights,” as 
articulated today are subject famously to the criticism, as in the case of Edmund Burke, 
because they are “abstract,” that is, unrelated to concrete human experience, “not adapted to 
the real world” where judicial decisions are made. Since human rights must be so adapted, they 
are illusory, and they are “impostures.” They pretend to be “universal,” but, as Karl Marx 
showed, they were used by the bourgeoisie to triumph over the nobles and the poor in France 
after 1789. Human rights conflict one with another (men with women, parents with children, 
etc.); accordingly, the classical doctrine of ius naturale is superior to the articulation of 
“human rights” today.) (relying, in particular, on MICHEL VILLEY, LE DROIT ET LES DROITS 
DE L’HOMME (1983) and Michel Villey, Critique des Droits de l’Humme, 12 ANALES DE LA 
CATEDRA FRANCISCO SUAREZ, at 9–16 (1972)). See also Romans 2:15 (“the demands of the 
law are written in their hearts”). 
 920. See generally DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 98–111. 
 921. See id. 
 922. R.L. TRASK, KEY CONCEPTS IN LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS 330 (1999). 
 923. DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 99. 
 924. TRASK, supra note 922, at 285. 
 925. DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 99. 
 926. Id.; see PALMER, supra note 911, at 3–4. 
 927. DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 99. 
 928. Id.; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1994) (definition of “debt” within RICO). 
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relation to something of which it is a part.929 “Carburetor,” for 
example, “means a part of a motor vehicle.”930 
¶27. As illustrated, these two definitions by analysis or synthesis 
are “connotative.”931 They are also “exhaustive” (that is, the 
definition gives the full sweep of the expression).932 A definition may 
also be “denotative”; it may define, not by set and subset and 
particular characteristics, but by listing all or some of the things to 
which the expression refers.933 The logical distinction between 
“connotative” and “denotative” is also sometimes put as “sense” and 
“reference” or “intentional” and “extensional.”934 Denotative 
definitions, too, may be exhaustive “means” or partial or illustrative 
“includes.”935 
¶28. Finally, a definition may also be an explication; while the 
definition retains the core meaning of the expression, it extends or 
restricts it to achieve a particular objective in the context in which it 
is used.936 
 
 929. DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 99–100. 
 930. Id. at 100. 
 931. Id. (definition by “significant characteristics”); see MILL, supra note 868, at 36–37 
(“attributes”). 
 932. DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 99–100; see Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 
121, 125 n.1 (1934) (distinguishing “means” from “includes”). 
 933. DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 100; see MILL, supra note 868, at 108 (“imperfect” 
definition). 
 934. PALMER, supra note 911, at 29, 190–92. 
 935. Helvering, 293 U.S. at 125 n.1; DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 100. Compare 18 
U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994) (definition of “racketeering activity” as “means” within RICO, 18 
U.S.C. § 248(e)(3) (1994); definition of “intimidate” as “means” within Extortionate 
Extension of Credit Act (“ECT”)), and 18 U.S.C. § 891(6) (1994) (definition of 
“extortionate extension of credit” as “is” within ECT), with 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994) 
(definition of “enterprise” as “includes” within RICO); 18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(1) (1994) 
(definition of “facility” as “includes” within ECT), and 18 U.S.C. § 891(4) (1994) 
(“repayment of any extension of credit” as “includes” within ECT). 
 936. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” within 
RICO as not, “means,” or “includes,” but “requires”); see MILL, supra note 868, at 90 
(“What would otherwise be a mere description may be raised to the rank of a real definition by 
the peculiar purpose which the . . . writer has in view . . . . [I]t may . . . be advisable to give 
some general name, without altering its denotation, a special connotation, different from its 
ordinary one.”). But see PALMER, supra note 911, at 205 (Control of definition lies with 
technical speakers, but the “ordinary speakers of a language cannot do this, for the definition 
of a word is not within the individual’s power.”). 
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APPENDIX B 
NATURAL LANGUAGE: GENERALITY, AMBIGUITY, AND VAGUENESS 
¶1. Natural language is adequate for most forms of 
communication. Typically, oral speech between a speaker and a 
listener who are face to face is occasioned by the constant give and 
take of question and answer that makes most oral speech an effective 
form of communication. Only when precision, not essential in most 
everyday matters, is required do the inherent defects of natural 
language come to the forefront. These defects are also compounded 
when the form of the communication is written and when the writer 
and the reader are separated by time and space, since the separation 
makes it difficult, if not impossible, to ask clarifying questions. But 
since the limitations of writing, including the separation of time and 
space, are characteristic of most forms of legal communication, an 
appreciation of the major defects of natural language facilitates legal 
analysis and communication. 
¶2. Reed Dickerson in his classic The Fundamentals of Legal 
Drafting identifies for the lawyer the major defects of natural 
language: generality, ambiguity, and vagueness.937 A term is 
“general” when it is not limited to a unique referent; that is, it can 
denote more than one member of a class. “President George 
Washington” refers, for example, to the first president of the United 
States; the phrase is singular.938 “President of the United States” 
refers to all of presidents past and future; the phrase is general.939 It 
may be indefinite in meaning, but it is not uncertain in reference.940 
 
 937. DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 22–23; see also REED DICKERSON, THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 43–53 (1975). 
 938. I. JOHN LYONS, SEMANTICS 178 (1971); see also Oliver W. Holmes, The Theory of 
Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 418 (1989) (citing Raffles v. Wichelhaous, H. & 
C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864)). Holmes noted: 
By the theory of our language, while other words may mean different things, a 
proper name means one person or thing and no other. . . . In theory of speech your 
name means you and my name means me [even if we have the same name], and the 
two names are different. [We admit parol evidence of the use of the same words to 
refer to two different things to] inquire what . . . [a person] meant in order to find 
out what he has said. It is on this ground that there is no contract when the proper 
name used by one party means one ship, and that used by the other means another. 
Id. 
 939. LYONS, supra note 938, at 178. 
 940. Id. 
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Lawyers are wont, however, to confuse generality with vagueness or 
ambiguity.941 Thus, the key distinction is that generality alone is not 
uncertain in meaning, while ambiguity and vagueness are always 
characterized by uncertainty of meaning. 
¶3. Ambiguity is equivocation; that which is ambiguous 
possesses two or more appropriate referents. Ambiguity is of three 
types: (1) semantic or verbal ambiguity, (2) syntactical ambiguity 
and (3) contextual ambiguity.942 Semantic or verbal ambiguity is 
present where one word or phrase possesses two or more equally 
appropriate referents. “Willfully” is, for example, hopelessly 
ambiguous until disambiguated by authoritative construction.943  
¶4. Syntactical ambiguity is present when it is not certain which 
word or words a word or phrase modifies.944 For example, 
“[w]hat . . . does ‘knowingly’ modify in a sentence from a ‘blue sky’ 
law criminal statute punishing one who ‘knowingly sells a security 
without a permit’ . . . [?]”945 As a matter of grammar, the sentence is, 
at least arguably, ambiguous; the uncertainty rests in which terms, if 
any, beyond the verb (“sell”) in the predicate “knowingly” modifies 
(to “security,” “without a permit,” both, or neither).946 
 
 941. See, e. g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (“‘The fact 
that RICO has been applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress[, that is, 
beyond organized crime to legitimate businesses,] does not demonstrate ambiguity. It 
demonstrates breadth.’” (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Chi., 
747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir), aff’d, 473 U.S. 606 (1984))). 
 942. DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 22–27; F.R. PALMER, SEMANTICS 38, 106–08 (2d 
ed. 1981). 
 943. Compare Browder v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 341–42 (1941) (“willfully” 
construed to mean “intentionally” instead of “accidentally”), with United States v. Murdock, 
290 U.S. 389, 394–96 (1933) (“willfully” construed to mean “done with a bad purpose”). See 
generally United States v. Bryan, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1999) (“The word ‘willfully’ is . . . ‘a 
word of many meanings’ whose construction is . . . dependent on the context in which it 
appears.” (citation omitted). Bryan surveys the various meanings of “willfully,” including 
deliberately, not accidentally, but in the criminal law, typically with a culpable state of mind, 
usually with a bad purpose, that is, knowing the conduct was unlawful; without justifiable 
excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, or perversely; without ground for believing the conduct is 
lawful or at least in a careless disregard whether or not the person has the right to act. See also 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDING 160 (1955) (“Judge [Learned] Hand: [‘Willfully’] is 
an awful word! It is one of the most troublesome words in a statute that I know. If I were to 
have [an index of words to be] purged, ‘willfully’ would lead all the rest in spite of its being at 
the end of the alphabet.”). 
 944. DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 25. 
 945. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 227. 
 946. Id. But see Michael Vitiello, Does Culpability Matter?: Statutory Construction Under 
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Unfortunately, courts and judges do not always acknowledge the 
presence of this sort of syntactical ambiguity nor do they consistently 
act upon it.947 
Other examples may be given.948 “Squinting modifiers” are 
common: “The trustee shall require him promptly to repay the loan.” 
Does “promptly” modify “require” or “repay”? Even more common 
are modifiers that precede or follow a series: “charitable corporations 
 
42 U.S.C. Sec. 6928, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 220 n.207 (1993) (Vitiello discusses “adjuncts,” 
or adverbial phrases, and concludes that in a semantically parallel sentence, transposed to the 
LaFave illustration, in normal grammar, the adverb (“knowingly”) is a “predication adjunct” 
composed of the adverb and all of the elements of the predication. In other words, the 
sentence could be rewritten without changing the meaning: “Knowing that he is acting 
without a permit and is selling a security, the person sells the security.” Briefly, the adverb 
modifies all elements of the elements of the predication. (citing RANDOLPH QUIRK ET AL., A 
COMPREHENSIVE GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 504–14 (1985))). Vitiello’s reading 
of the grammar of the sentences involving state of mind and predication concludes that they 
would not be syntactically ambiguous, but contextually ambiguous. That is, such sentences 
would be ambiguous until they were disambiguated by relevant background assumptions of 
the federal criminal law on state of mind and elements that serve grading, jurisdictional, and 
legal functions in the statement of the elements of federal offenses. See, e.g., United States v. X-
Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 n.3 (1996) (elements of an offense that serve solely to 
enhance an offense (e.g., making an assault an aggravated assault in light of the official 
character of the person assaulted), create federal jurisdiction over an offense (e.g., the person 
assaulted was a federal official), and constitutes a legal element (e.g., not the factual character 
of a work, but that such character is legally obscene) need not be encompassed by the 
offender’s state of mind) (citing United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (assaulting a 
federal officer) and Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (legal character of obscene 
material)). 
 947. Compare United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68–75 (1984) (Powell, J., for the 
Court) (“knowingly makes statement within the jurisdiction of the United States”; 
“knowingly” “clearly” does not modify “within the jurisdiction of the United States”); id. 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (because the sentence is ambiguous, it must be disambiguated in 
light of the principle of lenity that resolves ambiguity in favor of defendants); and United 
States v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 513 U.S. 64, 67–79 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court) 
(“knowingly” transports “visual depiction of minor in sexually explicit conduct”; despite “most 
natural reading” limiting “knowingly” to modifying “transports”; “knowingly” modifies 
“minor” in light of otherwise anomalous results, background assumption of state of mind for 
offenses, and First Amendment considerations); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying 
“knowingly” solely to “transports,” and finding that this is “the only grammatical reading”); 
with Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425–28 (1985) (Brennan, J., for the Court) 
(“knowingly” uses coupons “in any unauthorized manner”; “knowingly” modifies “in any 
unauthorized manner” in light of background assumption of state of mind for offenses and 
principle of lenity that resolves ambiguity in favor of defendants.); id. (White, J., dissenting) 
(the issue is how far down the sentence “knowingly” runs, and in light of the background 
assumption that knowledge of the law is not required, it need not be read to modify “in any 
[legally] unauthorized manner.” (emphasis added)). 
 948. See DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 25. 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
1114 
or institutions performing educational functions.”949 Does 
“charitable” modify both “corporations” and “institutions,” and 
does “performing educational functions” modify both “institutions” 
and “corporations”?950 Criminality often turns on the recognition 
and resolution of such ambiguities.951 
¶5. Contextual ambiguities come in two forms: (1) internal 
ambiguities that arise from an effort to read two words or passages in 
a document in a coherent fashion, (2) external ambiguities that arise 
from an effort to read a sentence in light of the context of the 
situation within which it is written.952 Internal contextual ambiguities 
are the usual stuff of legal interpretation.953 External contextual 
ambiguities are not so easily resolved. Defining the limits of the 
context, if any, is crucial, since “the world of experience must of 
necessity include the sum of human knowledge.”954 If meaning 
includes external context, its scope might well be “infinite.”955 That 
prospect made some eminent linguists “despair” of determining 
meaning where external context is included in the equation.956 In 
 
 949. Id. 
 950. See also FRANK PALMER, GRAMMAR 127 (Pelican ed. 1971) (“old men and women”; 
does “old” modify both “men” and “women”?); GEOFFREY LEECH, PRINCIPLES OF 
PRAGMATICS 47 (1983) (“we need more public schools”; does “more” modify “public,” as in 
more open schools, or “schools,” as in more public as opposed to private schools?). 
 951. See, e.g., People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1987) (mistake of law defense 
not available to federal correction officer charged with carrying a gun in a social club who 
argued that he was legally authorized to carry it because of exception to the prohibition for a 
“peace officer” defined as a “correction officers of any state correction facility or of any penal 
correctional institution” (emphasis added)). Does “state” modify both “corrections facility” 
and “any penal institution”? On the identification and resolution of syntactical ambiguities, see 
Layman Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting Legal 
Documents, 66 YALE L.J. 833 (1957). 
 952. DICKERSON, supra note 233, at 25. 
 953. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177–79 (1993) (Blackmun, J., for 
the Court) (In interpreting the phrase “to conduct . . . the conduct of such enterprise’s 
affairs,” the verb “to conduct” and the noun “conduct” should be read similarly. Since “to 
conduct” normally means “to manage or operate,” so, too, “conduct” means “to manage or 
operate.”). But see id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (the usage is ambiguous; the liberal construction 
clause of the statute, a “tie breaker,” requires that the broader reading—which defines “to 
conduct” and “conduct” as behavior—should be adopted). See also TEUN A. VAN DIJK, TEXT 
AND CONTEXT: EXPLORATIONS IN THE SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS OF DISCOURSE 3 
(1971) (“the meaning of sentences may depend on the meaning of other sentences . . . in 
terms of a larger unit, viz that of TEXT”). 
 954. PALMER, supra note 950, at 48. 
 955. Id. 
 956. Id. (referring to Leonard Bloomfield); see LEONARD BLOOMFIELD, LANGUAGE 513 
(1933) (“to study the universe in general”). 
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practice, many linguists working in the field of semantics deal with 
sentence meaning with “maximally decontextualized systems-
sentence.”957 Nevertheless, linguists also suggest that a distinction 
can be drawn between “sentence meaning” and “utterance 
meaning,” that is, “sentence meaning” consists of word meaning 
plus the grammar of the sentence, while utterance meaning adds to 
sentence meaning all of the various features of the context of the 
situation.958 Thus, the linguistic field of “semantics” is confined to 
“sentence meaning,” while the linguistic field of “pragmatics” 
extends to “utterance meaning.”959 The change in emphasis is from 
the abstract analysis of words and grammar to the examination of 
speaking as purposeful action in a particular context.960 Lawyers have 
 
 957. LYONS, supra note 938, at 590. 
 958. Id. at 643. 
 959. See LEECH, supra note 950, at 14 (“we can correctly describe pragmatics as dealing 
with utterance meaning, and semantics as dealing with sentence meaning”); see generally VAN 
DIJK, supra note 953, at 167–246. 
 960. ¶1. See LEECH, supra note 950, at 1, 4 (“how language is used in communication,” 
that is, “to meaning in use, rather than meaning in the abstract”). Different purposes in 
different contexts, too, give rise to different meanings. Id. at 2; see also VAN DIJK, supra note 
953, at 191 (“A context is not just one possible world-state, but at least a sequence of world-
states.”). 
¶2. Unfortunately, [“w]e cannot ultimately be certain of what a speaker means by an 
utterance.” LEECH, supra note 950, at 30 (emphasis added). A listener must try to identify the 
pragmatic meaning “of an utterance by forming hypotheses and checking them against 
available evidence.” Id. at 41. He begins with a “default” interpretation, that is, “the 
interpretation that is accepted in default of any evidence to the contrary.” Id.at 43. “The 
observable conditions, the utterance and the context, are determinants of what [a speaker] 
means by [an utterance]; it is the task of [the hearer] to diagnose the most likely 
interpretation.” Id. at 30. The process is “probabilistic.” Id. at 30. “Not all speech acts are 
performed by uttering sentences whose literal meaning expresses the intended speaker 
meaning.” JOHN SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY 150 (1999). 
¶3. Literal meaning will often be filtered through social conventions other than those of 
the language itself. The meaning, for example, of “Can you pass me the salt?” will vary 
depending on the purpose of who is speaking to whom and time and place. Id. at 150–51. If it 
is spoken by a physical therapist to his patient in the therapist’s office, and he seeks to ascertain 
how well the patient moves his arm at this point in the treatment process, it will be an 
interrogatory inquiring about ability; its semantic form and its pragmatic meaning will be 
isomorphic. But if you change the purpose and context, you will change the pragmatic, if not 
the semantic, meaning of the sentence. If it is spoken at a dinner party, and a guest is seeking 
to have the host pass the salt shaker so that he may salt his food, its semantic form will be the 
same, but its pragmatic meaning will be different: “Pass me the salt.” It will be spoken as an 
interrogatory, but uttered indirectly as an imperative because of considerations of politeness 
between guest and host. Thus, the “rules” of pragmatics, like the rules of statutory 
interpretation, are not “constitutive,” but “regulative.” That is, “pragmatic rules” of speech, 
often called “principles and maxims,” “can be contravened without abnegation of the kind of 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
1116 
 
activity which they control.” LEECH, supra note 950, at 8. In brief, if you do not follow the 
“rules of politeness” (you tell the host: “Pass the salt.”), you will be impolite, but you will not 
have failed to speak the English language or to convey intentional meaning. See also ALASDAIR 
MACINTYRE, AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OF THE AGE 128 (1971): 
  If I advise, warn, or threaten you, I back up my imperative implicitly or 
explicitly by giving you reasons for action; and it is the character of the reasons that 
makes of the imperative a piece of advice rather than a warning or a warning rather 
than a threat. The tone of voice or the choice of words may convey that what is 
being uttered is a threat, but what makes a threat a threat is the implicit or explicit 
answers offered to the questions “And what if I do not?” and “And what if I do?” 
addressed to the utterer of the imperative. 
¶4. See also SEARLE, supra ¶ 2, at 122–24 (discussion of distinction between constitutive 
and regulative rules); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. 
L. REV. 527, 544 (1947) (“[R]ules of construction are not in any true sense rules of law. So 
far as valid, they are what Mr. Justice Holmes called axioms of experience.”) (citing Boston 
Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (“axioms of experience”)). 
¶5. Similarly, and more to the point of these materials, “‘If I were you, I’d leave town 
straight away’ can be interpreted according to context as a piece of advice, a warning, or a 
threat.” LEECH, supra note 950, at 24 (emphasis added); see also supra note 17 (analytical 
overview of the materials). The interpretation will vary with who is talking to whom and when 
and where the speech occurs. The semantic meaning will be the same, but the pragmatic 
meaning will vary from context to context. But as in the interpretation of legislation, 
“purpose” will be the key. Meaning is both speaker-relative and hearer-relative. When it is 
speaker-relative, it is the “purpose” of the speaker that determines “intentional” meaning, but 
no responsible speaker can ignore with whom he is speaking and the context within which he 
will be heard; thus, meaning is ultimately not “intentional,” but “conventional,” that is, it is 
hearer-relative; that which the hearer hears determines what is, in fact, said, so long as the 
listener listens using the usual conventions of the relative speech community. See SEARLE, supra 
¶ 2, at 140 (“The meaning of a sentence is determined by the meaning of the words and the 
syntactical arrangement of the words in the sentence. But what the speaker means by the 
utterance of the sentence is, within certain limits, entirely a matter of his or her intentions. I 
have to say ‘within certain limits’ because you can’t just say anything and mean anything. . . . [, 
since t]he meaning of the sentence is entirely a matter of the convention of the language.”). 
¶6. For other authorities, see LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 
& THOUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 67 (Signet ed. 1960) (“‘Then you should say what you 
mean,’ the March Hare went on. ‘I do.’ Alice hastily replied; ‘at least—at least I mean what I 
say—that’s the same thing, you know.’ ‘Not the same thing a bit!’ said the Hatter. ‘Why you 
might just as well say that “I see what I eat” is the same thing as “I eat what I see”!’”), United 
States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905) (Holmes, J.) (“purpose is a more important aid 
to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down”), and Cabell v. 
Markham, 146 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (Hand, J.) (“purpose . . . is the surest guide 
to . . . meaning), aff’d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945). But see Frankfurter, supra ¶ 4, at 539–43 
(“[Purpose] is not drawn, like nitrogen out of the air; it is evidenced in the language . . . as 
read in light of the external manifestations of purpose. . . . While courts are no longer confined 
to the language, they are still confined by it.”); Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) 
(Holmes, J.) (“[Words are not “transparent and unchang[ing]. . . . [They] may vary greatly in 
color and content according to the circumstances and time in which . . . [they are] used.”); 
Holmes, supra note 938, at 417–20 (“[W]e ask, not what . . . [was] meant, but what those 
words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English, using them in the 
circumstances in which they were used. . . . [ to interpret a written contract.] . . . [Similarly, 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 1117 
no choice but to deal with both types of meanings.961 Indeed, in the 
federal criminal law, a number of background assumptions act to 
disambiguate natural language for the purpose of defining criminal 
offenses. State of mind is, for example, implied in sentences defining 
serious federal offenses stated in terms of conduct, result, and 
sanction without expressly indicating a culpable state of mind.962  
¶6. Understanding the legal concept of “vagueness” is facilitated 
by looking at two features of natural language: the concept of 
vagueness itself and the Law of the Excluded Middle. The classic 
paradox of the “heap” or the “bald man” illustrates the concept of 
vagueness in natural language. “Each grain of corn makes no sound 
when dropped, but a heap of them does: plucking one hair from a 
man’s head doesn’t make him bald but continuing the process long 
enough turns him bald.”963 Cicero in his classic, Academica, puts it 
well: 
[I]n any matter whatsoever—if we are asked by gradual states, is 
such and such a person a rich man or a poor man, famous or 
undistinguished, are yonder objects many or few, great or small, 
long or short, broad or narrow, we do not know at what point in 
the addition or subtraction to give a definite answer.964 
In short, natural language is characterized by an irreducible 
element of “vagueness” in any concept, not in the core but on the 
edge, where it becomes fuzzy, as day shades into night, and none 
can mark with certainty the distinctions between day and night at 
dusk or dawn (unless a measure of time over a set period is agreed 
 
we] do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means . . . So in 
the case of a will . . . [;] that means that [the testator’s written] words must be sufficient for 
the purpose when taken in the sense in which they would be used by the normal speaker of 
English under his circumstances.”). 
 961. See, e.g., E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 465–91 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing 
the various rule of law dealing with written contracts, including the integration of the 
agreement into written language, determining the meaning of contract terms, the merger of 
separate agreements into a single agreement, collateral agreements, invalidity, 
misrepresentation, reformation for mistake or fraud, and the requirements of burdens of 
coming forward with evidence and persuasion when parol evidence is offered in the context of 
a written agreement). 
 962. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–63 (1952); see also, supra note 644 
(discussion of Morissette applying the background assumption of state of mind for serious 
federal offenses); see supra note 90 ¶ 8 (principle of lenity and background assumptions of state 
of mind in serious federal criminal offenses and that knowledge of the law is not required). 
 963. MAX BLACK, THE LABYRINTH OF LANGUAGE 135 n.35 (1968). 
 964. CICERO, ACADEMICA 93 (Loeb 1951). 
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upon (24hours)). No amount of hand ringing over its presence will 
banish “vagueness” from the way we speak with each other in light 
of our ability to slice off with the concepts of natural language but a 
piece of the complex reality that we experience in common. We must 
learn to live with the sort of “vagueness” that is characteristic of 
natural language. 
¶7. Second, the Law of The Excluded Middle must be 
examined. It is well-illustrated by the classic Paradox of the Liar.965 
Assume that someone says, “I am now lying.” Is he speaking the 
truth, or not? If his statement is true, then he is lying and thus it is 
false; but if his statement is false, then he is not lying and hence it is 
true. If we suppose that the statement is either true or false, then we 
are forced to conclude that it is both true and false. But it cannot be 
both, for that would conflict with the Law of The Excluded Middle 
(between A (true) and -A (not true), no third area can be 
sandwiched). This law is one of the foundations of all thought, at 
least according to Aristotle.966 
¶8. The legal concept of “vagueness” is reflected in our earliest 
legal materials. At common law, the practice of courts was to refuse 
to enforce legislative acts that were “too uncertain.”967 Today, the 
concept of “vagueness” is embodied in various clauses of the 
Constitution. If a legislative enactment is “vague,” not in the sense 
of natural language “vagueness” (fuzzy edges), but in the 
constitutional sense (no core of meaning at all), it cannot be 
enforced. The doctrine is rooted in constitutional considerations 
relating to separations of powers under Article III968 and fair notice-
 
 965. See generally ANDRES WEDBERG, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 131–32 (1982). 
 966. Aristotle, in 8 GREAT BOOKS, supra note 130, at 531 (“There cannot be an 
intermediate between contradictories.”). 
 967. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 97. The English Privy Council also voided colonial “laws 
because they were carelessly written or so garbled as to be absurd.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEMAN, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 44 (1973). 
The classic analysis of the functions of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in the Supreme 
Court is Anthony Amsterdam, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. 
PA. L. REV. 67 (1960), which was an initialed student piece written by now Professor Anthony 
G. Amsterdam. It is typically cited by name by the Supreme Court, whose subsequent 
decisions reflect Professor Amsterdam’s brilliant work. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit Inc. v. Dallas, 
390 U.S. 676, 685 n.11 (1968) (“not suitable for young person” not definitely defined under 
First Amendment for crime; “vague standards, unless narrowed by interpretation, encourage 
erratic administration . . .” (citing Amsterdam, supra)). 
 968. U.S. CONST. art. III. In the nineteenth century, the issue tended to be put as a 
matter of kind; in the twentieth century, the issue is generally seen as a matter of degree. 
BLAKEY ENTIRE FIN 11/15/2002 7:39 PM 
829] Threats, Free Speech, and Jurisprudence 
 1119 
adequate guidelines under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.969 
¶9. Vagueness may infect the class of persons within the 
statute,970 to the conduct that is made unlawful,971 or to the sanction 
to be imposed for a violation.972 Conduct may not be made criminal, 
the Court holds, under a “statute sweeping in a great variety of 
conduct under a general and indefinite characterization and leaving 
to the executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion in its  
application.”973 “[A]scertainable standards of guilt” are,  
 
Compare United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220–21 (1875), with United States v. Evans, 
333 U.S. 483, 468–87 (1948). Justice Holmes put it well for the modern mind: “Most 
differences are [only one of degree] when nicely analyzed.” Rideout v. Knou, 19 N.E. 390, 
392 (Mass. 1889). Justice Cardozo’s point needs to be made, too. See Sweeting v. America 
Knife Co., 123 N.E. 82, 83 (N.Y. 1919) (Cardozo, J.) (“Lawmakers framing legislation must 
deal with general tendencies. The average and not the exceptional case determines the fitness 
of the remedy.”), aff’d, 250 U.S. 596 (1919). 
 969. See, e.g., Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 230 (1951) (The Court found that a 
“crime involving moral turpitude” within immigration act for deportation definite under 
criminal standard as applied to conspiracy to defraud. “The essential purpose of the ‘void-for-
vagueness’ doctrine is to warn individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct. . . . 
[C]riminal statutes which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is 
done are . . . deprivations of due process of law.” (citing Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 
(1939))). The corollary of fair notice to the defendant is the requirement of a guiding standard 
for law enforcement. Indeed, “the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine ‘is not 
actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine—the requirement that a 
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.’” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 358–59 (1983). See generally, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984) 
(The Court held that the human rights act prohibiting exclusion of women was not vague or 
over broad. “The void-for-vagueness doctrine . . . requires that the government articulate its 
aims with a reasonable degree of clarity[,] ensures that state power will be exercised only on 
behalf of policies reflecting an authoritative choice among competing social values, reduces the 
danger of caprice and discrimination of the administration of the laws, enable[s] individuals to 
conform their conduct to the requirements of law, and permits meaningful judicial review.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 970. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 453. 
 971. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509, 519 (1948). 
 972. United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 435, 486–87 (1948). But see United States v. 
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124–25 (1979) (vagueness not present where two statutes—each 
with a different penalty—apply, since defendant knows the maximum, and no more doubt is 
present than when a statute permits alternative punishments). 
 973. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (common law offense of breach 
of peace void for vagueness under First Amendment as applied to peaceful distribution of 
religious tracts). A broad statute is not made vague, however, merely because conduct not 
previously adjudicated to be within it—an unresolved possible interpretation—is held to violate 
it, absent some previous indication the conduct might be outside its scope, since the defendant 
had notice his conduct might be within the statute. Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50–53 (1975) 
(“crime against nature” definite as applied for crime of forcible cunnilingus). But an 
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therefore, required.974 
¶10. Nevertheless, constitutional vagueness is, like natural 
language vagueness, a question of degree. “Condemned to the use 
of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our 
language.”975 Accordingly, “the Constitution does not require 
impossible standards.”976 “[T]he law is full of instances where a 
man’s fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury 
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree.”977 Vagueness is 
not established simply because it is difficult to determine if certain 
marginal978 or hypothetical979 cases fall within a statute. 
 
unforeseeable judicial enlargement, which raises the specter of retroactive lawmaking, of a 
criminal statute, narrow and precise on its face, violates the Due Process Clause. Bowie v. 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964). 
 974. Winters, 333 U.S. at 515; Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 392 
(1926). 
 975. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). 
 976. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1948). The constitutional doctrine of 
vagueness “is not a principle designed to convert into a constitutional dilemma the practical 
difficulties in drawing criminal statutes both general enough to take into account a variety of 
human conduct and sufficiently specific to provide fair warning that certain kinds of conduct 
are prohibited.” Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972); see United States v. Lanier, 
520 U.S. 259, 267–71 (1997) (“constitution” in civil rights statute is not impermissibly vague 
where applied in criminal prosecution for assault and coerced sexual battery by state judge; 
particulars may be defined by court of appeal; permissible application if distinctions give 
reasonable warning; no conflict between prosecution to uphold one right that presses on the 
domain of another right). 
 977. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (Holmes, J.) (parallels to criminal 
homicide and its various decrees support unduly restricting competition under judicial 
construction of Sherman Act definite for crime).  
The mere fact that a penal statute is so framed as to require a jury upon occasion to 
determine a question of reasonableness is not sufficient to make it too vague to 
afford a practical guide to permissible conduct. 
  . . . . 
[S]tatutory provision [for willful tax evasion is not] . . . a trap for those who act in 
good faith. A mind intent upon willful evasion is inconsistent with surprised 
innocence. 
United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 523–24 (1942) (not “reasonable” allowance for salaries 
definite for crime of “willfully,” i.e., in bad faith, engaging in tax evasion (citing Nash, 229 
U.S. 373)). 
 978. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92, 93–94 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.) (The Court 
ruled that mailing “firearms capable of being concealed on the person” applied to sawed-off 
shotgun definite for crime. “‘[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First 
Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts’ . . . . While doubts as to the 
applicability of the language in marginal fact situations may be conceived . . . the statute gave 
respondent adequate warning [about the shotgun] . . . .” (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 
419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) and citing Nash, 229 U.S. 373 (matter of degree permissible) and 
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (could have drafted clearer not determinative))). 
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¶11. Aspects of the constitutional vagueness jurisprudence 
produce intellectual conundrums like the Liar’s Paradox. 980 No 
statute may, of course, be read in isolation. Gloss is a crucial part of 
it.981 Gloss includes constitutional doctrine.982 Accordingly, all 
statutes must be read in light of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. A 
statute’s validity also depends on the application of the doctrine to 
the statute. But the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which determines 
the statute’s validity, is itself “indefinite.”983 Accordingly, all statutes, 
like the doctrine itself, are “indefinite.” As such, the doctrine is self-
contradictory. 
¶12. Obviously, “nonsense” is to be avoided in resolving both 
the classic Liar’s Paradox and in applying the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine. In short, legal language, like natural language, contains an 
irreducible degree of vagueness.984 But lines must be drawn.985 As 
Justice Holmes noted, only a “tyro thinks to puzzle you by asking 
where you are going to draw the line,” as if the question itself were a 
valid objection to the need to draw a line or to the possibility of 
drawing it.986  Despite vagueness, communication occurs—at least for 
most practical purposes, legal and otherwise. “The law is 
administered,” as Justice Holmes said, “by able and experienced 
men, who know too much to sacrifice good sense to a syllogism.”987  
[W]e [are] entitled to incorporate, in a language containing vague 
terms . . . the Law of the Excluded Middle . . . [but s]ince vague 
terms occur in all regions of speech, with the possible exception of 
pure logic and mathematics . . . when we do it we [are justified 
only if we recognize that] we anticipate a precise formulation of the 
 
 979. United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954). 
 980. WEDBERG, supra note 965, at 132. 
 981. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514–15 (1948) (“construction fixes 
meaning”). 
 982. Dennis v. United States, 314 U.S. 494, 508–09 (1954) (clear and present danger 
test read into Smith Act). 
 983. Winters, 333 U.S. at 524 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
 984. See generally Max Black, Reasoning with Loose Concepts, 1 DIALOGUE 1–2 (1963–
64). 
 985. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926) (Holmes, J.) (“[T]he great 
body of the law consists in drawing such lines . . . .”); Dominion Hotel v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 
265, 269 (1919) (Holmes, J.) (“If . . . the distinction is justifiable, . . . the fact that some cases 
. . . are very near to the line, makes it none the worse.”). 
 986. Holmes, supra note 178 ¶ 7, at 232–33 (1921). 
 987. Id. at 32. 
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terms of our language which has not yet been, and most probably 
never will be, carried out.988  
To avoid nonsense, therefore, the void-for-vagueness doctrine must 
be applied only in a principled fashion. 
¶13. The question, of course, is always which principle. One 
principle—at least—ought to be beyond the pale: individual 
expediency.989 The application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
ought to turn on more than either dry logic or expediency. Neutral 
principles are required.990 A particular result must not be merely 
pleasing to “those . . . among us who, vouching no philosophy to 
warrant, frankly or covertly make the test of virtue in interpretation 
whether its result in the immediate decision seems to hinder or 
advance the interest or the values they support.”991 
¶14. The test for constitutional vagueness is usually framed in 
terms of the perspective of “men of common intelligence,”992 person 
of “ordinary intelligence,”993 or the “average man.”994 On the other 
hand, “such language cannot be accepted at face value.”995 In fact, 
words may be definite if they have well-settled common law 
 
 988. WEDBERG, supra note 965, at 135. 
 989. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) 
(The Supreme Court ought not “sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to 
considerations of individual expediency.”). 
 990. Wechsler, supra note 7, at 11 (“criteria that can be framed and tested as an exercise 
of reason and not merely as an act of willfulness or will”). 
 991. Id. 
 992. See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 386, 391 (1926). 
 993. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 501 
(1982). 
 994. Cline v. Frank Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 464 (1972). The test for vagueness is, of 
course, different in a purely civil context, where conduct inconsistent with the standard of the 
statute does not warrant the imposition of a criminal penalty. See, e.g., National Endowment 
for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998) (Awards of financial support may be 
limited by “considerations of decency” and the “diverse beliefs and values of the American 
people”; facial challenge on First Amendment ground rejected without a showing of a 
substantial risk of suppression of free expression; “although the First Amendment certainly has 
application in the subsidy context, we note that the Government may allocate competitive 
funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were direct regulation of speech or a 
criminal penalty at stake.”); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864–69 (1997) 
(Communications Decency Act of 1996 designed to protect children under eighteen from 
“indecent transmissions” and “patently offensive display” over the Internet abridges First 
Amendment freedoms; the vagueness of undefined terms in content-based regulations 
enforced with criminal penalties raises First Amendment concerns because of the chilling effect 
on free speech). 
 995. LAFAVE, supra note 56, at 92. 
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meaning996 or if they would be clear to any of a more narrow class of 
persons to whom they are directed.997 Statutes are read not merely 
on their face, but in light of “limiting construction.”998 Less clear 
notice is required when the person engages in commercial activity999 
or acts with mens rea.1000 
¶15. Apart from First Amendment considerations,1001 statutes are 
judged in light of the defendant’s conduct.1002 If he “engages in 
some conduct that is clearly proscribed[, he] cannot complain of the 
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”1003 “The 
rationale is evident: to sustain such a challenge, the complainant 
must prove that the enactment is vague . . . ‘in the sense that no 
standard of conduct is specified at all.’ . . . Such a provision simply 
 
 996. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391 (citing Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913)). 
 997. Id. (citing Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925) (“Kosher” 
meat)). 
 998. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 
U.S. 489 (1982)). 
 999. Id. at 359 n.8 (citing Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489); Hygrade Provision 
Co., 266 U.S. at 502. To be sure, commercial speech may be protected by the First 
Amendment, but the “State may deal effectively with false, deceptive, or misleading sales 
techniques. The State may also prohibit commercial speech related to illegal behavior.” Bolger 
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (prohibition of mailing contraceptive 
advertisement contravenes First Amendment). 
 1000. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 (“a scienter requirement may mitigate a 
law’s vagueness”); United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 523–24 (1942); Hygrade Provision 
Co., 266 U.S. at 501 (intent to defraud) (“not required to act at their peril, but only to 
exercise their judgment in food faith”). Vagueness is thus compounded by strict liability. 
Colaotti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392–97 (1979). 
 1001. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 (citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 
U.S. 544 (1975)); see supra note 137 (discussing different standards in different areas of the 
law, including the First Amendment). 
 1002. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 (citing Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544); see 
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988) (Absent First Amendment considerations, 
statutes are judged “in light of the facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as 
applied basis.” (citing United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975)); Schall v. Martin, 467 
U.S. 253, 268 n.18 (1984) (“outside the limited First Amendment context, a criminal statute 
may not be attacked as overbroad”). 
While facial attacks under the First Amendment may be entertained, they do not 
necessarily result in holdings of facial unconstitutionality; the “normal rule . . . [of] partial, 
rather than facial . . . [invalidity] is the required course.” Brochett v. Spokane Arcades Inc., 
472 U.S. 491, 503–04 (1985). 
 1003. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 (citing Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 550) 
(“Indian” and “community” definite for crime in context of liquor distribution. “It is well-
established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment 
freedom must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand.”). 
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has no core.”1004 Accordingly, for example, statutes are upheld 
prohibiting the coercion of employers to hire “unneeded” 
employees,1005 forbidding undue or unreasonable “restraint of 
trade,”1006 making it unlawful to build fires “near” any forest or 
inflammable material,1007 banning the receipt of contributions by 
members of Congress from federal employees for any “political 
purpose,”1008 copying of documents connected with “national 
defense,”1009 excessive charges in connection with loans except for 
“ordinary fees,”1010 and misstatement of the contents of packages, 
subject to “reasonable variations.”1011 
¶16. Today the void-for-vagueness doctrine’s scope, rationale, 
and function in Supreme Court jurisprudence are well-settled. Once 
it was used along with now-discredited Substantive Due Process 
reasoning to strike down economic regulation.1012 Now the Supreme 
 
 1004. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. 566 (1974)) (citations omitted). 
 1005. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 1006. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). 
 1007. United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264 (1927). 
 1008. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930). 
 1009. Corin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941) (with intent to injure United States or 
advantage a foreign nation). 
 1010. Kay v. United States, 303 U.S. 1 (1938). 
 1011. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932). Four basic 
assumptions are integral in any principled effort to interpret a statute: 
(1) legislative supremacy within the constitutional framework; 
(2) the use of the statutory vehicle to exercise that supremacy; 
(3) reliance on accepted means of communication; and 
(4) reasonable availability of the statutory vehicle to those to be governed by it, not 
only its text, but any other part of its legislative context that serves to give it 
meaning. 
DICKERSON, supra note 937, at 7–12. 
More than one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court noted, “It is easy, by very 
ingenious and astute construction, to evade the force of almost any statute, where a court is so 
disposed . . . .[By] such a construction [it is possible to annul it and render] it superfluous and 
useless.” Pillow v. Roberts, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 472, 476 (1851) (Grier, J.). Such an approach 
to statutory construction, however, carries with it a heavy price. After a lifetime of study of the 
law, Dean Roscoe Pound concluded that such construction (1) “tend[ed] to bring law into 
disrespect; (2) . . . subject[ed] the courts to political pressure; [and] (3) . . . invite[d] an 
arbitrary personal element in judicial administration.” 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 
488 (1959). It threatened, he found, to make all “law . . . worth little” and to “break down” 
the “legal order” itself. Id. at 490. 
 1012. Amsterdam, supra note 967, at 74 n.38 (“The void-for-vagueness doctrine was born 
in the reign of substantive due process and throughout that epoch was successfully urged 
exclusively in cases in regulatory or economic-control legislation.”). John Austin argues in his 
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Court uses it principally to protect First Amendment freedoms and 
to circumscribe police discretion in the enforcement of legislation 
designed to give to the police the power to control the public 
streets.1013 It is not often used to strike down general criminal 
legislation, particularly in the economic area, or where such 
legislation applies only to those who have to act with an appropriate 
state of mind and whose conduct is judged on an “as applied” basis. 
 
HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 94–108 (2d ed. 1975) that “statements” may be analyzed 
as “acts”: what is said (“locutionary” act), meant (“illocutionary” act), and done 
(“perlocutionary” act), or “say,” “mean,” and “do.” These early Supreme Court decisions said 
they were about “vagueness,” but they were in fact about other issues, which are what they 
meant, and that which was done. Decisions ought to be more candid about their holdings and 
their rationales. “Say,” “mean,” and “do” should be isomorphic. 
 1013. See generally Anthony Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the 
Punishment of Crime of Status Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police 
Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 216–33 (1967); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 
U.S. 41 (1998) (Gang Congregation Ordinance of Chicago too broad and fails to provide 
minimal guidelines to enforcement personnel; it may be attacked on its face, since it covers the 
“liberty interest” of the “freedom to loiter”; it does not attack a business interest with a 
provision for scienter, nor does it have a mens rea requirement). 
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APPENDIX C 
THE SPEECH OF CHARLES EVERS1014 
Thank you very much. We want our white friends here to know 
what we tell them happens to be so. Thank you for having the 
courage to walk down those streets with us. We thank you for letting 
our white brethren know that guns and bullets ain’t gonna stop us. 
(No) (No) We thank you for letting our white brothers know that 
Port Gibson ain’t none of their town. (Amen) (Applause) That Port 
Gibson is all of our town. (Applause) That black folks, red folks, 
Chinese and Japanese alike (Yeah) (That’s right.), that we are going 
to have our share. (Yeah, we are.) . . . 
We are going to beat you because we know you can’t trick us no 
more. (yea) You are not going to be able to fool us by getting 
somebody to give us a drink of whiskey no more. (Applause) You 
ain’t gonna be able to fool us by somebody giving us a few dollars 
no more. (Applause) We are gonna take your money and drink with 
you and then we’re gonna (Applause) vote against you. Then we are 
going to elect a sheriff in this county and a sheriff that is responsible, 
that won’t have to run and grab the telephone and call up the blood-
thirsty highway patrol when he gets ready (Yeah) to come in and 
beat innocent folks down to the ground for no cause. (That’s right) 
(Applause) (Boo) We are going to elect a sheriff that can call his 
deputies and represent black leaders in the community and stop 
whatever problem there is. (Yeah) (That’s right.) 
Then we are going to do more than that. The white merchants 
of this town are so wrapped up in the power structure here, since 
you love your Police Department so well, since you support them so 
well (Yeah), we are going to let them buy your dirty clothes and 
your filthy, rotten groceries. 
Oh, no, white folks, we ain’t going to shoot you with no bullet. 
(That’s right.) We are going to shoot you with our ballots and with 
our bucks. (Yea) (That’s right.) We are going to take away from you 
the thing that you have had over us all these years. (Yeah) Political 
power and economic power. While you kill our brothers and our 
sisters and rape our wives and our friends. (Yeah) You’re guilty. 
 
 1014. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 934–40 (1982) (portions of 
Charles Evers’s speech given on April 19, 1969, quoted in the appendix to the Court’s 
opinion). 
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You’re guilty because you don’t care a thing about anybody. (Yes.) 
And when you go and let a big, black burly nigger like you get on 
the police force (Yea) go down and grab another black brother’s arm 
and hold it while a white racist stole him from us, and he’s a liar if he 
says he didn’t hold him. . . . 
We mean what we are saying. We are not playing. (Right) We 
better not even think one of us is black. You better not even be 
caught near one of these stores. (Applause) 
We don’t want you caught in Piggly-Wiggly. You remember how 
he grinned at us four years ago? (Yeah) You know how when he took 
office he grinned at us? (Yeah) He ain’t hired nobody yet. (That’s 
right) (No) And you know old Jitney Jungle down there with those 
funny letters down on the end? (That’s right) (Applause) He haven’t 
hired nobody in there yet. (No) Do you know poor ole M & M or 
whatever it stands for, mud and mush, I guess. (Applause) They’re 
out here on the highway and they haven’t hired none of us yet. 
Do you know Ellis who had a part-time boy all his life? He ain’t 
hired nobody, is he, yet? (No) Then we got ole Stampley, and 
ninety-nine and three-fourths of his sales are black folks business. He 
got the nerve to tell me he ain’t gonna put no nigger ringing his 
cash register. I got news for you, Brother Stampley. You can ring it 
your damn self. (Extra loud applause.) I want some of you fat cats 
after this meeting who wants three of our young boys who ain’t 
a’scar’d of white folks (Applause) (Me) and we want you that’s 
willing to follow the rules now to go down by Brother Stampley’s 
and serve notice on him with our placards that we ain’t coming no 
more. 
Then we are going to tell all the young men that drive Piggly-
Wiggly trucks now (Yeah) (Be careful, Son.) because the soul 
brothers and the spirit is watching you. (Extra loud applause.) 
All right, Brother Wolf, you’re next. (Applause) We got a couple 
of ‘em to come down by Brother Wolf’s. We mean business, white 
folks. We ain’t gonna shoot you all, we are going to hit you where it 
hurts most. (In the pocketbook) (Applause) In the pocketbook and in 
the ballot box. (Applause) We may as well tell our friends at Alcorn to 
stay away from up here. (Yea) Now, you say, ‘What’s wrong with you 
niggers?’ I’ll tell you what is wrong with us niggers; We are tired of 
you white folks, you racists and you bigots mistreating us. (Yeah) We 
are tired of paying you to deny us the right to even exist. (Tell’em 
about it.) And we ain’t coming back, white folks. (We ain’t.) 
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You all put a curfew on us at eight o’clock tonight. We are going 
to do you better than that. We are going to leave at one-thirty. 
(Loud applause) We are going to leave at one-thirty and we ain’t 
coming back, white folks. . . . 
We are going to have Brother McCay; we are going to have our 
newly elected mayor who we elected, we are going to have him 
around here, too. Come on back, my dear friend. He say, “Naw, 
brother, we ain’t coming.” “Have you got rid of all those bigots you 
got on your police force?” “No.” “Have you hired Negroes in all 
them stores?” “No.” “Well, we ain’t coming back.” (Right) That’s 
all we gonna do. You know, what they don’t realize is you put on 
this curfew, that is all we needed. Let me just give them some 
instructions. We are going to buy gas only from the Negro-owned 
service stations. We agreed on it, remember? Now, don’t back upon 
your agreement. (Yea) I don’t care how many Negroes working on 
it, that’s too bad. We are going only to Negro-owned service 
stations. And we are going only—the only time you will see us 
around on this street, now listen good, you are going to Lee’s 
Grocery and other stores on this end. Is that clear? (Yeah) 
(Applause) 
We don’t want to go to none of them drugstores. They get us 
confused. Now, who am I going to get my medicine from? Let us 
know in time and we will be glad to furnish a car free to carry you 
anywhere you have to go to get a prescription filled. You can’t beat 
this. (No) It won’t cost you a dime. You go to any of the local black 
businessmen and tell them you have got to go to Vicksburg to get 
your stuff. And then if they don’t carry you, let us know. We’ll take 
care of them later. (Applause) Now, you know, we have got a little 
song that says, “This is your thing, do what you want to do.” 
(Applause) This is our thing, let’s do what we want to do with it. 
Let’s make sure now—if you be disobedient now you are going to be 
in trouble. Remember that, now, listen. Listen good. They are going 
to start saying, “You know what, Evers is down there with his goon 
squad, . . .” Now, we know Claiborne County,—“with his goon 
squad harassing poor ole niggers.” 
Well, good white folks you have been harassing us all our lives. 
(Applause) And if we decided to harass you that’s our business. 
(That’s right) They are our children and we are going to discipline 
them the way we want to. Now, be sure you get all this right on all 
these tape recorders. Whatever I say on this trip I will say it in 
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Jackson. (Amen) (Glory) And I will say it in Washington and New 
York. White folks ain’t gonna never control us no more. 
(Applause) . . .  
Now, my dear friends, the white folks have got the message. I 
hope you have got the message and tell every one of our black 
brothers until all these people are gone, you voted on this in the 
church, don’t let me down, and don’t let yourself down. We agreed 
in the church that we would vacate this town until they have met 
those requests, the white folks don’t demand nothing out of us. All 
right, white folks, we are just saying until you decide when you want 
to do these little things we beg of you, we are not coming back. (No 
way) 
None of us better not be caught up here. (Yea) I don’t care how 
old you are, I don’t care how sick you are, I don’t care how crazy 
you are, you better not be caught on these streets shopping in these 
stores until these demands are met. (Applause) 
Now, let’s get together. Are you for this or against it? (Applause) 
(For it.) Remember you voted this. We intend to enforce it. You 
needn’t go calling the chief of police, he can’t help you none. You 
needn’t go calling the sheriff, he can’t help you none. (That’s right.) 
He ain’t going to offer to sleep with none of us men, I can tell you 
that. (Applause) Let’s don’t break our little rules that you agreed 
upon here . . . . 
Let’s go to the funeral of our young son whenever the funeral is. 
I don’t want you to come with hate because that is not going to 
solve our problems. (No hate.) We don’t want you to hate the white 
folks here in Port Gibson. That is not going to solve it. If you hate 
what they have done, I hate to get personal, I hate what they did so 
much to Medgar, (I know.) I ain’t going to ever stop hating them 
for that. But I am going to chase them in the way what I know is 
right and just. I am not going to lay out in the bushes and shoot no 
white folks. That’s wrong. I am not gonna go out here and bomb 
none of them’s home. (No) That’s not right. But I am going to do 
everything in my power to take away all the power, political power, 
legal power that they possess anywhere I live. We are going to 
compete against them. When we blacks learn to support and respect 
each other, then and not until then, will white folks respect us. 
(Applause) 
Now, you know I trust white folks and I mean every word I say. 
But it comes a time when we got to make up in our mind 
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individually, are we going to make those persons worthwhile. We 
done talked and raised all kind of sand all day here, now, what is 
really going to prove it, are we going to live up to what we have said? 
(Applause) Now if there is any one of us breaks what we agreed 
upon, you are just as guilty as that little trigger-happy, blood-thirsty 
rascal. (Tell ‘em about it.) . . . 
I go all over this country, and I ought not to tell you white folks 
this, and I tell other white folks that some day we are going to get 
together in Mississippi, black and white, and work out our problems. 
And we are ready to start whenever you are. If you are ready to start, 
we are. We ain’t going to let you push us, not one inch. (That’s 
right.) If you come on beating us, we are going to fight back. 
(Right) We got our understanding. We are all God’s children. The 
same man that brought you all here brought us. You could have 
been black just like we are. We could have been white and 
baldheaded just like you are. (Laughter) (Inaudible) We are going to 
work hard at this, Dan. We are going to be organized this time. We 
ain’t going to be bought off and talked off. We are going to elect the 
county sheriff here this next time that don’t need the highway patrol. 
Now, you see, Dan had a good chance to set himself up right, but he 
goofed it. He goofed. (Yeah) He blew it. (Laughter) Don’t forget 
that, heah. (Right) It brings back memories like you know you 
remember things we do. 
Now, if you don’t think it is necessary, we don’t have to go back 
to the church. If you want to go back there, we can. I want you to 
make sure here that we are going to leave this town to our white 
brothers and we ain’t coming back no more until all our requests 
have been met. Is that the common consent of all of you here? 
(Applause) (Let’s go back to the church.) All right. Are we willing to 
make sure that everyone of us will be sure that none of the rest of 
our black brothers violate our . . . (Yea) We are all saying it now. 
Let’s not say it now so much on my part. You know, I’m just sort of 
leading, you know, how these lawyers are, leading our folks on to say 
what has to be said. And that’s the case. Let’s make us a white town. 
We would like for you to start it. Be courteous now. Don’t mistreat 
nobody. Tell them, in a nice forceful way, the curfew is going to be 
on until they do what we ask them. 
 
